




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
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# HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION  
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,

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IN TWELVE VOLUMES.—VOL. XI.


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Illustrating the Battle of Issus

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# HISTORY OF GREECE.

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## PART II.

### CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

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#### CHAPTER LXXXVI.

##### CENTRAL GREECE: THE ACCESSION OF PHILIP OF MACEDON TO THE BIRTH OF ALEXANDER, 359—356 B. C.

MY last preceding chapters have followed the history of the Sicilian Greeks through long years of despotism, suffering, and impoverishment, into a period of renovated freedom and comparative happiness, accomplished under the beneficent auspices of Timoleon, between 344—336 B. C. It will now be proper to resume the thread of events in Central Greece, at the point where they were left at the close of the eightieth chapter—the accession of Philip of Macedon in 360—359 B. C. The death of Philip took place in 336 B. C.; and the closing years of his life will bring before us the last struggles of full Hellenic freedom; a result standing in melancholy contrast with the achievements of the contemporary liberator Timoleon in Sicily.

No such struggles could have appeared within the limits of possibility, even to the most far-sighted politician either of Greece or of Macedon—at the time when Philip mounted the throne. Among the hopes and fears of most Grecian cities, Macedonia then passed wholly unnoticed; in Athens, Olynthus, Thasus, Thessaly, and a few others, it formed an item not without moment, yet by no means of first-rate magnitude.

**B.C. 360-359.**  
**State of**  
**Central**  
**Greece in**  
**360-359 B.C.**  
**Degrada-**  
**tion of**  
**Sparta.**

The Hellenic world was now in a state different from anything which had been seen since the repulse of Xerxes in 480—479 B.C. The defeat and degradation of Sparta had set free the inland states from the only presiding city whom they had ever learned to look up to. Her imperial ascendancy, long possessed and grievously abused, had been put down by the successes of Epaminondas and the Thebans. She was no longer the head of a numerous body of subordinate allies, sending deputies to her periodical synods—submitting their external politics to her influence—placing their military contingents under command of her officers (xenagi)—and even administering their internal government through oligarchies devoted to her purposes, with the reinforcement, wherever needed, of a Spartan harmost and garrison. She no longer found on her northern frontier a number of detached Arcadian villages, each separately manageable under leaders devoted to her, and furnishing her with hardy soldiers; nor had she the friendly city of Tegea, tied to her by a long-standing philo-Laconian oligarchy and tradition. Under the strong revolution of feeling which followed on the defeat of the Spartans at Leuktra, the small Arcadian communities, encouraged and guided by Epaminondas, had consolidated themselves into the great fortified city of Megalopolis, now the centre of a Pan-Arcadian confederacy, with a synod (called the Ten Thousand) frequently assembled there to decide upon matters of interest and policy common to the various sections of the Arcadian name. Tegea too had undergone a political revolution; so that these two cities, conterminous with each other and forming together the northern frontier of Sparta, converted her Arcadian neighbours from valuable instruments into formidable enemies.

But this loss of foreign auxiliary force and dignity was not the worst which Sparta had suffered. On her north-western frontier (conterminous also with Megalopolis) stood the newly-constituted city of Messênê, representing an amputation of nearly one-half of Spartan territory and substance. The western and more fertile half of Laconia had been severed from Sparta, and was divided between Messênê and various other independent cities; being tilled chiefly by those who had once been Periœki and Helots of Sparta.

In the phase of Grecian history on which we are now about to enter—when the collective Hellenic world, for the first time since the invasion of Xerxes, was about to be thrown upon its defence against a foreign enemy from Macedonia—this altered position of Sparta was a circumstance of grave moment. Not only were the Peloponnesians disunited, and deprived of their common chief; but Megalopolis and Messênê, knowing the intense hostility of Sparta against them—and her great superiority of force, even reduced as she was, to all that they could muster—lived in perpetual dread of her attack. Their neighbours the Argeians, standing enemies of Sparta, were well-disposed to protect them; but such aid was insufficient for their defence, without extra-Peloponnesian alliance. Accordingly we shall find them leaning upon the support either of Thebes or of Athens, whichever could be had; and ultimately even welcoming the arms of Philip of Macedon, as protector against the inexorable hostility of Sparta. Elis—placed in the same situation with reference to Triphylia, as Sparta with reference to Messênê—complained that the Triphylians, whom she looked upon as subjects, had been admitted as freemen into the Arcadian federation. We shall find Sparta endeavouring to engage Elis in political combinations, intended to ensure, to both, the recovery of lost dominion.<sup>1</sup> Of these combinations more will be said hereafter; at present I merely notice the general fact that the degradation of Sparta, combined with her perpetually menaced aggression against Messênê and Arcadia, disorganised Peloponnesus, and destroyed its powers of Pan-hellenic defence against the new foreign enemy now slowly arising.

The once powerful Peloponnesian system was in fact completely broken up. Corinth, Sikyon, Phlius, B.C. 360-359. Trœzen, and Epidaurus, valuable as secondary Corinth, Sikyon, &c. states and as allies of Sparta, were now detached from all political combination, aiming only to keep clear, each for itself, of all share in collision between Sparta and Thebes.<sup>2</sup> It would appear also that Corinth had recently been oppressed and disturbed by the temporary despotism

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, *Orat. pro Megalopolit.* p. 203, 204. s. 6-10; p. 206. s. 13—and indeed the whole Oration,

which is an instructive exposition of policy.

<sup>2</sup> Xen. *Hellen.* vii. 4, 6, 10.

of Timophanês, described in my last chapter; though the date of that event cannot be precisely made out.

But the grand and preponderating forces of Hellas now resided, for the first time in our history, *Comparatively good condition of Athens.* without, and not within, Peloponnesus; at Athens and Thebes. Both these cities were in full vigour and efficiency. Athens had a numerous fleet, a flourishing commerce, a considerable body of maritime and insular allies, sending deputies to her synod and contributing to a common fund for the maintenance of the joint security. She was by far the greatest maritime power in Greece. I have recounted in preceding chapters, how her general Timotheus had acquired for her the important island of Samos, together with Pydna, Methônê, and Potidæa, in the Thermaic Gulf; how he failed (as Iphikratês had failed before him) in more than one attempt upon Amphipolis; how he planted Athenian conquest and settlers in the Thracian Chersonese; which territory, after having been attacked and endangered by the Thracian prince Kotys, was regained by the continued efforts of Athens in the year 358 B.C. Athens had sustained no considerable loss, during the struggles which ended in the pacification after the battle of Mantinea; and her condition appears on the whole to have been better than it had ever been since her disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The power of Thebes also was imposing and formidable. *Power of Thebes.* She had indeed lost many of those Peloponnesian allies who formed the overwhelming array of Epaminondas, when he first invaded Laconia, under the fresh anti-Spartan impulse immediately succeeding the battle of Leuktra. She retained only Argos, together with Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messênê. The three last added little to her strength, and needed her watchful support; a price which Epaminondas had been perfectly willing to pay for the establishment of a strong frontier against Sparta. But the body of extra-Peloponnesian allies grouped round Thebes was still considerable;<sup>1</sup> the Phokians

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23; vii. 5, 4. Diodor. xv. 62. The Akarnanians had been allies of Thebes at the time of the first expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus; whether they remained so at the time of his last expedition, is

not certain. But as the Theban ascendancy over Thessaly was much greater at the last of those two periods than at the first, we may be sure that they had not lost their hold upon the Lokrians and Malians, who (as well as the Pho-

and Lokrians, the Malians, the Herakleots, most of the Thesalians, and most (if not all) of the inhabitants of Eubœa; perhaps also the Akarnanians. The Phokians were indeed reluctant allies, disposed to circumscribe their obligations within the narrowest limits of mutual defence in case of invasion: and we shall presently find the relations between the two becoming positively hostile. Besides these allies, the Thebans possessed the valuable position of Orôpus, on the north-eastern frontier of Attica; a town which had been wrested from Athens six years before, to the profound mortification of the Athenians.

But over and above allies without Bœotia, Thebes had prodigiously increased the power of her city within Bœotia. She had appropriated to herself the territories of Plataea and Thespiæ on her southern frontier, and of Koroneia and Orchomenus near upon her northern; by conquest and partial expulsion of their prior inhabitants. How and when these acquisitions had been brought about, has been already explained:<sup>1</sup> here I merely recall the fact, to appreciate the position of Thebes in 359 B.C.—That these four towns, having been in 372 B.C. autonomous—joined with her only by the definite obligations of the Bœotian confederacy—and partly even in actual hostility against her—had now lost their autonomy with their free citizens, and had become absorbed into her property and sovereignty. The domain of Thebes thus extended across Bœotia from the frontiers of Phokis<sup>2</sup> on the north-west to the frontiers of Attica on the south.

The new position thus acquired by Thebes in Bœotia, purchased at the cost of extinguishing three or four autonomous cities, is a fact of much moment in reference to the period now before us; not simply because it swelled the power and pride of the Thebans themselves; but also because it raised a strong body of unfavourable sentiment against them in the Hellenic mind. Just at the time when the Spartans had lost nearly one-half of Laconia, the Thebans had annexed to their own city one-third of the free Bœotian territory. The revival of free Messenian

Extinction of the free cities of Bœotia by the Thebans—repugnant to Grecian feeling.

kians) lay between Bœotia and Thessaly.

<sup>1</sup> See Chaps. LXXVII., LXXVIII., and LXXX.

<sup>2</sup> Orchomenus was conterminous with the Phokian territory (Pausanias, ix. 39, 1).

citizenship, after a suspended existence of more than two centuries, had recently been welcomed with universal satisfaction. How much would that same feeling be shocked when Thebes extinguished, for her own aggrandizement, four autonomous communities, all of her own Bœotian kindred—one of these communities too being Orchomenus, respected both for its antiquity and its traditional legends! Little pains were taken to canvass the circumstances of the case, and to inquire whether Thebes had exceeded the measure of rigour warranted by the war-code of the time. In the patriotic and national conceptions of every Greek, Hellas consisted of an aggregate of autonomous, fraternal, city-communities. The extinction of any one of these was like the amputation of a limb from the organized body. Repugnance towards Thebes, arising out of these proceedings, affected strongly the public opinion of the time, and manifests itself especially in the language of Athenian orators, exaggerated by mortification on account of the loss of Orôpus.<sup>1</sup>

The great body of Thessalians, as well as the Magnetes and the Phthiot Achæans, were among those subject to the ascendancy of Thebes. Even the powerful and cruel despot, Alexander of Pheræ, was numbered in this catalogue.<sup>2</sup> The cities of fertile Thessaly, possessed by powerful oligarchies with numerous dependent serfs, were generally a prey to intestine conflict and municipal rivalry with each other; disorderly as well as faithless.<sup>3</sup> The Aleuadæ, chiefs at Larissa—and the Skopadæ, at Krannon—had been once the ascendent families

<sup>1</sup> Isokratês, Or. viii. De Pace, s. 21; Demosthenês adv. Leptinem, p. 490. s. 121; pro Megalopol. p. 208. s. 29; Philippic ii. p. 69. s. 15.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 5, 4; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35. Wachsmuth states, in my judgement, erroneously, that Thebes was disappointed in her attempt to establish ascendancy in Thessaly. (Hellenisch. Alterthümer, vol. ii. x. p. 338).

<sup>3</sup> Plato, Kriton, p. 53 D; Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 24; Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23; Demosth. cont. Aristokratem, p. 658, s. 133.

"Pergit ire (the Roman consul Quinctius Flaminius) in Thessaliam; ubi non liberandæ modo civitates erant, sed ex omni colluvione et confusione in aliquam tolerabilem formam redigendæ. Nec enim temporum modo vitiis, ac violentiâ et licentiâ regiâ (i. e. the Macedonian) turbati erant: sed inquieto etiam ingenio gentis, nec comitia, nec conventum, nec concilium ullum, non per seditionem et tumultum, jam inde a principio ad nostram usque ætatem, traducentis" (Livy, xxxiv. 51).

in the country. But in the hands of Lykophron and the energetic Jason, Pheræ had been exalted to the first rank. Under Jason as tagus (federal general), the whole force of Thessaly was united, together with a large number of circumjacent tributaries, Macedonian, Epirotic, Dolopian, &c., and a well-organized standing army of mercenaries besides. He could muster 8000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites, and peltasts or light infantry in numbers far more considerable.<sup>1</sup> A military power of such magnitude, in the hands of one alike able and aspiring, raised universal alarm, and would doubtless have been employed in some great scheme of conquest, either within or without Greece, had not Jason been suddenly cut off by assassination in 370 B.C., in the year succeeding the battle of Leuktra.<sup>2</sup> His brothers Polyphron and Polydorus succeeded to his position as tagus, but not to his abilities or influence. The latter, a brutal tyrant, put to death the former, and was in his turn slain, after a short interval, by a successor yet worse, his nephew Alexander, who lived and retained power at Pheræ, for about ten years (368-358 B.C.).

During a portion of that time Alexander contended with success against the Thebans, and maintained his ascendancy in Thessaly. But before the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C., he had been reduced into the condition of a dependent ally of Thebes, and had furnished a contingent to the army which marched under Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. During the year 362-361 B.C., he even turned his hostilities against Athens, the enemy of Thebes; carrying on a naval war against her, not without partial success, and damage to her commerce.<sup>3</sup> And as the foreign ascendancy of Thebes everywhere was probably impaired by the death of her great leader Epaminondas, Alexander of Pheræ recovered strength; continuing to be the greatest potentate in Thessaly, as well as the most sanguinary tyrant, until the time of his death in the beginning of 359 B.C.<sup>4</sup> He then perished,

Alexander  
of Pheræ—  
his cruel-  
ties—his as-  
sassination.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenes adv. Polyklem, p. 1207. s. 5, 6; Diodor. xv. 61-95. See Chap. LXXX.

<sup>4</sup> I concur with Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 359 B.C.,

and Appendix, c. 15) in thinking that this is the probable date of the assassination of Alexander of Pheræ; which event is mentioned by Diodorus (xvi. 14) under the year 357-356 B.C., yet in conjunction with a series of subsequent events,

in the vigour of age and in the fulness of power. Against oppressed subjects or neighbours he could take security by means of mercenary guards; but he was slain by the contrivance of his wife Thêbê and the act of her brothers:—a memorable illustration of the general position laid down by Xenophon, that the Grecian despot could calculate neither on security nor on affection anywhere, and that his most dangerous enemies were to be found among his own household or kindred.<sup>1</sup> The brutal life of Alexander, and the cruelty of his proceedings, had inspired his wife with mingled hatred and fear. Moreover she had learnt from words dropped in a fit of intoxication, that he was intending to put to death her brothers Tisiphonus, Pytholaus, and Lykophron—and along with them herself; partly because she was childless, and he had formed the design of re-marrying with the widow of the late despot Jason, who resided at Thebes. Accordingly Thêbê, apprising her brothers of their peril, concerted with them the means of assassinating Alexander. The bed-chamber which she shared with him was in an upper story, accessible only by a removeable staircase or ladder; at the foot of which there lay every night a fierce mastiff in chains, and a Thracian soldier tattooed after the fashion of his country. The whole house moreover was regularly occupied by a company of guards; and it is even said that the wardrobe and closets of Thêbê were searched every evening for concealed weapons. These numerous precautions of mistrust, however, were baffled by her artifice. She concealed her brothers during all the day in a safe adjacent hiding-place. At night, Alexander, coming to bed intoxicated, soon fell fast asleep; upon which Thêbê stole out of the room—directed the dog to be removed from the foot of the stairs,

and in a manner scarcely constraining us to believe that he meant to affirm the assassination itself as having actually taken place in that year.

To the arguments adduced by Mr. Clinton, another may be added, borrowed from the expression of Plutarch (Pelopidas, c. 35) ὀλίγον ὄρον. He states that the assassination of Alexander occurred “a little while” after the period when

the Thebans, avenging the death of Pelopidas, reduced that despot to submission. Now this reduction cannot be placed later than 363 B.C. That interval therefore which Plutarch calls “a little while,” will be three years, if we place the assassination in 359 B.C., six years, if we place it in 357-356 B.C. Three years is a more suitable interpretation of the words than six years.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hiero, i. 38; ii. 10; iii. 8.

under pretence that the despot wished to enjoy undisturbed repose—and then called her armed brothers. After spreading wool upon the stairs, in order that their tread might be noiseless, she went again up into the bed-room, and brought away the sword of Alexander, which always hung near him. Notwithstanding this encouragement, however, the three young men, still trembling at the magnitude of the risk, hesitated to mount the stair; nor could they be prevailed upon to do so, except by her distinct threat, that if they flinched, she would awaken Alexander and expose them. At length they mounted, and entered the bed-chamber, wherein a lamp was burning; while Thêbê, having opened the door for them, again closed it, and posted herself to hold the bar. The brothers then approached the bed; one seized the sleeping despot by the feet, another by the hair of his head, and the third with a sword thrust him through.<sup>1</sup>

After successfully and securely consummating this deed, popular on account of the odious character of the slain despot, Thêbê contrived to win over the mercenary troops, and to ensure the sceptre to herself and her eldest brother Tisiphonus. After this change, it would appear that the power of the new princes was not so great as that of Alexander had been, so that additional elements of weakness and discord were introduced into Thessaly. This is to be noted as one of the material circumstances paving the way for Philip of Macedon to acquire ascendancy in Greece—as will hereafter appear.

Tisiphonus  
despot at  
Phæræ—  
loss of  
power in the  
Phærean  
dynasty.

It was in the year 360-359 B.C., that Perdikkas, elder brother and predecessor of Philip on the throne of Macedonia, was slain, in the flower of his age. He perished, according to one account, in a bloody battle with the Illyrians, wherein 4000 Macedonians fell also; according to another statement, by the hands of assassins and the treacherous subornation of his mother Eurydikê.<sup>2</sup>

Macedon—  
reign and  
death of  
Perdikkas.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 36, 37; Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 35; Conon, ap. Photium, Narr. 50. Codex, 186; Cicero, de Offic. ii. 7. The details of the assassination, given in these authors, differ. I have principally followed Xenophon, and have ad-

mitted nothing positively inconsistent with his statements.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, vii. 5; Diodor. xvi. 2. The allusion in the speech of Philotas immediately prior to his execution (Curtius, vi. 43. p. 591, Mützell) supports the affirmation of

Of the exploits of Perdikkas during the five years of his reign we know little. He had assisted the Athenian general Timotheus in war against the Olynthian confederacy, and in the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Torônê, and other neighbouring places; while on the other hand he had opposed the Athenians in their attempt against Amphipolis, securing that important place by a Macedonian garrison, both against them and for himself. He was engaged in serious conflicts with the Illyrians.<sup>1</sup> It appears too that he was not without some literary inclinations—was an admirer of intellectual men, and in correspondence with Plato at Athens. Distinguished philosophers or sophists, like Plato and Isokratês, enjoyed renown, combined with a certain measure of influence, throughout the whole range of the Grecian world. Forty years before, Archelaus king of Macedonia had shown favour to Plato,<sup>2</sup> then a young man, as well as to his master Sokratês. Amyntas, the father both of Perdikkas and of Philip, had throughout his reign cultivated the friendship of leading Athenians, especially Iphikratês and Timotheus; the former of whom he had even adopted as his son; Aristotle, afterwards so eminent as a philosopher (son of Nikomachus the confidential physician of Amyntas<sup>3</sup>), had been for some time studying at Athens as a pupil of Plato; moreover Perdikkas during his reign had resident with him a friend of the philosopher—Euphræus of Oreus. Perdikkas lent himself much to the guidance of Euphræus, who directed him in the choice of his associates, and permitted none to be his guests except persons of studious habits; thus exciting much disgust among the military Macedonians.<sup>4</sup> It is a signal testimony to the reputation of Plato, that we find

Justin—that Perdikkas was assassinated.

<sup>1</sup> Antipater (the general of Philip and viceroy of his son Alexander in Macedonia) is said to have left an historical work, *Περδίκκου πράξεις Ἰλλυρικῆς* (Suidas, v. Ἀντίπατρος), which can hardly refer to any other Perdikkas than the one now before us.

<sup>2</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. Πλάτων, δὲ Σπεύσιππος φησι φίλτατον ὄντα Ἀρχελάῳ, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Diogenês Laërt. v. 1, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 506 E. p. 508 E. The fourth among the letters of Plato (alluded to by Diogenês Laërt. iii. 62) is addressed to Perdikkas, partly in recommendation and praise of Euphræus. There appears nothing to prove it to be spurious; but whether it be spurious or genuine, the fact that Plato corresponded with Perdikkas is sufficiently probable.

his advice courted, at one and the same time, by Dionysius the younger at Syracuse, and by Perdikkas in Macedonia.

On the suggestion of Plato, conveyed through Euphræus, Perdikkas was induced to bestow upon his own brother Philip a portion of territory or an appanage in Macedonia. In 368 B.C. (during the reign of Alexander elder brother of Perdikkas and Philip), Pelopidas had reduced Macedonia to partial submission, and had taken hostages for its fidelity; among which hostages was the youthful Philip, then about fifteen years of age. In this character Philip remained about two or three years at Thebes.<sup>1</sup> How or when he left that city, we cannot clearly make out. He seems to have returned to Macedonia after the murder of Alexander by Ptolemy Alorîtês; probably without opposition from the Thebans, since his value as a hostage was then diminished. The fact that he was confided (together with his brother Perdikkas) by his mother Eurydikê to the protection of the Athenian general Iphikratês,

<sup>1</sup> Justin, vi. 9; vii. 5. "Philippus obses triennio Thebis habitus," &c.

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26; Diodor. xv. 67; xvi. 2; and the copious note of Wesseling upon the latter passage. The two passages of Diodorus are not very consistent; in the latter, he states that Philip had been deposited at Thebes by the Illyrians, to whom he had been made over as a hostage by his father Amyntas. This is highly improbable; as well for other reasons (assigned by Wesseling), as because the Illyrians, if they ever received him as a hostage, would not send him to Thebes but keep him in their own possession. The memorable interview described by Æschinês—between the Athenian general Iphikratês and the Macedonian queen Eurydikê with her two youthful sons Perdikkas and Philip—must have taken place some time before the death of Ptolemy Alorîtês, and before the accession of Perdikkas. The expressions of Æschinês do not, perhaps, necessarily compel us to sup-

pose the interview to have taken place *immediately* after the death of Alexander (Æschinês, Fal. Leg. p. 31, 32); yet it is difficult to reconcile the statement of the orator with the recognition of three years' continuous residence at Thebes. Flathe (Geschichte Makedoniens, vol. i. p. 39-47) supposes Æschinês to have allowed himself an oratorical misrepresentation, when he states that Philip was present in Macedonia at the interview with Iphikratês. This is an unsatisfactory mode of escaping from the difficulty; but the chronological statements, as they now stand, can hardly be all correct. It is possible that Philip may have gone again back to Thebes, or may have been sent back, after the interview with Iphikratês; we might thus obtain a space of three years for his stay, at two several times, in that city. We are not to suppose that his condition at Thebes was one of durance and ill-treatment. See Mr. Clinton, Fast Hell. App. iv. p. 229.

then on the coast of Macedonia—has been recounted in a previous chapter. How Philip fared during the regency of Ptolemy Aloritês in Macedonia, we do not know; we might even suspect that he would return back to Thebes as a safer residence. But when his brother Perdikkas, having slain Ptolemy Aloritês, became king, Philip resided in Macedonia, and even obtained from Perdikkas (as already stated), through the persuasion of Plato, a separate district to govern as subordinate. Here he remained until the death of Perdikkas in 360-359 B.C.; organising a separate military force of his own (like Derdas in 382 B.C., when the Lacedæmonians made war upon Olynthus<sup>1</sup>); and probably serving at its head in the wars carried on by his brother.

The time passed by Philip at Thebes, however, from fifteen to eighteen years of age, was an event of much importance in determining his future character.<sup>2</sup> Though detained at Thebes, Philip was treated with courtesy and respect. He resided with Pammenês, one of the principal citizens; he probably enjoyed good literary and rhetorical teaching, since as a speaker, in after life, he possessed considerable talent;<sup>3</sup> and he may also have received some instruction in philosophy, though he never subsequently manifested any taste for it, and though the assertion of his having been taught by Pythagoreans merits little credence. But the lesson, most indelible of all, which he imbibed at Thebes, was derived from the society and from the living example of men like Epaminondas and Pelopidas. These were leading citizens, manifesting those qualities which ensured for them the steady

<sup>1</sup> Athenæus, xi. p. 506. διατρέπων δ' ἐντὺθα δούαμιν (Philippus), &c. About Derdas, see Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 38.

<sup>2</sup> It was in after times a frequent practice with the Roman Senate, when imposing terms of peace on kings half-conquered, to require hostages for fidelity, with a young prince of the royal blood among the number; and it commonly happened that the latter, after a few years' residence at Rome, returned

home an altered man on many points.

See the case of Demetrius, younger son of the last Philip of Macedon, and younger brother of Perseus (Livy, xxxiii. 13; xxxix. 53; xl. 5), of the young Parthian princes, Vononês (Tacitus, Annal. ii. 1, 2), Phraatês (Tacit. Annal. vi. 32), Meherdatês (Tacit. Ann. xii. 10, 11).

<sup>3</sup> Even in the opinion of very competent judges: see Æschinês, Fals. Leg. c. 18. p. 253.

admiration of a free community—and of a Theban community, more given to action than to speech; moreover they were both of them distinguished military leaders—one of them the ablest organiser and the most scientific tactician of his day. The spectacle of the Theban military force, excellent both as cavalry and as infantry, under the training of such a man as Epaminondas, was eminently suggestive to a young Macedonian prince; and became still more efficacious when combined with the personal conversation of the victor of Leuktra—the first man whom Philip learnt to admire, and whom he strove to imitate in his military career.<sup>1</sup> His mind was early stored with the most advanced strategic ideas of the day, and thrown into the track of reflection, comparison, and invention, on the art of war.

When transferred from Thebes, to the subordinate government of a district in Macedonia under his elder brother Perdikkas, Philip organised a military force; and in so doing had the opportunity of applying to practice, though at first on a limited scale, the lessons learnt from the illustrious Thebans. He was thus at the head of troops belonging to and organised by himself—when the unexpected death of Perdikkas opened to him the prospect of succeeding to the throne. But it was a prospect full of doubt and hazard. Perdikkas had left an infant son; there existed, moreover, three princes, Archelaus, Aridæus, and Menelaus,<sup>2</sup> sons of Amyntas by another wife or mistress Gygæa, and therefore half-brothers of Perdikkas and Philip: there were also two other pretenders to the crown—Pausanias (who had before aspired to the throne after the death of Amyntas), seconded by a Thracian prince—and Argæus, aided by the Athenians. To these dangers was to be added, attack from the

B.C. 360-359.

Condition  
of Philip at  
the death of  
Perdikkas.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 26. ζηλωτής γεγονέναι ἔδοξεν Ἐπαμεινώνδου, τὸ περὶ τοῦς πολέμους καὶ τὰς στρατηγίας δραστήριον ἴσως κατανοήσας, ὃ μικρὸν ἦν τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀρετῆς μέρου, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, vii. 4. Menelaus, the father of Amyntas and grandfather of Philip, is stated to have been an illegitimate son: while Amyntas himself is said to have been originally an attendant or slave of Ætō-

pus (Ælian, V. H. xii. 43). Our information respecting the relations of the successive kings, and pretenders to the throne, in Macedonia, is obscure and unsatisfactory. Justin (l. c.) agrees with Ælian in calling the father of Amyntas Menelaus; but Dexippus (ap. Syncellum, p. 263) calls him Aridæus; while Diodorus (xiv. 92) calls him Tharraleus.

neighbouring barbaric nations, Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—always ready<sup>1</sup> to assail and plunder Macedonia at every moment of intestine weakness. It would appear that Perdikkas, shortly before his death, had sustained a severe defeat, with the loss of 4000 men, from the Illyrians: his death followed, either from a wound then received, or by the machinations of his mother Eurydikê. Perhaps both the wound in battle and the assassination may be real facts.<sup>2</sup>

Philip at first assumed the government of the country as guardian of his young nephew Amyntas the son of Perdikkas. But the difficulties of the conjuncture were so formidable, that the Macedonians around constrained him to assume the crown.<sup>3</sup> Of his three half-brothers, he put to death one, and was only prevented from killing the other two by their flight into exile; we shall find them hereafter at Olynthus. They had either found, or were thought likely to find, a party in Macedonia to sustain their pretensions to the crown.<sup>4</sup>

The succession to the throne in Macedonia, though descending in a particular family, was open to frequent and bloody dispute between the individual members of that family, and usually fell to the most daring and unscrupulous among them. None but an energetic man, indeed, could well maintain himself there, especially under the circumstances of Philip's accession. The Macedonian monarchy has been called a limited monarchy; and in a large sense of the word, this proposition is true. But what the limitations were, or how they were made operative, we do not know. That there were some ancient forms and customs, which the king habitually respected, we cannot doubt;<sup>5</sup> as there

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xxix. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 2; Justin, vii. 5; Quint. Curt. vi. 48, 26.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, vii. 5. Amyntas lived through the reign of Philip, and was afterwards put to death by Alexander, on the charge of conspiracy. See Justin, xii. 6; Quintus Curtius, vi. 34, 17; with the note of Müttzell.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, viii. 3. "Post hæc Olyn-

thios aggreditur (Philip): receperant enim per misericordiam, post eandem unius, duos fratres ejus, quos Philippus, ex novercâ genitos, velut participes regni, interficere gestiebat."

<sup>5</sup> Arrian, Exp. Alex. iv. 11. ὃν βίη, ἀλλὰ νόμον Μακεδόνων ἀρχόντας διατέλεσαν (Alexander and his ancestors before him).

probably were also among the Illyrian tribes, the Epirots, and others of the neighbouring warlike nations. A general assembly was occasionally convened, for the purpose of consenting to some important proposition, or trying some conspicuous accused person. But though such ceremonies were recognised and sometimes occurred, the occasions were rare in which they interposed any serious constitutional check upon the regal authority.<sup>1</sup> The facts of Macedonian history, as far as they come before us, exhibit the kings acting on their own feelings and carrying out their own schemes—consulting whom they please and when they please—subject only to the necessity of not offending too violently the sentiments of that military population whom they commanded. Philip and Alexander, combining regal station with personal ability and unexampled success, were more powerful than any of their

<sup>1</sup> The trial of Philotas, who is accused by Alexander for conspiracy before an assembly of the Macedonian soldiers near to headquarters, is the example most insisted on of the prevalence of this custom, of public trial in criminal accusations. Quintus Curtius says (vi. 32, 25), "*De capitalibus rebus vetusto Macedonum more inquirebat exercitus: in pace erat vulgi: et nihil potestas regum valebat, nisi prius valuisset auctoritas.*" Compare Arrian, iii. 26; Diodor. xvii. 79, 80.

That this was an ancient Macedonian custom, in reference to conspicuous persons accused of treason, we may readily believe; and that an officer of the great rank and military reputation of Philotas, if suspected of treason, could hardly be dealt with in any other way. If he was condemned, all his relatives and kinsmen, whether implicated or not, became involved in the same condemnation. Several among the kinsmen of Philotas either fled or killed themselves; and Alexander then issued an edict pardoning them all, except Parmenio; who was in Media, and

whom he sent secret orders instantly to despatch. If the proceedings against Philotas, as described by Curtius, are to be taken as correct, it is rather an appeal made by Alexander to the soldiery, for their consent to his killing a dangerous enemy, than an investigation of guilt or innocence.

Olympias, during the intestine contests which followed after the death of Alexander, seems to have put to death as many illustrious Macedonians as she chose, without any form of trial. But when her enemy Kassander got the upper hand, subdued and captured her, he did not venture to put her to death without obtaining the consent of a Macedonian assembly (Diodor. xix. 11, 51; Justin, xiv. 6; Pausanias, i. 11, 2). These Macedonian assemblies, insofar as we read of them, appear to be summoned chiefly as mere instruments to sanction some predetermined purpose of the king or the military leader predominant at the time. Flathe (*Geschicht. Makedon.* p. 43—45) greatly overrates, in my judgment, the rights and powers enjoyed by the Macedonian people.

predecessors. Each of them required extraordinary efforts from their soldiers, whom they were therefore obliged to keep in willing obedience and attachment; just as Jason of Phæræ had done before with his standing army of mercenaries.<sup>1</sup> During the reign of Alexander the army manifests itself as the only power by his side, to which even he is constrained occasionally to bow; after his death, its power becomes for a time still more ascendent. But so far as the history of Macedonia is known to us, I perceive no evidence of co-ordinate political bodies, or standing apparatus (either aristocratical or popular) to check the power of the king — such as to justify in any way the comparison drawn by a modern historian between the Macedonian and English constitutions.

The first proceeding of Philip, in dealing with his numerous enemies, was to buy off the Thracians by seasonable presents and promises; so that the competition of Pausanias for the throne became no longer dangerous. There remained as assailants the Athenians with Argæus from seaward, and the Illyrians from landward.

But Philip showed dexterity and energy sufficient to make head against all. While he hastened to reorganise the force of the country, to extend the application of those improved military arrangements which he had already been attempting in his own province, and to encourage his friends and soldiers by collective harangues,<sup>2</sup> in a style and spirit such as the Macedonians had never before heard from regal lips — he contrived to fence off the attack of the Athenians until a more convenient moment.

He knew that the possession of Amphipolis was the great purpose for which they had been carrying on war against Macedonia for some years, and for which they now espoused the cause of Argæus. Accordingly he professed his readiness at once to give up to them this important place, withdrawing the Macedonian garrison whereby Perdikkas had held it against them, and leaving the town to its own citizens. This act was probably construed by the Athenians as tantamount to an actual cession; for even if Amphipolis should still hold

Proceed-  
ings of  
Philip  
against his  
numerous  
enemies.  
His success  
—Thracians  
—Athe-  
nians.

He evacu-  
ates Amphi-  
polis. He  
defeats the  
Athenians  
and Argæ-  
ans—his  
mild treat-  
ment of  
Athenian  
prisoners.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 6, 16.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 2, 3.

out against them, they doubted not of their power to reduce it when unaided. Philip farther despatched letters to Athens, expressing an anxious desire to be received into her alliance, on the same friendly terms as his father Amyntas before him.<sup>1</sup> These proceedings seem to have had the effect of making the Athenians lukewarm in the cause of Argæus. For Mantias the Athenian admiral, though he conveyed that prince by sea to Methônê, yet stayed in the seaport himself, while Argæus marched inland—with some returning exiles, a body of mercenaries, and a few Athenian volunteers—to Ægæ or Edessa;<sup>2</sup> hoping to procure admission into that ancient capital of the Macedonian kings. But the inhabitants refused to receive him; and in his march back to Methônê, he was attacked and completely defeated by Philip. His fugitive troops found shelter on a neighbouring eminence, but were speedily obliged to surrender. Philip suffered the greater part of them to depart on terms, requiring only that Argæus and the Macedonian exiles should be delivered up to him. He treated the Athenian citizens with especial courtesy, preserved to them all their property, and sent them home full of gratitude, with conciliatory messages to the people of Athens. The exiles, Argæus among them, having become his prisoners, were probably put to death.<sup>3</sup>

The prudent lenity exhibited by Philip towards the Athenian prisoners, combined with his evacuation of Amphipolis, produced the most favourable effect upon the temper of the Athenian public, and disposed them to accept his pacific offers. Peace was accordingly concluded. Philip renounced all claim to Amphipolis, acknowledging that town as a possession rightfully belonging to Athens.<sup>4</sup> By such renunciation he really abandoned no rightful possession; for Amphipolis had never belonged to the Macedonian kings; nor had any Macedonian soldiers ever entered it until three or four years before, when the citizens had invoked aid from Perdikkas to share in the defence against Athens. But the Athenians appeared to have gained the chief prize for which they had been so long struggling.

Philip makes peace with Athens—renounces his claim to Amphipolis.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. πων τινὰς πολιτῶν, &c. Justin, vii. 6.  
p. 660. s. 144.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 3; Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 660 *ut sup.* τῶν ἡμετέ-

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 4.

They congratulated themselves in the hope, probably set forth with confidence by the speakers who supported the peace, that the Amphipolitans alone would never think of resisting the acknowledged claims of Athens.

Philip was thus relieved from enemies on the coast, and had his hands free to deal with the Illyrians and Pæonians of the interior. He marched into the territory of the Pæonians (seemingly along the upper course of the river Axius), whom he found weakened by the recent death of their king Agis. He defeated their troops, and reduced them to submit to Macedonian supremacy. From thence he proceeded to attack the Illyrians—a more serious and formidable undertaking. The names *Illyrians*, *Pæonians*, *Thracians*, &c., did not designate any united national masses, but were applied to a great number of kindred tribes or clans, each distinct, separately governed, and having its particular name and customs. The Illyrian and Pæonian tribes occupied a wide space of territory to the north and north-west of Macedonia, over the modern Bosnia nearly to the Julian Alps and the river Save. But during the middle of the fourth century before Christ, it seems that a large immigration of Gallic tribes from the westward was taking place, invading the territory of the more northerly Illyrians and Pæonians, circumscribing their occupancy and security, and driving them farther southward; sometimes impelling them to find subsistence and plunder by invasion of Macedonia or by maritime piracies against Grecian commerce in the Adriatic.<sup>1</sup> The Illyrians had become more dangerous neighbours to Macedonia than they were in the time of Thucydides; and it seems that a recent coalition of their warriors, for purposes of invasion and plunder, was now in the zenith of its force. It was under a chief named Bardylis, who had raised himself to command from the humble occupation of a charcoal burner; a man renowned for his bravery, but yet more renowned for dealings rigidly just towards his

<sup>1</sup> See the remarks of Niebuhr, on these migrations of Gallic tribes from the west, and their effect upon the prior population established between the Danube and the Ægean Sea (Niebuhr, *Vorfrage*

*über alte Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 225, 281; also the earlier work of the same author—*Kleine Schriften, Untersuchungen über die Gesch. der Skythen*, p. 375).

soldiers, especially in the distribution of plunder.<sup>1</sup> Bardylis and his Illyrians had possessed themselves of a considerable portion of Western Macedonia (west of Mount Bermius), occupying for the most part the towns, villages, and plains,<sup>2</sup> and restricting the native Macedonians to the defensible, yet barren hills. Philip marched to attack them, at the head of a force which he had now contrived to increase to the number of 10,000 foot and 600 horse. The numbers of Bardylis were about equal; yet on hearing of Philip's approach, he sent a proposition tendering peace, on the condition that each party should retain what it actually possessed. His proposition being rejected, the two armies speedily met. Philip had collected around him on the right wing his chosen Macedonian troops, with whom he made his most vigorous onset; manœuvring at the same time with a body of cavalry so as to attack the left flank of the Illyrians. The battle, contested with the utmost obstinacy on both sides, was for some time undecided; nor could the king of Macedon break the oblong square into which his enemies had formed themselves. But at length his cavalry were enabled to charge them so effectively in flank and rear, that victory declared in his favour. The Illyrians fled, were vigorously pursued with the loss of 7000 men, and never again rallied. Bardylis presently sued for peace, and consented to purchase it by renouncing all his conquests in Macedonia; while Philip pushed his victory so strenuously, as to reduce to subjection all the tribes eastward of Lake Lychnidus.<sup>3</sup>

These operations against the inland neighbours of Macedonia must have occupied a year or two. During that interval Philip left Amphipolis to himself, having withdrawn from it the Macedonian garrison as a means of conciliating the Athenians. We might have expected that they would forthwith have availed themselves of the

B.C. 359-358.

Amphipolis evacuated by Philip—the Athenians neglect it.

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus, Fragm. 35, ed. Didot; Cicero de Officiis, ii. 11; Diodor. xvi. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, vii. 9, 2, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 4-8. Frontinus (Strategem. ii. 3, 2) mentions a battle gained by Philip against the Illyrians; wherein, observing that their chosen troops were in the centre,

he placed his own greatest strength in his right wing, attacked and beat their left wing; then came upon their centre in flank and defeated their whole army. Whether this be the battle alluded to, we cannot say. The tactics employed are the same as those of Epaminondas at Leuktra and Mantinea; strengthening

opening and taken active measures for regaining Amphipolis. They knew the value of that city: they considered it as of right theirs: they had long been anxious for its repossession, and had even besieged it five years before, though seemingly only with a mercenary force, which was repelled mainly by the aid of Philip's predecessor Perdikkas. Amphipolis was not likely to surrender to them voluntarily; but when thrown upon its own resources, it might perhaps have been assailed with success. Yet they remained without making any attempt on the region at the mouth of the river Strymon. We must recollect (as has been already narrated<sup>1</sup>), that during 359 B.C., and the first part of 358 B.C., they were carrying on operations in the Thracian Chersonese, against Charidêmus and Kersobleptês, with small success and disgraceful embarrassment. These vexatious operations in the Chersonese—in which peninsula many Athenians were interested as private proprietors, besides the public claims of the city—may perhaps have absorbed wholly the attention of Athens, so as to induce her to postpone the acquisition of Amphipolis until they were concluded; a conclusion which did not arrive (as we shall presently see) until immediately before she became plunged in the dangerous crisis of the Social War. I know no better explanation of the singular circumstance, that Athens, though so anxious, both before and after, for the possession of Amphipolis, made no attempt to acquire it during more than a year after its evacuation by Philip; unless indeed we are to rank this opportunity among the many which she lost (according to Demosthenês<sup>2</sup>) from pure negligence; little suspecting how speedily such opportunity would disappear.

In 358 B.C., an opening was afforded to the Athenians for regaining their influence in Eubœa; and for this island, so near their own shores, they struck a more vigorous blow than for the distant possession of Amphipolis. At the revival of the maritime confederacy under Athens (immediately after 378 B.C.), most of the cities in Eubœa had joined it voluntarily; but after the battle of Leuktra (in 371 B.C.), the island passed under

B.C. 358.  
State of  
Eubœa—the  
Thebans  
foment re-  
volt and  
attack the  
island—  
victorious  
efforts of  
Athens.

one wing peculiarly for the offensive, and keeping back the rest of the army upon the defensive.

<sup>1</sup> See Chap. LXXX.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Orat. de Chersoneso, p. 98. s. 34. φέρει γὰρ, πρὸς

Theban supremacy. Accordingly Eubœans from all the cities served in the army of Epaminondas, both in his first and his last expedition into Peloponnesus (369-362 B.C.<sup>1</sup>). Moreover, Orôpus, the frontier town of Attica and Bœotia—immediately opposite to Eubœa, having been wrested from Athens<sup>2</sup> in 366 B.C. by a body of exiles crossing the strait from Eretria, through the management of the Eretrian despot Themison—had been placed in the keeping of the Thebans, with whom it still remained. But in the year 358 B.C., discontent began in the Eubœan cities, from what cause we know not, against the supremacy of Thebes; whereupon a powerful Theban force was sent into the island to keep them down. A severe contest ensued, in which if Thebes had succeeded, Chalkis and Eretria might possibly have shared the fate of Orchomenus.<sup>3</sup> These cities sent urgent messages entreating aid from the Athenians, who were powerfully moved by the apprehension of seeing their hated neighbour Thebes reinforced by so large an acquisition close to their borders. The public assembly, already disposed to sympathise with the petitioners, was kindled into enthusiasm by the abrupt and emphatic appeal of Timotheus son of Konon.<sup>4</sup> “How! Athenians (said he), when you have the Thebans actually in the island, are you still here debating what is to be done, or how you shall deal with the case? Will you not fill the sea with triremes? Will you not start up at once, hasten down to Peiræus, and

Διός, εἰ λόγον ὑμᾶς ἀπαιτήσκειαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ὧν νυνὶ παρίκατε καιρῶν διὰ ῥαθυμίαν, &c.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23. Εὐβοεῖς ἀπὸ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων: also vii. 5, 4. Βοιωτοὺς ἔχων πάντας καὶ Εὐβοέας (Epaminondas), &c.

Winiewski, in his instructive commentary upon the historical facts of the Oration of Demosthenès de Coronâ, states erroneously that Eubœa continued in the dependence of Athens without interruption from 377 to 358 B.C. (Winiewski, Commentarii Historici et Chronologici in Demosthenis Orationem de Coronâ, p. 30).

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 4, 1; Diodor. xv. 76; Demosthen. de Coronâ,

p. 259. s. 123.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenès, Orat. de Chersones. p. 108. s. 80. τοὺς Εὐβοέας σώζειν, ὅτε Θηβαῖοι κατεδουλοῦντ' αὐτούς, &c. compare Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 259. s. 123. Θηβαίων σφετεριζομένων τὴν Εὐβοίαν, &c.; and Æschinès cont. Ktesiphont. p. 397. c. 31. ἐπειδὴ διέβησαν εἰς Εὐβοίαν Θηβαῖοι, καταδουλώσασθαι τὰς πόλεις πειρώμενοι, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Orat. de Chersones. p. 108. s. 80. Εἰπέ μοι, βουλευέσθε, ἔφη (Timotheus), Θηβαίους ἔχοντας ἐν νήσῳ, τί χρήσεσθε, καὶ τί δεῖ ποιεῖν; Οὐκ ἐμπλήσετε τὴν θάλασσαν, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τριηρῶν; Οὐκ ἀναστάντες ἤδη πορεύεσθε εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ; Οὐ καθέλξετε τὰς ναῦς;

haul the triremes down to the water?" This animated apostrophe, reported and doubtless heard by Demosthenês himself, was cordially responded to by the people. The force of Athens, military as well as naval, was equipped with an eagerness, and sent forth with a celerity, seldom paralleled. Such was the general enthusiasm, that the costly office of trierarchy was for the first time undertaken by volunteers, instead of awaiting the more tardy process of singling out those rich men whose turn it was to serve, with the chance of still farther delay from the legal process called *Antidosis* or Exchange of property,<sup>1</sup> instituted by any one of the persons so chosen who might think himself hardly used by the requisition. Demosthenês himself was among the volunteer trierarchs; he and a person named Philinus being co-trierarchs of the same ship. We are told that in three or in five days the Athenian fleet and army, under the command of Timotheus,<sup>2</sup> were landed in full force on Eubœa; and that in the course of thirty days the Thebans were so completely worsted, as to be forced to evacuate it under capitulation. A body of mercenaries under Charês contributed to the Athenian success. Yet it seems not clear that the success was so easy and rapid

<sup>1</sup> See, in illustration of these delays, Demosthenês, *Philippic* i. p. 50. s. 42.

Any citizen who thought that he had been called upon out of his fair turn to serve a trierarchy or other expensive duty, and that another citizen had been unduly spared, might tender to this latter an exchange of properties, offering to undertake the duty if the other's property were made over to him. The person, to whom tender was made, was compelled to do one of three things; either, 1. to show, at legal process, that it was not his turn, and that he was not liable; 2. or to relieve the citizen tendering from the trierarchy just imposed upon him; 3. or to accept the exchange, receiving the other's property, and making over his own property in return; in which case the citizen tendering undertook

the trierarchy.

This obligatory exchange of properties, with the legal process attached to it, was called *Antidosis*.

<sup>2</sup> That Timotheus was commander, is not distinctly stated by Demosthenês, but may be inferred from Plutarch, *De Gloria Athen.* p. 350 F. ἐν ᾧ Τιμόθεος Εὐβοίαν ἤλευθερου, which, in the case of a military man like Timotheus, can hardly allude merely to the speech which he made in the assembly. Dioklès is mentioned by Demosthenês as having concluded the convention with the Thebans; but this does not necessarily imply that he was commander: see Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 570. s. 219.

About Philinus as colleague of Demosthenês in the trierarchy, see Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 566. s. 204.

as the orators are fond of asserting.<sup>1</sup> However, their boast, often afterwards repeated, is so far well-founded, that Athens fully accomplished her object, rescued the Eubœans from Thebes, and received the testimonial of their gratitude in the form of a golden wreath dedicated in the Athenian acropolis.<sup>2</sup> The Eubœan cities, while acknowledged as autonomous, continued at the same time to be enrolled as members of the Athenian confederacy, sending deputies to the synod at Athens; towards the general purposes of which they paid an annual tribute, assessed at five talents each for Oreus (or Histiaëa) and Eretria.<sup>3</sup>

On the conclusion of this Eubœan enterprise, Charês with his mercenaries was sent forward to the Chersonese, where he at length extorted from Charidêmus and Kersobleptês the evacuation of that peninsula and its cession to Athens, after a long train of dilatory manœuvres and bad faith on their part. I have, in my preceding chapters, described these events, remarking at the same time that Athens attained at this moment the maximum of her renewed foreign power and second confederacy, which had begun in 378 B.C.<sup>4</sup> But her period of exaltation was very short. It was speedily overthrown by two important events—the Social War, and the conquests of Philip in Thrace.

B.C. 358.  
Surrender  
of the Cher-  
sonese to  
Athens.

The Athenian confederacy, recently strengthened by the rescue of Eubœa, numbered among its members a large proportion of the islands in the Ægean as well as the Grecian seaports in Thrace. The list included the islands Lesbos, Chios, Samos (this last now partially occupied by a body of Athenian Kleruchs or settlers), Kos and Rhodes; together with the important city of Byzantium. It was shortly after the recent success in Eubœa, that Chios, Kos,

Social War  
—Chios,  
Kos, Rho-  
des, and  
Byzantium  
revolt from  
Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 7) states that the contest in Eubœa lasted for some considerable time.

Demosthenês talks of the expedition as having reached its destination in three days, Æschinês in five days; the latter states also that within thirty days the Thebans were vanquished and expelled (Demosthenês cont. Androtion. p. 597. s. 17; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont.

p. 397. c. 31).

About Charês and the mercenaries, see Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 678. s. 206.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Androtion. p. 616. s. 89. cont. Timokrat. p. 756. s. 205.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. p. 401, 403, 404. c. 32, 33; Demosthenês pro Megalopolitan. p. 204. s. 16.

<sup>4</sup> See Chap. LXXX.

Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War.

Respecting the proximate causes of this outbreak we find unfortunately little information. There was now, and had always been since 378 B.C., a synod of deputies from all the confederate cities habitually assembling at Athens; such as had not subsisted under the first Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently, we do not know. At least it must have afforded to the allies, if aggrieved, a full opportunity of making their complaints heard; and of criticising the application of the common fund to which each of them contributed. But the Athenian confederacy which had begun (378 B.C.) in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence,<sup>1</sup> had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more exclusively Athenian. Athens had been conquering the island of Samos—Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê, on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace—and the Thracian Chersonese; all of them acquisitions made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate synod—and made too in great part to become the private property of her own citizens as Kleruchs, in direct breach of her public resolution passed in 378 B.C., not to permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica.

In proportion as Athens came to act more for her own separate aggrandizement, and less for interests common to the whole confederacy, the adherence of the larger confederate states grew more and more reluctant. But what contributed yet farther to detach them from Athens, was, the behaviour of her armaments on service, consisting in great proportion of mercenaries, scantily and irregularly paid; whose disorderly and rapacious exaction, especially at the cost of the confederates of Athens, is characterised in strong terms by all the contemporary orators—Demosthenês, Æschinês, Isokratês, &c. The commander, having no

Athens acts more for her own separate interests, and less for that of her allies—her armaments on service—badly paid mercenaries—their extortions.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 194. s. 17. παρὸν αὐτοῖς (the Rhodians) Ἑλλήσι καὶ βελ-

τιοσιν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἐξ ἴσου συμμαχεῖν, &c.

means of paying his soldiers, was often compelled to obey their predatory impulses, and conduct them to the easiest place from whence money could be obtained; indeed some of the commanders, especially Charês, were themselves not less ready than their soldiers to profit by such depredations.<sup>1</sup> Hence the armaments sent out by Athens sometimes saw little of the enemy whom they were sent to combat, preferring the easier and lucrative proceeding of levying contributions from friends, and of plundering the trading vessels met with at sea. Nor was it practicable for Athens to prevent such misconduct, when her own citizens refused to serve personally, and when she employed foreigners, hired for the occasion, but seldom regularly paid.<sup>2</sup> The suffering, alarm, and alienation, arising from hence among the confederates, was not less mischievous than discreditable to Athens. We cannot doubt that complaints in abundance were raised in the confederate synod; but they must have been unavailing, since the abuse continued until the period shortly preceding the battle of Chæroneia.

Amidst such apparent dispositions on the part of Athens to neglect the interests of the confederacy for purposes of her own, and to tolerate or encourage the continued positive depredations of unpaid armaments—discontent naturally grew up, manifesting itself most powerfully among some of the larger dependencies near the Asiatic coast. The islands of Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, together with the important city of Byzantium on the Thracian Bosphorus, took counsel together, and declared themselves detached from Athens and

B.C. 358.

The four cities declare themselves independent of Athens—interference of the Karian Mausôlus.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xv. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès, Philip. i. p. 46. s. 28. εἰς οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικά ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γέγονασιν. Καὶ παρακύψαντα ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον ἢ πανταχοῦ μᾶλλον οἴχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως· οὐ γάρ ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 51. "Οποὶ δ' ἂν στρατηγὸν καὶ ψήφισμα κενὸν καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ἐλπίδας ἐκπέμφητε, οὐδὲν ὑμῖν τῶν δεόντων γίγνεται, ἀλλ'

οἱ μὲν ἐχθροὶ καταγελῶσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι τεθνήσκει τῷ δέσει τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀποστόλους.

Ibid. p. 53. s. 53. Νῦν δ' εἰς τοῦθ' ἤκει τὰ πράγματα αἰσχύνῃς, ὥστε τῶν στρατηγῶν ἕκαστος δις καὶ τρίς κρίνεται παρ' ὑμῖν περὶ θανάτου, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἅπασι αὐτῶν ἀγωνίσασθαι περὶ θανάτου τολμᾷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἀνδραποδιστῶν καὶ λωποδυτῶν θάνατον μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται τοῦ προσήκοντος.

Compare Olynthiac ii. p. 26. s. 28; De Chersoneso, p. 95. s. 24-27, cont. Aristokrat. p. 639. s. 69; De

her confederacy. According to the spirit of the convention, sworn at Sparta, immediately before the battle of Leuktra, and of the subsequent alliance, sworn at Athens, a few months afterwards<sup>1</sup>—obligatory and indefeasible confederacies stood generally condemned among the Greeks, so that these islands were justified in simply seceding when they thought fit. But their secession, which probably Athens would, under all circumstances, have resisted, was proclaimed in a hostile manner, accompanied with accusations that she had formed treacherous projects against them. It was moreover fomented by the intrigues, as well as aided by the arms, of the Karian prince Mausôlus.<sup>2</sup> Since the peace of Antalkidas, the whole Asiatic coast had been under the unresisted dominion either of satraps or of subordinate princes dependent upon Persia, who were watching for opportunities of extending their conquests in the neighbouring islands. Mausôlus appears to have occupied both Rhodes and Kos; provoking in the former island a revolution which placed it under an oligarchy, not only devoted to him, but farther sustained by the presence of a considerable force of his mercenary troops.<sup>3</sup> The government of Chios appears to have been always oligarchical; which fact was one ground for want of sympathy between the Chians and Athens. Lastly, the Byzantines had also a special ground for discontent; since they assumed the privilege of detaining and taxing the cornships from the Euxine in their passage through the Bosphorus<sup>4</sup>—while Athens, as chief of the insular confederacy, claimed that right for herself, and at any rate protested against the use of such power by any other city for its own separate profit.

Republ. Ordinand. περί Συντάξεως, p. 167. s. 7. Also Æschinês de Fals. Legat. p. 264. c. 24; Isokratês, De Pace, s. 57, 160.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 3, 18; vi. 5, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 191. s. 3. ἡτιῶσαντο γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς Χίοι καὶ Βυζάντιοι καὶ Ῥόδιοι καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συνέστησαν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς τὸν τελευταῖον τούτον πόλεμον φανήσεται ὃ ὁ μὲν πρυτανεύσας ταῦτα καὶ πείσας Μαύ-

σωλος, φίλος εἶναι φάσκων Ῥοδίων, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν αὐτῶν ἀφῆρημένος.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. de Rhodior. Libert. p. 195. s. 17. p. 198. s. 34; de Pace, p. 63. s. 25; Diodor. xvi. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. de Pace, p. 63. s. 25. (ἐῶμεν) τὸν Κᾶρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Ῥόδον, καὶ Βυζαντίους κατὰ γειν τὰ πλοῖα, &c.

Compare Demosthenês adv. Polykl. p. 1207. s. 6. p. 1211. s. 22; adv. Leptinem, p. 475. s. 68.

This revolt, the beginning of what is termed the Social War, was a formidable shock to the foreign ascendancy of Athens. Among all her confederates, Chios was the largest and most powerful, the entire island being under one single government. Old men, like Plato and Isokratês, might perhaps recollect the affright occasioned at Athens fifty-four years before (B.C. 412) by the news of the former revolt of Chios,<sup>1</sup> shortly after the great disaster before Syracuse. And probably the alarm was not much less, when the Athenians were now apprised of the quadruple defection among their confederates near the Asiatic coast. The joint armament of all four was mustered at Chios, whither Mausôlus also sent a reinforcement. The Athenians equipped a fleet with land-forces on board, to attack the island; and on this critical occasion we may presume that their citizens would overcome the reluctance to serve in person. Chabrias was placed in command of the fleet, Charês of the land force; the latter was disembarked on the island, and a joint attack upon the town of Chios, by sea and land at the same moment, was concerted. When Charês marched up to the walls, the Chians and their allies felt strong enough to come forth and hazard a battle, with no decisive result; while Chabrias at the same time attempted with the fleet to force his way into the harbour. But the precautions for defence had been effectively taken, and the Chian seamen were resolute. Chabrias, leading the attack with his characteristic impetuosity, became entangled among the enemy's vessels, was attacked on all sides, and fell gallantly fighting. The other Athenian ships either were not forward in following him, or could make no impression. Their attack completely failed, and the fleet was obliged to retire, with little loss apparently, except that of the brave admiral. Charês with his land force having been again taken aboard, the Athenians forthwith sailed away from Chios.<sup>2</sup>

B.C. 358.

Great force  
of the re-  
volters—  
armament  
despatched  
by Athens  
against  
Chios—  
battle at  
Chios—  
repulse of  
the Athe-  
nians, and  
death of  
Chabrias.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. viii. 15.

<sup>2</sup> The account of this event comes to us in a meagre and defective manner, Diodorus, xvi. 7; Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 4; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 6.

Demosthenês, in an harangue de-

livered three years afterwards, mentions the death of Chabrias, and eulogises his conduct at Chios among his other glorious deeds; but gives no particulars (Demosth. cont. Leptin. p. 481, 482).

Cornel. Nep. says that Chabrias

B.C. 357.

Farther armaments of Athens—Iphikratês, Timotheus, and Charês—unsuccessful operations in the Hellespont, and quarrel between the generals.

This repulse at Chios was a serious misfortune to Athens. Such was the dearth of military men and the decline of the military spirit, in that city, that the loss of a warlike citizen, daring as a soldier and tried as a commander, like Chabrias, was never afterwards repaired. To the Chians and their allies, on the other hand, the event was highly encouraging. They were enabled, not merely to maintain their revolt, but even to obtain fresh support, and to draw into the like defection other allies of Athens—among them seemingly Sestos and other cities on the Hellespont. For some months they appear to have remained masters of the sea, with a fleet of 100 triremes, disembarking and inflicting devastation on the Athenian islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samos, and elsewhere, so as to collect a sum for defraying their expenses. They were even strong enough to press the town of Samos by close siege, until at length the Athenians, not without delay and difficulty, got together a fleet of 120 triremes, under the joint command of Charês, Iphikratês with his son Menestheus, and Timotheus. Notwithstanding that Samos was under siege, the Athenian admirals thought it prudent to direct their first efforts to the reduction of Byzantium; probably from the paramount importance of keeping open the two straits between the Euxine and the Ægean, in order that the corn-ships, out of the former, might come through in safety.<sup>1</sup> To protect Byzantium, the Chians and their allies raised the siege of Samos, and sailed forthwith to the Hellespont, in which narrow strait both fleets were collected—as the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war. A plan of naval action had been concerted by the three Athenian commanders, and was on the point of taking place, when there supervened a sudden storm, which, in the judgement both of Iphikratês and Timotheus, rendered it rash and

was not commander, but only serving as a private soldier on shipboard. I think this less probable than the statement of Diodorus, that he was joint-commander with Charês.

<sup>1</sup> It appears that there was a great

and general scarcity of corn during this year 357 B.C. Demosthenês adv. Leptinem, p. 467. s. 38. προπέσει αυτοδίασπαρά πάντων ἀνθρώποις γενομένης, &c. That oration was delivered in 355 B.C.

perilous to assist in the execution. They therefore held off, while Charès, judging differently, called upon the trierarchs and seamen to follow him, and rushed into the fight without his colleagues. He was defeated, or at least was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything. But so incensed was he against his two colleagues, that he wrote a despatch to Athens accusing them of corruption and culpable backwardness against the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

The three joint admirals were thus placed not merely in opposition, but in bitter conflict, among themselves. At the trial of accountability, undergone by all of them not long afterwards at Athens, Charès stood forward as the formal accuser of his two colleagues, who in their turn also accused him. He was seconded in his attack by Aristophon, one of the most practised orators of the day. Both of them charged Iphikratès and Timotheus with

B.C. 358.

Iphikratès and Timotheus are accused by Charès at Athens.

<sup>1</sup> I follow chiefly the account given of these transactions by Diodorus, meagre and unsatisfactory as it is (xvi. 21). Nepos (Timotheus, c. 3) differs from Diodorus on several points. He states that both Samos and the Hellespont had revolted from Athens; and that the locality in which Charès made his attack, contrary to the judgement of his two colleagues, was near Samos—not in the Hellespont. He affirms farther that Menestheus, son of Iphikratès, was named as colleague of Charès; and that Iphikratès and Timotheus were appointed as advisers of Menestheus.

As to the last assertion—that Timotheus only served as adviser to his junior relative and not as a general formally named—this is not probable in itself; nor seemingly consistent with Isokratès (Or. xv. De Permutat. s. 137), who represents Timotheus as afterwards passing through the usual trial of accountability. Nor can Nepos be correct in saying that Samos had now revolted; for we find it still

in possession of Athens after the Social War, and we know that a fresh batch of Athenian Kleruchs were afterwards sent there.

On the other hand, I think Nepos is probably right in his assertion, that the Hellespont now revolted (“descierat Hellespontus”). This is a fact in itself noway improbable, and helping us to understand how it happened that Charès conquered Sestos afterwards in 353 B.C. (Diodor. xvi. 34), and that the Athenians are said to have then recovered the Chersonesus from Kersobleptès.

Polyænus (iii. 2, 29) has a story representing the reluctance of Iphikratès to fight, as having been manifested near Embata; a locality not agreeing either with Nepos or with Diodorus. Embata was on the continent of Asia, in the territory of Erythræ.

See respecting the relations of Athens with Sestos, my preceding chapter, Chap. LXXX.

Our evidence respecting this period is so very defective, that nothing like certainty is attainable.

having received bribes from the Chians and Rhodians,<sup>1</sup> and betrayed their trust; by deserting Charès at the critical moment when it had been determined beforehand to fight, and when an important success might have been gained.

How the justice of the case stood, we cannot decide. The characters of Iphikratès and Timotheus raise strong presumption that they were in the right and their accuser in the wrong. Yet it must be recollected that the Athenian public (and probably every other public—ancient or modern—Roman, English, or French) would naturally sympathise with the forward and daring admiral, who led the way into action, fearing neither the storm nor the enemy, and calling upon his colleagues to follow. Iphikratès and Timotheus doubtless insisted upon the rashness of his proceedings, and set forth the violence of the gale. But this again would be denied by Charès, and would stand as a point where the evidence was contradictory; captains and seamen being produced as witnesses on both sides, and the fleet being probably divided into two opposing parties. The feeling of the Athenian Dikasts might naturally be, that Iphikratès and Timotheus ought never to have let their colleague go into action unassisted, even though they disapproved of the proceeding. Iphikratès defended himself partly by impeaching the behaviour of Charès, partly by bitter retort upon his other accuser Aristophon. “Would *you* (he asked) betray the fleet for money?” “No,” was the reply. “Well, then, *you*, Aristophon, would not betray the fleet; shall *I*, Iphikratès, do so?”<sup>2</sup>

The issue of this important cause was, that Iphikratès was acquitted, while Timotheus was found guilty and condemned to the large fine of 100 talents. Upon what causes such difference of sentence turned, we make out but imperfectly. And it appears that Iphikratès, far from exonerating himself by throwing blame on Timotheus, emphatically assumed the responsibility of the whole

Iphikratès  
is acquitted,  
Timotheus  
is fined and  
retires from  
Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Deinarchus cont. Philokl. s. 17. ἑκατον ταλάντων τιμήσαντες (Τιμόθεον), ὅτι χρήματ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη παρὰ Χίων εἰληφέναι καὶ Ῥοδίων: compare Deinarch. cont. Demosth. s. 15, where the same charge of

bribery is alluded to, though αὐτὸς ἔφη is put in place of αὐτὸν Ἀριστοφῶν ἔφη, seemingly by mistake of the transcriber.

<sup>2</sup> See Aristotel. Rhetoric. ii. 24; iii. 10. Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 12, 10.

proceeding; while his son Menestheus tendered an accurate account, within his own knowledge, of all the funds received and disbursed by the army.<sup>1</sup>

The cause assigned by Isokratês, the personal friend of Timotheus, is, the extreme unpopularity of the latter in the city. Though as a general and on foreign service, Timotheus conducted himself not only with scrupulous justice to every one, but with rare forbearance towards the maritime allies whom other generals vexed and plundered

Arrogance and unpopularity of Timotheus, attested by his friend Isokratês.

—yet at home his demeanour was intolerably arrogant and offensive, especially towards the leading speakers who took part in public affairs. While recognised as a man of ability and as a general who had rendered valuable service, he had thus incurred personal unpopularity and made numerous enemies; chiefly among those most able to do him harm. Isokratês tells us that he had himself frequently remonstrated with Timotheus (as Plato admonished Dion) on this serious fault, which overclouded his real ability, caused him to be totally misunderstood, and laid up against him a fund of popular dislike sure to take melancholy effect on some suitable occasion. Timotheus (according to Isokratês), though admitting the justice of the reproof, was unable to conquer his own natural disposition.<sup>2</sup> If such was the bearing of this eminent man, as described by his intimate friend, we may judge how it would incense unfriendly politicians, and even indifferent persons who knew him only from his obvious exterior. Iphikratês, though by nature a proud man, was more discreet and conciliatory in his demeanour, and more alive to the mischief of political odium.<sup>3</sup> Moreover he seems to have been an

<sup>1</sup> Isokratês, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 137. εἰ τοσαύτας μὲν πόλεις ἐλόντα, μηδεμίαν δ' ἀπολέσαντα, περὶ προδοσίας ἔκρινε (ἡ πόλις Τιμόθεον), καὶ πάλιν εἰ διδόντος εὐθύνας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰς μὲν πράξεις Ἰφικράτους ἀναδεχομένου, τὸν δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν χρημάτων λόγον Μενέσθεως, τούτους μὲν ἀπέλυσε, Τιμόθεον δὲ τοσούτοις ἐζημίωσε χρήμασιν, ὅσοις οὐδένα πώποτε τῶν προγεγενημένων.

<sup>2</sup> Isokratês, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s.

146. Ταῦτα δ' ἀκούων ὀρθῶς μὲν ἔφασκε με λέγειν, οὐ μὴν οἷός τ' ἦν τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλεῖν, &c.

Isokratês goes at some length into the subject from s. 137 to s. 147. The discourse was composed seemingly in 353 B.C., about one year after the death of Timotheus, and four years after the trial here described.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês cont. Meidiam, p. 534, 535; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 39.

effective speaker<sup>1</sup> in public, and his popularity among the military men in Athens was so marked, that on this very trial many of them manifested their sympathy by appearing in arms near the Dikastery.<sup>2</sup> Under these circumstances, we may easily understand that Charês and Aristophon might find it convenient to press their charge more pointedly against Timotheus than against Iphikratês; and that the Dikastery, while condemning the former, may have been less convinced of the guilt of the latter, and better satisfied in every way to acquit him.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dionysius Halikarnass., *Judicium de Lysiâ*, p. 481; Justin, vi. §. 5. Aristotle in his *Rhetorica* borrows several illustrations on rhetorical points from the speeches of Iphikratês; but none from any speeches of Timotheus.

<sup>2</sup> Polyænus, iii. 9, 29. That this may have been done with the privacy and even by the contrivance of Iphikratês, is probable enough. But it seems to me that any obvious purpose of intimidating the Dikastery would have been likely to do him more harm than good.

<sup>3</sup> Rehdantz (*Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei*, p. 224 *seqq.*), while collecting and discussing instructively all the facts respecting these two commanders, places the date of this memorable trial in the year 354 B.C.; three years after the events to which it relates, and two years after the peace which concluded the Social War. Mr. Clinton (*Fast. Hellenici*, B.C. 354) gives the same statement. I dissent from their opinion on the date; and think that the trial must have occurred very soon after the abortive battle in the Hellespont—that is in 357 B.C. (or 356 B.C.), while the Social War was still going on.

Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton rely on the statement of Dionysius Halikarnass. (*De Dinarcho Judicium*, p. 667). Speaking of an oration falsely ascribed to Deinarchus, Dionysius says, that it was

spoken before the maturity of that orator—εἴρηται γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Τιμοθέου ζῶντος, κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τῆς μετὰ Μενεσθέως στρατηγίας, ἐφ' ἣ τὰς εὐθύνas ὑποσχών, ἐάλω. Τιμόθεος δὲ τὰς εὐθύνas ὑπέσχεχεν ἐπὶ Διοτίμου, τοῦ μετὰ Καλλίστρατον, ἔτε καὶ. . . . These are the last words in the MS., so that the sentence stands defective; Mr. Clinton supplies ἐτελεύτησεν, which is very probable.

The archonship of Diotimus is in 354–353 B.C.; so that Dionysius here states the trial to have taken place in 354 B.C. But on the other hand, the same Dionysius, in another passage, states the same trial to have taken place while the Social War was yet going on; that is, some time between 358 and 355 B.C. *De Lysiâ Judicium*, p. 480. ἐν γὰρ τῷ συμμαχικῷ πολέμῳ τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν Ἰφικράτης ἡγώνισται, καὶ τὰς εὐθύνas ὑπέσχεχε τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου γίγνεται καταφανές· οὗτος δὲ ὁ πόλεμος πίπτει κατὰ Ἀγαθοκλέα καὶ Ἑλπίνην ἀρχοντας. The archonships of Agathoklês and Elpinês cover the interval between Midsummer 357 B.C. and Midsummer 355 B.C.

It is plain that these two passages of Dionysius contradict each other. Rehdantz and Mr. Clinton notice the contradiction, but treat the passage first cited as containing the truth, and the other as erroneous. I cannot but think that

A fine of 100 talents is said to have been imposed upon Timotheus, the largest fine (according to Isokratès) ever imposed at Athens. Upon his condemnation he retired to Chalkis, where he died three years afterwards, in 354 B.C. In the year succeeding his death, his memory was still very unpopular; yet it appears that the fine was remitted to his family, and that his son Konon was allowed to compromise the demand by a disbursement of the smaller sum of ten talents for the repairs of the city walls. It seems evident that Timotheus by his retirement evaded payment of the full fine; so that his son Konon appears after him as one of the richest citizens in Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Exile of  
Timotheus  
—his death  
soon after-  
wards.

The loss of such a citizen as Timotheus was a fresh misfortune to her. He had conducted her armies with signal success, maintained the honour of her name throughout the Eastern and Western Seas, and greatly extended the list of her foreign allies. She had recently lost Chabrias in battle; a second general, Timotheus, was now taken from her; and the third, Iphikratès, though acquitted at the last trial, seems, as far as we can make out, never to have been subsequently employed on military command. These three were the last eminent military citizens at Athens; for Phokion, though brave and deserving, was not to be compared with either of them. On the other hand, Charès, a man of great personal courage, but of no other

Iphikratès  
no more  
employed—  
great loss  
to Athens  
in these two  
generals.

the passage last cited is entitled to most credit, and that the true date of the trial was 357-356 B.C., not 354 B.C. When Dionysius asserts that the trial took place while the Social War was yet going on, he adds, "as is evident from the speech itself—ὡς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τοῦ λόγου καταφανές." Here therefore there was no possibility of being misled by erroneous tables; the evidence is direct and complete; whereas he does not tell us on what authority he made the other assertion, about the archonship of Diotimus. Next, it is surely improbable that the abortive combat in the Hellespont, and the fierce quarrel between Charès and

his colleagues, probably accompanied with great excitement in the fleet, could have remained without judicial settlement for three years. Lastly, assuming the statement about the archonship of Diotimus to be a mistake, we can easily see how the mistake arose. Dionysius has confounded the year in which Timotheus died, with the year of his trial. He seems to have died in 354 B.C. I will add that the text in this passage is not beyond suspicion.

<sup>1</sup> Cornelius Nepos, Timoth. c. 4; Rehdantz, Vit. Iph., Ch. et Timoth. p. 235; Isokratès, Or. xv. (Permutat.) s. 108, 110, 137.

merit, was now in the full swing of reputation. The recent judicial feud between the three Athenian admirals had been doubly injurious to Athens, first as discrediting Iphikratês and Timotheus, next as exalting Charês, to whom the sole command was now confided.

In the succeeding year 356 B.C., Charês conducted another powerful fleet to attack the revolted allies. Being however not furnished with adequate funds from home to pay his troops, chiefly foreign mercenaries, he thought it expedient, on his own responsibility, to accept an offer from Artabazus (satrap of Daskylum and the region south of the Propontis), then in revolt against the Persian king.<sup>1</sup> Charês joined Artabazus with his own army, reinforced by additional bodies of mercenaries recently disbanded by the Persian satraps. With this entire force he gave battle to the king's troops under the command of Tithraustês, and gained a splendid victory; upon which Artabazus remunerated him so liberally, as to place the whole Athenian army in temporary affluence. The Athenians at home were at first much displeased with their general, for violating his instructions, and withdrawing his army from its prescribed and legitimate

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22. Demosthenês (Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28) has an emphatic passage, alluding to this proceeding on the part of Charês; which he represents as a necessary result of the remissness of the Athenians, who would neither serve personally themselves, nor supply their general with money to pay his foreign troops—and as a measure which the general could not avoid.

. . . . ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ ξενικά ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχθροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγονασιν, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ παντ' ἀχού μᾶλλον εἶχεται πλέοντα· ὁ δὲ στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖ· εἰκότως—οὗ γάρ ἐστιν ἄρχειν, μὴ διδόντα μισθόν. Compare the Scholia on the same oration, a passage which

occurs somewhat earlier, p. 44. s. 22.

It seems evident, from this passage, that the Athenians were at first displeased with such diversion from the regular purpose of the war, though the payment from Artabazus afterwards partially reconciled them to it; which is somewhat different from the statement of Diodorus.

From an inscription (cited in Rehdantz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriz, &c. p. 156) we make out that Charês, Charidêmus, and Phokion, were about this time in joint-command of the Athenian fleet near Lesbos, and that they were in some negotiation as to pecuniary supplies with the Persian Orontês on the mainland. But the inscription is so mutilated, that no distinct matter of fact can be ascertained.

task. The news of his victory, however, and of the lucrative recompense following it, somewhat mollified them. But presently they learned that the Persian king, indignant at such a gratuitous aggression on their part, was equipping a large fleet to second the operations of their enemies. Intimidated by the prospect of Persian attack, they became anxious to conclude peace with the revolted allies; who on their part were not less anxious to terminate the war. Embassies being exchanged, and negotiations opened, in the ensuing year (355 B.C., the third of the war) a peace was sworn, whereby the Athenians recognised the complete autonomy, and severance from their confederacy, of the revolted cities Chios, Rhodes, Kos, and Byzantium.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired the power, and lowered the dignity, of Athens. Imperfectly as we know the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt were feeble and inadequate; evincing a sad downfall of energy since the year 412 B.C., when she had contended with transcendent vigour against similar and even greater calamities, only a year after her irreparable disaster before Syracuse. In- glorious as the result of the Social War was, it had nevertheless been costly, and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the activity of Demosthenês as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered this year (355 B.C.), he notes the poverty of the treasury; and refers back to it in discourses of after time as a fact but too notorious.<sup>2</sup>

End of the  
Social War  
—great loss  
of power to  
Athens.

But the misfortunes arising to Athens from the Social War did not come alone. It had the farther effect of

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22. I place little reliance on the Argument prefixed to the Oration of Isokratês De Pace. As far as I am able to understand the facts of this obscure period, it appears to me that the author of that Argument has joined them together erroneously, and misconceived the situation.

The assertion of Demosthenês, in the Oration against Leptinês (p.

461. s. 90), respecting the behaviour of the Chians towards the memory of Chabrias seems rather to imply that the peace with Chios had been concluded before that oration was delivered. It was delivered in the very year of the peace 355 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês adv. Leptinem, p. 464. s. 26, 27; and De Coronâ, p. 305. s. 293.

rendering her less competent for defence against the early aggressions of Philip of Macedon.

That prince, during the first year of his accession (359 B.C.), had sought to conciliate Athens by various measures, but especially by withdrawing his garrison from Amphipolis, while he was establishing his military strength in the interior against the Illyrians and Pæonians. He had employed in this manner a period apparently somewhat less than two years; and employed it with such success, as to humble his enemies in the interior, and get together a force competent for aggressive operations against the cities on the coast. During this interval, Amphipolis remained a free and independent city; formally renounced by Philip, and not assailed by the Athenians. Why they let slip this favourable opportunity of again enforcing by arms pretensions on which they laid so much stress—I have before partially (though not very satisfactorily) explained. Philip was not the man to let them enjoy the opportunity longer than he could help, or to defer the moment of active operations as they did. Towards the close of 358 B.C., finding his hands free from impediments in the interior, he forthwith commenced the siege of Amphipolis. The inhabitants are said to have been unfavourably disposed towards him, and to have given him many causes for war.<sup>1</sup> It is not easy to understand what these causes could have been, seeing that so short a time before, the town had been garrisoned by Macedonians invoked as protectors against Athens; nor were the inhabitants in any condition to act aggressively against Philip.

Having in vain summoned Amphipolis to surrender, Philip commenced a strenuous siege, assailing the walls with battering-rams and other military engines. The weak points of the fortification must have been well known to him, from his own soldiers who had been recently in garrison. The inhabitants defended themselves with vigour; but such was now the change of circumstances, that they were forced to solicit their ancient enemy Athens for aid against the Macedonian prince. Their envoys Hierax and Stratoklês, reaching Athens shortly after the successful close of the Athenian

B.C. 358.  
The Amphipolitans send to ask assistance from Athens—manœuvres of Philip to induce Athens not to interfere.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 8.

expedition to Eubœa, presented themselves before the public assembly, urgently inviting the Athenians to come forthwith and occupy Amphipolis, as the only chance of rescue from Macedonian dominion.<sup>1</sup> We are not certain whether the Social War had yet broken out; if it had, Athens would be too much pressed with anxieties arising out of so formidable a revolt, to have means disposable even for the tempting recovery of the long-lost Amphipolis. But at any rate Philip had foreseen and counter-worked the prayers of the Amphipolitans. He sent a courteous letter to the Athenians, acquainting them that he was besieging the town, yet recognising it as belonging of right to them, and promising to restore it to them when he should have succeeded in the capture.<sup>2</sup>

Much of the future history of Greece turned upon the manner in which Athens dealt with these two conflicting messages. The situation of Amphipolis, commanding the passage over the Strymon, was not only all-important—as shutting up Macedonia to the eastward and as opening the gold regions around Mount Pangæus—but was also easily defensible by the Athenians from seaward, if once acquired. Had they been clear-sighted in the appreciation of chances, and vigilant in respect to future defence, they might now have acquired this important place, and might have held it against the utmost efforts of Philip. But that fatal inaction which had become their general besetting sin, was on the present occasion encouraged by some plausible, yet delusive, pleas. The news of the danger of the Amphipolitans would be not unwelcome at Athens—where strong

B.C. 358.

The Athenians determine not to assist Amphipolis—their motives—the importance of this resolution.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 8. . . . . εἰ γὰρ, ὅθ' ἤκομεν Εὐβοεῦσι βεβοηθηκότες, καὶ παρήσαν Ἀμφιπολιτῶν Ἰέραξ καὶ Στρατοκλήης ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸ βῆμα, κελεύοντες ἡμᾶς πλεῖν αὐτὴν παραλαμβάνειν τὴν πόλιν, τὴν αὐτὴν παρειχόμεθ' ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίαν ἦν περ ὑπὲρ τῆς Εὐβοέων σωτηρίας, εἴχετ' ἂν Ἀμφίπολιν τότε καὶ πάντων τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἦτε ἀπαραλαβμένοι πραγμάτων.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 659. s. 138. . . . . χάσειναι εἰδότες,

ὅτι Φίλιππος, ὅτε μὲν Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρχει, ἴν' ὑμῖν παραδῶ, πολιορκεῖν ἔφη· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔλαβε, καὶ Ποτιδαίαν προσεφείλετο.

Also the Oration De Halonneso, p. 83. s. 28. . . . . τῆς δ' ἐπιστολῆς, ἣν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔπεμψεν (Philip) ὅτ' Ἀμφίπολιν ἐπολιόρχει, ἐπιτέλῃσται, ἐν ᾧ ὡμολόγει τὴν Ἀμφίπολιν ὑμετέραν εἶναι· ἔφη γὰρ ἐκπολιορχήσας ὑμῖν ἀποδύσειν ὡς οὖσαν ὑμετέραν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων.

aversion was entertained towards them, as refractory occupants of a territory not their own, and as having occasioned repeated loss and humiliation to the Athenian arms. Nor could the Athenians at once shift their point of view, so as to contemplate the question on the ground of policy alone, and to recognise these old enemies as persons whose interests had now come into harmony with their own. On the other hand, the present temper of the Athenians towards Philip was highly favourable. Not only had they made peace with him during the preceding year, but they also felt that he had treated them well both in evacuating Amphipolis and in dismissing honourably their citizens who had been taken prisoners in the army of his competitor Argæus.<sup>1</sup> Hence they were predisposed to credit his positive assurance, that he only wished to take the place in order to expel a troublesome population who had wronged and annoyed him, and that he would readily hand it over to its rightful owners the Athenians. To grant the application of the Amphipolitans for aid, would thus appear, at Athens, to be courting a new war and breaking with a valuable friend, in order to protect an odious enemy, and to secure an acquisition which would at all events come to them, even if they remained still, through the cession of Philip. It is necessary to dwell upon the motives which determined Athens on this occasion to refrain from interference; since there were probably few of her resolutions which she afterwards more bitterly regretted. The letter of assurance from Philip was received and trusted; the envoys from Amphipolis were dismissed with a refusal.

Deprived of all hope of aid from Athens, the Amphipolitans still held out as long as they could. But a party in the town entered into correspondence with Philip to betray it, and the defence thus gradually became feebler. At length he made a breach in the walls, sufficient, with the aid of partisans within, to carry the city by assault, not without a brave resistance from those who still remained faithful. All the citizens unfriendly to him were expelled or fled, the rest were treated with lenity; but we are told that little favour was shown by Philip towards those who had helped in the betrayal.<sup>2</sup>

Capture of  
Amphipolis  
by Philip,  
through the  
treason of a  
party in the  
town.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenès cont. Aristokrat.

p. 660. s. 144.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 8, with the passage  
from Libanius cited in Wesseling's

Amphipolis was to Philip an acquisition of unspeakable importance, not less for defence than for offence. It was not only the most convenient maritime station in Thrace, but it also threw open to him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold region near Mount Pangæus. He established himself firmly in his new position, which continued from henceforward one of the bulwarks of Macedonia, until the conquest of that kingdom by the Romans. He took no steps to fulfil his promise of handing over the place to the Athenians, who doubtless sent embassies to demand it. The Social War, indeed, which just now broke out, absorbed all their care and all their forces, so that they were unable, amidst their disastrous reverses at Chios and elsewhere, to take energetic measures in reference to Philip and Amphipolis. Nevertheless he still did not peremptorily refuse the surrender, but continued to amuse the Athenians with delusive hopes, suggested through his partisans, paid or voluntary, in the public assembly.

It was the more necessary for him to postpone any open breach with Athens, because the Olynthians had conceived serious alarm from his conquest of Amphipolis, and had sent to negotiate a treaty of amity and alliance with the Athenians. Such an alliance, had it been concluded, would have impeded the farther schemes of Philip. But his partisans at Athens procured the dismissal of the Olynthian envoys, by renewed assurances that the Macedonian prince was still the friend of Athens, and still disposed to cede Amphipolis as her legitimate possession. They represented, however, that he had good ground for complaining that Athens continued to retain Pydna, an ancient Macedonian seaport.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly they proposed to open negotiations with him for the exchange of

Importance of Amphipolis to Philip—disappointment of the Athenians at his breach of promise.

Philip amuses the Athenians with false assurances—he induces them to reject advances from the Olynthians—proposed exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis.

note. Demosthenès, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5.

Hierax and Stratoklês were the Amphipolitan envoys despatched to Athens to ask for aid against Philip. An Inscription yet remains, recording the sentence of perpetual

banishment against Philo and Stratoklês. See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. No. 2008.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 61, 137; Diodor. xiii. 49. Pydna had been acquired to Athens by Timotheus.

Pydna against Amphipolis. But as the Pydnæans were known to be adverse to the transfer, secrecy was indispensable in the preliminary proceedings; so that Antiphon and Charidæmus, the two envoys named, took their instructions from the Senate and made their reports only to the Senate. The public assembly being informed that negotiations, unavoidably secret, were proceeding, to ensure the acquisition of Amphipolis—was persuaded to repel the advances of Olynthus, as well as to look upon Philip still as a friend.<sup>1</sup>

The proffered alliance of the Olynthians was thus rejected, as the entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid had previously been. Athens had good reason to repent of both. The secret negotiation brought her no nearer to the possession of Amphipolis. It ended in nothing, or in worse than nothing, as it amused her with delusive expectations, while Philip opened a treaty with the Olynthians, irritated, of course, by their recent repulse at Athens. As yet he had maintained pacific relations with the Athenians, even while holding Amphipolis contrary to his engagement. But he now altered his policy, and contracted alliance with the Olynthians; whose friendship he purchased not only by ceding to them the district of Anthemus (lying between Olynthus and Therma, and disputed by the Olynthians with former Macedonian kings), but also by conquering and handing over to them the important Athenian possession of Potidæa.<sup>2</sup> We know no particulars of these important transactions. Our scanty authorities merely inform us, that during the first two years (358-356 B.C.), while Athens was absorbed by her disastrous Social War, Philip began to act as her avowed enemy. He conquered from her not only Pydna and other places for himself, but also Potidæa for the Olynthians. We are told that Pydna was betrayed to Philip by a party of traitors in the town;<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> This secret negotiation, about the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, is alluded to briefly by Demosthenès, and appears to have been fully noticed by Theopompus (Demosthenès, Olynth. ii. p. 19. s. 6. with the comments of Ulpian;

Theopompus, Fr. 189, ed. Didot).

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. adv. Leptinem, p. 476. s. 71. . . . . φέρε δὲ καὶ αὖτις ἐξατάσμεν, οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πύδναν καὶ τὰλλα χωρὶς τῷ Φιλίππῳ τῷ ποτ'.

he probably availed himself of the propositions made by Athens respecting the exchange of Pydna for Amphipolis, to exasperate the Pydnæans against her bad faith; since they would have good ground for resenting the project of transferring them underhand, contrary to their own inclination. Pydna was the first place besieged and captured. Several of its inhabitants, on the ground of prior offence towards Macedonia,<sup>1</sup> are said to have been slain, while even those who had betrayed the town were contemptuously treated. The siege lasted long enough to transmit news to Athens, and to receive aid, had the Athenians acted with proper celerity in despatching forces. But either the pressure of the Social War—or the impatience of personal service as well as of pecuniary payment—or both causes operating together—made them behindhand with the exigency. Several Athenian citizens were taken in Pydna and sold into slavery, some being ransomed by Demosthenês out of his own funds; yet we cannot make out clearly that any relief at all was sent from Athens.<sup>2</sup> If any was sent, it came too late.

Equal tardiness was shown in the relief sent to Potidæa<sup>3</sup>—though the siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians, was both long and costly<sup>4</sup>—and though

ἐπαρθέντες ὑμᾶς ἡδίκουν; ἢ πᾶσι πρό-  
δηλον τοῦτο, ὅτι ταῖς παρ' ἐκείνου  
δωρεαῖς, ἃς διὰ ταῦτα ἔσσεσθαι σφίσιν  
ἤρουντο;

Compare Olynthiac i. p. 10. s. 5.

This discourse was pronounced in 356 B.C., thus affording confirmatory evidence of the date assigned to the surrender of Pydna and Potidæa.

What the "other places" here alluded to by Demosthenês are (besides Pydna and Potidæa), we do not know. It appears by Diodorus (xvi. 31) that Methônê was not taken till 354-353 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> The conquests of Philip are always enumerated by Demosthenês in this order, Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, &c., Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9. p. 13. s. 13; Philippic i. p. 41. s. 6; De Coronâ, p. 248. s. 85.

See Ulpian ad Demosthenem, Olynth. i. p. 10. s. 5; also Diodor. xvi. 8; and Wesseling's note.

<sup>2</sup> In the public vote of gratitude passed many years afterwards by the Athenian assembly towards Demosthenês, his merits are recited; and among them we find this contribution towards the relief of captives at Pydna, Methônê, and Olynthus (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 851).

<sup>3</sup> Compare Demosthenês, Olynthiac i. p. 11. s. 9; Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40 (where he mentions the expedition to Potidæa as having come too late, but does not mention any expedition for relief of Pydna).

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 128. πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολέμων, χροῖματα πολλὰ ἀναλωσας (Philip, in the siege of Potidæa). In this

there were a body of Athenian settlers (Kleruchs) resident there, whom the capture of the place expelled from their houses and properties.<sup>1</sup> Even for the rescue of these fellow-citizens, it does not appear that any native Athenians would undertake the burden of personal service. The relieving force despatched seems to have consisted of a general with mercenary foreigners; who, as no pay was provided for them, postponed the enterprise on which they were sent, to the temptation of plundering elsewhere for their own profit.<sup>2</sup> It was thus that Philip, without any express declaration of war, commenced a series of hostile measures against Athens, and deprived her of several valuable maritime possessions on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, besides his breach of faith respecting the cession of Amphipolis.<sup>3</sup> After her losses from the Social War, and her disappointment about Amphipolis, she was yet

oration (delivered B.C. 352) Demosthenès treats the capture of Potidæa as mainly the work of Philip; in the second Olynthiac, he speaks as if Philip had been a secondary agent, a useful adjunct to the Olynthians in the siege, πάλιν αὖ πρὸς Ποτιδαίαν Ὀλυνθίοις ἐφάνη τι τοῦτο συναμφοτέρων—i. e. the Macedonian power was προσθήκη τις οὐ σμικρά.... The first representation, delivered two or three years before the second, is doubtless the more correct.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenès, Philipp. ii. p. 71. s. 22. Ποτιδαίαν δ' ἐδίδου, τοὺς Ἀθηναίων ἀποίκους ἐκβάλλων (Philip gave it to the Olynthians), καὶ τῇ μὲν ἐχθρᾷ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτὸς ἀνήρητο, τὴν χωρὰν δ' ἐκείνοις ἐδοῶναι καρποῦσθαι. The passage in the Oratio de Halonneso (p. 79. s. 19) alludes to this same extrusion and expropriation of the Athenian Kleruchs, though Voemel and Franke (erroneously, I think) suppose it to allude to the treatment of these Kleruchs by Philip, some years afterwards, when he took Potidæa for himself. We may be sure that no Athenian Kleruchs were per-

mitted to stay at Potidæa even after the first capture.

<sup>2</sup> The general description given in the first Philippic of Demosthenès, of the ἀπόστολοι from Athens, may doubtless be applied to the expedition for the relief of Potidæa—Demosthenès, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 28. p. 53. s. 52. and the general tenor of the harangue.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 8), in mentioning the capture of Potidæa, considers it an evidence of the kind disposition of Philip, and of his great respect for the dignity of Athens (φιλανθρώπως προσενηγάμενος) that he spared the persons of these Athenians in the place, and permitted them to depart. But it was a great wrong, under the circumstances, that he should expel and expropriate them, when no offence had been given to him, and when there was no formal war (Demosth. Or. de Halonneso, p. 79. s. 10).

Diodorus states also that Philip gave Pydna, as well as Potidæa, to the Olynthians; which is not correct.

farther mortified by seeing Pydna pass into his hands, and Potidæa (the most important possession in Thrace next to Amphipolis) into those of Olynthus. Her impoverished settlers returned home, doubtless with bitter complaints against the aggression, but also with just vexation against the tardiness of their countrymen in sending relief.

These two years had been so employed by Philip as to advance prodigiously his power and ascendancy. He had deprived Athens of her hold upon the Thermaic gulf, in which she now seems only to have retained the town of Methônê, instead of the series of ports round the gulf acquired for her by Timotheus.<sup>1</sup> He had conciliated the good-will of the Olynthians by his cession of Anthemus and Potidæa; the latter place, from its commanding situation on the isthmus of Pallênê, giving them the mastery of that peninsula,<sup>2</sup> and ensuring (what to Philip was of great importance) their enmity with Athens. He not only improved the maritime conveniences of Amphipolis, but also extended his acquisitions into the auriferous regions of Mount Pangæus eastward of the Strymon. He possessed himself of that productive country immediately facing the island of Thasos; where both Thasians and Athenians had once contended for the rights of mining, and from whence, apparently, both had extracted valuable produce. In the interior of this region he founded a new city called Philippi, enlarged from a previous town called Krênides, recently founded by the Thasians. Moreover, he took such effective measures for increasing the metallic works in the neighbourhood, that they presently yielded to him a large revenue; according to Diodorus, not less than 1000 talents per annum.<sup>3</sup> He caused a new gold coin to be struck, bearing a name derived from his own. The fresh source of wealth thus opened was of the greatest moment to him, as furnishing means to meet the constantly increasing expense of his military force. He had full employment to keep his soldiers in training; for the nations of the interior

B.C. 358-356.

Increase of the power of Philip—he founds Philippi, opens gold mines near Mount Pangæus, and derives large revenues from them.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenès, Philippiæ i. p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès, Philippiæ ii. p. 70.

Ε. 6. . . . . εἰχομέν ποτε ἡμεῖς

s. 22.

Πύδναν καὶ Ποτιδαῖαν καὶ Μεθώνην,

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 4-8; Harpokration

καὶ πάντα τὸν τόπον τοῦτον

v. Δάτον. Herodot. ix. 74.

οἰκεῖον κύκλῳ, &c.

—Illyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians—humbled but not subdued, rose again in arms, and tried again jointly to reclaim their independence. The army of Philip—under his general Parmenio, of whom we now hear for the first time—defeated them, and again reduced them to submission.<sup>1</sup>

It was during this interval too that Philip married Olympias, daughter of Neoptolemos prince of the Molossi,<sup>2</sup> and descended from the ancient Molossian kings, who boasted of an heroic Æakid genealogy. Philip had seen her at the religious mysteries in the island of Samothrace, where both were initiated at the same time. In violence of temper—in jealous, cruel, and vindictive disposition—she forms almost a parallel to the Persian queens Amestris and Parysatis. The Epirotic women, as well as the Thracian, were much given to the Bacchanalian religious rites, celebrated with fierce ecstasy amid the mountain solitudes in honour of Dionysus.<sup>3</sup> To this species of religious excitement Olympias was peculiarly susceptible. She is said to have been fond of tame snakes playing around her, and to have indulged in ceremonies of magic and incantation.<sup>4</sup> Her temper and character became, after no long time, repulsive and even alarming to Philip. But in the year 356 B.C. she bore to him a son, afterwards renowned as Alexander the Great. It was in the summer of this year, not long after the taking of Potidæa, that Philip received nearly at the same time, three messengers with good news—the birth of his son; the defeat of the Illyrians by Parmenio; and the success of one of his running horses at the Olympic games.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22; Plutarch, Alex. and. c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, vii. 6.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 2, 3. The Bacchæ of Euripidès contains a powerful description of these exciting ceremonies.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Alexander. c. 2. ἡ δὲ Ὀλυμπιάς μᾶλλον ἐτέρων ζηλώσασα

τὰς κατοχὰς, καὶ τοὺς ἐνθουσιασμοὺς ἐξήγουσα βαρβαρικώτερον, ὅφεις μεγάλους χειροσῆθεις ἐφείλκετο τοῖς θιάσοις, &c.

Compare Duris apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 560.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 3; Justin, xii. 19.

## CHAPTER LXXXVII.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SACRED WAR  
TO THAT OF THE OLYNTHIAN WAR.

IT has been recounted in the preceding chapter, how Philip, during the continuance of the Social War, aggrandised himself in Macedonia and Thrace at the expense of Athens, by the acquisition of Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa—the two last actually taken from her, the first captured only under false assurances held out to her while he was besieging it: how he had farther strengthened himself by enlisting Olynthus both as an ally of his own, and as an enemy of the Athenians. He had thus begun the war against Athens, usually spoken of as the war about Amphipolis, which lasted without any formal peace for twelve years. The resistance opposed by Athens to these his first aggressions had been faint and ineffective—partly owing to embarrassments. But the Social War had not yet terminated, when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, sprang up elsewhere—known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable aggressor in Macedonia.

The Amphiktyonic assembly, which we shall now find exalted into an inauspicious notoriety, was an Hellenic institution ancient and venerable, but rarely invested with practical efficiency. Though political by occasion, it was religious in its main purpose, associated with the worship of Apollo at Delphi and of Dêmêtêr at Thermopylæ. Its assemblies were held twice annually—in spring at Delphi, in autumn at Thermopylæ; while in every fourth year it presided at the celebration of the great Pythian festival near Delphi, or appointed persons to preside in its name. It consisted of deputies called Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ, sent by

Causes of  
the Sacred  
War—the  
Amphikty-  
onic as-  
sembly.

the twelve ancient nations or fractions of the Hellenic name, who were recognised as its constituent body: Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnètes, Lokrians, Cêtæans or Ænians, Achæans, Malians, Phokians, Dolopes. These were the twelve nations, sole partners in the Amphiktyonic sacred rites and meetings: each nation, small and great alike, having two votes in the decision and no more; and each city, small and great alike, contributing equally to make up the two votes of that nation to which it belonged. Thus Sparta counted only as one of the various communities forming the Dorian nation: Athens, in like manner in the Ionian, not superior in rank to Erythræ or Priênê.<sup>1</sup>

That during the preceding century, the Aphiktyonic assembly had meddled rarely, and had never meddled to any important purpose, in the political affairs of Greece—is proved by the fact that it is not once mentioned either in the history of Thucydidês, or in the Hellenica of Xenophon. But after the humiliation of Sparta at Leuktra, this great religious convocation of the Hellenic world, after long torpor, began to meet for the despatch of business. Unfortunately its manifestations of activity were for the most part abusive and mischievous. Probably not long after the battle of Leuktra, though we do not know the precise year—the Thebans exhibited before the Amphiktyons an accusation against Sparta, for having treacherously seized the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) in a period of profound peace. Sentence of condemnation was pronounced against her,<sup>2</sup> together with a fine of 500 talents, doubled after a certain interval of non-payment. The act here put in accusation was indisputably a gross political wrong; and a pretence, though a very slight pretence, for bringing political wrong under cognizance of the Amphiktyons, might be found in the tenor of the old oath taken by each included city.<sup>3</sup> Still, every one knew that for generations past, the assembly had taken no actual cognizance of political wrong; so that

Political  
complaint  
brought  
before the  
assembly,  
first by  
Thebes  
against  
Sparta.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. p. *seqq.*

280. c. 36. For particulars respecting the Amphiktyonic assembly, see the treatise of Tittman, Ueber den Amphiktyonischen Bund, p. 37, 45,

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 23-29; Justin, viii. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, De Fals. Leg. p. 279. c. 35.

both trial and sentence were alike glaring departures from understood Grecian custom—proving only the humiliation of Sparta and the insolence of Thebes. The Spartans of course did not submit to pay, nor were there any means of enforcement against them. No practical effect followed therefore, except (probably) the exclusion of Sparta from the Amphiktyonic assembly—as well as from the Delphian temple and the Pythian games. Indirectly, however, the example was most pernicious, as demonstrating that the authority of a Pan-hellenic convocation, venerable from its religious antiquity, could be abused to satisfy the political antipathies of a single leading state.

In the year 357 B.C., a second attempt was made by Thebes to employ the authority of the Amphiktyonic assembly as a means of crushing her neighbours the Phokians. The latter had been, from old time, border-enemies of the Thebans, Lokrians, and Thessalians. Until the battle of Leuktra, they had fought as allies of Sparta against Thebes, but had submitted to Thebes after that battle, and continued to be her allies, though less and less cordial, until the battle of Mantinea and the death of Epaminondas.<sup>1</sup> Since that time, the old antipathy appears to have been rekindled, especially on the part of Thebes. Irritated against the Phokians probably as having broken off from a sworn alliance, she determined to raise against them an accusation in the Amphiktyonic assembly. As to the substantive ground of accusation, we find different statements. According to one witness, they were accused of having cultivated some portion of the Kirrhæan plain, consecrated from of old to Apollo; according to another, they were charged with an aggressive invasion of Bœotia; while according to a third, the war was caused by their having carried off Theano, a married Theban woman. Pausanias confesses that he cannot distinctly make out what was the allegation against them.<sup>2</sup> Assisted by the antipathy of the Thessalians and

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Next, by Thebes against the Phokians. The Phokians are condemned and heavily fined.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 5, 23, and vii. 5, 4. About the feud of the Thessalians and Phokians, see Herodot. vii. 176, viii. 27; 43—of the Lokrians and Phokians, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 5, 3; Pausanias, iii. 9. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 23; Justin, viii. 1; Pausanias, x. 2, 1; Duris ap. Athe-

Lokrians, not less vehement than her own, Thebes had no difficulty in obtaining sentence of condemnation against the Phokians. A fine was imposed upon them; of what amount, we are not told, but so heavy as to be far beyond their means of payment.

It was thus that the Thebans, who had never been able to attach to themselves a powerful confederacy such as that which formerly held its meetings at Sparta, supplied the deficiency by abusing their ascendancy in the Amphiktyonic assembly to procure vengeance upon political enemies. A certain time was allowed for liquidating the fine, which the Phokians had neither means nor inclination to do. Complaint of the fact was then made at the next meeting of the Amphiktyons, when a decisive resolution was adopted, and engraven along with the rest on a column in the Delphian temple, to expropriate the recusant Phokians, and consecrate all their territory to Apollo — as Kirrha with its fertile plain had been treated two centuries before. It became necessary, at the same time, for the maintenance of consistency and equal dealing, to revive the mention of the previous fine still remaining unpaid by the Lacedæmonians; against whom it was accordingly proposed to pass a vote of something like excommunication.

Such impending dangers, likely to be soon realized under the instigation of Thebes, excited a resolute spirit of resistance among the Phokians. A wealthy and leading citizen of the Phokian town Ledon, named Philomeluss on of Theotimus, stood forward as the head of this sentiment, setting himself energetically to organize means for the preservation of Phokian liberty as well as property. Among his assembled countrymen, he protested against the gross injustice of the recent sentence, amercing them in an enormous sum exceeding their means; when the

B.C. 357.

The assembly pass a vote consecrating the Phokian territory to Apollo.

Resolution of the Phokians to resist—Philomelus their leader.

næum, xiii. p. 560. Justin says, "Causa et origo hujus mali, Thebani fuere; qui cum rerum potirentur, secundam fortunam imbecillo animo ferentes, victos armis Lacedæmonios et Phocenses, quasi parva supplicia cædibus et rapinis luisent, apud commune Græciæ con-

cilium superbe accusaverunt. Lacedæmoniis crimini datum, quod arcem Thebanam induciarum tempore occupassent; Phocensibus, quod Bœotiam depopulati essent; prorsus quasi post arma et bellum locum legibus reliquissent."

strip of land, where they were alleged to have trespassed on the property of the god, was at best narrow and insignificant. Nothing was left now to avert from them utter ruin, except a bold front and an obstinate resistance; which he (Philomelus) would pledge himself to conduct with success, if they would entrust him with full powers. The Phokians (he contended) were the original and legitimate administrators of the Delphian temple—a privilege of which they had been wrongfully dispossessed by the Amphiktyonic assembly and the Delphians. “Let us reply to our enemies (he urged) by re-asserting our lost rights and seizing the temple; we shall obtain support and countenance from many Grecian states, whose interest is the same as our own, to resist the unjust decrees of the Amphiktyons.<sup>1</sup> Our enemies the Thebans (he added) are plotting the seizure of the temple for themselves, through the corrupt connivance of an Amphiktyonic majority: let us anticipate and prevent their injustice.”<sup>2</sup>

Here a new question was raised, respecting the right of presidency over the most venerated sanctuary in Greece; a question fraught with ruin to the peace of the Hellenic world. The claim of the Phokians was not a mere fiction, but founded on an ancient reality, and doubtless believed by themselves to be just. Delphi and its inhabitants were originally a portion of the Phokian name. In the Homeric Catalogue, which Philomelus emphatically cited, it stands enumerated among the Phokians commanded by Schedius and

Question of right raised as to the presidency of the temple—old right of the Phokians against that of the Delphians and the Amphiktyons.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 23, 24; Pau-anias, x. 2, 1.

<sup>2</sup> That this design, imputed to the Thebans, was a part of the case made out by the Phokians for themselves, we may feel assured from the passage in Demosthenès, Fals. Leg. p. 347. s. 22. Demosthenès charges Æschinès with having made false promises and statements to the Athenian assembly, on returning from his embassy in 346 B.C. Æschinès told the Athenians (so Demosthenès affirms) that he had persuaded Philip to act altogether in the interest and policy of Athens;

that the Athenians would presently see Thebes besieged by Philip, and the Bœotian towns restored; and furthermore, τῷ θεῷ δὲ τὰ χρήματα εἰσπραττόμενα, οὐ παρὰ Φωκίων, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Θηβαίων τῶν βουλευσάντων τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ διδάσκειν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὸν Φίλιππον οὐτι οὐδὲν ἡττόν ἤσεβήχασιν οἱ βεβουλευκότες τῶν ταῖς χερσὶ πραξάντων, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα χρήμαθ' ἑαυτῷ τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐπιχεκρυχέναι.

How far Æschinès really promised to the Athenians that which Demosthenès here alleges him to

Epistrophus, under the name of the "rocky Pytho"—a name still applied to it by Herodotus.<sup>1</sup> The Delphians had acquired sufficient force to sever themselves from their Phokian brethren—to stand out as a community by themselves—and to assume the lucrative privilege of administering the temple as their own peculiar. Their severance had been first brought about, and their pretensions as administrators espoused, by Sparta,<sup>2</sup> upon whose powerful interest they mainly depended. But the Phokians had never ceased to press their claim, and so far was the dispute from being settled against them, even in 450 B.C., that they then had in their hands the actual administration. The Spartans despatched an army for the express purpose of taking it away from them and transferring it to the Delphians; but very shortly afterwards, when the Spartan forces had retired, the Athenians marched thither, and dispossessed the Delphians,<sup>3</sup> restoring the temple to the Phokians. This contest went by the name of the Sacred War. At that time the Athenians were masters of most parts of Bœotia, as well as of Megara and Pegæ; and had they continued so, the Phokians would probably have been sustained in their administration of the holy place; the rights of the Delphians on one side, against those of the Phokians on the other, being then obviously dependent on the comparative strength of Athens and Sparta. But presently evil days came upon Athens, so that she lost all her inland possessions north of Attica, and could no longer uphold her allies in Phokis. The Phokians now in fact passed into allies of Sparta, and were forced to relinquish their temple management to the Delphians; who were confirmed in it by a formal article of the peace of Nikias in 421 B.C.,<sup>4</sup> and retained it without question, under the recognised Hellenic

have promised—is a matter to be investigated when we arrive at the transactions of the year 346 B.C. But it seems to me clear that the imputation (true or false) against the Thebans, of having been themselves in conspiracy to seize the temple, must have emanated first from the Phokians, as part of the justification of their own proceedings. If the Thebans ever conceived an idea, it must have been

*before* the actual occupation of the temple by the Phokians; if they were falsely charged with conceiving it, the false charge would also be preferred at the time. Demosthenês would hardly invent it twelve years after the Phokian occupation.

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. i. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, ix. p. 423.

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i. 12.

<sup>4</sup> Thucyd. v. 13.

supremacy of Sparta, down to the battle of Leuktra. Even then, too, it continued undisturbed; since Thebes was nowise inclined to favour the claim of her enemies the Phokians, but was on the contrary glad to be assisted in crushing them by their rivals the Delphians; who, as managers of the temple, could materially contribute to a severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic assembly.

We see thus that the claim now advanced by Philomelus was not fictitious, but genuine, and felt by himself as well as by other Phokians to be the recovery of an ancient privilege, lost only through superior force.<sup>1</sup> His views being heartily embraced by his countrymen, he was nominated general with full powers. It was his first measure to go to Sparta, upon whose aid he counted, in consequence of the heavy fine which still stood imposed upon her by the Amphiktyonic sentence. He explained his views privately to King Archidamus, engaging, if the Phokians should become masters of the temple, to erase the sentence and fine from the column of record. Archidamus did not dare to promise him public countenance or support; the rather, as Sparta had always been the chief supporter of the Delphian presidency (as against the Phokian) over the temple. But in secret he warmly encouraged the scheme; furnishing a sum of fifteen talents, besides a few mercenary soldiers, towards its execution. With this aid Philomelus returned home, provided an equal sum of fifteen talents from his purse, and collected a body of peltasts, Phokians as well as strangers. He then executed his design against Delphi, attacking suddenly both the town and the temple, and capturing them, as it would appear, with little opposition. To the alarmed Delphians, generally, he promised security and good treatment; but he put to death the members of the Gens (or Clan) called Thrakidæ, and seized their property: these men constituted one among several holy Gentes, leading conductors of the political and religious agency of the place.<sup>2</sup> It is probable,

Active measures taken by Philomelus. He goes to Sparta— obtains aid from king Archidamus. He seizes Delphi— defeats the Lokrians.

<sup>1</sup> Justin (viii. 1) takes no notice of this first position of the Phokians in regard to the temple of Delphi. He treats them as if they had been despoilers of the temple even at first; "velut deo irascentes."  
<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 24. Hesychius (v. Λατριάδαι) mentions another phratry or gens at Delphi, called La-phriadæ. See Wilhelm Götte, Das

that when thus suddenly assailed, they had sent to solicit aid from their neighbours the Lokrians of Amphissa; for Philomelus was scarcely in possession of Delphi, when these latter marched up to the rescue. He defeated them however with serious loss, and compelled them to return home.

Thus completely successful in his first attempt, Philomelus lost no time in announcing solemnly and formally his real purpose. He proclaimed that he had come only to resume for the Phokians their ancient rights as administrators; that the treasures of the temple should be safe and respected as before; that no impiety or illegality of any kind should be tolerated; and that the temple and its oracle would be opened, as heretofore, for visitors, sacrificers, and inquirers. At the same time, well aware that his Lokrian enemies at Amphissa were very near, he erected a wall to protect the town and temple, which appears to have been hitherto undefended—especially its western side. He farther increased his levies of troops. While the Phokians, inspirited with this first advantage obeyed his call in considerable numbers, he also attracted new mercenaries from abroad by the offer of higher pay. He was presently at the head of 5000 men, strong enough to hold a difficult post like Delphi against all immediate attack. But being still anxious to appease Grecian sentiment and avert hostility, he despatched envoys to all the principal states—not merely to Sparta and Athens, but also to his enemy Thebes. His envoys were instructed to offer solemn assurances, that the Phokians had taken Delphi simply to reclaim their paternal right of presidency against past wrongful usurpation; that they were prepared

Philomelus fortifies the temple—levies numerous mercenaries—tries to conciliate Grecian sentiment by promising respect to the temple property. The Grecian world divided.

Delphische Orakel, p. 83. Leipsic, 1839.

It is stated by Pausanias, that the Phokians were bent upon dealing with Delphi and its inhabitants in the harshest manner; intending to kill all the men of military age, to sell the remaining population as slaves, and to raze the whole town to the ground. Archidamus king of Sparta (according to Pausanias) induced the Phokians to

abandon this resolution (Pausanias iii. 10, 4).

At what moment the Phokians ever determined on this step—or, indeed, whether they ever really determined on it—we cannot feel any certainty. Nor can we decide confidently, whether Pausanias borrowed the statement from Theopompus, whom he quotes a little before.

to give any security required by the Hellenic body, for strict preservation of the valuables in the temple, and to exhibit and verify all, by weight and number, before examiners; that conscious of their own rectitude of purpose, they did not hesitate to entreat positive support against their enemies, or at any rate, neutrality.<sup>1</sup>

The answers sent to Philomelus were not all of the same tenor. On this memorable event, the sentiments of the Grecian world were painfully divided. While Athens, Sparta, the Peloponnesian Achæans and some other states in Peloponnesus, recognised the possession of the Phokians, and agreed to assist them in retaining it—the Thebans and Thessalians declared strenuously against them, supported by all the states north of Bœotia, Lokrians, Dorians,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 27. 'Ομοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν, ἀπολογούμενος, ὅτι κατεῖληπται τοὺς Δελφοὺς, οὐ τοῖς ἱεροῖς χρήμασιν ἐπιβουλεύων, ἀλλὰ τῆς τοῦ ἱεροῦ προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν εἶναι γὰρ Φωκέων αὐτὴν ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς παλαιοῖς χρόνοις ἀποδεδειγμένην. Τῶν δὲ χρημάτων τὸν λόγον ἔφη πᾶσι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἀποδώσειν, καὶ τὸν τε σταθμὸν καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀναθημάτων ἕτοιμος εἶναι παραδίδοναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐξετάζειν. Ἡζίου δὲ, ἂν τις δὲ ἐχθρὰν ἢ φθόρον πολέμῃ Φωκεῦσι, ἀλίστα μὲν ξυμμαχεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ γε, τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν.

In reference to the engagement taken by Philomelus, that he would exhibit and verify, before any general Hellenic examiners, all the valuable property in the Delphian temple, by weight and number of articles—the reader will find interesting matter of comparison in the Attic Inscriptions, No. 137-142, vol. i. of Boeckh's *Corpus Inscript. Græcarum*—with Boeckh's valuable commentary. These are the records of the numerous gold and silver donatives, preserved in the Parthenon, handed over by the treasurers

of the goddess annually appointed, to their successors at the end of the year, from one Panathenaic festival to the next. The weight of each article is formally recorded, and the new articles received each year (ἐπίτευα) are specified. Where an article is transferred without being weighed (ἄσταθμον), the fact is noticed.—That the precious donatives in the Delphian temple also, were carefully weighed, we may judge by the statement of Herodotus, that the golden lion dedicated by Kræsus had lost a fraction of its weight in the conflagration of the building (Herodot. i. 50).

Pausanias (x. 2, 1) does not advert to the difference between the first and the second part of the proceedings of Philomelus: first, the seizure of the temple, without any spoliation of the treasure, but simply upon the plea that the Phokians had the best right to administer its affairs; next, the seizure of the treasure and donatives of the temple—which he came to afterwards, when he found it necessary for defence.

Ænians, Phthiot-Achæans, Magnètes, Perrhæbians, Athamânes, and Dolopes. Several of these last were dependents of the Thessalians, and followed their example; many of them moreover, belonging to the Amphiktyonic constituency, must have taken part in the votes of condemnation just rescinded by the Phokians.

We may clearly see that it was not at first the intention of Philomelus or his Phokian comrades to lay hands on the property of the Delphian temple; and Philomelus, while taking pains to set himself right in the eyes of Greece, tried to keep the prophetic agency of the temple in its going—conduct of the Pythia. ordinary working, so as to meet the exigencies of sacrificers and inquirers as before. He required the Pythian priestess to mount the tripod, submit herself to the prophetic inspiration, and pronounce the words thus put into her mouth, as usual. But the priestess—chosen by the Delphians, and probably herself a member of one among the sacred Delphian Gentes—obstinately refused to obey him; especially as the first question which he addressed concerned his own usurpation, and his chances of success against enemies. On his injunctions, that she should prophesy according to the traditional rites—she replied, that these rites were precisely what he had just overthrown upon which he laid hold of her, and attempted to place her on the tripod by force. Subdued and frightened for her own personal safety, the priestess exclaimed involuntarily, that he might do what he chose. Philomelus gladly took this as an answer favourable to his purpose. He caused it to be put in writing and proclaimed, as an oracle from the god, sanctioning and licensing his designs. He convened a special meeting of his partisans and the Delphians generally, wherein appeal was made to this encouraging answer, as warranting full confidence with reference to the impending war. So it was construed by all around and confirmatory evidence was derived from farther signs and omens occurring at the moment.<sup>1</sup> It is probable however that Philomelus took care for the future to name a new priestess, more favourable to his interest, and disposed to deliver oracular answers under the new administrators in the same manner as under the old.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 25, 26, 27.

Though so large a portion of the Grecian name had thus declared war against the Phokians, yet none at first appear to have made hostile movements, except the Lokrians, with whom Philomelus was fully competent to deal. He found himself strong enough to overrun and plunder their territory, engaging in some indecisive skirmishes. At first the Lokrians would not even give up the bodies of his slain soldiers for burial, alleging that sacrilegious men were condemned by the general custom of Greece to be cast out without sepulture. Nor did they desist from their refusal until he threatened retaliation towards the bodies of their own slain.<sup>1</sup> So bitter was the exasperation arising out of this deplorable war throughout the Hellenic world! Even against the Lokrians alone, however, Philomelus soon found himself in want of money, for the payment of his soldiers—native Phokians as well as mercenary strangers. Accordingly, while he still adhered to his pledge to respect the temple property, he did not think himself precluded from levying a forced contribution on the properties of his enemies, the wealthy Delphian citizens; and his arms were soon crowned with a brilliant success against the Lokrians, in a battle fought near the Rocks called Phædriades; a craggy and difficult locality so close to Delphi, that the Lokrians must evidently have been the aggressors, marching up with a view to relieve the town. They were defeated with great loss, both in slain and in prisoners; several of them only escaping the spear of the enemy by casting themselves to certain death down the precipitous cliffs.<sup>2</sup>

This victory, while imparting courage to the Phokians, proved the signal for fresh exertions among their numerous enemies. The loud complaints of the defeated Lokrians raised universal sympathy; and the Thebans, now pressed by fear, as well as animated by hatred, of the Phokians, put themselves at the head of the movement. Sending round envoys to the Thessalians and the other Amphiktyonic states, they invoked aid and urged the necessity of mustering a common force—"to assist the god,"—to vindicate the judicial dignity of the Amphiktyonic assembly,—and to put down the sacrilegious Phokians.<sup>3</sup>

Battles of  
Philomelus  
against the  
Lokrians—  
his success.

B.C. 356-355.  
Exertions  
of the The-  
bans to  
raise a con-  
federacy  
against the  
Phokians.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 28. ψηφισαμένων δὲ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν πρὸς Φωκεῖς

It appears that a special meeting of the assembly itself was convened; probably at Thermopylæ, since Delphi was in possession of the enemy. Decided resolutions were here taken to form an Amphiktyonic army of execution; accompanied by severe sentences of fine and other punishments, against the Phokian leaders by name—Philomelus and Onomarchus, perhaps brothers, but at least joint commanders, together with others.<sup>1</sup>

The peril of the Phokians now became imminent. Their own unaided strength was nowise sufficient to resist the confederacy about to arm in defence of the Amphiktyonic assembly;<sup>2</sup> nor does it appear that either Athens or Sparta had as yet given them anything more than promises and encouragement. Their only chance of effective resistance lay in the levy of a large mercenary force; for which purpose neither their own funds, nor any farther aid derivable from private confiscation, could be made adequate. There remained no other resource except to employ the treasures and valuables in the Delphian temple, upon which accordingly Philomelus now laid hands. He did so, however, as his previous conduct evinced, with sincere reluctance, probably with various professions at first of borrowing only a given sum, destined to meet the actual emergency, and intended to be repaid as soon as safety should be provided for.<sup>3</sup> But whatever may have been his intentions

πόλεμον, πολλή ταραχή καὶ διάστασις ἦν καθ' ἑλὴν τὴν Ἑλλάδα. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοὺς Φωκεῖς, ὡς ἱεροσύλους, χολάζειν· οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Φωκῶν βοήθειαν ἀπέκλιναν.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 32. about Onomarchus—πολλαῖς γὰρ καὶ μεγάλας δίκαις ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις, &c.

Onomarchus is denominated the colleague of Philomelus, cap. 31, and his brother, cap. 61.

<sup>2</sup> Even in 374 B.C., three years before the battle of Leuktra, the Phokians had been unable to defend themselves against Thebes without

aid from Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 1).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 30. ἡναγχάζετο (Philomelus) τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναβήμασιν ἐμβαλεῖν τὰς χεῖρας καὶ συλᾶν τὸ μαντεῖον. A similar proposition had been started by the Corinthian envoys in the congress at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war; they suggested as one of their ways and means the borrowing from the treasures of Delphi and Olympia, to be afterwards repaid (Thucyd. i. 121). Periklès made the like proposition in the Athenian assembly; "for purposes of security," the property of the temples might be employed to defray the

at the outset, all such reserves or limits, or obligations to repay, were speedily forgotten in practice. When the feeling which protected the fund was broken through, it was as easy to take much as little, and the claimants became more numerous and importunate; besides which, the exigences of the war never ceased, and the implacable repugnance raised by the spoliation amidst half of the Grecian world, left to the Phokians no security except under the protection of a continued mercenary force.<sup>1</sup> Nor were Philomelus and his successors satisfied without also enriching their friends and adorning their wives or favourites.

Availing himself of the large resources of the temple, Philomelus raised the pay of his troops to a sum half as large again as before, and issued proclamations inviting new levies at the same rate. Through such tempting offers he was speedily enabled to muster a force, horse and

B.C. 355-354.

Numerous mercenaries employed by the Phokians—violence and

cost of war, subject to the obligation of replacing the whole afterwards (*χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστήσαι πάλιν*, Thucyd. ii. 13). After the disaster before Syracuse, and during the years of struggle intervening before the close of the war, the Athenians were driven by financial distress to appropriate to public purposes many of the rich donatives in the Parthenon, which they were never afterwards able to replace. Of this abstraction, proof is found in the Inscriptions published by Boeckh, Corp. Inscript. No. 137-142, which contain the official records of the successive Boards of Treasurers of Athênâ. It is stated in an instructive recent Dissertation, by J. L. Ussing (*De Parthenone ejusque partibus Disputatio*, p. 3. Copenhagen, 1849), "Multæ in arce Athenarum inventæ sunt tabulæ Quæstorûm Minervæ, in quibus quotannis inscribebant, quænam vasa aurea aliæque res pretiosæ in æde Minervæ dedicata extarent. Harum longe maxima

pars ante Euclidem archontem scripta est . . . . . Nec tamen una tabula templi dona continebat universa, sed separatim quæ in Pronao, quæ in Hecatompedo, quæ in Parthenone (the part of the temple specially so called), servabantur, separatim suis quæque lapidibus consignata erant. Singulari quadam fortuna contigit, ut inde ab anno 434 B.C. ad 407 B.C., tam multa fragmenta tabularum servata sint, ut hos donorum catalogos aliquatenus restituere possimus. In quo etiam ad historiam illius temporis pertinet, quod florentibus Athenarum rebus opes Deæ semper augeri, fractis autem bello Siculo, inde ab anno 412 B.C., eas paulatim deminui videmus. . . . Urgente pecuniæ inopia Athenienses ad Deam confugiebant, et jam ante annum 406 B.C., pleraque Pronai dona ablata esse videmus. Proximis annis sine dubio nec Hecatompedo nec Parthenoni pepercerunt; nec mirum est, post bellum Peloponnesiacum ex antiquis illis donis fere nulla comparere."

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus, Frag. 182, ed.

ferocity of the war—  
defeat and death of Philomelus.

foot together, said to amount to 10,000 men chiefly, as we are told, men of peculiarly wicked and reckless character, since no pious Greek would enlist in such a service. With these he attacked the Lokrians, who were however now assisted by the Thebans from one side, and by the Thessalians with their circumjacent allies from the other. Philomelus gained successive advantages against both of them, and conceived increased hopes from a reinforcement of 1500 Achæans who came to him from Peloponnesus. The war assumed a peculiarly ferocious character; for the Thebans, confident in their superior force and chance of success, even though the Delphian treasure was employed against them, began by putting to death all their prisoners, as sacrilegious men standing condemned by the Amphiktyonic assembly. This so exasperated the troops of Philomelus, that they constrained him to retaliate upon the Bœotian prisoners. For some time such rigorous inflictions were continued on both sides, until at length the Thebans felt compelled to desist, and Philomelus followed their example. The war lasted awhile with indecisive result, the Thebans and their allies being greatly superior in number. But presently Philomelus incautiously exposed himself to attack in an unfavourable position, near the town of Neon, amidst embarrassing woods and rocks. He was here defeated with severe loss, and his army dispersed; himself receiving several wounds, and fighting with desperate bravery, until farther resistance became impossible. He then tried to escape, but found himself driven to the brink of a precipice, where he could only avoid the tortures of captivity by leaping down and perishing. The remnant of his vanquished army was rallied at some distance by Onomarchus.<sup>2</sup>

The Thebans and their allies, instead of pressing the important victory recently gained over Philomelus, seem to have supposed that the Phokians would now disperse or submit of their own accord,

B.C. 354-353.  
Onomarchus general of the

Didot; Athenæ. xiii. p. 605, vi. p. 232; Ephorus, Frag. 155, ed. Didot; Diodor. xvi. 64.

<sup>1</sup> Isokratès, Orat. v. (ad Philip-pum) s. 60. τελευτώντες δὲ πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν (the Thebans), ὡς τῶν τε πόλεων ἐν ὀλίγῳ

χρόνῳ κρατήσοντας, τὸν τε τόπον ἅπαντα τὸν περιέχοντα κατασχέσοντας, τῶν τε χρημάτων τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς περιγενησόμενοι ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων δαπάναις.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 31; Pausan. x. 2, 1. The dates and duration of these

and accordingly returned home. Their remissness gave time to Onomarchus to re-organize his dispirited countrymen. Convening at Delphi a general assembly of Phokians and allies, he strenuously exhorted them to persevere in the projects, and avenge the death, of their late general. He found however no inconsiderable amount of opposition; for many of the Phokians—noway prepared for the struggle in which they now found themselves embarked, and themselves ashamed of the spoliation of the temple—were anxious by some accommodation to put themselves again within the pale of Hellenic religious sentiment. Onomarchus doubtless replied, and with too good reason, that peace was unattainable upon any terms short of absolute ruin; and that there was no course open except to maintain their ground as they stood, by renewed efforts of force. But even if the necessities of the case had been less imperative, he would have been able to overbear all opposition of his own countrymen through the numerous mercenary strangers, now in Phokis and present at the assembly under the name of allies.<sup>1</sup> In fact, so irresistible was his ascendancy by means of this large paid force under his command, that both Demosthenês and Æschinês<sup>2</sup> denominate him (as well as his predecessor and his successor) not general, but despot, of the Phokians. The soldiers were not less anxious than Onomarchus to prosecute the war, and to employ the yet unexhausted wealth of the temple in every way conducive to ultimate success. In this sense the assembly decreed, naming Onomarchus general with full powers for carrying the decree into effect.

Phokians—  
he renews  
the war—  
his power  
by means of  
the merce-  
naries.

His energetic measures presently retrieved the Phokian cause. Employing the temple funds still more profusely than Philomelus, he invited fresh soldiers from all quarters, and found himself after some time at the head of a larger army than before. The temple exhibited many donatives, not only of gold and silver, but also of brass and iron. While Onomarchus melted the precious metals and coined them into money, he at the same time turned the brass and iron into

Violent  
measures of  
Onomar-  
chus—he  
employs  
the  
treasures of  
the temple  
to scatter  
bribes  
through the  
various  
cities.

events are only known to us in a loose and superficial manner from the narrative of Diodorus.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 32. Οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς—επανήλθον εἰς Δελφούς καὶ συναλθόντες

μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐβουλευόντο περὶ τοῦ πολέμου.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 286. ο 41. τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι τυράννων, &c.

arms;<sup>1</sup> so that he was enabled to equip both his own soldiers disarmed in the recent defeat, and a class of volunteers poorer than the ordinary self-armed mercenaries. Besides paying soldiers, he scattered everywhere presents or bribes to gain influential partisans in the cities favourable to his cause; probably Athens and Sparta first of all. We are told that the Spartan king Archidamus, with his wife Deinicha, were among the recipients; indeed the same corrupt participation was imputed, by the statement of the hostile minded Messenians,<sup>2</sup> to the Spartan Ephors and Senate. Even among enemies, Onomarchus employed his gold with effect, contriving thus to gain or neutralise a portion of the Thessalians; among them the powerful despots of Pheræ, whom we afterwards find allied to him. Thus was the great Delphian treasure turned to account in every way: and the unscrupulous Phokian despot strengthened his hands yet farther, by seizing such of his fellow-countrymen as had been prominent in opposition to his views, putting them to death, and confiscating their property.<sup>3</sup>

Through such combination of profuse allurements, corruption, and violence, the tide began to turn again in favour of the Phokians. Onomarchus found himself shortly at the head of a formidable army, with which he marched forth from Delphi, and subdued successively the Lokrians of Amphissa, the Epiknemidian Lokrians, and the neighbouring territory of Doris. He carried his conquests even as far as the vicinity of Thermopylæ; capturing Thronium, one of the towns which commanded that important pass, and reducing its inhabitants to slavery. It is probable that he also took Nikæa and Alpônus—two other valuable positions near Thermopylæ, which we know to have been

B.C. 354-353.

Successes of Onomarchus—he advances as far as Thermopylæ—he invades Boeotia—is repulsed by the Thebans.

Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. s. 147. Φαύλλος ὁ Φωκεὺς ἢ τις ἄλλος θυναστῆς, &c.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33. The numerous iron spits, dedicated by the courtizan Rhodôpis at Delphi, may probably have been applied to this military purpose. Herodotus (ii. 135) saw them at Delphi; in the time of Plutarch, the guide of the temple only showed the place in

which they had once stood (Plutarch, De Pythiæ Oraculis, p. 400).

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus, Frag. 255, ed. Didot; Pausanias, iii. 10, 2; iv. 5, 1. As Archidamus is said to have furnished fifteen talents privately to Philomelus (Diodor. xvi. 24), he may, perhaps, have received now repayment out of the temple property.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33.

in the power of the Phokians until the moment immediately preceding their ruin—since we find him *ceforward* master of Thermopylæ, and speedily opening his communications with Thessaly.<sup>1</sup> Besides this extension of dominion to the north and east of Phokis, Onomarchus also invaded Bœotia. The Thebans, now deprived of their northern allies, did not at first meet him in the field, so that he was enabled to capture Orchomenus. But when he proceeded to attack Chæroneia, they made an effective effort to relieve the place. They brought out their forces, and defeated him, in an action not very decisive, yet sufficient to constrain him to return into Phokis.

Probably the Thebans were at this time much pressed, and prevented from acting effectively against the Phokians, by want of money. We know at least, that in the midst of the Phokian war they hired out a force of 5000 hoplites commanded by Pammenês, to Artabazus the revolted Phrygian satrap. Here Pammenês with his soldiers acquired some renown, gaining two important victories over the Persians.<sup>2</sup> The Thebans, it would seem, having no fleet and no maritime dependencies, were less afraid of giving offence to the Great King than Athens had been, when she interdicted Charês from aiding Artabazus, and acquiesced in the unfavourable pacification which terminated the Social War. How long Pammenês and the Thebans remained in Asia, we are not informed. But in spite of the victories gained by them, Artabazus was not long able to maintain himself against the Persian

B.C. 353-352.

The Thebans send a force under Pammenês to assist Artabazus in Asia Minor.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33. His account of the operations of Onomarchus is, as usual, very meagre—εις δὲ τὴν πολεμίαν ἐμβαλὼν, Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορχήσας ἐξηνδραποδίσαστο, Ἀμφισσεῖς δὲ καταπληξάμενος, τὰς δ' ἐν Δωριεῦσι πόλεις πορθέσας, τὴν χώραν αὐτῶν ἐδῆωσεν.

That Thronium, with Alpônus and Nikæa, were the three places which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ—and that all the three were in possession of the Phokians immediately before they were conquered by Philip of Macedon in 346 B.C.—we know from Æschinês,

Fals. Leg. p. 286. c. 41.

... πρέσβεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς (the Athenians) ἦλθον ἐκ Φωκίων, βοηθεῖν αὐτοῖς κελεύοντες, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι παραδῶσιν Ἀλπωνὸν καὶ Θρόνιον καὶ Νίκαιαν, τὰ τῶν παρόδων τῶν εἰς Πύλας χωρὶα κύρια.

In order to conquer Thronium, Onomarchus must have marched through and mastered the Epiknemidian Lokrians; and though no place except Thronium is specified by Diodorus, it seems plain that Onomarchus cannot have conquered Thronium alone.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 34.

arms. Three years afterwards, we hear of him and his brother-in-law Memnon as expelled from Asia, and as exiles residing with Philip of Macedon.<sup>1</sup>

While Pammenês was serving under Artabazus, the Athenian general Charês recaptured Sestos in the Hellespont, which appears to have revolted from Athens during the Social War. He treated the captive Sestians with rigour; putting to death the men of military age, and selling the remainder as slaves.<sup>2</sup> This was an important acquisition for Athens, as a condition of security in the Chersonese as well as of preponderance in the Hellespont.

Alarmed at the successes of Charês in the Hellespont, the Thracian prince Kersobleptês now entered on an intrigue with Pammenês in Asia, and with Philip of Macedon (who was on the coast of Thrace, attacking Abdêra and Maroneia), for the purpose of checking the progress of the Athenian arms. Philip appears to have made a forward movement, and to have menaced the possessions of Athens in the Chersonese; but his access thither was forbidden by Amadokus, another prince of Thrace, master of the intermediate territory, as well as by the presence of Charês with his fleet off the Thracian coast.<sup>3</sup> Apollonidês of Kardia was the agent of Kersobleptês; who however finding his schemes abortive, and intimidated by the presence of Charês, came to terms with Athens, and surrendered to her the portion of the Chersonese which still remained to him, with the exception of Kardia. The Athenians sent to the Chersonese a farther detachment of Kleruchs or out-settlers, for whom considerable room must have been made as well by the depopulation of Sestos, as by the recent cession from Kersobleptês.<sup>4</sup> It was in the

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 22, seems to belong to this juncture.

<sup>4</sup> We derive what is here stated from the comparison of two passages, put together as well as the uncertainty of their tenor admits, Diodor. xvi. 34, with Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 681. s. 219 (s. 183, in

Weber's edition, whose note ought to be consulted). Demosthenês says, Φιλίππου γάρ εἰς Μαρώνηαιον ἐλθόντος ἐπεμφε (Kersobleptês) πρὸς αὐτὸν Ἀπολλωνίδην, πίστει δούς ἐκείνῳ καὶ Παμμένει καὶ εἰ μὴ κρατῶν τῆς χώρας Ἀμάδοκος ἀπειπε Φιλίππῳ μὴ ἐπιβαίνειν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ἐν μέσῳ πολεμεῖν ἡμᾶς πρὸς Καρδιανούς ἤδη καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην. Καὶ ἔτι ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ λέγω

ensuing year (352 B.C.) that the Athenians also despatched a fresh batch of 2000 citizens as settlers to Samos, in addition to those who had been sent thither thirteen years before.<sup>1</sup>

The mention of Philip as attacking Maroneia and menacing the Thracian Chersonese, shows the indefatigable activity of that prince and the steady enlargement of his power. In 358 B.C., he had taken Amphipolis; before 355 B.C., he had captured Pydna and Potidæa, founded the new town of Philippi, and opened for himself the resource of the adjoining auriferous region; he had established relations with Thessaly, assisting the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa in their struggles against Lykophron and Peitholaus, the despots of Phæræ:<sup>2</sup> he had farther again chastised the interior tribes

B.C. 353-352.

Activity and constant progress of Philip—he conquers Methônê—remissness of Athens.

λαβὲ τὴν Χάρητος ἐπιστολὴν.

The mention of Pammenês, as being within reach of communication with Kersobleptês—the mention of Charês as being at the Chersonese, and sending home despatches—and the notice of Philip as being at Maroneia—all conspire to connect this passage with the year 353-352 B.C., and with the facts referred to that year by Diodor, xvi. 34. There is an interval of five years between the presence of Charês here alluded to, and the presence of Charês noticed before in the same oration, p. 678. s. 206, immediately after the successful expedition to Eubœa in 358 B.C. During these five years, Kersobleptês had acted in a hostile manner towards Athens in the neighbourhood of the Chersonese (p. 680. s. 214), and also towards the two rival Thracian princes, friends of Athens. At the same time Sestos had again revolted; the forces of Athens being engaged in the Social War, from 358 to 255 B.C. In 353 B.C. Charês is at the Hellespont, recovers Sestos, and again defeats the intrigues of Kersobleptês, who makes

cession to Athens of a portion of territory which he still held in the Chersonese. Diodorus ascribes this cession of Kersobleptês to the motive of aversion towards Philip and goodwill towards the Athenians. Possibly these may have been the motives pretended by Kersobleptês, to whom a certain party at Athens gave credit for more favourable dispositions than the Demosthenic oration against Aristokratês recognises—as we may see from that oration itself. But I rather apprehend that Diodorus, in describing Kersobleptês as hostile to Philip, and friendly to Athens, has applied to the year 353 B.C. a state of relations which did not become true until a later date, nearer to the time when peace was made between Philip and the Athenians in 346 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> Dionysius Hal. Judic. de Dinarcho, p. 664; Strabo, xiv. p. 638.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 14. This passage relates to the year 357-356 B.C., and possibly Philip may have begun to meddle in the Thessalian party-disputes, even as early as that year; but his effective interference comes

bordering on Macedonia, Thracians, Pæonians, and Illyrians, who were never long at rest, and who had combined to regain their independence.<sup>1</sup> It appears to have been in 354-353 B.C., that he attacked Methônê, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast. Situated on the Thermaic Gulf, Methônê was doubtless a convenient station for Athenian privateers to intercept trading vessels, not merely to and from Macedonian ports, but also from Olynthus and Potidæa; so that the Olynthians, then in alliance with Philip against Athens, would be glad to see it pass into his power, and may perhaps have lent him their aid. He pressed the siege of the place with his usual vigour, employing all the engines and means of assault then known; while the besieged on their side were not less resolute in the defence. They repelled his attacks for so long a time, that news of the danger of the place reached Athens, and ample time was afforded for sending relief, had the Athenians been ready and vigorous in their movement. But unfortunately they had not even now learnt experience from the loss of Pydna and Potidæa. Either the Etesian winds usual in summer, or the storms of winter, both which circumstances were taken into account by Philip in adjusting the season of his enterprises<sup>2</sup>—or (which is more probable)—the aversion of the Athenian respectable citizens to personal service on ship-board, and their slackness even in pecuniary payment—caused so much delay in preparations, that the expedition sent out did not reach Methônê until too late.<sup>3</sup> The Methonæans, having gallantly held out until all their means were exhausted, were at length compelled to surrender. Diodorus tells us that Philip granted terms so far lenient as to allow them to depart with the clothes on their backs.<sup>4</sup> But this

two or three years later. See the general order of Philip's aggressions indicated by Demosthenês, *Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13.*

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 22.

<sup>2</sup> See a striking passage in Demosthenês, *Philip. i. p. 48. s. 35.* There was another place called Methônê—the Thracian Methônê—situated in the Chalkidic or Thracian peninsula, near Olynthus and Apollonia—of which we shall hear presently.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, *Philip. i. p. 50. s. 40; Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9.*

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 31-34) mentions the capture of Methônê by Philip twice, in two successive years; first in 354-353 B.C.; again, more copiously, in 353-352 B.C. In my judgement, the earlier of the two dates is the more probable. In 353-352 B.C., Philip carried on his war in Thrace, near Abdera and Maroneia—and also his war against Onomarchus in Thessaly; which transactions seem enough

can hardly be accurate, since we know that there were Athenian citizens among them sold as slaves, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenês with his own money.<sup>1</sup>

Being now master of the last port possessed by Athens in the Thermaic Gulf—an acquisition of great importance, which had never before<sup>2</sup> belonged to the Macedonian kings—Philip was enabled to extend his military operations to the neighbourhood of the Thracian Chersonese on the one side, and to that of Thermopylæ on the other. How he threatened the Chersonese, has been already related; and his campaign in Thessaly was yet more important. That country was, as usual, torn by intestine disputes. Lykophron the despot of Pheræ possessed the greatest sway; while the Aleuadæ of Larissa, too weak to contend against him with their own forces, invited assistance from Philip; who entered Thessaly with a powerful army. Such a reinforcement so completely altered the balance of Thessalian power, that Lykophron in his turn was compelled to entreat aid from Onomarchus and the Phokians.

B.C. 353-352.  
Philip  
marches  
into Thes-  
saly against  
the despots  
of Pheræ.

So strong were the Phokians now, that they were more than a match for the Thebans with their other hostile neighbours, and had means to spare for combating Philip in Thessaly. As their force

Great  
power of  
Onomar-  
chus and

to fill up the time. From the language of Demosthenês (Olynth. i. p. 12. s. 13), we see that Philip did not attack Thessaly until after the capture of Methônê. Diodorus as well as Strabo (vii. p. 330), and Justin (vii. 6) state that Philip was wounded and lost the sight of one eye in this siege. But this seems to have happened afterwards, near the Thracian Methônê.

Compare Justin, vii. 6; Polyænus, iv. 2, 15. Under the year 354-353 B.C., Diodorus mentions not only the capture of Methônê by Philip, but also the capture of Pagæ. Παγάς δὲ χειρωσάμενος, ἡγάχασεν ὑποταγῆναι. Pagæ is unknown, anywhere near Macedonia and Thessaly. Wes-seling and Mr. Clinton suppose Pagasæ in Thessaly to be meant.

But it seems to me impossible that Philip, who had no considerable power at sea, can have taken Pagasæ, before his wars in Thessaly, and before he had become master of Pheræ, which events did not occur until one year or two years afterwards. Pagasæ is the port of Pheræ, and Lykophron the despot of Pheræ was still powerful and unconquered. If, therefore, the word intended by Diodorus be Παγάσας instead of Παγάς, I think the matter of fact asserted cannot be correct.

<sup>1</sup> This fact is mentioned in the public vote of gratitude passed by the Athenian people to Demosthenês (Plutarch, Vitæ X. Orat. p. 851).

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. vi. 7. Μεθώνην τὴν ἑμπορὸν Μακεδονία, &c.

the Phokians—plans of Athens and Sparta—the Spartans contemplate hostilities against Megalopolis.

consisted of a large body of mercenaries, whom they were constrained for security to retain in pay—to keep them employed beyond the border was a point not undesirable. Hence they readily entered upon the Thessalian campaign. At this moment they counted, in the comparative assessment of Hellenic forces, as an item of first-rate magnitude. They were hailed both by Athenians and Spartans as the natural enemy and counterpoise of Thebes alike odious to both. While the Phokians maintained their actual power, Athens could manage her foreign policy abroad, and Sparta her designs in Peloponnesus, with diminished apprehensions of being counterworked by Thebes. Both Athens and Sparta had at first supported the Phokians against unjust persecution by Thebes and abuse of Amphiktyonic jurisdiction, before the spoliation of the Delphian temple was consummated or even anticipated. And though, when that spoliation actually occurred, it was doubtless viewed with reprobation among Athenians, accustomed to unlimited freedom of public discussion—as well as at Sparta, in so far as it became known amidst the habitual secrecy of public affairs—nevertheless political interests so far prevailed, that the Phokians (perhaps in part by aid of bribery) were still countenanced, though not much assisted, as useful rivals to Thebes.<sup>1</sup> To restrain “the Leuktric insolence of the Thebans,”<sup>2</sup> and to see the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Plataea, restored to their pristine autonomy, was an object of paramount desire with each of the two ancient heads of Greece. So far both Athens and Sparta felt in unison. But Sparta cherished a farther hope—in which Athens by no means concurred—to avail herself of the embarrassments of Thebes for the purpose of breaking up Megalopolis and Messênê, and recovering her former Peloponnesian dominion. These two

<sup>1</sup> Such is the description of Athenian feeling, as it then stood, given by Demosthenes twenty-four years afterwards in the *Oration De Corona*, p. 230. s. 21.

Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ συστάντος πολέμου, πρῶτον μὲν ὑμεῖς οὕτω διέχεισθε, ὥστε Φωκέας μὲν βούλεσθαι σωθῆναι, καίπερ οὐ δίκαια ποιοῦντας ὀρώντες, Ἀθηναῖοις δ' ὅτι οὖν ἂν ἐφησθῆναι πα-

θοῦσιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως οὐδ' ἀδίκως αὐτοῖς ὀργιζόμενοι, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 58. Βουλόμενος τὰ Λευκτρικά φρονήματα συστῆλαι τῷ Βοιωτῶν, &c., an expression used in reference to Philip a few years afterwards, but more animated and emphatic than we usually find in Diodorus; who, perhaps, borrowed it from Theopompus.

new Peloponnesian cities, erected by Epaminondas on the frontier of Laconia, had been hitherto upheld against Sparta by the certainty of Theban interference if they were menaced. But so little did Thebes seem in a condition to interfere, while Onomarchus and the Phokians were triumphant in 353—352 B.C., that the Megalopolitans despatched envoys to Athens to entreat protection and alliance, while the Spartans on their side sent to oppose the petition.

It is on occasion of the political debates in Athens during the years 354 and 353 B.C., that we first have before us the Athenian Demosthenês, as adviser of his countrymen in the public assembly. His first discourse of public advice was delivered in 354—353 B.C., on an alarm of approaching war with Persia; his second, in 353—352 B.C., was intended to point out the policy proper for Athens in dealing with the Spartan and Megalopolitan envoys.

First appearance of Demosthenês as a public adviser in the Athenian assembly.

A few words must here be said about this eminent man, who forms the principal ornament of the declining Hellenic world. He was above twenty-seven years old; being born, according to what seems the most probable among contradictory accounts, in 382-381 B.C.<sup>1</sup> His father, named also Demosthenês, was a citizen of considerable property, and of a character so unimpeachable that even Æschinês says nothing against him; his mother Kleobulê was one of the two daughters and co-heiresses of a citizen named Gylon,<sup>2</sup> an Athenian exile,

Parentage and early youth of Demosthenês—wealth of his father—dishonesty of his guardians.

<sup>1</sup> The birth-year of Demosthenês is matter of notorious controversy. No one of the statements respecting it rests upon evidence thoroughly convincing.

The question has been examined with much care and ability both by Mr. Clinton (*Fasti Hellen. Append. xx.*) and by Dr. Thirlwall (*Histor. Gr. vol. v. Append. i. p. 485 seq.*); by Böhnecke (*Forschungen*, p. 1-64) more copiously, but still with much instruction; also by K. F. Herrmann (*De Anno Natali Demosthenis*) and many other critics.

In adopting the year Olymp. 99. 3 (the archonship of Evander, 382-381 B.C.), I agree with the conclusion of Mr. Clinton and of K. F. Herrmann; differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who prefers the previous year (Olymp. 99. 2)—and from Böhnecke, who vindicates the year affirmed by Dionysius (Olymp. 99. 4).

Mr. Clinton fixes the *first month* of Olymp. 99. 3, as the month in which Demosthenês was born. This appears to me greater precision than the evidence warrants.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Demosth. c. 4*; Æschinês *adv. Ktesiph. p. 78. c. 57*;

who, having become rich as a proprietor of land and exporter of corn in Bosphorus, sent his two daughters to Athens; where, possessing handsome dowries, they married two Athenian citizens—Democharês and the elder Demosthenês. The latter was a man of considerable

Demosth. cont. Aphob. B. p. 835. According to Æschinês, Gylon was put on his trial for having betrayed Nymphæum to the enemy, but not appearing, was sentenced to death in his absence, and became an exile. He then went to Bosphorus (Pantikapæum), obtained the favour of the king (probably Satyrus—see Mr. Clinton's Appendix on the kings of Bosphorus—Fasti Hellenic. Append. xiii. p. 282), together with the grant of a district called Kepi, and married the daughter of a rich man there; by whom he had two daughters. In after-days, he sent these two daughters to Athens, where one of them, Kleobulê, was married to the elder Demosthenês. Æschinês has probably exaggerated the gravity of the sentence against Gylon, who seems only to have been fined. The guardians of Demosthenês assert no more than that Gylon was fined, and died with the fine unpaid, while Demosthenês asserts that the fine *was* paid.

Upon the facts here stated by Æschinês, a few explanatory remarks will be useful. Demosthenês being born 382-381 B.C., this would probably throw the birth of his mother Kleobulê to some period near the close of the Peloponnesian war, 405-404 B.C. We see, therefore, that the establishment of Gylon in the kingdom of Bosphorus, and his nuptial connection there formed, must have taken place during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war; between 412 B.C. (the year after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse) and 405 B.C.

These were years of great mis-

fortune to Athens. After the disaster at Syracuse, she could no longer maintain ascendancy over, or grant protection to, a distant tributary like Nymphæum in the Tauric Chersonese. It was therefore natural that the Athenian citizens there settled, engaged probably in the export trade of corn to Athens, should seek security by making the best bargain they could with the neighbouring kings of Bosphorus. In this transaction Gylon seems to have stood conspicuously forward, gaining both favour and profit to himself. And when, after the close of the war, the corn trade again became comparatively unimpeded, he was in a situation to carry it on upon a large and lucrative scale. Another example of Greeks who gained favour, held office, and made fortunes, under Satyrus in the Bosphorus, is given in the Oration (xvii.) Trapezitica of Isokratês, s. 3, 14. Compare also the case of Mantitheus the Athenian (Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi. s. 4), who was sent by his father to reside with Satyrus for some time, before the close of the Peloponnesian war; which shows that Satyrus was at that time, when Nymphæum was probably placed under his protection, in friendly relations with Athens.

I may remark that the woman whom Gylon married, though Æschinês calls her a Scythian woman, may be supposed more probably to have been the daughter of some Greek (not an Athenian) resident in Bosphorus.

wealth, and carried on two distinct manufactories; one of swords or knives, employing thirty-two slaves—the other, of couches or beds, employing twenty. In the new schedule of citizens and of taxable property, introduced in the archonship of Nausinikus (378 B.C.), the elder Demosthenês was enrolled among the richest class, the leaders of Symmories. But he died about 375 B.C., leaving his son Demosthenês seven years old, with a younger daughter about five years of age. The boy and his large paternal property were confided to the care of three guardians named under his father's will. These guardians—though the father, in hopes of ensuring their fidelity, had bequeathed to them considerable legacies, away from his own son, and though all of them were rich men as well as family connections and friends—administered the property with such negligence and dishonesty, that only a sum comparatively small was left, when they came to render account to their ward. At the age of sixteen years complete, Demosthenês attained his civil majority, and became entitled by the Athenian law to the administration of his own property. During his minority, his guardians had continued to enrol him among the wealthiest class (as his father had ranked before), and to pay the increased rate of direct taxation chargeable upon that class; but the real sum handed over to him by his guardians was too small to justify such a position. Though his father had died worth fourteen talents,—which would be diminished by the sums bequeathed as legacies, but ought to have been increased in greater proportion by the interest on the property for the ten years of minority, had it been properly administered—the sum paid to young Demosthenês on his majority was less than two talents, while the guardians not only gave in dishonest accounts, but professed not to be able to produce the father's will. After repeated complaints and remonstrances, he brought a judicial action against one of them—Aphobus, and obtained a verdict carrying damages to the amount of ten talents. Payment however was still evaded by the debtor. Five speeches remain delivered by Demosthenês, three against Aphobus, two against Onêtôr, brother-in-law of Aphobus. At the date of the latest oration, Demosthenês had still received nothing; nor do we know how much he ultimately realised, though it would seem that the difficulties thrown in his way were such as to compel him to

forego the greater part of the claim. Nor is it certain whether he ever brought the actions, of which he speaks as intended, against the other two guardians Demophoon and Therippidês.<sup>1</sup>

Demosthenês received during his youth the ordinary grammatical and rhetorical education of a wealthy Athenian. Even as a boy, he is said to have manifested extraordinary appetite and interest for rhetorical exercise. By earnest entreaty, he prevailed on his tutors to conduct him to hear Kallistratus, one of the ablest speakers in Athens, delivering an harangue in the Dikastery on the matter of Oropus.<sup>2</sup> This harangue, producing a profound impression upon Demosthenês, stimulated his fondness for rhetorical studies. Still more was the passion excited, when on attaining his majority he found himself cheated of most of his paternal property, and constrained to claim his rights by a suit at law against his guardians. Being obliged, according to Athenian practice, to plead his own cause personally, he was made to feel keenly the helpless condition of an incompetent speaker, and the necessity of acquiring oratorical power, not simply as an instrument of ambition, but even as a means of individual defence and safety.<sup>3</sup> It appears

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Onetor. ii. p. 880. *κεκομισμένον μηδ' ὅτιοῦν, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐθέλοντα ποιεῖν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, εἴτι τῶν δεόντων ἐβούλεσθε πράττειν.*

That he ultimately got much less than he was entitled to, appears from his own statement in the oration against Meidias, p. 540.

See Westermann, *De Litibus quas Demosthenês oravit ipse*, cap. i. p. 15, 16.

Plutarch (*Vit. X. Oratt.* p. 844) says that he voluntarily refrained from enforcing the judgement obtained. I do not clearly understand what is meant by *Æschinês* (cont. *Ktesiph.* p. 78), when he designates Demosthenês as *τὰ πατρῶα καταγελάστως προέμενος*.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Demosth.* c. 5; *Vit. X. Orator.* p. 844; *Hermippus ap. Aul. Gell.* iii. 13. Nothing positive can

be made out respecting this famous trial; neither the date, nor the exact point in question, nor the manner in which Kallistratus was concerned in it—nor who were his opponents. Many conjectures have been proposed, differing materially one from the other, and all uncertain.

These conjectures are brought together and examined in *Rehdant Vitæ Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei*, p. 111-114.

In the month of November, 3 B.C., Kallistratus was in exile at Methônê on the Thermaic Gulf. He had been twice condemned to death by the Athenians (*Demosth. cont. Polykl.* p. 1221). But when the condemnations took place, we do not know.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Demosth.* c. 4. Such a view of the necessity of a power

also that he was, from childhood, of sickly constitution and feeble muscular frame; so that partly from his own disinclination, partly from the solicitude of his mother, he took little part either as boy or youth in the exercises of the palæstra. His delicate clothing, and somewhat effeminate habits, procured for him as a boy the nickname of Batalus, which remained attached to him most part of his life, and which his enemies tried to connect with degrading imputations.<sup>1</sup> Such comparative bodily disability probably contributed to incite his thirst for mental and rhetorical acquisitions, as the only road to celebrity open. But it at the same time disqualified him from appropriating to himself the full range of a comprehensive Grecian education, as conceived by Plato, Isokratês, and Aristotle; an education applying alike to thought, word, and action—combining bodily strength, endurance, and fearlessness, with an enlarged mental capacity and a power of making it felt by speech. The disproportion between the physical energy, and the mental force, of Demosthenês, beginning in childhood, is recorded and lamented in the inscription placed on his statue after his death.<sup>2</sup>

of public speaking is put forward by Kalliklês in the *Gorgias* of Plato, p. 486, 511. c. 90, 142. τὴν ῥητορικὴν τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις διασώζουσαν, &c. Compare *Aristot. Rhetoric*. i. 1, 3. Ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δὲ, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν ὃ μᾶλλον ἰδίον ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας.

The comparison of Aristotle is instructive as to the point of view of a free Greek. "If it be disgraceful not to be able to protect yourself by your bodily force, it is equally so not to be able to protect yourself by your powers of speaking; which is in a more peculiar manner the privilege of man." See also *Tacitus, Dialog. de Orator*. c. 5.

<sup>1</sup> *Plutarch. Demosth.* c. 4; *Æschinês cont. Timarch.* p. 17, 18, c. 27, with *Scholia, De Fal. Leg.* p. 41. c.

31. εἰ γὰρ τις σοῦ τὰ κομπὰ ταῦτα χλανίσχια περικλώμενος καὶ τοὺς μαλακοὺς χιτωνίσκους, ἐν οἷς τοὺς κατὰ τῶν φίλων λόγους γράφεις, περιενέγκας, δοίῃ εἰς τὰς χεῖρας τῶν δικαστῶν, οἶμαι ἂν αὐτοὺς, εἴ τις μὴ προειπῶν ταῦτα ποιήσειεν, ἀπορήσειεν εἴτε γυναικὸς εἴτε ἀνδρὸς εἰλήψασιν ἐσθῆτα. Compare *Æsch. Fal. Leg.* p. 45.

The foundation of the nickname *Batalus* is not clear, and was differently understood by different persons; compare also *Libanius, Vita Demosth.* p. 294, ap. *Westermann, Scriptores Biographici*. But it can hardly have been a very discreditable foundation, since *Demosthenês* takes the name to himself, *De Coronâ*, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> *Plutarch, Demosth.* c. 30.

Εἵπερ ἴσην ῥώμην γνώμη, Δημόσθενες, εἶχες,  
Οὐποτ' ἂν Ἑλλήνων ἦρξεν Ἄρης  
Μαχεδῶν.

As a youth of eighteen years of age, Demosthenês found himself with a known and good family position at Athens, being ranked in the class of richest citizens and liable to the performance of liturgies and trierarchy as his father had been before him;<sup>1</sup> yet with a real fortune very inadequate to the outlay expected from him—embarrassed by a legal proceeding against guardians wealthy as well as unscrupulous—and an object of dislike and annoyance from other wealthy men, such as Meidias and his brother Thrasylochus,<sup>2</sup> friends of those guardians. His family position gave him a good introduction to public affairs, for which he proceeded to train himself carefully; first as a writer of speeches for others, next as a speaker in his own person. Plato and Isokratês were both at this moment in full celebrity, visited at Athens by pupils from every part of Greece; Isæus also, who had studied under Isokratês, was in great reputation as a composer of judicial harangues for plaintiffs or defendants in civil causes. Demosthenês put himself under the teaching of Isæus (who is said to have assisted him in composing the speeches against his guardians), and also profited largely by the discourse of Plato, of Isokratês, and others. As an ardent aspirant he would seek instruction from most of the best sources, theoretical as well as practical—writers as well as lecturers.<sup>3</sup> But besides living teachers, there was one of the past generation who contributed largely to his improvement. He studied Thucydidês with indefatigable labour and attention; according to one account, he copied the whole history eight times over with his own hand; according to another, he learnt it

<sup>1</sup> Position of Demosthenês, πατὴρ τριηραρχικός—χρυσέα χρημὶς, κατὰ Πινδαρον, &c. (Lucian, *Encomium Demosth.* vol. iii. p. 499, ed. Reitz.).

<sup>2</sup> See the account given by Demosthenês (cont. Meidiam, p. 539, 540) of the manner in which Meidias and Thrasylochus first began their persecution of him, while the suit against his guardians was still going on. These guardians attempted to get rid of the suit by inducing Thrasylochus to force upon him an exchange of properties (*Antidosis*),

tendered by Thrasylochus, who had just been put down for a trierarchy. If the exchange had been effected, Thrasylochus would have given the guardians a release. Demosthenês could only avoid it by consenting to incur the cost of the trierarchy—20 minæ.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês both studied attentively the dialogues, and heard the discourse, of Plato (*Cicero*, Brutus, 31, 121; *Orator*, 4, 15; *Plutarch*, Vit. X. *Orator*. p. 844). Tacitus, *Dialog. de Orator*. c. 32.

all by heart, so as to be able to rewrite it from memory when the manuscript was accidentally destroyed. Without minutely criticising these details, we ascertain at least that Thucydidês was the object of his peculiar study and imitation. How much the composition of Demosthenês was fashioned by the reading of Thucydidês—reproducing the daring, majestic and impressive phraseology, yet without the overstrained brevity and involutions of that great historian—and contriving to blend with it a perspicuity and grace not inferior to Lysias—may be seen illustrated in the elaborate criticism of the rhetor Dionysius.<sup>1</sup>

While thus striking out for himself a bold and original style, Demosthenês had still greater difficulties to overcome in regard to the external requisites of an orator. He was not endowed by nature, like Æschinês, with a magnificent voice; nor, like Demadês, with a ready flow of vehement improvisation. His thoughts required to be put together by careful preparation; his voice was bad and even lisping—his breath short—his gesticulation ungraceful; moreover he was overawed and embarrassed by the manifestations of the multitude. Such an accumulation of natural impediments were at least equal to those of which Isokratês complains, as having debarred him all his life from addressing the public assembly, and restrained him to a select audience of friends or pupils. The energy and success with which Demosthenês overcame his defects, in such a manner as to satisfy a critical assembly like the Athenian, is one of the most memorable circumstances in the general history of self-education. Repeated humiliation and repulse only spurred him on to fresh solitary efforts for improvement. He corrected his defective elocution by speaking with pebbles in his mouth; he prepared himself to overcome the noise of the assembly by declaiming in stormy weather on the sea-shore of Phalerum; he opened his lungs by running, and extended his powers of holding breath by pronouncing sentences in marching up-hill; he sometimes passed two or three months without interruption in a subterranean chamber, practising night and day either in composition or declamation, and shaving one-half of his head in order to disqualify himself from

Indefatigable efforts of Demosthenês to surmount his natural defects as a speaker.

<sup>1</sup> Dionys. Hal. De Thucydidæ Judicium, p. 944; De Admirab. Vi. Dicend. Demosthen. p. 982, 983.

going abroad. After several trials without success before the assembly, his courage was on the point of giving way, when Eunomus and other old citizens reassured him by comparing the matter of his speeches to those of Periklês, and exhorting him to persevere a little longer in the correction of his external defects. On another occasion, he was pouring forth his disappointment to Satyrus the actor, who undertook to explain to him the cause, desiring him to repeat in his own way a speech out of Sophoklês, which he (Satyrus) proceeded to repeat after him, with suitable accent and delivery. Demosthenês, profoundly struck with the difference, began anew the task of self-improvement; probably taking constant lessons from good models. In his unremitting private practice, he devoted himself especially to acquiring a graceful action, keeping watch on all his movements while declaiming before a tall looking-glass.<sup>1</sup> After pertinacious efforts for several years, he was rewarded at length with complete success. His delivery became full of decision and vehemence, highly popular with the general body of the assembly; though some critics censured his modulation as artificial and out of nature, and savouring of low stage-effect; while others, in the same spirit, condemned his speeches as over-laboured and smelling of the lamp.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> These and other details are given in Plutarch's *Life of Demosthenês*, c. 4, 9. They depend upon good evidence; for he cites Demetrius the Phalerean, who heard them himself from Demosthenês in the latter years of his life. The subterranean chamber where Demosthenês practised was shown at Athens even in the time of Plutarch.

Cicero (who also refers to Demetrius Phalereus), *De Divinat.* ii. 46, 96. Libanius, Zosimus, and Photius, give generally the same statements, with some variations.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Demosth.* c. 9. Ἐπαιτόλμαν γε καὶ θάρσος οἱ λεγθέντες ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι τῶν γραφέντων μᾶλλον εἶχον· εἰ τι δεῖ πιστεῦειν Ἐρατοσθέναι καὶ Δημοτρίῳ τῷ Φαληρεῖ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς. Ὡν Ἐρατοσθένης μὲν φησιν αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πολλαχοῦ γε-

γονέναι παράβαχον, ὁ δὲ Φαληρεὺς τὸν ἔμμετρον ἐκείνον ὄρκον ὁμοῖαι ποτὲ πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὥσπερ ἐνθουσιῶντα. Again, c. 11. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς ὑποκρινόμενος ἤρεσκε θαυμάσιος, οἱ δὲ χαριέντες ταπεινὸν ἡγούντο καὶ ἀγεννὲς αὐτοῦ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ μαλακὸν, ὧν καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐστίν.

This sentence is illustrated by a passage in Quintilian, i. 8. 2. "Sit autem in primis lectio virilis, et cum suavitate quadam gravis: et non quidem prosæ similis—quia carmen est, et se poetæ canere testantur—non tamen in canticum dissoluta, nec *plasmate* (ut nunc a plerisque fit) effeminata."

The meaning of *plasma*, in the technical language of rhetoricians contemporary with Quintilian, seems different from that which it

So great was the importance assigned by Demosthenês himself to these external means of effect, that he is said to have pronounced "Action" to be the first, second, and third requisite for an orator. If we grant this estimate to be correct, with reference to actual hearers—we must recollect that his speeches are (not less truly than the history of Thucydidês) "an everlasting possession rather than a display for momentary effect." Even among his contemporaries, the effect of the speeches, when read apart from the speaker, was very powerful. There were some who thought that their full excellence could only be thus appreciated;<sup>1</sup> while to the after-world, who know them only by reading, they have been and still are the objects of an admiration reaching its highest pitch in the enthusiastic sentiment of the fastidious rhetor Dionysius.<sup>2</sup> The action of Demosthenês—consummate as it doubtless was, and highly as he may himself have prized an accomplishment so laboriously earned—produced its effect only in conjunction with the matter of Demosthenês; his thoughts, sentiments, words, and above all, his sagacity in appreciating and advising on the actual situation. His political wisdom, and his lofty patriotic *idéal*, are in truth quite as remarkable as his oratory. By what training he attained either the one or the other of these qualities, we are unfortunately not permitted to know. Our informants have little interest in him except as a speaker; they tell us neither what he learnt, nor from whom, nor by what companions, or party-associates, his political point of view was formed. But we shall hardly err in supposing that

Value set  
by Demosthenês  
upon action  
in oratory.  
His mind  
and  
thoughts  
—how  
formed.

bears in Dionysius, p. 1060-1061. But whether Plutarch has exactly rendered to us what Demetrius Phalereus said of Demosthenês—whether Demetrius spoke of the modulation of Demosthenês as being *low* and *vulgar*—I cannot but doubt. Æschinês urges very different reproaches against him—overmuch labour and affectation, but combined with bitterness and malignity (adv. Ktesiph. p. 77-86). He denounces the *character* of Demosthenês as low and vulgar—but not his oratorical delivery. The expression ὡς περ ἐνθου-

σιῶν, which Plutarch cites from Demetrius Phalereus, hardly suits well with ταπεινὸν καὶ ἀγεννές.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 11. Αἰσίωνα δὲ φησιν Ἑρμιππος, ἐρωτηθέντα περὶ τῶν πάλαι ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν, εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἀκούων μὲν ἂν τις ἐθαύμασεν ἐκείνους εὐκόσμως καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς τῷ δῆμῳ διαλεγομένους, ἀναγινωσκόμενοι δὲ οἱ Δημοσθένους λόγοι πολὺ τῇ κατασκευῇ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρουσιν.

<sup>2</sup> Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth. p. 1022, a very remarkable passage.

his attentive meditation of Thucydidês supplied him, not merely with force and majesty of expression, but also with that conception of Athens in her foretime which he is perpetually impressing on his countrymen—Athens at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, in days of exuberant energy, and under the advice of her noblest statesman.

In other respects, we are left in ignorance as to the mental history of Demosthenês. Before he acquired reputation as a public adviser, he was already known as a logographer, or composer of discourses to be delivered either by speakers in the public assembly or by litigants in the Dikastery; for which compositions he was paid, according to usual practice at Athens. He had also pleaded in person before the Dikastery; in support of an accusation preferred by others against a law, proposed by Leptinês, for abrogating votes of immunity passed by the city in favour of individuals, and restraining such grants in future. Nothing is more remarkable, in this speech against Leptinês, than the intensity with which the young speaker enforces on the people the necessity of strict and faithful adherence to engagements, in spite of great occasional inconvenience in so doing. It would appear that he was in habitual association with some wealthy youths—among others, with Apollodorus son of the wealthy banker Pasion—whom he undertook to instruct in the art of speaking. This we learn from the denunciations of his rival Æschinês;<sup>1</sup> who accuses him of having thus made his way into various wealthy families—especially where there was an orphan youth and a widowed mother—using unworthy artifices to defraud and ruin them. How much truth there may be in such imputations, we cannot tell. But Æschinês was not unwarranted in applying to his rival the obnoxious appellations of logographer and sophist; appellations all the more disparaging, because Demosthenês belonged to a trierarchic family, of the highest class in point of wealth.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês cont. Timarch. p. 16, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês cont. Timarchum, p. 13, 17, 25, cont. Ktesiphont. p. 78.

Περὶ δὲ τὴν κατὰ ἡμέραν διαίτην τίς ἐστιν; Ἐκ τριηράρχου λογογράφος

ἀνεφάνη, τὰ πατρῷα καταγελᾶσθαι προέμενος, &c.

See also Demosthenês. De Fals. Legat. p. 417—420.

Compare the shame of the rich

It will be proper here to notice another contemporary adviser, who stands in marked antithesis and rivalry to Demosthenês. Phokion was a citizen of small means, son of a pestle-maker. Born about the year 402 B.C., he was about twenty years older than Demosthenês. At what precise time his political importance commenced, we do not know; but he lived to the great age of 84, and was a conspicuous man throughout the last half-century of his life. He becomes known first as a military officer, having served in subordinate command under Chabrias, to whom he was greatly attached, at the battle of Naxos in 376 B.C. He was a man of thorough personal bravery, and considerable talents for command; of hardy and enduring temperament, insensible to cold or fatigue; strictly simple in his habits, and above all, superior to every kind of personal corruption. His abstinence from plunder and peculation, when on naval expeditions, formed an honourable contrast with other Athenian admirals, and procured for him much esteem on the part of the maritime allies. Hence probably his surname of Phokion the Good.<sup>1</sup>

Phokion—his antithesis and rivalry with Demosthenês—his character and position—his bravery and integrity.

I have already remarked how deep and strong was the hold acquired on the Athenian people, by any public man who once established for himself a character above suspicion on the score of personal corruption. Among Athenian politicians, but too many were not innocent on this point; moreover, even when a man was really innocent, there were often circumstances in his life which rendered more or less of doubt admissible against him. Thus Demosthenês—being known not only as a person of somewhat costly habits, but also as frequenting wealthy houses, and receiving money for speeches composed or rhetoric communicated—was sure to be accused, justly or unjustly, by his enemies, of having cheated rich clients, and would never obtain unquestioned credit for a high pecuniary independence, even in regard to the public affairs; although he certainly was not corrupt, nor

Lasting hold acquired by his integrity on the public of Athens. Number of times that he was elected general.

1 youth Hippokratês, in the Platonic dialogue called Protagoras, when the idea is broached that he is about to visit Protagoras for the purpose of becoming himself a sophist (Plato, Protagor. p. 154 F, 163 A, cap. 8—19).  
<sup>1</sup> Ælian, V. H. iii. 47; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 10; Cornelius Nepos. Phokion, c. 1.

generally believed to be corrupt—at least during the period which this volume embraces, down to the death of Philip.<sup>1</sup> But Phokion would receive neither money nor gifts from any one—was notoriously and obviously poor—went barefoot and without an upper garment even in very cold weather—had only one female slave to attend on his wife; while he had enjoyed commands sufficient to enrich him if he had chosen. His personal incorruptibility thus stood forth prominently to the public eye. Combined as it was with bravery and fair generalship, it procured for him testimonies of confidence greater than those accorded even to Periklês. He was elected no less than forty-five times to the annual office of Stratêgus or General of the city—that is, one of the Board of Ten so denominated, the greatest executive function at Athens—and elected too, without having ever on any occasion solicited the office, or even been present at the choice.<sup>2</sup> In all Athenian history, we read of no similar multiplication of distinct appointments and honours to the same individual.

According to the picture of Athens and her democracy, as usually presented by historians, we are taught to believe that the only road open to honours or political influence, was, by a seductive address, and by courting the people with fine speeches, unworthy flattery, or unmeasured promises. Those who take this view of the Athenian character, will find it difficult to explain the career of Phokion. He was no orator—from disdain rather than incompetence.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I introduce here this reservation as to time, not as meaning to affirm the contrary with regard to the period after Philip's death, but as wishing to postpone for the present the consideration of the later charges against Demosthenês—the receipt of money from Persia, and the abstraction from the treasures of Harpalus. I shall examine these points at the proper time.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Ὁμολογεῖται γάρ, ὅτι πέντε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα στρατηγίας ἔλαβεν οὐδ' ἅπασι ἀρχαιρεσίους παρατυχῶν, ἀλλ' ἀπόντα μεταπεμπομένων αὐτὸν αἰεὶ καὶ χειροτονούντων, ὥστε θαυμάζειν τοὺς οὐκ

εὖ φρονούντας τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι πλεῖστα τοῦ Φωκίωνος ἀντικρούοντος αὐτῷ καὶ μηδὲν εἰπόντος πώποτε μηδὲ πράξαντος πρὸς χάριν, ὥσπερ αἰετοῦσι τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοῖς κόλαξι χρῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ, ἔχρητο οὗτος τοῖς μὲν κομψοτέροις καὶ ἱλαροῖς ἐν παιδιᾷς μέρει δημαγωγίαις, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰεὶ νήφων καὶ σπουδάζων τὸν αὐστηρότατον καὶ φρονιμώτατον ἐκάλει τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ μόνον ἢ μᾶλλον ταῖς βουλήσαςιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁρμαῖς ἀντιτασσόμενον.

<sup>3</sup> Tacit. Dialog. de Clar. Orator c. 2. "Aper, communi eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat."

Besides receiving a good education, he had profited by the conversation of Plato as well as of Xenokratês, in the Academy;<sup>1</sup> and we are not surprised that in their school he contracted a contempt for popular oratory, as well as a love for brief, concentrated, pungent reply. Once when about to speak in public, he was observed to be particularly absorbed in thought. "You seem meditative, Phokion," said a friend. "Ay, by Zeus," was the reply—"I am meditating whether I cannot in some way abridge the speech which I am just about to address to the Athenians." He knew so well, however, on what points to strike, that his telling brevity, strengthened by the weight of character and position, cut through the fine oratory of Demosthenês more effectively than any counter-oratory from men like Æschinês. Demosthenês himself greatly feared Phokion as an opponent, and was heard to observe, on seeing him rise to speak, "Here comes the cleaver of my harangues."<sup>2</sup> Polyeuktus—himself an orator and a friend of Demosthenês—drew a distinction highly complimentary to Phokion, by saying—"That Demosthenês was the finest orator, but Phokion the most formidable in speech."<sup>3</sup> In public policy, in means of political effect, and in personal character—Phokion was the direct antithesis of Demosthenês; whose warlike eloquence, unwarlike disposition, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of life—he doubtless alike despised.

As Phokion had in his nature little of the professed orator, so he had still less of the flatterer. He affected and sustained the character of a blunt soldier, who speaks out his full mind without suppression or ornament, careless whether it be acceptable to hearers or not.<sup>4</sup> His estimate of his countrymen was thoroughly and undisguisedly contemptuous. This is manifest in his whole proceedings; and appears especially in the memorable remark ascribed to him, on an occasion when

His frankness—his contempt of the Athenian people—his imperturbability—his repulsive manners.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 5. ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπίς πάρεστιν.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch. Phokion, c. 5. εἰπεῖν—ὅτι ῥήτωρ μὲν ἄριστος εἴη Δημοσθένης, εἰπεῖν δὲ δεινότητος ὁ Φωκίων.

<sup>4</sup> So Tacitus, after reporting the

exact reply of the tribune Subrius Flavius, when examined as an accomplice in the conspiracy against Nero—"Ipsaretuli verba: quia non, ut Senecæ, vulgata erant; nec minus nosci decebat sensus militaris viri incompotos sed validos."

something that he had said in the public assembly met with peculiar applause. Turning round to a friend, he asked — "Have I not unconsciously said something bad?" His manners, moreover, were surly and repulsive, though his disposition is said to have been kind. He had learnt in the Academy a sort of Spartan self-suppression and rigour of life.<sup>1</sup> No one ever saw him either laughing, or weeping, or bathing in the public baths.

If then Phokion attained the unparalleled honour of being chosen forty-five times general, we may be sure that there were other means of reaching it besides the arts of oratory and demagogy. We may indeed ask with surprise, how it was possible for him to attain it, in the face of so many repulsive circumstances, by the mere force of bravery and honesty; especially as he never performed any supereminent service,<sup>2</sup> though on various occasions he conducted himself with credit and ability. The answer to this question may be found in the fact, that Phokion, though not a flatterer of the people, went decidedly along with the capital weakness of the people. While despising their judgement, he manifested no greater foresight, as to the public interests and security of Athens, than they did. The Athenian people had doubtless many infirmities and committed many errors; but the worst error of all, during the interval between 360-336 B.C., was their unconquerable repugnance to the efforts, personal and pecuniary, required for prosecuting a hearty war against Philip. Of this aversion to a strenuous foreign policy, Phokion made himself the champion;<sup>3</sup> addressing, in his own vein, sarcastic taunts against those who called for action against Philip, as if they were mere brawlers and cowards, watching for opportunities to enrich themselves at the public expense. Eubulus the orator was among the leading statesmen who formed what may be called the peace-party at Athens, and who continually resisted or discouraged energetic warlike efforts, striving to keep out of sight the idea of Philip as

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Cornelius Nepos (Phokion, c. 1) found in his authors no account of the military exploits of Phokion, but much about his personal in-

tegrity.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 8. Οἷον δὲ συντάξας ἑαυτὸν ἐπολιτεύετο μὲν αἰεὶ πρὸς εἰρήνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν, &c.

a dangerous enemy. Of this peace-party, there were doubtless some who acted corruptly, in the direct pay of Philip. But many others of them, without any taint of personal corruption, espoused the same policy merely because they found it easier for the time to administer the city under peace than under war—because war was burdensome and disagreeable, to themselves as well as to their fellow-citizens—and because they either did not, or would not, look forward to the consequences of inaction. Now it was a great advantage to this peace-party, who wanted a military leader as partner to their civil and rhetorical leaders, to strengthen themselves by a colleague like Phokion; a man not only of unsuspected probity, but peculiarly disinterested in advising peace, since his importance would have been exalted by war.<sup>1</sup> Moreover most of the eminent military leaders had now come to love only the license of war, and to disdain the details of the war-office at home; while Phokion,<sup>2</sup> and he almost alone among them, was content to stay at Athens, and keep up that combination of civil with military efficiency which had been formerly habitual. Hence he was sustained, by the peace-party and by the aversion to warlike effort prevalent among the public, in a sort of perpetuity of the strategic functions, without any solicitation or care for personal popularity on his own part.

The influence of Phokion as a public adviser, during the period embraced in this volume, down to the battle of Chæroneia, was eminently mischievous to Athens; all the more mischievous, partly (like that of Nikias) from the respectability of his personal qualities—partly because he espoused and sanctioned the most dangerous infirmity of the Athenian mind. His biographers mislead our judgement by pointing our attention chiefly to the last twenty years of his long life, after the battle of Chæroneia. At that time, when the victorious military force of Macedonia had been fully organized and that of Greece comparatively prostrated, it might be argued plausibly (I do not say decisively, even then) that submission to Macedonia had become a fatal necessity; and that attempts to resist could only end by

Influence of  
Phokion  
mis-  
chievous  
during the  
reign of  
Philip—at  
that time,  
Athens  
might have  
prevailed  
over Mace-  
donia.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. See Phokion.

the first repatee there ascribed to <sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 7.

converting bad into worse. But the peace-policy of Phokion—which might be called prudence, after the accession of Alexander—was ruinously imprudent as well as dishonourable during the reign of Philip. The odds were all against Philip in his early years; they shifted and became more and more in his favour, only because his game was played well, and that of his opponents badly. The superiority of force was at first so much on the side of Athens, that if she had been willing to employ it, she might have made sure of keeping Philip at least within the limits of Macedonia. All depended upon her will; upon the question, whether her citizens were prepared in their own minds to incur the expense and fatigue of a vigorous foreign policy—whether they would handle their pikes, open their purses, and forego the comforts of home, for the maintenance of Grecian and Athenian liberty against a growing, but not as yet irresistible, destroyer. To such a sacrifice the Athenians could not bring themselves to submit; and in consequence of that reluctance, they were driven in the end to a much graver and more irreparable sacrifice—the loss of liberty, dignity, and security. Now it was precisely at such a moment, and when such a question was pending, that the influence of the peace-loving Phokion was most ruinous. His anxiety that the citizens should be buried at home in their own sepulchres—his despair, mingled with contempt, of his countrymen and their refined habits—his hatred of the orators who might profit by an increased war-expenditure<sup>1</sup>—all contributed to make him discourage public effort, and await passively the preponderance of the Macedonian arms; thus playing the game of Philip, and siding, though himself incorruptible, with the orators in Philip's pay.

The love of peace, either in a community, or in an individual, usually commands sympathy without farther inquiry, though there are times of growing danger from without, in which the adviser of peace is the worst guide that can be followed. Since the Peloponnesian war, a revolution had been silently going on in Greece, whereby the duties of soldiership had passed to a great degree from citizen militia into the hands of paid mercenaries. The resident citizens generally had

Change in the military spirit of Greece since the Peloponnesian war. Decline of the citizen soldiership: increased spread of mercenary

<sup>1</sup> See the replies of Phokion in Plutarch, Phokion, c. 23.

become averse to the burthen of military service; while on the other hand the miscellaneous aggregate of Greeks willing to carry arms anywhere and looking merely for pay, had greatly augmented. Very differently had the case once stood. The Athenian citizen of 432 B.C.—by concurrent testimony of the eulogist Periklēs and of the unfriendly Corinthians—was ever ready to brave the danger, fatigue, and privation, of foreign expeditions, for the glory of Athens. “He accounted it holiday work to do duty in her service (it is an enemy who speaks<sup>1</sup>); he wasted his body for her as though it had been the body of another.” Embracing with passion the idea of imperial Athens, he knew that she could only be upheld by the energetic efforts of her individual citizens, and that the talk in her public assemblies, though useful as a preliminary to action, was mischievous if allowed as a substitute for action.<sup>2</sup> Such was the Perikleian Athenian of 431 B.C. But this energy had been crushed in the disasters closing the Peloponnesian war, and had never again revived. The Demosthenic Athenian of 360 B.C. had as it were grown

troops.  
Contrast  
between  
the Peri-  
kleian and  
the Demo-  
sthenic  
citizen.

<sup>1</sup> I have more than once referred to the memorable picture of the Athenian character, in contrast with the Spartan, drawn by the Corinthian envoy at Sparta in 432 B.C. (Thucyd. i. 70, 71). Among the many attributes indicative of exuberant energy and activity, I select those which were most required, and most found wanting, as the means of keeping back Philip.

1. Παρά δόναμιν τολμηταί, καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνεύται, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες.

2. Ἄσχοι προὐς ὑμᾶς μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταί προὐς ἐνδημοτάτους (in opposition to you, Spartans).

3. Τοῖς μὲν σωμασιν ἄλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρώνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκαιοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, &c.

4. Καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπο

λαβοῦσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξαι, ξυμφερόν τε οὐχ ἥσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχολίαν ἐπίπουν, &c.

To the same purpose Periklēs expresses himself in his funeral oration of the ensuing year; extolling the vigour and courage of his countrymen, as alike forward and indefatigable—yet as combined also with a love of public discussion, and a taste for all the refinements of peaceful and intellectual life (Thucyd. ii. 40, 41).

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 40, 41. 43. τῆς πόλεως δόναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστάς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δόξῃ εἶναι, ἐνθυμούμενους ὅτι τολμώντες καὶ γινώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυρόμενοι ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτίσαντο, &c.

Compare ii. 63—the last speech of Periklēs.

old. Pugnacity, Pan-hellenic championship, and the love of enterprise, had died within him. He was a quiet, home-keeping, refined citizen, attached to the democratic constitution, and executing with cheerful pride his ordinary city-duties under it; but immersed in industrial or professional pursuits, in domestic comforts, in the impressive manifestations of the public religion, in the atmosphere of discussion and thought, intellectual as well as political. To renounce all this for foreign and continued military service, he considered as a hardship not to be endured, except under the pressure of danger near and immediate. Precautionary exigences against distant perils, however real, could not be brought home to his feelings; even to pay others for serving in his place, was a duty which he could scarcely be induced to perform.

Not merely in Athens, but also among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, the resident citizens had contracted the like indisposition to military service. In the year 431 B.C., these Peloponnesians (here too we have the concurrent testimony of Periklês and Archidamus<sup>1</sup>) had been forward for service with their persons, and only backward when asked for money. In 383 B.C., Sparta found them so reluctant to join her standard, especially for operations beyond sea, that she was forced to admit into her confederacy the principle of pecuniary commutation;<sup>2</sup> just as Athens had done (about 460-450 B.C.) with the unwarlike islanders enrolled in her confederacy of Delos.<sup>3</sup>

Amidst this increasing indisposition to citizen military service, the floating, miscellaneous, bands who made soldiery a livelihood under any one who would pay them, increased in number from year to year. In 402-401 B.C., when the Cyreian army (the Ten Thousand Greeks) were levied, it had been found difficult to bring so many together; large premiums were given to the chiefs or enlisting agents; the recruits consisted, in great part, of settled men tempted by lucrative promises away from their homes.<sup>4</sup> But active men ready for paid foreign

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 80, 81, 141.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 21. The allied cities furnished money instead of men in the expedition of

Mnasippus to Korkyra (Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 2, 16).

<sup>3</sup> Thucyd. i. 99.

<sup>4</sup> Isokratès, Orat. (v. Philipp.) s.

service were perpetually multiplying, from poverty, exile, or love of enterprise;<sup>1</sup> they were put under constant training and greatly improved, by Iphikratês and others, as peltasts or light infantry to serve in conjunction with the citizen force of hoplites. Jason of Pheræ brought together a greater and better trained mercenary force than had ever been seen since the Cyreians in their upward march;<sup>2</sup> the Phokians also in the Sacred War, having command over the Delphian treasures, surrounded themselves with a formidable array of mercenary soldiers. There arose (as in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in modern Europe) Condottieri like Charidêmus and others—generals having mercenary bands under their command, and hiring themselves out to any prince or potentate who would employ and pay them. Of these armed rovers—poor, brave, desperate, and held by no civic ties—Isokratês makes repeated complaint, as one of the most serious misfortunes of Greece.<sup>3</sup> Such wanderers, indeed, usually formed the natural emigrants in

112. . . . ἐν ἐκείνοις δὲ τοῖς χρό-  
νοις οὐκ ἦν ξενικὸν οὐδὲν, ὥστ' ἀνα-  
γκαζόμενοι ξεολογεῖν ἐκ τῶν πόλει-  
ων, πλέον ἀνήλiskon εἰς τὰς διδομένας τοῖς  
συλλέγουσι ὠρεάς, ἢ τὴν εἰς τοὺς  
στρατιώτας μισθοφορὰν.

About the liberal rewards of Cyrus to the generals Klearchus, Proxenus, and others, for getting together the army, and to the soldiers themselves also, see Xenoph. Anab. i. 1, 9; i. 3, 4; iii. 1, 4; vi. 8, 48.

<sup>1</sup> See the mention of the mercenary Greeks in the service of the satraps Mania in Æolis—of the satraps Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and of the Spartan Agesilaus—of Iphikratês and others, Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 13; iii. 3, 15; iv. 2, 5; iv. 3, 15; iv. 4, 14; iv. 8, 35; vii. 5, 10.

Compare Harpokration—Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ—and Demosthenês, Philippi. i. p. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Isokratês pours forth this complaint in many places: in the fourth or Panegyric Oration (B.C. 380); in the eighth or Oratio de Pace (356

B.C.); in the fifth or Oratio ad Philippum (346 B.C.). The latest of these discourses is delivered in the strongest language. See Orat. Panegyric. s. 195. τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ξένης μετὰ παιδῶν καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλᾶσθαι, πολλοὺς δὲ δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπικουρεῖν (i. e. to become an ἐπικοῦρος, or paid soldier in foreign service) ἀναγκαζομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν τοῖς φίλοις μαχομένους ἀποθνήσκειν. See also Orat. de Pace (viii.) s. 53, 56, 58; Orat. ad Philipp. (v.) s. 112. οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει τὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὥστε ῥᾶον εἶναι συστῆσαι στρατόπεδον μείζον καὶ κρεῖττον ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευόμενων, &c. . . . also s. 142, 149; Orat. de Permutat. (xv.) s. 122. ἐν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοῖς πλανωμένοις κατατρίμμενος, &c. A melancholy picture of the like evils is also presented in the ninth Epistle of Isokratês, to Archidamus, s. 9, 12. Compare Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 665 s. 162.

For an example of a disappointed lover who seeks distraction by taking foreign military service, see Theokritus, xiv. 58.

new colonial enterprises. But it so happened that few Hellenic colonies were formed during the interval between 400-350 B.C.; in fact, the space open to Hellenic colonization was becoming more circumscribed by the peace of Antalkidas—by the despotism of Dionysius—and by the increase of Lucanians, Bruttians, and the inland powers generally. Isokratês, while extolling the great service formerly rendered to the Hellenic world by Athens, in setting on foot the Ionic emigration, and thus providing new homes for so many unsettled Greeks—insists on the absolute necessity of similar means of emigration in his own day. He urges on Philip to put himself at the head of an Hellenic conquest of Asia Minor, and thus to acquire territory which might furnish settlement to the multitudes of homeless, roving, exiles, who lived by the sword, and disturbed the peace of Greece.<sup>1</sup>

This decline of the citizen militia, and growing aversion to personal service, or military exercises—together with the contemporaneous increase of the professional soldiery unmoved by civic obligations—is one of the capital facts of the Demosthenic age. Though not peculiar to Athens, it strikes us more forcibly at Athens, where the spirit of self-imposed individual effort had once been so high wrought—but where also the charm and stimulus<sup>2</sup> of peaceful existence was most diversified, and the activity of industrial pursuit most continuous. It was a fatal severance of the active force of society from political freedom and intelligence; breaking up that many-sided combination, of cultivated thought with vigorous deed, which formed the Hellenic *idéal*—and throwing the defence of Greece upon

Deterioration of the Grecian military force occurred at the same time with the great development of the Macedonian force.

<sup>1</sup> Isokratês ad Philipp. (v.) s. 142-144. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις χτίσαι πόλεις ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῇ τόπῳ, καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν μὲν πλανωμένους δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένους οἷς ἂν ἐντύχωσιν. Οὕς εἰ μὴ παύσομεν ἀθροίζομένους, βίον αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν πορίσαντες, λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς τοσούτοι γενόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστε μηδὲν ἦτον αὐτοὺς εἶναι φοβεροὺς τοῖς Ἑλ-

λῃσιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 41 (the funeral harangue of Periklès)—ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πόλιν πᾶσαν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδεύειν εἶναι, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστα ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρχεῖς παρέχεσθαι.

armed men looking up only to their general or their paymaster. But what made it irreparably fatal, was that just at this moment the Grecian world was thrown upon its defence against Macedonia led by a young prince of indefatigable enterprise; who had imbibed, and was capable even of improving, the best ideas of military organization<sup>1</sup> started by Epaminondas and Iphikratês. Philip (as described by his enemy Demosthenês) possessed all that forward and unconquerable love of action which the Athenians had manifested in 431 B.C., as we know from enemies as well as from friends; while the Macedonian population also retained, amidst rudeness and poverty, that military aptitude and readiness which had dwindled away within the walls of the Grecian cities.

Though as yet neither disciplined nor formidable, they were an excellent raw material for soldiers, in the hands of an organising genius like Philip. They were still (as their predecessors had been in the time of the first Perdikkas,<sup>2</sup> when the king's wife baked cakes with her own hand on the hearth), mountain shepherds ill-clothed and ill-housed—eating and drinking from wooden platters and cups—destitute to a great degree, not merely of cities, but of fixed residences.<sup>3</sup>

Rudeness  
and  
poverty of  
the Macedonians—  
excellent  
material  
for  
soldiers—  
organising  
genius of  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> The remarkable organization of the Macedonian army, with its systematic combination of different arms and sorts of troops,—was the work of Philip. Alexander found it ready made to his hands, in the very first months of his reign. It must doubtless have been gradually formed; year after year improved by Philip; and we should be glad to be enabled to trace the steps of his progress. But unfortunately we are left without any information about the military measures of Philip, beyond bare facts and results. Accordingly I am compelled to postpone what is to be said about the Macedonian military organization until the reign of Alexander, about whose operations we have valuable details.

<sup>2</sup> Herodot. viii. 137.

<sup>3</sup> This poor condition of the Macedonian population at the accession of Philip, is set forth in the striking speech made thirty-six years afterwards by Alexander the Great (in 323 B.C., a few months before his death) to his soldiers, satiated with conquest and plunder, but discontented with his increasing insolence and Orientalism.

Arrian, Exp. Alex. vii. 9. Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα κατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ περὶ τούτων κακῶς μοχόμενους Ἰλλυριοῖς καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις θραξί, χλαμύδας μὲν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀρίων ἐς τὰ πεδία, &c.

Other points are added in the version given by Quintus Curtius

The men of substance were armed with breastplates and made good cavalry; but the infantry were a rabble destitute of order,<sup>1</sup> armed with wicker shields and rusty swords, and contending at disadvantage, though constantly kept on the alert, to repel the inroads of their Illyrian or Thracian neighbours. Among some Macedonian tribes, the man who had never slain an enemy was marked by a degrading badge.<sup>2</sup> These were the men whom Philip on becoming king found under his rule; not good soldiers, but excellent recruits to be formed into soldiers. Poverty, endurance and bodies inured to toil, were the natural attributes, well appreciated by ancient politicians, of a military population destined to make conquests. Such had been the native Persians, at their first outburst under Cyrus the Great; such were even the Greeks at the invasion of Xerxes, when the Spartan king Demaratus reckoned poverty both as an inmate of Greece, and as a guarantee of Grecian courage.

Now it was against these rude Macedonians, to whom camp-life presented chances of plunder without any sacrifice, that the industrious and refined Athenian citizen had to go forth and fight, renouncing his trade, family, and festivals; a task the more severe, as the perpetual aggressions and systematised warfare of his new enemies could be counter-vailed only by an equal continuity of effort on his part. For such personal devotion, combined with the anxieties of preventive vigilance, the Athenians of the Periklean age would have been prepared, but those of the Demosthenic age were not; though their whole freedom and security were in the end found to be at stake.

Without this brief sketch of the great military changes in Greece since the Peloponnesian war—the decline of the

of the same speech (x. 10) — “*En tandem! Illyriorum paulo ante et Persarum tributariis, Asia et tot gentium spolia fastidio sunt. Modo sub Philippo seminudis, amacula ex purpura sordent: aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt; lignea enim vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta et rubiginem gladiatorum.*”

<sup>1</sup> Thucydides (ii. 100) recognises the goodness of the Macedonian cavalry; so also Xenophon, in the Spartan expedition against Olyn-

thus (Hellen. v. 2, 40).

That the infantry were of little military efficiency, we see from the judgement of Brasidas — Thucyd. iv. 126: compare also ii. 100.

See O. Müller's short tract on the Macedonians, annexed to his History of the Dorians, s. 33.

<sup>2</sup> Aristot. Polit. vii. 2, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. vii. 102. τῇ Ἑλλάδι παντὶ μὲν αἰεὶ κατὰ σύντροφόν ἐστι, &c. About the Persians, Herodot. 71; Arrian, v. 4, 13.

citizen force and the increase of mercenaries—the reader would scarcely understand either the proceedings of Athens in reference to Philip, or the career of Demosthenês on which we are now about to enter.

Having by assiduous labour acquired for himself these high powers both of speech and of composition, Demosthenês stood forward in 354 B.C. to devote them to the service of the public. His first address to the assembly is not less interesting, objectively, as a memorial of the actual Hellenic political world in that year—than subjectively, as an evidence of his own manner of appreciating its exigences.<sup>1</sup> At that moment, the predominant apprehension at Athens arose from reports respecting the Great King, who was said to be contemplating measures of hostility against Greece, and against Athens in particular, in consequence of the aid recently lent by the Athenian general Charês to the revolted Persian satrap Artabazus. By this apprehension—which had already, in part, determined the Athenians (a year before) to make peace with their revolted insular allies, and close the Social War—the public mind still continued agitated. A Persian armament of 300 sail, with a large force of Grecian mercenaries—and an invasion of Greece—was talked of as probable.<sup>2</sup> It appears that Mausôlus, prince or satrap of Karia, who had been the principal agent in inflaming the Social War, still prosecuted hostilities against the islands even after the peace, announcing that he acted in execution of the king's designs; so that the Athenians sent envoys to remonstrate with him.<sup>3</sup> The Persians seem also to have been collecting inland forces, which were employed some years afterwards in reconquering Egypt, but of which the

First parliamentary harangue of Demosthenês—on the Symmories—alarm felt about Persia.

<sup>1</sup> The oration *De Symmoriis* is placed by Dionysius of Halikarnassus in the archonship of Diotimus, 354-353 B.C. (Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 724). And it is plainly composed prior to the expedition sent by the Thebans under Pammenês to assist the revolted Artabazus against the Great King; which expedition is placed by Diodorus (xvi. 34) in the ensuing year 353-52 B.C. Whoever will examine the

way in which Demosthenês argues, in the *Oration De Symmoriis* (p. 187. s. 40-42), as to the relations of the Thebans with Persia—will see that he cannot have known anything about assistance given by the Thebans to Artabazus against Persia.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês cont. Timokratem. s. 15: see also the second Argument prefixed to that Oration.

destination was not at this moment declared. Hence the alarm now prevalent at Athens. It is material to note—as a mark in the tide of events—that few persons as yet entertained apprehensions about Philip of Macedon, though that prince was augmenting steadily his military force as well as his conquests. Nay, Philip afterwards asserted, that during this alarm of Persian invasion, he was himself one of the parties invited to assist in the defence of Greece.<sup>1</sup>

Though the Macedonian power had not yet become obviously formidable, we trace in the present speech of Demosthenês that same Pan-hellenic patriotism which afterwards rendered him so strenuous in blowing the trumpet against Philip. The obligation incumbent upon all Greeks, but upon Athens especially, on account of her traditions and her station, to uphold Hellenic liberty against the foreigner at all cost, is insisted on with an emphasis and dignity worthy of Periklês.<sup>2</sup> But while Demosthenês thus impresses upon his countrymen noble and Pan-hellenic purposes, he does not rest content with eloquent declamation, or negative criticism on the past. His recommendations as to means are positive and explicit; implying an attentive survey and a sagacious appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. While keeping before his countrymen a favourable view of their position, he never promises them success except on condition of earnest and persevering individual efforts, with arms and with money. He exhausts all his invention in the unpopular task of shaming them, by direct reproach as well as by oblique insinuation, out of that aversion to personal military service which, for the misfortune of Athens, had become a confirmed habit. Such positive and practical character as to means, always contemplating the full exigences of a given situation—combined with the constant presentation of Athens, as the pledged champion of Grecian freedom, and with appeals to Athenian foretime, not as a patrimony to rest upon, but as an example to imitate—constitute the imperishable charm of

<sup>1</sup> See *Epistola Philipp. ap. Demosthen.* p. 160. s. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, *De Symmoriis*, p. 179. s. 7. Οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδ' ἀπ' ἰσῆς ὁρῶ τοῖς τ' ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσι καὶ ὑμῖν περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τῆς βουλῆς οὖσαν—ἀλλ' ἐκείνων μὲν πολλοὶς ἐνδέ-

χεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἰδίᾳ τι συμφέρωντων διοικουμένοις τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀμελήσαι, ὑμῖν δ' οὐδ' ἀδιοικουμένοις παρὰ τῶν ἀδικούντων καλὸν ἐστὶ λαβεῖν ταύτην τὴν δίκην, εἶσαι τινὰς αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τῷ βαρβάρῳ γενέσθαι.

these harangues of Demosthenês, not less memorable than their excellence as rhetorical compositions. In the latter merit, indeed, his rival Æschinês is less inferior to him than in the former.

In no one of the speeches of Demosthenês is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public assembly—on the Symmories—delivered by a young man of twenty-seven years of age, who could have had little other teaching except from the decried classes of sophists, rhetors, and actors. While proclaiming the king of Persia as the common and dangerous enemy of the Grecian name, he contends that no evidence of impending Persian attack had yet transpired, sufficiently obvious and glaring to warrant Athens in sending round<sup>1</sup> to invoke a general league of Greeks, as previous speakers had suggested. He deprecates on the one hand any step calculated to provoke the Persian king or bring on a war—and on the other hand, any premature appeal to the Greeks for combination, before they themselves were impressed with a feeling of common danger. Nothing but such common terror could bring about union among the different Hellenic cities; nothing else could silence those standing jealousies and antipathies, which rendered intestine war so frequent, and would probably enable the Persian king to purchase several Greeks for his own allies against the rest.

Positive recommendations in the speech—mature thought and sagacity which they imply.

“Let us neither be immoderately afraid of the Great King, nor on the other hand be ourselves the first to begin the war and wrong him—as well on our account as from the bad feeling and mistrust prevalent among the Greeks around us. If indeed we, with the full and unanimous force of Greece, could attack him unassisted, I should have held that even wrong, done towards him, was no wrong at all. But since this is impossible, I contend that we must take care not to give the king a pretence for enforcing claims of right on behalf of the other Greeks. While we remain quiet, he cannot do any such thing without being mistrusted; but if we have been the first to begin war, he will naturally seem to mean sincere friendship to the others, on account of their aversion to us. Do not, therefore, expose to light the sad distempers of the Hellenic world, by

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 181. s. 14.

calling together its members when you will not persuade them, and by going to war when you will have no adequate force ; but keep the peace, confiding in yourselves, and making full preparation."<sup>1</sup>

It is this necessity of making preparation, which constitutes the special purpose of Demosthenês in his harangue. He produces an elaborate plan matured by careful reflection,<sup>2</sup> for improving and extending the classification by Symmories proposing a more convenient and systematic distribution of the leading citizens as well as of the total financial and nautical means—such as to ensure both the ready equipment of armed force whenever required, and a fair apportionment both of effort and of expense among the citizens. Into the details of this plan of economical reform, which are explained with the precision of an administrator and not with the vagueness of a rhetor, I do not here enter; especially as we do not know that it was actually adopted. But the spirit in which it was proposed deserves all attention, as proclaiming, even at this early day, the home-truth which the orator reiterates in so many subsequent harangues. "In the preparation which I propose to you, Athenians (he says), the first and most important point is, that your minds shall be so set, as that each man individually will be willing and forward in doing his duty. For you see plainly that of all those matters on which you have determined collectively, and on which each man individually has looked upon the duty of execution as devolving upon himself—no one has ever slipped through your hands; while, on the

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 42-46. . . . "Ὅστι' οὐτε φοβείσθαι φημι δεῖν πέρα τοῦ μετρίου, οὐθ' ὑπαχθῆναι προτέρους ἐκφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον . . .

. . . Τοῦτον ἡμεῖς φοβώμεθα; μῆδ' αὖ μῶς· ἀλλὰ μῆδ' ἀδικῶμεν, αὐτῶν ἡμῶν ἕνεκα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπιστίας· ἐπεὶ εἴ γ' ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἦν μετὰ πάντων ἐπιθίσθαι μόνῳ, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνον ἀδικημ' ἀνέθιχα. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, φυλάττεσθαι φημι δεῖν μὴ προφασιν δῶμεν βασιλεῖ τοῦ τα δίκαια ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ζητεῖν· ἡσυχίαν μὲν γὰρ ἐχόντων ἡμῶν,

ὑποπτος ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτό τι πράττων· πόλεμον δὲ ποιησαμένων προτέρῳ εἰκότως ἂν δοκοίη διὰ τὴν πρό ὑμᾶς ἐχθρὰν τοῖς ἄλλοις φίλοις εἶναι βούλεσθαι. Μὴ οὖν ἐξελεῖσθε, ζητεῖτε ὡς κακῶς ἔχει τὰ Ἑλληνικά, συγκαλοῦντες ὅτ' οὐ πεσέτε, καὶ πολεμοῦντες ὅτ' οὐ δουήσεσθε· ἀλλ' ἔχετε ἡσυχίαν, θάρροοντες καὶ παρασκευαζέμενοι.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 188. s. 17. Τὴν μὲν παρασκευὴν, ὅπως οὐ ἄριστα καὶ τάχιστα γενήσεται, πᾶσι πολλὰ πράγματα ἔσχει σκοπῶν.

contrary, whenever, after determination has been taken, you have stood looking at one another, no man intending to do anything himself, but every one throwing the burthen of action upon his neighbour—nothing has ever succeeded. Assuming you, therefore, to be thus disposed and wound up to the proper pitch, I recommend,"<sup>1</sup> &c.

This is the true Demosthenic vein of exhortation, running with unabated force through the Philippics and Olynthiacs, and striving to revive that conjunction—of which Periklês had boasted as an established fact in the Athenian character<sup>2</sup>—energetic individual action following upon full public debate and collective resolution. How often here, and elsewhere, does the orator denounce the uselessness of votes in the public assembly, even after such votes had been passed—if the citizens individually hung back, and shrunk from the fatigue or the pecuniary burthen indispensable for execution! Demus in the Pnyx (to use, in an altered sense, an Aristophanic comparison<sup>3</sup>) still remained Pan-hellenic and patriotic, when Demus at home had come to think that the city would march safely by itself without any sacrifice on his part, and that he was at liberty to become absorbed in his property, family, religion, and recreations. And so Athens might really have proceeded, in her enjoyment of liberty, wealth, refinement, and individual security—could the Grecian world have been guaranteed against the formidable Macedonian enemy from without.

Spirit of the Demosthenic exhortations—always impressing the necessity of personal effort and sacrifice as conditions of success.

It was in the ensuing year, when the alarm respecting Persia had worn off, that the Athenians were called on to discuss the conflicting applications of Sparta and of Megalopolis. The success of the Phokians appeared to be such as to prevent

B.C. 354-353. Affairs of Peloponnesus—projects of

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Symmor. p. 182. s. 18. Ἔστι τοίνυν πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρασκευῆς, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ μέγιστον, οὕτω διακείσθαι τὰς γνώμας ὑμᾶς, ὥς ἕκαστον ἔχοντα προθύμως, ἵτι ἀν δέῃ ποιήσονται. Ὅρατε γάρ, ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵτι, ὅσα μὲν πῶποθ' ἄπαντες ὑμεῖς ἡβουλῆθητε, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸ πρᾶττειν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐαυτῷ προσ-

ἡκεῖν ἡγήσατο, οὐδὲν πῶποθ' ὑμᾶς ἐξέφυγεν· ὅσα δ' ἡβουλῆθητε μὲν, μετὰ ταῦτα δ' ἀπεβλέψατε πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὡς αὐτὸς μὲν ἕκαστος οὐ ποιήσων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πράξοντα, οὐδὲν πῶποθ' ὑμῖν ἐγένετο. Ἐχόντων δ' ὑμῶν οὕτω καὶ παρωξυμμένων, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 39, 40.

<sup>3</sup> Aristophanēs, Equit. 750.

Sparta  
against  
Megalopoli-  
s—her  
attempt to  
obtain  
coopera-  
tion from  
Athens.

Thebes, especially while her troops, under Pammenês, were absent in Asia, from interfering in Peloponnesus for the protection of Megalopolis. There were even at Athens politicians who confidently predicted the approaching humiliation of Thebes,<sup>1</sup> together with the emancipation and reconstitution of those Bœotian towns which she now held in dependence—Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea; predictions cordially welcomed by the miso-Theban sentiment at Athens. To the Spartans, the moment appeared favourable for breaking up Megalopolis and recovering Messênê; in which scheme they hoped to interest not only Athens, but also Elis, Phlius, and some other Peloponnesian states. To Athens they offered aid for the recovery of Orôpus, now and for about twelve years past in the hands of the Thebans; to Elis and Phlius they also tendered assistance for regaining respectively Triphylia and the Trikaranum, from the Arcadians and Argeians.<sup>2</sup> This political combination was warmly espoused by a considerable party at Athens; being recommended not less by aversion to Thebes than by the anxious desire for repossessing the border town of Orôpus. But it was combated by others, and by Demosthenês among the number, who could not be tempted by any bait to acquiesce in the reconstitution of the Lacedæmonian power as it had stood before the battle of Leuktra. In the Athenian assembly, the discussion was animated and even angry; the envoys from Megalopolis, as well as those from Sparta on the other side, finding strenuous partisans.<sup>3</sup>

Demosthenês strikes a course professedly middle between the two, yet really in favour of defending Megalopolis against Spartan reconquest. We remark in this oration (as in the oration *De Symmoriis*, a year before) that there is no allusion to Philip; a point to be noticed as

Views and  
recommen-  
dations of  
Demo-  
sthenês—he  
advises that  
Athens

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, *Orat. pro Megalopolitanis*, p. 203. s. 5. p. 210. s. 36. Ἔστι τοίνυν ἐν τινι τοιοῦτῳ καιρῷ τὰ πράγματα νῦν, εἴ τι δεῖ τοῖς εἰρημένους πολλάκις παρ' ὑμῖν λόγοις τεκμήρασθαι, ὥστε Ἑλλήτους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθεῖσιν ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι, &c. Ἄν μὲν τοίνυν καταπολεμηθῶσιν οἱ

Ἑλλήται, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δεῖ, &c.

Compare Demosthenês cont. *Aristokrat.* p. 654. s. 120.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês *pro Megalopolitanis* p. 206. s. 18; compare Xenoph. *Hellen.* vii. 2, 1-5.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês *pro Megalopolitanis* p. 202. s. 1.

evidence of the gradual changes in the Demosthenic point of view. All the arguments urged turn upon Hellenic and Athenian interests, without reference to the likelihood of hostilities from without. In fact, Demosthenês lays down, as a position not to be disputed by any one, that for the interest of Athens, both Sparta and Thebes ought to be weak; neither of them in condition to disturb her security;<sup>1</sup>—a position, unfortunately, but too well recognised among all the leading Grecian states in their reciprocal dealings with each other, rendering the Pan-hellenic aggregate comparatively defenceless against Philip or any skilful aggressor from without. While, however, affirming a general maxim, in itself questionable and perilous, Demosthenês deduces from it nothing but judicious consequences. In regard to Sparta, he insists only on keeping her *in statu quo*, and maintaining inviolate against her the independence of Megalopolis and Messênê. He will not be prevailed upon to surrender to her these two cities, even by the seductive prospect of assistance to Athens in recovering Crôpus, and in reviving the autonomy of the Bœotian cities. At that moment the prevalent disposition among the Athenian public was antipathy against Thebes, combined with a certain sympathy in favour of Sparta, whom they had aided at the battle of Mantinea against the Megalopolitans.<sup>2</sup> Though himself sharing this sentiment,<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês will not suffer his countrymen to be misled by it. He recommends that Athens shall herself take up the Theban policy in regard to Megalopolis and Messênê, so as to protect these two cities against Sparta; the rather, as by such a proceeding the Thebans will be excluded from Peloponnesus, and their general influence narrowed. He even goes so far as to say, that if Sparta should succeed in reconquering Megalopolis and Messênê, Athens must again become the ally of the Thebans to restrain her farther aggrandisement.<sup>3</sup>

shall  
uphold  
Messênê  
and Mega-  
lopolis.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. pro Megalopolit. p. 63. s. 5, 6. Compare a similar sentiment. Demosthenês cont. Aristocrat. p. 654. s. 120.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. pro Megalopolit. p. 63. s. 7, 9. p. 207. s. 22.

<sup>3</sup> See Demosthen. cont. Leptinem. p. 489 s. 172 (delivered 355 B.C.); and Olynthiac. i. p. 16. s. 27.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês pro Megalopolit. p. 207. s. 24.

As far as we make out from imperfect information, it seems that the views of Demosthenês did not prevail, and that the Athenians declined to undertake the protection of Megalopolis against Sparta; since we presently find the Thebans continuing to afford that protection, as they had done before. The aggressive schemes of Sparta appear to have been broached at the moment when the Phokians under Onomarchus were so decidedly superior to Thebes as to place that city in some embarrassment. But the superiority of the Phokians was soon lessened by their collision with a more formidable enemy—Philip of Macedon.

That prince had been already partially interfering in Thessalian affairs,<sup>1</sup> at the instigation of Eudikus and Simus, chiefs of the Aleuadæ of Larissa, against Lykophron the despot of Pheræ. But his recent acquisition of Methônê left him more at liberty to extend his conquests southward and to bring a larger force to bear on the dissensions of Thessaly. In that country, the great cities were,<sup>2</sup> as usual, contending for supremacy and holding in subjection the smaller by means of garrisons; while Lykophron of Pheræ was exerting himself to regain that ascendancy over the whole, which had once been possessed by Jason and Alexander. Philip now marched into the country and attacked him so vigorously as to constrain him to invoke aid from the Phokians. Onomarchus, at that time victorious over the Thebans and master as far as Thermopylæ, was interested in checking the farther progress of Philip southward and extending his own ascendancy. He sent into Thessaly a force of 7000 men, under his brother Phayllus to sustain Lykophron. But Phayllus failed altogether being defeated and driven out of Thessaly by Philip, so that Lykophron of Pheræ was in greater danger than ever. Upon this, Onomarchus went himself thither with the full force of Phokians and foreign mercenaries. An obstinate and seemingly a protracted contest now took place, in the course of which he was at first decidedly victorious. He defeated Philip in two battles, with such severe loss that the Macedonian army was withdrawn from Thessaly, while

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 14; Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 241. s. 60. Harpokration v. Σίμος. <sup>2</sup> Isokratês, Orat. viii. (De Pace) s. 143, 144.

Lykophron with his Phokian allies remained masters of the country.<sup>1</sup>

This great success of the Phokian arms was followed by farther victory in Bœotia. Onomarchus renewed his invasion of that territory, defeated the Thebans in battle, and made himself master of Koroneia, in addition to Orchomenus, which he held before.<sup>2</sup> It would seem that the Thebans were at this time deprived of much of their force, which was serving in Asia under Artabazus, and which, perhaps from these very reverses, they presently called. The Phokians, on the other hand, were at the height of their power. At this juncture falls, probably, the aggressive combination of the Spartans against Megalopolis, and the debate, before noticed, in the Athenian assembly.

Successes of Onomarchus in Bœotia—maximum of the Phokian power.

Philip was for some time in embarrassment from his defeats in Thessaly. His soldiers, discouraged and even mutinous, would hardly consent to remain under his standard. By great pains, and animated exhortation, he at last succeeded in reanimating them. After a certain interval of restoration and reinforcement, he advanced with a fresh army into Thessaly, and resumed his operations against Lykophron; who was obliged again to solicit aid from Onomarchus, and promise that all Thessaly should henceforward be held under his dependence. Onomarchus accordingly joined him in Thessaly with a large army, and to consist of 20,000 foot and 500 cavalry. But he found on this occasion, within the country, more obstinate resistance than before; for the cruel dynasty of Pheræ had probably abused their previous victory by aggravated violence and rapacity, so as to throw into the arms of their enemy a multitude of exiles. On Philip's coming into Thessaly with a new army, the Thessalians embraced his cause so warmly, that he soon found himself at the head of an army of 20,000 foot and 3000 horse. Onomarchus met him in the field, somewhere near the southern coast of Thessaly; not diffident of success, as well from his recent victories, as from the neighbourhood of an Athenian ally under Charês, cooperating with him. Here a battle

B.C. 353-352. Philip repairs his forces and marches again into Thessaly—his complete victory over the Phokians—Onomarchus is slain.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 35.

was joined, and obstinately contested between the two armies, nearly equal in numbers of infantry. Philip exalted the courage of his soldiers by decorating them with laurel wreaths,<sup>1</sup> as crusaders in the service of the god against the despoilers of the Delphian temple; while the Thessalians also, forming the best cavalry in Greece and fighting with earnest valour, gave decisive advantage to his cause. The defeat of the forces of Onomarchus and Lykophron was complete. Six thousand of them are said to have been slain, and three thousand to have been taken prisoners: the remainder escaped either by flight, or by throwing away their arms, and swimming off to the Athenian ships. Onomarchus himself perished. According to one account he was slain by his own mercenaries, provoked by his cowardice: according to another account, he was drowned—being carried into the sea 'by an unruly horse, and trying to escape to the ships. Philip caused his dead body to be crucified, and drowned all the prisoners as men guilty of sacrilege.<sup>2</sup>

This victory procured for the Macedonian prince great renown as avenger of the Delphian god—and became an important step in his career of aggrandisement. It not only terminated the power of the Phokians north of Thermopylæ, but also finally crushed the powerful dynasty of Pheræ in Thessaly. Philip laid siege to the city, upon which Lykophron and Peitholaos, surrounded by an adverse population and unable to make any long defence, capitulated, and surrendered it to him; retiring with their mercenaries, 200 in number, into Phokis.<sup>3</sup> Having obtained possession of Pheræ and proclaimed it a free city, Philip proceeded to besiege the neighbouring town of Pagasæ, the most valuable maritime station in Thessaly. How long Pagasæ resisted, we do not know; but long enough to send intimations

B.C. 353-352  
Philip  
conquers  
Pheræ and  
Pagasæ—  
becomes  
master of  
all Thes-  
saly--ex-  
pulsion of  
Lykophron.

<sup>1</sup> This fact is mentioned by Justin (viii. 2), and seems likely to be true, from the severity with which Philip, after his victory, treated the Phokian prisoners. But the farther statement of Justin is not likely to be true—that the Phokians, on beholding the insignia of the god, threw away their arms and fled without resistance.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 55; Pausan. x. 3; Philo Judeus apud Eusebii Præp. Evang. viii. p. 392. Diodor states that Charès with the Athenian fleet was sailing by, accidentally. But this seems highly improbable. It cannot but be supposed that he was destined to operate with the Phokians.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 37.

to Athens, with entreaties for succour. The Athenians, alarmed at the successive conquests of Philip, were well-disposed to keep this important post out of his hands, which their naval power fully enabled them to do. But here again (as in the previous examples of Pydna, Potidæa, and Methônê), the aversion to personal service among the citizens individually—and the impediments as to apportionment of duty or cost, whenever actual outgoing was called for—produced the untoward result, that though an expedition was voted and despatched, it did not arrive in time.<sup>1</sup> Pagasæ surrendered and came into the power of Philip; who fortified and garrisoned it for himself, thus becoming master of the Pagasæan Gulf, the great inlet of Thessaly.

Philip was probably occupied for a certain time in making good his dominion over Thessaly. But as soon as sufficient precautions had been taken for this purpose, he sought to push this advantage over the Phokians by invading them in their own territory. He marched to Thermopylæ, still proclaiming as his aim the liberation of the Delphian temple and the punishment of its sacrilegious robbers; while he at the same time conciliated the favour of the Thessalians by promising to restore to them the Pylæa, or half-yearly Amphiktyonic festival at Thermopylæ, which the Phokians had discontinued.<sup>2</sup>

B.C. 353-352.

Philip invades Thermopylæ—the Athenians send a force thither and arrest his progress. Their alarm at this juncture, and unusual rapidity of movement.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic i. p. 50. s. 40. Καίτοι, τί δήποτε νομίζετε . . . . τούς ἀποστόλους πάντας ὑμῖν ὑστερίζειν τῶν καιρῶν, τὸν εἰς Μεθώνην, τὸν εἰς Παγασάς, τὸν εἰς Ποτιδαίαν, &c.

Demosthenês, Olynth. i. p. 11. s. 9. Καὶ πάλιν ἦνικα Πύδνα, Ποτιδαία, Μεθώνη, Παγασαί—πολιτορχούμενα ἀπηγγέλλετο, εἰ τότε τούτων ἐνὶ τῷ πρώτῳ προθύμως καὶ ὡς προσῆκεν ἐβοηθήσαμεν αὐτοῖς, &c.

The first Philippic was delivered in 352-351 B.C., which proves that Philip's capture of Pagasæ cannot have been later than that year. Nor can it have been earlier than his capture of Pheræ—as I have before remarked in reference to the passage of Diodorus (xvi. 31), where

it seems to be placed in 354-353 B.C.; if Παγὰς is to be taken for Παγασάς.

I apprehend that the first campaign of Philip in Thessaly against the Phokians, wherein he was beaten and driven out by Onomarchus, may be placed in the summer of 353 B.C. The second entrance into Thessaly, with the defeat and death of Onomarchus, belongs to the early spring of 352 B.C. The capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ comes immediately afterwards; then the expedition of Philip to Thermopylæ, where his progress was arrested by the Athenians, comes about Midsummer 352 B.C.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, De Pace, p. 62. s.

The Phokians, though masters of this almost inexpugnable pass, seemed to have been so much disheartened by their recent defeat, and the death of Onomarchus, that they felt unable to maintain it long. The news of such a danger, transmitted to Athens, excited extraordinary agitation. The importance of defending Thermopylæ—and of prohibiting the victorious king of Macedonia from coming to cooperate with the Thebans on the southern side of it,<sup>1</sup> not merely against the Phokians, but probably also against Attica—were so powerfully felt, that the usual hesitations and delay of the Athenians in respect to military expedition were overcome. Chiefly from this cause—but partly also, we may suppose, from the vexatious disappointment recently incurred in the attempt to relieve Pagasæ—an Athenian armament under Nausiklês (amounting to 5000 foot and 400 horse, according to Diodorus)<sup>2</sup> was fitted out with not less vigour and celerity than had been displayed against the Thebans in Eubœa, seven years before. Athenian citizens shook off their lethargy, and promptly volunteered. They reached Thermopylæ in good time, placing the pass in such a condition of defence that Philip did not attack it at all. Often afterwards does Demosthenês,<sup>3</sup> in combating the general remissness of his countrymen when military exigences arose, remind them of this unwonted act of energetic movement, crowned with complete effect. With little or no loss, the Athenians succeeded in guarding both themselves and their allies against a very menacing contingency, simply by the promptitude of their action. The cost of the armament altogether was more than 200 talents; and from the stress which Demosthenês lays on that portion of the expense which was defrayed by the soldiers privately and individually,<sup>4</sup> we may gather that these soldiers (as in the Sicilian expedition under Nikias<sup>5</sup>) were in considerable proportion opulent citizens. Among a portion of the Grecian public, however,

23; Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 27; De Legat. Fals. p. 443. s. 365.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 94. p. 446. s. 375. Τίς γάρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὁμῶν ἔτι τῇ Φωκέων πολέμῳ καὶ τῇ κυρίους εἶναι Πολῶν Φωκέας, ἥ τε ἀπὸ Θεβαίων ἄδεια ὑπῆρχεν ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε ἔλθειν αὐν εἰς Πελοπόννησον μηδ' Εὐβοίαν

Φίλιππον μηδὲ Θεβαίους;

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic i. p. 44. s. 20; De Coronâ, p. 236. s. 40; De Fals. Leg. p. 444. s. 366.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, De Fals. Leg. p. 367. s. 95.

<sup>5</sup> Thucyd. vi. 31.

he Athenians incurred obloquy as accomplices in the Phokian sacrilege, and enemies of the Delphian god.<sup>1</sup>

But though Philip was thus kept out of Southern Greece, and the Phokians enabled to re-organise themselves against Thebes, yet in Thessaly and without the straits of Thermopylæ, Macedonian ascendancy was henceforward an uncontested fact. Before we follow his subsequent proceedings, however, it will be convenient to turn to events both in Phokis and in Peloponnesus,

In the depressed condition of the Phokians after the defeat of Onomarchus, they obtained reinforcement not only from Athens, but also from Sparta (1000 men), and from the Peloponnesian Achæans (2000 men).<sup>2</sup> Phayllus, the successor (by some called brother) of Onomarchus, put himself again in a condition of defence. He had recourse a third time to that yet unexhausted store—the Delphian treasures and valuables. He despoiled the temple to a greater extent than Philomelus, and not less than Onomarchus; accruing aggravated odium from the fact, that he could not now supply himself without laying hands on offerings of conspicuous magnificence and antiquity, which his two predecessors had spared. It was thus that the splendid golden donatives of the Lydian king Kræus were now melted down and turned into money; 117 bricks or ingots of gold, most of them weighing two talents each; 360 golden goblets, together with a female statue three cubits high, and a lion, of the same metal—said to have weighed in the aggregate thirty talents.<sup>3</sup> The

B.C. 352.

Phayllus takes the command of the Phokians—third spoliation of the temple—revived strength of the Phokians—malversations of the leaders.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, vii. 2. His rhetorical exaggerations ought not to make us reject the expression of this opinion against Athens, as a real fact.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês (Fals. Leg. p. 443) asserts that no one else except Athens assisted or rescued the Phokians in this emergency. But Diodorus (xvi. 37) mentions succours from the other allies also; and there seems no ground for disbelieving him. The boast of Demosthenês, however, that Athens single-handed saved the Phokians,

is not incorrect as to the main fact, though overstated in the expression. For the Athenians, commanding a naval force, and on this rare occasion rapid in their movements, reached Thermopylæ in time to arrest the progress of Philip, and before the Peloponnesian troops could arrive. The Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ seems to have occurred about May 352 B.C.—as far as we can make out the chronology of the time.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56. The account

abstraction of such ornaments, striking and venerable in the eyes of the numerous visitors of the temple, was doubtless deeply felt among the Grecian public. And the indignation was aggravated by the fact, that beautiful youths or women, favourites of Onomarchus or Phayllus, received some of the most precious gifts, and wore the most noted ornaments, which had decorated the temple—even the necklaces of Helen and Eriphylê. One woman, a flute-player named Bromias, not only received from Phayllus a silver cup and a golden wreath (the former dedicated in the temple by the Phokæans, the latter by the Peparethians), but was also introduced by him, in his capacity of superintendent of the Pythian festival, to contend for the prize in playing the sacred Hymn. As the competitors for such prize had always been men, the assembled crowd so loudly resented the novelty, that Bromias was obliged to withdraw.<sup>1</sup> Moreover profuse largesses, and flagrant malversation, became more notorious than ever.<sup>2</sup> The Phokian leaders displayed with ostentation their newly-acquired wealth, and either imported for the first time bought slaves, or at least greatly multiplied the pre-existing

of these donatives of Kræsus may be read in Herodotus (i. 50, 51), who saw them at Delphi. As to the exact weight and number, there is some discrepancy between him and Diodorus; moreover the text of Herodotus himself is not free from obscurity.

<sup>1</sup> Theopomp. *Fragm.* 182, 183; Phylarchus, *Fragm.* 60, ed. Didot; Anaximenês and Ephorus ap. *Athenæum*, vi. p. 231, 232. The Pythian games here alluded to must have been those celebrated in August or September 350 B.C. It would seem therefore that Phayllus survived over that period.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56, 57. The story annexed about Iphikratês and the ships of Dionysius of Syracuse—a story which, at all events, comes quite out of its chronological place—appears to me not worthy of credit, in the manner in which Diodorus here gives it. The squadron of Dionysius, which Iphikra-

tês captured on the coast of Korkyra, was coming to the aid and at the request of the Lacedæmonians, then at war with Athens (*Xenoph. Hellen.* vi. 2, 33). It was therefore a fair capture, for an Athenian general, together with all on board. If, amidst the cargo, there happened to be presents intended for Olympia and Delphi, these, as being on board of ships of war, would follow the fate of the other persons and things along with them. They would not be considered as the property of the god until they had been actually dedicated in his temple. Nor would the person sending them be entitled to invoke the privilege of a consecrated cargo unless he divested it of all hostile accompaniment. The letter of complaint to the Athenians, which Diodorus gives as having been sent by Dionysius, seems to me neither genuine nor even plausible.

number. It had before been the practice in Phokis, we are told, for the wealthy men to be served by the poor youthful freemen of the country; and complaints arose among the latter class that their daily bread was thus taken away.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding the indignation excited by these proceedings not only throughout Greece, but even in Phokis itself—Phayllus carried his point of levying a fresh army of mercenaries, and of purchasing new alliances among the smaller cities. Both Athens and Sparta profited more or less by the distribution; though the cost of the Athenian expedition to Thermopylæ, which rescued the Phokians from destruction, seems clearly to have been paid by the Athenians themselves.<sup>2</sup> Phayllus carried on war for some time against both the Bœotians and Lokrians. He is represented by Diodorus to have lost several battles. But it is certain that the general result was not unfavourable to him; that he kept possession of Orchomenus in Bœotia; and that his power remained without substantial diminution.<sup>3</sup>

The stress of war seems, for the time, to have been transferred to Peloponnesus, whither a portion both of the Phokian and Theban troops went to cooperate. The Lacedæmonians had at length opened their campaign against Megalopolis, of which I have already spoken as having been debated before the Athenian public assembly. Their plan seems to have been formed some months before, when Onomarchus was at the maximum of his power, and when Thebes was supposed to be in danger; but it was not executed until after his defeat and death, when the Phokians, depressed for the time, were rescued only by the prompt interference of Athens—and when the Thebans had their hands comparatively free. Moreover, the Theban division which had been sent into Asia under Pammenês a year or two before, to assist Artabazus, may now be presumed to have returned; especially as we know that no very long time afterwards, Artabazus appears as completely defeated by the Persian troops—expelled from Asia—and constrained

B.C. 352-351.

B.C. 352-351.

War in  
Pelopon-  
nesus—the  
Spartans  
attack  
Megalopo-  
lis—inter-  
ference of  
Thebes.

<sup>1</sup> Timæus, Fragm. 67, ed. Didot; mosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 367.

ap. Athenæum, vi. p. 264—272.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 37, 38.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 57; compare De-

to take refuge, together with his brother-in-law Memnon, under the protection of Philip.<sup>1</sup> The Megalopolitans had sent envoys to entreat aid from Athens, under the apprehension that Thebes would not be in a condition to assist them. It may be doubted whether Athens would have granted their prayer, in spite of the advice of Demosthenês; but the Thebans had now again become strong enough to uphold with their own force their natural allies in Peloponnesus.

Accordingly, when the Lacedæmonian army under **B.C. 352-351.** king Archidamus invaded the Megalopolitan territory, a competent force was soon brought together to oppose them; furnished partly by the Argeians—who had been engaged during the preceding year in a border warfare with Sparta, and had experienced a partial defeat at Orneæ<sup>2</sup>—partly by the Sikyonians and Messenians, who came in full muster. Besides this, the forces on both sides from Bœotia and Phokis were transferred to Peloponnesus. The Thebans sent 4000 foot, and 500 horse, under Kephision, to the aid of Megalopolis: while the Spartans not only recalled their own troops from Phokis, but also procured 3000 of the mercenaries in the service of Phayllus, and 150 Thessalian horse from Lykophron, the expelled despot of Pheræ. Archidamus received his reinforcements, and got together his aggregate forces, earlier than the enemy. He advanced first into Arcadia, where he posted himself near Mantinea, thus cutting off the Argeians from Megalopolis; he next invaded the territory of Argos, attacked Orneæ, and defeated the Argeians in a partial action. Presently the Thebans arrived, and effected a junction with their Argeian and Arcadian allies. The united force was greatly superior in number to the Lacedæmonians; but such superiority was counterbalanced by the bad discipline of the Thebans, who had sadly declined on this point during the interval of ten years since the death of Epaminondas. A battle ensued, partially advantageous to the Lacedæmonians; while the Argeians and Arcadians chose to go home to their neighbouring cities. The Lacedæmonians also, having ravaged a portion of Arcadia, and stormed the Arcadian town of Helissus, presently recrossed their own frontier and

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52.<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 34.

returned to Sparta. They left however a division in Arcadia under Anaxander, who, engaging with the Thebans near Telphusa, was worsted with great loss and made prisoner. In two other battles, also, the Thebans were successively victorious; in a third, they were vanquished by the Lacedæmonians. With such balanced and undecided success was the war carried on, until at length the Lacedæmonians proposed and concluded peace with Megalopolis. Either formally, or by implication, they were forced to recognise the autonomy of that city; thus abandoning, for the time at least, their aggressive purposes, which Demosthenês had combated and sought to frustrate before the Athenian assembly. The Thebans on their side returned home, having accomplished their object of protecting Megalopolis and Messênê; and we may presume that the Phokian allies of Sparta were sent home also.<sup>1</sup>

The war between the Bœotians and Phokians had doubtless slackened during this episode in Peloponnesus; but it still went on, in a series of partial actions, on the river Kephissus, at Koroneia, at Abæ in Phokis, and near the Lokrian town of Naryx. For the most part, the Phokians are said to have been worsted; and their commander Phayllus presently died of a painful disease—the suitable punishment (in the point of view of a Grecian historian<sup>2</sup>) for his sacrilegious deeds. He left as his successor Phalækus, a young man, son of Onomarchus, under the guardianship and advice of an experienced friend named Mnaseas. But Mnaseas was soon surprised at night, defeated, and slain, by the Thebans; while Phalækus, left to his own resources, was defeated in two battles near Chæroneia, and was unable to hinder his enemies from ravaging a large part of the Phokian territory.<sup>3</sup>

B.C. 351-350.

Ill-success of the Phokians in Bœotia—death of Phayllus, who is succeeded by Phalækus.

We know the successive incidents of this ten years' Sacred War only from the meagre annals of Diodorus; whose warm sympathy in favour of the religious side of the question seems to betray him into exaggeration of the victories of the Thebans, or at least into some omission of counterbalancing reverses. For in spite of these successive

B.C. 350-349.

The Thebans obtain money from the Persian king.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 39.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 38. 39.

victories, the Phokians were noway put down, but remained in possession of the Bœotian town of Orchomenus; moreover the Thebans became so tired out and impoverished by the war, that they confined themselves presently to desultory incursions and skirmishes.<sup>1</sup> Their losses fell wholly upon their own citizens and their own funds; while the Phokians fought with foreign mercenaries and with the treasures of the temple.<sup>2</sup> The increasing poverty of the Thebans even induced them to send an embassy to the Persian king, entreating pecuniary aid; which drew from him a present of 300 talents. As he was at this time organising a fresh expedition on an immense scale, for the reconquest of Phenicia and Egypt, after more than one preceding failure—he required Grecian soldiers as much as the Greeks required his money. Hence we shall see presently that the Thebans were able to send him an equivalent.

In the war just recounted on the Laconian and Arcadian frontier, the Athenians had taken no part. Their struggle with Philip had been becoming from month to month more serious and embarrassing. By occupying in time the defensible pass of Thermopylæ, they had indeed prevented him both from crushing the Phokians and from meddling with the Southern states of Greece. But the final battle wherein he had defeated Onomarchus, had materially increased both his power and his military reputation. The numbers on both sides were very great; the result was decisive and ruinous to the vanquished; moreover, we cannot doubt that the Macedonian phalanx, with the other military improvements and manœuvres which Philip had been gradually organising since his accession, was now exhibited in formidable efficiency. The king of Macedon had become the ascendent soldier and potentate hanging on the skirt of the Grecian world, exciting fears, or hopes, or both a

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 40. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων, ὀθβαῖοι χάμνοντες τῇ πρὸς Φωκεῖς πολέμῳ, καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορούμενοι, πρέσβεις ἐξέπεμψαν πρὸς τὸν τῶν Περσῶν βασιλέα . . . Τοῖς δὲ Βοιωτοῖς καὶ τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἀκροβολισμοὶ μὲν καὶ χώρας καταδρομαὶ συνέστησαν,

πράξεις δὲ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ἑνιαυτὸν (351-350 B.C. — according to the chronology of Diodorus) οὗ συνέτελέσθησαν.

<sup>2</sup> Isokratēs, Orat. v. (ad Philippum) s. 61.

nce, in every city throughout its limits. In the first Philippic of Demosthenês, and in his oration against Aristokratês (delivered between Midsummer 352 B.C. and Midsummer 351 B.C.), we discern evident marks of the errors which Philip had come to inspire, within a year after his repulse from Thermopylæ, to reflecting Grecian politicians. "It is impossible for Athens (says the orator) to provide any landforce competent to contend in the field against that of Philip."

The reputation of his generalship and his indefatigable activity was already everywhere felt; as well as that of the officers and soldiers, partly native Macedonians, partly chosen Greeks, whom he had assembled round him<sup>2</sup>—especially the lochages or front rank men of the phalanx and the hypaspistæ. Moreover, the excellent cavalry of Thessaly became embodied from henceforward as an element in the Macedonian army; since Philip had acquired unbounded ascendancy in that country, from his expulsion of the Pheræan despots and their auxiliaries the Phokians. The philo-Macedonian party in the Thessalian cities had constituted him federal chief (or in some sort *Tagus*) of the country, not only enrolling their cavalry in his armies, but also placing at his disposal the customs and market-dues, which formed a standing common fund for supporting the Thessalian collective administration.<sup>3</sup> The financial means of Philip, for payment of his foreign troops, and prosecution of his military enterprises, were thus materially increased.

But besides his irresistible land-force, Philip had now become master of no inconsiderable naval power also. During the early years of the war, though he had taken not only Amphipolis but also all the Athenian possessions on the Macedonian coast, yet the exports from his territory had been

B.C. 351.

Philip acquires a considerable naval power—

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic i. p. 46. s. 26 (352-351 B.C.).

Compare Philippic iii. p. 124. s. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. ii. p. 23. s. 17 (delivered in 350 B.C.).

... Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν ὄντες εἶναι καὶ πελῆταιροι δόξαν μὲν ἔχουσιν ὅς εἰσι θαυμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 133 (352-351 B.C.); also

Demosthen. Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23 (349 B.C.). ἤκουον δ' ἔγωγέ τινων ὥς οὐδὲ τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς ἔτι δῶ σοι εἰεν αὐτῷ καρποῦσθαι τὰ γὰρ κοινὰ τὰ θετταλῶν ἀπὸ τούτων δεοὶ δικαίῃ, οὐ Φίλιππον λαμβάνειν· εἰ δὲ τούτων ἀποστερηθῇσεται τῶν χρημάτων, εἰς στενὸν χομιδῇ τὰ τῆς τροφῆς τοῖς ξένοις αὐτῷ καταστήσεται.

importance of the Gulf of Pagasæ to him—his flying squadrons annoy the Athenian commerce and coast.

interrupted by the naval force of Athens, so as to lessen seriously the produce of his export duties.<sup>1</sup> But he had now contrived to get together a sufficient number of armed ships and privateers, if not to ward off such damage from himself, at least to retaliate it upon Athens. Her navy indeed was still incomparably superior, but the languor and remissness of her citizens refused to bring it out with efficiency; while Philip had opened for himself a new avenue to maritime power by his acquisition of Pheræ and Pagasæ, and by establishing his ascendancy over the Magnètes and their territory, round the eastern border of the Pagasæan Gulf. That Gulf (now known by the name of Volo) is still the great inlet and outlet for Thessalian trade; the eastern coast of Thessaly, along the line of Mount Pelion, being craggy and harbourless.<sup>2</sup> The naval force belonging to Pheræ and its seaport Pagasæ was very considerable, and had been so even from the times of the despots Jason and Alexander;<sup>3</sup> at one moment painfully felt even by Athens. All these ships now passed into the service of Philip, together with the dues on export and import levied round the Pagasæan Gulf, the command of which he farther secured by erecting suitable fortifications on the Magnesian shore, and by placing a garrison in Pagasæ.<sup>4</sup> Such additional naval means, combined with

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 657. s. 131-133 (352-351 B.C.); compare Isokratês, Orat. v. (ad Philipp.) s. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 56; Hermippus ap. Athenæum, i. p. 27. About the lucrative commerce in the Gulf, in reference to Demetrias and Thebæ Phthiotidês, see Livy, xxxix. 25.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês cont. Polykl. p. 1207; De Coronâ Trierarchicâ, p. 1230; Diodor. xv. 95; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 1, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. i. p. 15. s. 23. Καὶ γὰρ Παγασᾶς ἀπαίτουν αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐψηφισμένοι (the Thessalians redemand the place from Philip), καὶ Μαγνησίαν κερωνόχασαι τεύχεσιν. In Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 11 it stands—καὶ γὰρ νῦν εἶναι ἐψηφ-

φισμένοι Παγασᾶς ἀπαίτουν, καὶ περ Μαγνησίας λόγους ποιεῖσθαι. I take the latter expression to state the fact with more strict precision; the Thessalians passed a vote to remonstrate with Philip; it is not probable that they actually hindered him. And if he afterwards "gave" to them Magnesia, as we are told in a later oration delivered 344 B.C. (Philippic ii. p. 71. s. 24), he probably gave it with reserve of the fortified posts to himself; since we know that his ascendancy over Thessaly was not only not relaxed but became more violent and compressive.

The value which the Macedonian kings always continued to set, from this time forward, upon Magnesia and the recess of the Pagasæan

that he already possessed at Amphipolis and elsewhere, made him speedily annoying, if not formidable, to Athens, even at sea. His triremes showed themselves everywhere, probably in small and rapidly moving squadrons. He levied large contributions on the insular allies of Athens, and paid the costs of war greatly out of the capture of merchant vessels in the Ægean. His squadrons made incursions on the Athenian islands of Lemnos and Imbros, carrying off several Athenian citizens as prisoners. They even stretched southward as far as Geræstus, the southern promontory of Eubœa, where they not only fell in with and captured a lucrative squadron of corn-ships, but also insulted the coast of Attica itself in the opposite bay of Marathon, towing off as a prize one of the sacred triremes.<sup>1</sup> Such was the mischief successfully inflicted by the flying squadrons of Philip, though Athens had probably a considerable number of cruisers at sea, and certainly a far superior number of ships at home in Peiræus. Her commerce and even her coasts were disturbed and endangered; her insular allies suffered yet more. Eubœa especially, the nearest and most important of all her allies, separated

alf, is shown in the foundation of the city of Demetrias in that important position by Demetrius Poliorketês, about sixty years afterwards. Demetrias, Chalkis, and Olynth came to be considered the best commanding positions in Greece.

This fine bay, with the fertile territory lying on its shores under Mount Pelion, are well described by Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iv. ch. 41. p. 3 *seqq.* I doubt whether either Olynth (ad Demosthen. Olynth. i. 24) or Colonel Leake (p. 381) is borne out in supposing that there was any town called *Magnesia* on the shores of the Gulf. None such is mentioned either by Strabo or by Skylax; and I apprehend that the passages above cited from Demosthenês mean *Magnesia the town* inhabited by the Magnètes; in Demosthenês cont. Neæram,

p. 1382. s. 141.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, *Philippic* i. p. 46. s. 25. δει γάρ, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου ναυτικόν, καὶ ταχειῶν τριηρῶν ἡμῖν, ὥπως ἀσφαλῶς ἡ δύναμις πλέη.—p. 49. s. 38. Πρῶτον μὲν, τὸν μέγιστον τῶν ἐκείνου πόρων ἀφαίρησέσθε· ἐστὶ δ' οὗτος τις; ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θάλασσαν. Ἐπειτα, τί πρὸς τοῦτο τοῦ πάσχειν αὐτοὶ κακῶς ἔξω γενήσεσθε, οὐχ ὥσπερ τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Δῆμον καὶ Ἰμβρον ἐμβάλων αἰχμαλώτους πολίτας ὑμετέρους ᾤχετ' ἄγων, πρὸς τῷ Γεραισιτῷ τὰ πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμύθητα χρήματ' ἐξέλεξε, τὰ τελευταῖα εἰς Μαραθῶνα ἀπέβη, καὶ τὴν ἱερὰν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ᾤχετ' ἔχων τριῆρη, &c.

We can hardly be certain that the Sacred Trireme thus taken was either the *Paralus* or the *Salaminia*; there may have been other sacred triremes besides these two.

only by a narrow strait from the Pagasæan Gulf and the southern coast of Phthiotis, was now within the immediate reach not only of Philip's marauding vessels, but also of his political intrigues.

It was thus that the war against Philip turned more and more to the disgrace and disadvantage of the Athenians. Though they had begun it in the hope of punishing him for his duplicity in appropriating Amphipolis, they had been themselves the losers by the capture of Pydna, Potidæa, Methônê, &c.; and they were now thrown upon the defensive, without security for their maritime allies, their commerce, or their coasts.

The intelligence of these various losses and insults endured at sea, in spite of indisputable maritime preponderance called forth at Athens acrimonious complaints against the generals of the state, and exaggerated outbursts of enmity against Philip.<sup>2</sup> That prince, having spent a few months after his repulse from Thermopylæ, in Thessaly, and having so far established his ascendancy over that country that he could leave the completion of the task to his officers, pushed with his characteristic activity into Thrace. He there took part in the disputes between various native princes expelling some, confirming or installing others, and extending his own dominion at the cost of all.<sup>3</sup> Among these princes were probably Kersobleptês and Amadokus; for Philip carried his aggressions to the immediate neighbourhood of the Thracian Chersonese.

In November 352 B.C., intelligence reached Athens that he was in Thrace besieging Heræon Teichos, a place so near to the Chersonese,<sup>4</sup> that the Athenian possessions and colonists in that peninsula were threatened with considerable danger. So great was the alarm and excitement caused

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic i. p. 52. s. 49. ὁρῶν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου γεγεννημένην ὑπὲρ τοῦ τιμωρησασθαι Φιλίππον, τὴν δὲ τελευταίην οὖσαν ἤδη ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν κακῶς ὑπὸ Φιλίππου. (Between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B.C.).

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 660. s. 144. p. 656. s. 130. Ἄλλ' ὁ μάλιστα δοκῶν νῦν ἡμῖν ἐχθρὸς εἶναι

Φίλιππος οὐτος, &c. (this harangue also between Midsummer 352 and Midsummer 351 B.C.).

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. i. p. 1: s. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. ii. p. 26 s. 5 (delivered in the latter half of 350 B.C.).

... ἀπηγγέλη Φίλιππος ὅμῃ ἐν Θράκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τουτ

by this news, that a vote was immediately passed in the public assembly to equip a fleet of forty triremes—to man it with Athenian citizens, all persons up to the age of 45 being made liable to serve on the expedition—and to raise 60 talents by a direct property-tax. At first active steps were taken to accelerate the armament. But before the difficulties of detail could be surmounted—before it could be determined, amidst the general aversion to personal service, what citizens should go abroad, and how the burthen of trierarchy should be distributed—fresh messengers arrived from the Chersonese, reporting first that Philip had fallen sick, next that he was actually dead.<sup>1</sup> The last-mentioned report proved false; but the sickness of Philip was an actual fact, and seems to have been severe enough to cause a temporary suspension of his military operations. Though the opportunity became thus only the more favourable for attacking Philip, yet the Athenians, no longer spurred on by the fear of farther immediate danger, relapsed into their former languor, and renounced or postponed their intended armament. After passing the whole ensuing summer in inaction, they could only be prevailed upon, in the month of September 351, to despatch to Thrace a feeble force under the mercenary

send out a  
the fleet:  
Philip  
falls sick:  
the fleet is  
not sent.

Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν, τότε τοίνυν μὴν μὲν ἦν Μαίμακτηριῶν, &c.

This Thracian expedition of Philip (alluded to also in Demosthenēs, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13) stands fixed to the date of November 352 B.C., on reasonably good grounds.

That the town or fortress called Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was near to the Chersonese, cannot be doubted. The commentators identify it with Ἡραῖον, mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 90) as being near Perinthus. But this hypothesis is open to much doubt. Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος is not quite the same as Ἡραῖον; nor was the latter place very near to the Chersonese; nor would Philip be yet in a condition to provoke or menace so powerful a city as Perinthus—though he did so ten years afterwards (Diodor. xvi. 74).

I cannot think that we know where Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος was situated; except that it was in Thrace, and near the Chersonese.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenēs, Olynth. iii. p. 29, 30. ὥς γὰρ ἡγγέλθη Φίλιππος ἀσθενῶν ἢ τεθνεῶς (ἦλθε γὰρ ἀμφοτέρω), &c. These reports of the sickness and death of Philip in Thrace are alluded to in the first Philippic, p. 43. s. 14. The expedition of Philip threatening the Chersonese, and the vote passed by the Athenians when they first heard of this expedition, are also alluded to in the first Philippic, p. 44. s. 20. p. 51. s. 46. καὶ ὁμοίως; ἂν ἐν Χερρόνῃσιν πύθησθε Φίλιππον, ἐκείσε βοηθεῖν ψηφίσεσθε, &c. When Philip was besieging Ἡραῖον Τεῖχος, he was said to be ἐν Χερρόνῃσιν.

chief Charidêmus; ten triremes, without any soldiers aboard, and with no more than five talents in money.<sup>1</sup>

At this time Charidêmus was at the height of his popularity. It was supposed that he could raise and maintain a mercenary band by his own ingenuity and valour. His friends confidently averred before the Athenian assembly that he was the only man capable of putting down Philip and conquering Amphipolis.<sup>2</sup> One of these partisans, Aristokratês, even went so far as to propose that a vote should be passed ensuring inviolability to his person, and enacting that any one who killed him should be seized wherever found in the territory of Athens or her allies. This proposition was attacked judicially by an accuser named Euthyklês, who borrowed a memorable discourse from the pen of Demosthenês.

It was thus that the real sickness, and reported death, of Philip, which ought to have operated as a stimulus to the Athenians by exposing to them their enemy during a moment of peculiar weakness, proved rather an opiate exaggerating their chronic lethargy, and cheating them into a belief that no farther efforts were needed. That belief appears to have been proclaimed by the leading, best-known, and senior speakers, those who gave the tone to the public assembly, and who were principally relied upon for advice. These men—probably Eubulus at their head, and Phokion, so constantly named as general, along with him—either did not feel, or could not bring themselves to proclaim, the painful necessity of personal military service and increased taxation. Though repeated debates took place on the insults offered to Athens in her maritime dignity, and on the sufferings of those allies to whom she owed protection—combined with accusations against the generals, and complaints of the inefficiency of such mercenary foreigners as Athens took into commission

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 625. s. 14. p. 682, 683. This oration, delivered between Midsummer 352

and Midsummer 351 B.C., seems to have been prior to November 352 B.C., when the news reached Athens that Philip was besieging Ἡράκλειον.

ut never paid—still the recognised public advisers shrank from appeal to the dormant patriotism or personal endurance of the citizens. The serious, but indispensable, duty which they thus omitted, was performed for them by a younger competitor, far beneath them in established footing and influence—Demosthenês, now about thirty years old—in an harangue known as the first Philippic.

We have already had before us this aspiring man, as public adviser in the assembly. In his first parliamentary harangue two years before,<sup>1</sup> he had begun to inculcate on his countrymen the general lesson of energy and self-reliance, and to remind them of that which the comfort, activity, and peaceful refinement of Athenian

B.C. 351—  
Spring.  
First Philippic of  
Demosthenês,  
352-351 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> I adopt the date accepted by most critics, on the authority of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, to the first Philippic; the archonship of Aristodêmus 352-351 B.C. It belongs, I think, to the latter half of that year.

The statements of Dionysius bearing on this oration have been much called in question; to a certain extent, with good reason, in what he states about the *sixth Philippic* (ed. Ammæum, p. 736). What he calls the *sixth*, is in reality the *fourth* in his own enumeration, coming next after the first Philippic and the three Olynthiacs. To the *ratio de Pace*, which is properly the *sixth* in his enumeration, he assigns no ordinal number whatever. What is still more perplexing—he gives as the initial words what he calls the *sixth Philippic*, certain words which occur in the middle of the first Philippic, immediately after the financial scheme read by Demosthenês to the people, the words—“*Ἀ μὲν ἡμεῖς, ὧ ἄνδρες ἰθνηαῖοι, δεδυνήμεθα εὐρεῖν, ταῦτ' εἶναι*” (Philipp. i. p. 48). If this were correct, we should have to divide the first Philippic into two parts, and recognise the latter part (after the words “*Ἀ μὲν ἡμεῖς*”) as a separate

and later oration. Some critics, among them Dr. Thirlwall, agree so far with Dionysius as to separate the latter part from the former, and to view it as a portion of some later oration. I follow the more common opinion, accepting the oration as one. There is a confusion either in the text or the affirmations of Dionysius, which has never yet been, perhaps cannot be, satisfactorily cleared up.

Böhnecke (in his *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Attischen Redner*, p. 222 *seq.*) has gone into a full and elaborate examination of the first Philippic and all the controversy respecting it. He rejects the statement of Dionysius altogether. He considers that the oration as it stands now is one whole, but delivered three years later than Dionysius asserts; not in 351 B.C., but in the Spring of 348 B.C., after the three Olynthiacs, and a little before the fall of Olynthus. He notices various chronological matters (in my judgement none of them proving his point) tending to show that the harangue cannot have been delivered so early as 351 B.C. But I think the difficulty of supposing that the oration was spoken at so late a period of

life, had a constant tendency to put out of sight:—That the City, as a whole, could not maintain her security and dignity against enemies, unless each citizen individually besides his home-duties, were prepared to take his fair share, readily and without evasion, of the hardship and cost of personal service abroad.<sup>1</sup> But he had then been called upon to deal (in his discourse *De Symmoriis*) only with the contingency of Persian hostilities—possible indeed, yet neither near nor declared; he now renews the same exhortation under more pressing exigences. He has to protect interests already suffering, and to repel dishonourable insults, becoming from month to month more frequent, from an indefatigable enemy. Successive assemblies have been occupied with complaints from sufferers, amidst a sentiment of unwonted chagrin and helplessness among the public—yet with no material comfort from the leading and established speakers; who content themselves with inveighing against the negligence of the mercenaries—taken into service by Athens but never paid—and with threatening to impeach the general. The assembly, wearied by repetition of topics promising no improvement for the future, is convoked, probably to hear some farther instance of damage committed by the Macedonian cruisers, when Demosthenês, breaking through the common formalities of precedence, rises first to address them.

It had once been the practice at Athens, that the herald formally proclaimed, when a public assembly was opened—“Who among the citizens above fifty years of age wishes to speak? and after them, which of the other citizens in his turn?”<sup>2</sup> Though this old proclamation had fallen into disuse, the habit still remained, that speakers of advanced age and experience rose first after the debate had been opened by the presiding magistrates. But the relations of Athens with Philip had been so often discussed, that all these men had already delivered their sentiments and exhausted their recommendations. “Had the

the Olynthian war, and yet that earlier date.

nothing is said in it about that war, and next to nothing about <sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, *De Symmor.* 182. s. 18.

Olynthus itself—is greater than any <sup>2</sup> Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. 366.

of those difficulties which Böhnecke tries to make good against the

recommendations been good, you need not have been now debating the same topic over again"—says Demosthenês as an apology for standing forward out of his turn to produce his own views.

His views indeed were so new, so independent of party-sympathies or antipathies, and so plain-spoken in comments on the past as well as in demands for the future—that they would hardly have been proposed except by a speaker instinct with the ideal of the Periklean foretime, familiar to him from his study of Thucydidês. In explicit language, Demosthenês throws the blame of the public misfortunes, not simply on the past advisers and generals of the people, but also on the people themselves.<sup>2</sup> It is from this proclaimed fact that he starts, as his main ground of hope for future improvement. Athens contended formerly with honour against the Lacedæmonians; and now also, she will exchange disgrace for victory in her war against Philip, if her citizens individually will shake off their past inertness and negligence, each of them henceforward becoming ready to undertake his full share of personal duty in the common cause. Athens had undergone enough humiliation, and more than enough, to teach her this lesson. She might learn it farther from her enemy Philip himself, who had raised himself from small beginnings, and heaped losses as well as shame upon her, mainly by his own personal energy, perseverance, and ability; while the Athenian citizens had been hitherto so backward as individuals, and so unprepared as a public, that even if a lucky turn of fortune were to hand over to them

Remarks and recommendation of the first Philippic. Severe comments on the past apathy of the people.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. init. . . . Εἰ μὲν περὶ καινοῦ τινὸς πράγματος προϋτίθετο λέγειν, ἐπισχὼν ἂν ἔως οἱ πλείστοι τῶν εἰωθότων γνῶμην ἀπεφύγαντο . . . ἐπειδὴ δὲ περὶ ὧν πολλάκις εἰρήνασιν οὗτοι πρότερον συμβαίνει καὶ νυνὶ σκοπεῖν, ἡγοῦμαι καὶ πρῶτος ἀναστὰς εἰκότως ἂν συγγνώμης τυγχάνειν· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὰ δέοντα οὗτοι συνεβούλευσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ὑμᾶς νῦν ἔδει βουλεύεσθαι.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic i. p. 40, 41. Ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων ποι-

ούντων ὑμῶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἔχει· ἐπεὶ τοι, εἰ πάνθ' ᾧ προσήκεε πραττόντων οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐλπίς ἦν αὐτὰ βελτίω γενέσθαι, &c. Again, p. 42. Ἄν τοίνυν καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐβελήσθητε γενέσθαι γνῶμης νῦν, ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ περ οὐ πρότερον, . . . καὶ παύσησθε αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν ἕκαστος ποιήσειν ἐλπίζων, τὸν δὲ πλησίον πάνθ' ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πράξειν, &c.

Compare the previous harangue, De Symmoriis, p. 182. s. 18.

Amphipolis, they would be in no condition to seize it.<sup>1</sup> Should the rumour prove true, that this Philip were dead, they would soon make for themselves another Philip equally troublesome.

After thus severely commenting on the past apathy of the citizens, and insisting upon a change of disposition as indispensable, Demosthenês proceeds to specify the particular acts whereby such change ought to be manifested. He entreats them not to be startled by the novelty of his plan, but to hear him patiently to the end. It is the result of his own meditations; other citizens may have better to propose; if they have, he shall not be found to stand in their way. What is past, cannot be helped; nor is extemporaneous speech the best way of providing remedies for a difficult future.<sup>2</sup>

He advises first, that a fleet of fifty triremes shall be immediately put in readiness; that the citizens shall firmly resolve to serve in person on board, whenever the occasion may require, and that triremes and other vessels shall be specially fitted out for half of the horsemen of the city, who shall serve personally also. This force is to be kept ready to sail at a moment's notice, and to meet Philip in any of his sudden out-marches to Chersonesus, to Thermopylæ, to Olynthus, &c.<sup>3</sup>

Secondly, that a farther permanent force shall be set on foot immediately, to take the aggressive, and carry on active continuous warfare against Philip, by harassing him in various points of his own country. Two thousand infantry, and 200 horse, will be sufficient; but it is essential that one-fourth part—500 of the former and 50 of the latter—shall be citizens of Athens. The remainder are to

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic i. p. 43, i. 15. ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχετε, οὐδὲ διδόντων τῶν καιρῶν Ἀμφίπολιν δέξασθαι θῶναισθ' ἂν, ἀπηρτημένοι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς καὶ ταῖς γνώμας.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 44. . . . ἐπειδὴν ἅπαντα ἀκούσῃτε, κρίνατε—μὴ πρότερον προλαμβάνετε· μηδ' ἂν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δοκῶ τινὶ καινὴν παρασκευὴν λέγειν, ἀναβάλλειν μετὰ πρᾶγματα ἡγείσθω· οὐ γὰρ οἱ ταχύ

καὶ τήμερον εἰποντες μάλιστα εἰς δέον λέγουσιν, &c.

. . . . Οἶμαι τοίνυν ἐγὼ ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχειν, μὴ κωλύων εἰ τις ἄλλος ἐπαγγέλλεται τι.

This deprecatory tone deserves notice, and the difficulty which the speaker anticipates in obtaining a hearing.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 44, 45.

be foreign mercenaries; ten swift sailing war triremes are also to be provided to protect the transports against the naval force of Philip. The citizens are to serve by relays, relieving each other; every one for a time fixed beforehand, yet none for a very long time.<sup>1</sup> The orator then proceeds to calculate the cost of such a standing force for one year. He assigns to each seaman, and to each foot soldier, ten drachmæ per month, or two oboli per day; to each horseman, thirty drachmæ per month, or one drachma (six oboli) per day. No difference is made between the Athenian citizen and the foreigner. The sum here assigned is not full pay, but simply the cost of each man's maintenance. At the same time, Demosthenês pledges himself, that if thus much be furnished by the state, the remainder of a full pay (or as much again) will be made up by what the soldiers will themselves acquire in the war; and that too, without wrong done to allies or neutral Greeks. The total annual cost thus incurred will be 92 talents (= about 22,000*l.*). He does not give any estimate of the probable cost of his other armament, of 50 triremes; which are to be equipped and ready at a moment's notice for emergencies, but not sent out on permanent service.

His next task is, to provide ways and means for meeting such additional cost of 92 talents. Here he produces and reads to the assembly, a special financial scheme, drawn up in writing. Not being actually embodied in the speech, the scheme has been unfortunately lost; though its contents would help us materially to appreciate the views of Demosthenês.<sup>2</sup> It must have been more or less complicated in its details; not a simple proposition for an *eisphora* or property-tax, which would have been announced in a sentence of the orator's speech.

His  
financial  
propo-  
sitions.

Assuming the money, the ships, and the armament for permanent service, to be provided, Demosthenês proposes that a formal law be passed, making such permanent service peremptory; the general in command being held responsible for the efficient employment of the force.<sup>3</sup> The islands, the maritime allies, and the commerce of the Ægean would then become secure; while the profits of

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 45, 46. ἐστὶν ἀγὼ γέγραφα.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 48,

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 49.

49. "Α δ' ὑπάρξαι δεῖ παρ' ὑμῶν, ταῦτ' s. 37.

Philip from his captures at sea would be arrested.<sup>1</sup> The quarters of the armament might be established, during winter or bad weather, in Skiathos, Thasos, Lemnos, or other adjoining islands, from whence they could act at all times against Philip on his own coast; while from Athens it was difficult to arrive thither either during the prevalence of the Etesian winds or during winter—the seasons usually selected by Philip for his aggressions.<sup>2</sup>

The aggregate means of Athens (Demosthenês affirmed) in men, money, ships, hoplites, horsemen, were greater than could be found anywhere else. But hitherto they had never been properly employed. The Athenians, like awkward pugilists, waited for Philip to strike, and then put up their hands to follow his blow. They never sought to look him in the face—nor to be ready with a good defensive system beforehand—nor to anticipate him in offensive operations.<sup>3</sup> While their religious festivals, the Panathenaic, Dionysiac, and others, were not only celebrated with costly splendour, but pre-arranged with the most careful pains, so that nothing was ever wanting in detail at the moment of execution—their military force was left without organisation or pre-determined system. Whenever any new encroachment of Philip was made known, nothing was found ready to meet it; fresh decrees were to be voted, modified, and put in execution, for each special occasion; the time for action was wasted in preparation, and before a force could be placed on shipboard, the moment for execution had passed.<sup>4</sup> This

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 49. s. 38, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. "The obstinacy and violence of the Etesian winds, in July and August, are well known to those who have had to struggle with them in the Ægean during that season" (Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iv. ch. 42. p. 426).

The Etesian winds, blowing from the north, made it difficult to reach Macedonia from Athens.

Compare Demosthenês, *De Rebus*

*Chersonesi*, p. 93. s. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 51. s. 46. . . . ὅμεις δὲ, πλειστην δύναμιν ἀπάντων ἔχοντες, τριηρεῖς, ὀπλίτας, ἱππέτας, χρημάτων πρόσδοτον, τούτων μὲν μέχρι τῆς τήμερον ἡμέρας οὐδενὶ πώποτε εἰς δέον τι κέχρησθε.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 50. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄτακτα, ἀδιόρθωτα, ἀόριστα, ἅπαντα. Τοιγάρ οὖν ἅμα ἀκηχόαμέν τε καὶ τριηράρχους καθίσταμεν, καὶ τούτοις ἀντιδόσεις ποιοῦμεθα καὶ περὶ χρημάτων πόρου σκοποῦμεν, &c.

practice of waiting for Philip to act offensively, and then sending aid to the point attacked, was ruinous; the war must be carried on by a standing force put in motion beforehand.<sup>1</sup>

To provide and pay such a standing force, is one of the main points in the project of Demosthenês; the absolute necessity that it shall consist, in large proportion at least, of citizens, is another. To this latter point he reverts again and again, insisting that the foreign mercenaries—sent out to make their pay where or how they could, and unaccompanied by Athenian citizens—were at best useless and untrustworthy. They did more mischief to friends and allies, who were terrified at the very tidings of their approach—than to the enemy.<sup>2</sup> The general unprovided with funds to pay them, was compelled to follow them wheresoever they chose to go, disregarding his orders received from the city. To try him afterwards for that which he could not help, was unprofitable disgrace. But if the troops were regularly paid; if, besides, a considerable proportion of them were Athenian citizens, themselves interested in success, and inspectors of all that was done; then the general would be found willing and able to attack the enemy with vigour—and might be held to a rigorous accountability, if he did not. Such was the only way in which the formidable and evergrowing force of their enemy Philip could be successfully combated. As matters now stood, the inefficiency of Athenian operations was so ridiculous, that men might be tempted to doubt whether Athens was really in earnest. Her chief military officers—her ten generals, ten taxiarchs, ten phylarchs, and two hipparchs, annually chosen—were busied only in the affairs of the city and in the showy religious processions. They

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 48, 49. δαί—μή βοηθήσεις πολεμεῖν (ὅστε-  
ριοῦμεν γὰρ ἀπάντων) ἀλλὰ παρα-  
σκευῇ συνεχεῖ καὶ δυνάμει.

Compare his Oration De Rebus  
Chersonesi, p. 92. s. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 46.  
s. 28. ἐξ οὗ δ' αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ τὰ  
ξενικά ὑμῖν στρατεύεται, τοὺς φίλους  
νικᾷ καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, οἱ δ' ἐχ-  
θροὶ μείζους τοῦ δέοντος γεγόνασιν  
καὶ παραχύψαντα ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς πόλεως  
πόλεμον, πρὸς Ἀρτάβαζον καὶ παν-

ταχοὶ μᾶλλον οἵχεται πλείοντα, ὃ δὲ  
στρατηγὸς ἀκολουθεῖν εἰκότως· οὐ γάρ  
ἔστιν ἄρχειν μὴ διδόντα μισθόν. Τί  
οὖν κελεύω; τὰς προφάσεις ἀφελεῖν  
καὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν στρατιω-  
τῶν, μισθὸν πορίσαντας καὶ στρα-  
τιώτας οἰκείους ὥσπερ ἐπόπτας τῶν  
στρατηγουμένων παρακαταστήσαντας,  
&c.

..... p. 53. s. 51. καὶ οἱ μὲν  
ἐχθροὶ καταγελωσιν, οἱ δὲ σύμμαχοι  
τεθνήσκει τῇ δέει τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀπα-  
στόλους, &c.

left the real business of war to a foreign general named Menelaus.<sup>1</sup> Such a system was disgraceful. The honour of Athens ought to be maintained by her own citizens, both as generals and as soldiers.

Such are the principal features in the discourse called the First Philippic; the earliest public harangue delivered by Demosthenês to the Athenian assembly, in reference to the war with Philip. It is not merely a splendid piece of oratory, emphatic and forcible in its appeal to the emotions; bringing the audience by many different roads, to the main conviction which the orator seeks to impress; profoundly animated with genuine Pan-hellenic patriotism, and with the dignity of that free Grecian world now threatened by a monarch from without. It has other merits besides, not less important in themselves, and lying more immediately within the scope of the historian. We find Demosthenês, yet only thirty years old—young in political life—and thirteen years before the battle of Chæro-neia—taking accurate measure of the political relations between Athens and Philip; examining those relations during the past, pointing out how they had become every year more unfavourable, and foretelling the dangerous contingences of the future, unless better precautions were taken; exposing with courageous frankness not only the past mismanagement of public men, but also those defective dispositions of the people themselves wherein such management had its root; lastly, after fault found, adventuring on his own responsibility to propose specific measures of correction, and urging upon reluctant citizens a painful imposition of personal hardship as well as of taxation. We shall find him insisting on the same obligation, irksome alike to the leading politicians and to the people,<sup>2</sup> throughout all the Olynthiacs and Philippics. We note his

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 47  
ἐπεὶ νῦν γε γέλως ἔσθ' ὥς χρώμεθα  
τοῖς πράγμασι.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 54.  
s. 58. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐτ' ἄλλοτε  
πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν,  
ὅτι ἂν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμέ-  
νος ὦ, νῦν τε ἂ γινώσκω πάθ' ἁ-  
πλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαρ-

ήσιασμαί. Ἐβουλόμην δ' ἂν, ὥσπερ  
ὅτι ὑμῖν συμφέροι τὰ βέλτιστα ἀκού-  
ειν οἷδα, οὕτως εἰδέναι συνοίσο, καὶ  
τῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εἰπόντι· πολλῶ γάρ  
ἂν ἥδιον εἶπον. Νῦν δ' ἐπ' ἀδύλου  
οὔσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμαυτῷ γενη-  
σομένοις, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν  
ἂν πράξητε, ταῦτα πεπείσθαι λέγειν  
αἰρούμαι.

warnings, given at this early day, when timely prevention would have been easily practicable; and his superiority to elder politicians like Eubulus and Phokion, in prudent appreciation, in foresight, and in the courage of speaking out unpalatable truths. More than twenty years after this period, when Athens had lost the game and was in her phase of humiliation, Demosthenês (in repelling the charges of those who imputed her misfortunes to his bad advice) measures the real extent to which a political statesman is properly responsible. The first of all things is,—“To see events in their beginnings—to discern tendencies beforehand, and proclaim them beforehand to others—to abridge as much as possible the rubs, impediments, jealousies, and tardy movements, inseparable from the march of a free city—and to infuse among the citizens harmony, friendly feelings, and zeal for the performance of their duties.”<sup>1</sup> The first Philippic is alone sufficient to prove, how justly Demosthenês lays claim to the merit of having “seen events in their beginnings” and given timely warning to his countrymen. It will also go to show, along with other proofs hereafter to be seen, that he was not less honest and judicious in his attempts to fulfil the remaining portion of the statesman’s duty—that of working up his countrymen to unanimous and resolute enterprise; to the pitch requisite not merely for speaking and voting, but for acting and suffering, against the public enemy.

We know neither the actual course, nor the concluding vote of this debate, wherein Demosthenês took a part so unexpectedly prominent. But we know that neither of the two positive measures which he recommends was carried into effect. The working armament was not sent out, nor was the home-force, destined to be held in reserve for instant movement in case of emergency, ever got ready. It was not until the following month of September (the oration being delivered

B.C. 351.

Advice of Demosthenês not carried into effect: no serious measures adopted by Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 308. s. 306. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὦν γ' ἂν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὑπεύθυνος εἴη, πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν λάμβανει οὐ παραιτούμαι. Τίνα οὖν ἐστὶ ταῦτα; Ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα, καὶ προαισθῆσθαι καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. Ταῦτα πέπραχται μοι. Καὶ

ἔτι τὰς ἐκασταχοῦ βραδυτῆτας, ὁκνοῦς, ἀγνοίας, φιλονεικίας, ἀπολιτικά ταῖς πόλεσι πρόσσεσιν ἀπάσαις καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἀμαρτήματα, ταῦθ' ὡς εἰς ἐλάχιστα συστεῖλαι, καὶ τοῦναντίον εἰς ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ τοῦ τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ὁρμὴν προτρέψαι.

some time in the first half of 351 B.C.), that any actual force was sent against Philip; and even then nothing more was done than to send the mercenary chief Charidæmus to the Chersonese, with ten triremes, and five talents in money, but no soldiers.<sup>1</sup> Nor is there any probability that Demosthenês even obtained a favourable vote of the assembly; though strong votes against Philip were often passed without being ever put in execution afterwards.<sup>2</sup>

Demosthenês was doubtless opposed by those senior statesmen whose duty it would have been to come forward themselves with the same propositions, assuming the necessity to be undeniable. But what ground was taken in opposing him, we do not know. There existed at that time in Athens a certain party or section who undervalued Philip as an enemy not really formidable—far less formidable than the Persian king.<sup>3</sup> The reports of Persian force and preparation, prevalent two years before when Demosthenês delivered his harangue on the Symmories, seem still to have continued, and may partly explain the inaction against Philip. Such reports would be magnified, or fabricated, by another Athenian party much more dangerous; in communication with, and probably paid by, Philip himself. To this party Demosthenês makes his earliest allusion in the first Philippic,<sup>4</sup> and reverts to them on many occasions afterwards. We may be very certain that there were Athenian citizens serving as Philip's secret agents, though we cannot assign their names. It would be not less his interest to purchase such auxiliaries, than to employ paid spies in his operations of war;<sup>5</sup> while the prevalent political

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 34; Olynth. ii. p. 21. s. 12; Olynth. iii. p. 29. s. 5. p. 32. s. 16; De Rhodiorum Libertate, p. 190. s. 1. And not merely votes against Philip, but against others also, remained either unexecuted or inadequately executed (Demosthenês, De Republicâ Ordinanda, p. 175, 176).

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, De Rhodior. Libertat. p. 197. s. 31. ὁρῶ δ' ὅμως

ἐνίοις Φιλίππου μὲν ὡς ἄρ' οὐδενὸς ἀξίου πολλάκις ὀλιγωροῦντας, βασιλέα δ' ὡς ἰσχυρὸν ἐχθρὸν εἰς ἂν προέλῃται φοβουμένους. Εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς φαῦλον οὐχ ἄμυνόμεθα, τῷ δὲ ὡς φοβερῷ πάνθ' ὑπείκομεν, τῶς τίνας παραταξόμεθα;

This oration was delivered in 351-350 B.C.; a few months after the first Philippic.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 48. s. 21; Olynthiac ii. p. 19. s. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Compare the advice of the The-

antipathies at Athens, coupled with the laxity of public morality in individuals, would render it perfectly practicable to obtain suitable instruments. That not only at Athens, but also at Amphipolis, Potidæa, Olynthus and elsewhere, Philip achieved his successes, partly by purchasing corrupt partisans among the leaders of his enemies—is an assertion so intrinsically probable, that we may readily believe it, though advanced chiefly by unfriendly witnesses. Such corruption alone, indeed, would not have availed him, but it was eminently useful when combined with well-employed force and military genius.

ans to Mardonius in 479 B.C.—during the Persian invasion of Greece (Herodot. ix. 2).

## CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

## EUBOIC AND OLYNTHIAN WARS.

IF even in Athens, at the date of the first Philippic c.  
 B.C. 351. Demosthenês, the uneasiness about Philip was  
 considerable, much more serious had it become  
 among his neighbours the Olynthians. He had  
 gained them over, four years before, by trans-  
 ferring to them the territory of Anthemus—  
 and the still more important town of Potidæa—  
 captured by his own arms from Athens. Gratefully  
 for these cessions, they had become his allies in  
 his war with Athens, whom they hated on every ground.  
 But a material change had since taken place. Since the  
 loss of Methônê, Athens, expelled from the coast of Thraci-  
 and Macedonia, had ceased to be a hostile neighbour, or  
 to inspire alarm to the Olynthians; while the immense  
 increase in the power of Philip, combined with his ability  
 and ambition alike manifest, had overlaid their gratitude  
 for the past by a sentiment of fear for the future. It was  
 but too clear that a prince who stretched his encroaching  
 arms in all directions—to Thermopylæ, to Illyria, and to  
 Thrace—would not long suffer the fertile peninsula  
 between the Thermaic and Strymonic gulfs to remain  
 occupied by free Grecian communities. Accordingly, it  
 seems that after the great victory of Philip in Thessaly  
 over the Phokians (in the first half of 352 B.C.), the  
 Olynthians manifested their uneasiness by seceding from  
 alliance with him against Athens. They concluded peace  
 with that city, and manifested such friendly sentiment  
 that an alliance began to be thought possible. This peace  
 seems to have been concluded before November 352 B.C.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. cont. Aristokrat. p. 656. s. 129. ἐκείνοι (Olynthians) ἕως μὲν ἔωρων αὐτὸν (Philip) τηλικούτον ἡλικίος ὥν πιστὸς ὑπῆρχε, σύμμαχοί τε ἦσαν, καὶ δι' ἐκείνον ἡμῖν ἐπολέ-

μουν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶδον μείζων τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς πίστεως γιγνόμενον . . . ὑμᾶς, οὕς ἴσασιν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡδιστ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἐκείνου φίλους καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον ἀποκτείναντα

Here was an important change of policy on the part of the Olynthians. Though they probably intended it, not as a measure of hostility against Philip, but simply as a precaution to ensure to themselves recourse elsewhere in case of becoming exposed to his attack, it was not likely that he would either draw or recognise any such distinction. He would probably consider that by the cession of Potidæa, he had purchased their cooperation against Athens, and would treat their secession as at least making an end to all amicable relations.

Unfriendly feelings of Philip towards Olynthus—ripening into war in 350 B.C.

A few months afterwards (at the date of the first Philippic<sup>1</sup>) we find that he, or his soldiers, had attacked, and made sudden excursions into their territory, close adjoining to his own.

In this state of partial hostility, yet without proclaimed or vigorous war, matters seem to have remained throughout the year 351 B.C. Philip was engaged during that year in his Thracian expedition, where he fell sick, so that aggressive enterprise was for the time suspended. Meanwhile the Athenians seem to have proposed to Olynthus a scheme of decided alliance against Philip.<sup>2</sup> But the Olynthians had too much to fear from him, to become themselves the aggressors. They still probably hoped that he might find sufficient enemies and occupation elsewhere, among Thracians, Illyrians, Pæonians, Arymbas and the Spirots, and Athenians;<sup>3</sup> at any rate, they would not be the first to provoke a contest. This state of reciprocal mistrust<sup>4</sup> continued for several months, until at length

λους πεποιήνται, φασὶ δὲ καὶ συμ-  
τχοὺς ποιήσεσθαι.

We know from Dionysius that this oration was delivered between Midsummer 352 B.C. and Midsummer 351 B.C. I have already remarked that it must have been delivered, in my judgement, before the month embakterion (November) 352 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenès, Philippic i. p. 44. 20. . . . ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξαίφνης ταύτας ὁ τῆς οἰκείας χώρας αὐτοῦ στρα-  
τας, εἰς Πύλας καὶ Χερρόνησον καὶ  
Λυνθὸν καὶ ὁποῖ βούλεται.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès, Olynthiac i. p. 11.

7. . . . . νυνὶ γάρ, ὃ πάντες

ἐθρύλλουν τέως, Ὀλυνθίους  
ἐκπολεμῆσαι δεῖν Φιλίππῳ, γέ-  
γονεν αὐτόματον, καὶ ταῦθ' ὥς ἂν  
ὑμῖν μάλιστα συμφέροι. Εἰ μὲν γάρ  
ὑπ' ὑμῶν πεισθέντες ἀνείλοντο τὸν  
πόλεμον, σφαλεροὶ σύμμαχοι καὶ μέχρι  
τουταῦτ' ἀγνώστοι ἦσαν ἰσως, &c.

Compare Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 9. and p. 32. s. 18. οὐχ οὕς εἰ πολεμή-  
σαιεν, ἐτοίμως σώσειν ὑπισχνόμεθα,  
οὔτοι νῦν πολεμοῦνται;

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenès, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenès, Olynth. iii. p. 30. s. 8. οὕτε Φίλιππος ἐθάρρει τούτους,  
οὔθ' οὔτοι Φιλίππον, &c.

Philip began serious operations against them; not very long after his recovery from the sickness in Thrace, and seemingly towards the middle of 350 B.C.;<sup>1</sup> a little before the beginning of Olympiad 107, 3.

It was probably during the continuance of such semi-hostile relations that two half-brothers of Philip, sons of his father Amyntas by another mother, sought and obtained shelter at Olynthus. They came as his enemies; for he had put to death already one of their brothers, and they themselves only escaped the same fate by flight. Whether they had committed any positive act to provoke his wrath, we are not informed; but such tragedies were not unfrequent in the Macedonian regal family. While Olynthus was friendly and grateful to Philip, these exiles would not have resorted thither; but they were now favourably received, and may perhaps have held out hope that in case of war they could raise a Macedonian party against Philip. To that prince, the reception of his fugitive enemies served as a plausible pretence for war—which he doubtless would under all circumstances have prosecuted—against Olynthus; and it seems to have been so put forward in his public declarations.<sup>2</sup>

But Philip, in accomplishing his conquests, knew well how to blend the influences of deceit and seduction with those of arms, and to divide or corrupt those whom he intended to subdue. To such insidious approaches Olynthus was in many ways open. The power of that city consisted in great part, in her position as chief of a numerous confederacy, including a large proportion

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenès, Olynth. i. p. 13. s. 13. . . . ἡσθένησε· πάλιν παύσας οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ῥαθυμῆσθαι ἀπέκλινεν, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς Ὀλυνθίοις ἐπέχειρσεν.

What length of time is denoted by the adverb εὐθὺς, must, of course, be matter of conjecture. If the expression had been found in the Oration De Coronâ, delivered twenty years afterwards, we might have construed εὐθὺς very loosely. But it occurs here in an oration delivered probably in the latter half of 350 B.C.,—certainly not later than the first half of 348 B.C. Ac-

cordingly, it is hardly reasonable to assign to the interval here designated by εὐθὺς (that between Philip's recovery and his serious attack upon the Olynthians) a longer time than six months. We should then suppose this attack to have been commenced about the last quarter of Olymp. 107, 2; or in the first half of 350 B.C. This is the view of Böhnecke, and I think very probable (Forschungen, p. 211).

<sup>2</sup> Justin, viii. 3; Orosius, iii. 1. Justin states this as the cause of the attack made by Philip on Olynthus.

though probably not all, of the Grecian cities in the peninsula of Chalkidikê. Among the different members of such a confederacy, there was more or less of dissentient interest or sentiment, which accidental circumstances might inflame so as to induce a wish for separation. In each city, moreover, and in Olynthus itself, there were ambitious citizens competing for power, and not scrupulous as to the means whereby it was to be acquired or retained. In each of them, Philip could open intrigues, and enlist partisans; in some, he would probably receive invitations to do so; for the greatness of his exploits, while it inspired alarm in some quarters, raised hopes among disappointed and jealous minorities. If, through such predisposing circumstances, he either made or found partisans and traitors in the distant cities of Peloponnesus, much more was this practicable for him in the neighbouring peninsula of Chalkidikê. Olynthus and the other cities were nearly all conterminous with the Macedonian territory, some probably with boundaries not clearly settled. Perdikkas II. had given to the Olynthians (at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war<sup>1</sup>) a portion of his territory near the Lake Bolbê: Philip himself had given to them the district of Anthemus. Possessed of so much neighbouring land, he had the means, with little loss to himself, of materially favouring or enriching such individual citizens, of Olynthus or other cities, as chose to promote his designs. Besides direct bribes, where that mode of proceeding was most effective, he could grant the right of gratuitous pasture to the flocks and herds of one, and furnish abundant supplies of timber to another. Master as he now was of Amphipolis and Philippi, he could at pleasure open or close to them the speculations in the gold mines of Mount Pangæus, for which they had always hankered.<sup>2</sup> If his privateers harassed even the powerful Athens, and the islands under her protection, much more vexatious would they be to his neighbours in the Chalkidic peninsula, which they as it were encircled, from the Thermaic Gulf on one side to the Strymonic Gulf on the other. Lastly, we cannot doubt that some individuals in these cities had found it

—which I do not believe. But I see no ground for doubting the fact itself—or for doubting that Philip laid hold of it as a *pretext*. He found the half-brothers in Olyn-

thus when the city was taken, and put both of them to death.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. i. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès, *Fals. Leg.* p. 425, 426; Xenophon, *Hellen.* v. 2. 17.

profitable to take service, civil or military, under Philip, which would supply him with correspondents and adherents among their friends and relatives.

It will thus be easily seen, that with reference to Olynthus and her confederate cities, Philip had at his command means of private benefit and annoyance to such an extent, as would ensure to him the cooperation of a venal and traitorous minority in each; such minority of course blending its proceedings, and concealing its purposes, among the standing political feuds of the place. These means however were only preliminary to the direct use of the sword. His seductions and presents commenced the work, but his excellent generalship and soldiers—the phalanx, the hypaspistæ, and the cavalry, all now brought into admirable training during the ten years of his reign—completed it.

Though Demosthenês in one passage goes so far as to say that Philip rated his established influence so high as to expect to incorporate the Chalkidic confederacy in his empire without serious difficulty and without even real war<sup>1</sup>—there is ground for believing that he encountered strenuous resistance, avenged by unmeasured rigours after the victory. The two years and a half between Midsummer 350 B.C., and the commencement of 347 B.C. (the two last years of Olympiad 107 and the nine first months of Olympiad 108), were productive of phænomena more terror-striking than anything in the recent annals of Greece. No less than thirty-two free Grecian cities in Chalkidikê were taken and destroyed, the inhabitants being reduced to slavery, by Philip. Among them was Olynthus, one of the most powerful, flourishing, and energetic members of the Hellenic brotherhood; Apollonia, whose inhabitants would now repent the untoward obstinacy of their fathers (thirty-two years before) in repudiating a generous and equal confederacy with Olynthus, and invoking Spartan aid to revive the falling power of Philip's father, Amyntas; and Stageira, the birth-place of Aristotle. The destruction of thirty-two free Hellenic communities in two years by a foreign prince,

Conquest and destruction of the Olynthian confederate towns by Philip between 350-347 B.C.—terrible phænomena.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Olynth. i. p. 15. ε. 22. οὐτ' ἂν ἐξήνεγκε τὸν πόλεμόν ποτε τοῦτον ἐκείνος, εἰ πολεμεῖν ᾤθηται αὐτὸν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπιγὰρ ἅπαντα

τότε ἤλπιζε τὰ πράγματα ἀναμειβεσθαι, κατὰ διέψευσταί. Τοῦτο δὲ πρῶτον αὐτὸν ταραττεῖ παρὰ γνῶμην γεγονός, &c.

was a calamity the like of which had never occurred since the suppression of the Ionic revolt and the invasion of Xerxes. I have already recounted in a previous chapter<sup>1</sup> the manifestation of wrath at the festival of the 99th Olympiad (384 B.C.) against the envoys of the elder Dionysius of Syracuse, who had captured and subverted five or six free Hellenic communities in Italy. Far more vehement could be the sentiment of awe and terror, after the Plynthian war, against the Macedonian destroyer of thirty-two Chalkidic cities. We shall find this plainly indicated in the phænomena immediately succeeding. We shall see Athens terrified into a peace alike dishonourable and improvident, which even Demosthenês does not venture to oppose: we shall see Æschinês passing out of a free-spoken Athenian citizen into a servile worshipper, if not a paid agent, of Philip: we shall observe Isokratês, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia. These were terrible times; suitably illustrated in their cruel details by the gangs of enslaved Chalkidic Greeks of both sexes, seen passing even into Peloponnesus<sup>2</sup> as the property of new grantees who extolled the munificence of the donor Philip; and suitably ushered in by awful celestial signs, showers of fire and blood falling from the heavens to the earth, in testimony of the wrath of the gods.<sup>3</sup>

See Ch. LXXXIII.

Demosthenês, Fals. Leg. p. 439. Æschinês himself met a person named Atrestidas followed by one of these sorrowful troops. We may be sure that this case was only one among many.

Pliny, H. N. ii. 27. "Fit et cœli hiatus, quod vocant chasma. et sanguineâ specie (quo nihil terribilius mortalium timori est) pendium ad terras cadens inde; et Olympiadis centesimæ septimæ anno tertio, cum rex Philippus Troiam quateret. Atque ego hæc in temporibus naturæ, ut cetera, auctor existere; non (ut plerique) de causis, quas ingeniorum

acumen excogitat. Quippe ingentium malorum fuere prænuntia; sed ea accidisse non quia hæc facta sunt arbitror, verum hæc ideo facta, quia incasura erant illa: raritate autem occultam eorum esse rationem, ideoque non sicut exortus supra dictos defectusque et multa alia nosci."

The precision of this chronological note makes it valuable. Olymp. 107, 3—corresponds to the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B.C.

Taylor, who cites this passage in his Prolegomena ad Demosthenem (ap. Reiske Oratt. Gr. vol. viii. p. 756), takes the liberty, without

While, however, we make out with tolerable clearness the general result of Philip's Olynthian war, and the terror which it struck into the Grecian mind—we are not only left without information as to its details, but are even perplexed by its chronology. I have already remarked, that though the Olynthians had contracted such suspicions of Philip, even before the beginning of 351 B.C., as to induce them to make peace with his enemy Athens—they had, nevertheless, declined the overtures of Athens for a closer alliance, not wishing to bring upon themselves decided hostility from so powerful a neighbour, until his aggressions should become such as to leave them no choice. We have no precise information as to Philip's movements after his operations in Thrace and his sickness in 351 B.C. But we know that it was not in his nature to remain inactive; that he was incessantly pushing his conquests; and that no conquest could be so important to him as that of Olynthus and the Chalkidic peninsula. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find, that the Olynthian and Chalkidian confederates became the object of his direct hostility in 350 B.C. He raised pretences for attack against one or other of these cities separately; avoiding to deal with the confederacy as a whole, and disclaiming, by special envoys, all purposes injurious to Olynthus.

any manuscript authority, of altering *tertio* into *quarto*; which Böhnecke justly pronounces to be unreasonable (Forschungen, p. 212). The passage as it stands is an evidence, not merely to authenticate the terrific character of the time, but also to prove, among other evidences, that the attack of Philip on the Olynthians and Chalkidians began in 350-349 B.C.—not in the following Olympic year, or in the time after Midsummer 349 B.C.

Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 201-221) has gone into an examination of the dates and events of this Olynthian war, and has arranged them in a manner different from any preceding critic. His examination is acute and instructive, including however some reasonings

of little force or pertinence. I follow him generally in placing the beginning of the Olynthian war, at the Olynthiacs of Demosthenès, before Olymp. 107, 4. This is the opinion which I can form, on matters lamentably unattested and uncertain.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Philipp. iii. p. 13. That Philip not only attacked but even subdued, the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, before he marched directly and finally to assail Olynthus—is stated in the Fragment Kallisthenès ap. Stobæum, Eclog. Tit. vii. p. 92.

Kallisthenès, whose history is lost, was a native of Olynthus, born a few years before the capture of the city.

Probably the philippising party in that city may have dwelt upon this disclaimer as satisfactory, and given as many false assurances about the purposes of Philip, as we shall find Æschinês hereafter uttering at Athens. But the general body of citizens were not so deceived. Feeling that the time had come when it was prudent to close with the previous Athenian overtures, they sent envoys to Athens to propose alliance and invite cooperation against Philip. Their first propositions were doubtless not couched in the language of urgency and distress. They were not as yet in any actual danger; their power was great in reality, and estimated at its full value abroad; moreover, as prudent diplomatists, they would naturally overstate their own dignity and the magnitude of what they were offering. Of course they would ask for Athenian aid to be sent to Chalkidikê—since it was there that the war was being carried on; but they would ask for aid in order to act energetically against the common enemy, and repress the growth of his power—not to avert immediate danger menacing Olynthus.

The Olynthians conclude alliance with Athens.

There needed no discussion to induce the Athenians to accept this alliance. It was what they had long been seeking, and they willingly closed with the proposition. Of course they also promised—what indeed was almost involved in the acceptance—to send a force to cooperate against Philip in Chalkidikê. On this first recognition of Olynthus as an ally—or perhaps shortly afterwards, but before circumstances had at all changed—Demosthenês delivered his earliest Olynthiac harangue. Of the three memorable compositions so denominated, the earliest is, in my judgement, that which stands *second* in the edited order. Their true chronological order has long been, and still is, matter of controversy; the best conclusion which I can form, is that the first and the second are erroneously placed, but that the third is really the latest;<sup>1</sup> all of them being delivered during the six or seven last months of 350 B.C.

The Athenians contract alliance with Olynthus—earliest Olynthiac speech of Demosthenês.

<sup>1</sup> Some remarks will be found on the order of the Olynthiacs in an Appendix to the present chapter. It must be understood that I always speak of the Olynthiacs as *first, second, and third*, according to the common and edited order; though I cannot adopt that order as correct.

In this his earliest advocacy (the speech which stands printed as the second Olynthiac), Demosthenês insists upon the advantageous contingency which has just turned up for Athens, through the blessing of the gods, in the spontaneous tender of so valuable an ally. He recommends that aid be despatched to the new ally; the most prompt and effective aid will please him the best. But his recommendation is contained in a single sentence, in the middle of the speech; it is neither repeated a second time, nor emphatically insisted upon, nor enlarged by specification of quantity or quality of aid to be sent. No allusion is made to necessities or danger of Olynthus, nor to the chance that Philip might conquer the town; still less to ulterior contingences, that Philip, if he did conquer it, might carry the seat of war from his own coasts to those of Attica. On the contrary, Demosthenês adverts to the power of the Olynthians—to the situation of their territory, close on Philip's flanks—to their fixed resolution that they will never again enter into amity or compromise with him—as evidences how valuable their alliance will prove to Athens; enabling her to prosecute with improved success the war against Philip, and to retrieve the disgraceful losses brought upon her by previous remissness. The main purpose of the orator is to inflame his countrymen into more hearty and vigorous efforts for the prosecution of this general war; while to furnish aid to the Olynthians, is only a secondary purpose, and a part of the larger scheme. "I shall not (says the orator) expatiate on the formidable power of Philip as an argument to urge you to the performance of your public duty. That would be too much both of compliment to him and of disparagement to you. I should, indeed, myself have thought him truly formidable, if he had achieved his present eminence by means consistent with justice. But he has aggrandised himself, partly through your negligence and improvidence, partly by treacherous means—by taking into pay corrupt partisans at Athens, and by cheating successively Olynthians, Thessalians, and all his other allies. These allies, having now detected his treachery, are deserting him; without them, his power will crumble away. Moreover, the Macedonians themselves have no sympathy with his personal ambition; they are fatigued with the labour imposed upon

them by his endless military movements and impoverished by the closing of their ports through the war. His vaunted officers are men of worthless and dissolute habits; his personal companions are thieves, vile ministers of amusement, outcasts from our cities. His past good fortune imparts to all this real weakness a fallacious air of strength; and doubtless his good fortune has been very great. But the fortune of Athens, and her title to the benevolent aid of the gods is still greater—if only you, Athenians, will do your duty. Yet here you are, sitting still, doing nothing. The sluggard cannot even command his friends to work for him—much less the gods. I do not wonder, that Philip, always in the field, always in movement, doing everything for himself, never letting slip an opportunity—prevails over you who merely talk, inquire, and vote, without action. Nay—the contrary would be wonderful—if under such circumstances, he had *not* been the conqueror. But what I do wonder at is, that you Athenians—who in former days contended for Pan-hellenic freedom against the Lacedæmonians—who, scorning unjust aggrandisement for yourselves, fought in person and lavished your substance to protect the rights of other Greeks—that *you* now shrink from personal service and payment of money for the defence of your own possessions. You, who have so often rescued others, can now sit still after having lost so much of your own! I wonder you do not look back to that conduct of yours which has brought your affairs into this state of ruin, and ask yourselves how they can ever mend, while such conduct remains unchanged. It was much easier at first to preserve what we once had, than to recover it now that it is lost; we have nothing left now to lose—we have every thing to recover. This must be done by ourselves, and at once; we must furnish money, we must serve in person by turns; we must give our generals means to do their work well, and then exact from them a severe account afterwards—which we cannot do, so long as we ourselves will neither pay nor serve. We must correct that abuse which has grown up, whereby particular symmories in the state combine to exempt themselves from burthensome duties, and to cast them all unjustly upon others. We must not only come forward vigorously and heartily, with person and with money, but each man must embrace faithfully his fair share of patriotic obligation.”

Disposition to magnify the practical effect of the speeches of Demosthenès—his true position—he is an opposition speaker.

Such are the main points of the earliest discourse delivered by Demosthenès on the subject of Olynthus. In the mind of modern readers, as in that of the rhetor Dionysius,<sup>1</sup> there is an unconscious tendency to imagine that these memorable pleadings must have worked persuasion, and to magnify the efficiency of their author as an historical and directing person. But there are no facts to bear out such an impression. Demosthenès was still comparatively a young man—thirty-one years of age; admired indeed for his speeches and his compositions written to be spoken by others;<sup>2</sup> but as yet not enjoying much practical influence. It is moreover certain—to his honour—that he descried and measured foreign dangers before they were recognised by ordinary politicians; that he advised a course, energetic and salutary indeed, but painful for the people to act upon, and disagreeable for recognised leaders to propose; that these leaders, such as Eubulus and others, were accordingly adverse to him. The tone of Demosthenès in these speeches is that of one who feels that he is contending against heavy odds—combating an habitual and deep-seated reluctance. He is an earnest remonstrant—an opposition speaker—contributing to raise up gradually a body of public sentiment and conviction which ultimately may pass into act. His rival Eubulus is the ministerial spokesman, whom the majority, both rich and poor, followed; a man not at all corrupt (so far as we know), but of simple conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property

<sup>1</sup> Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæ. p. 736. μετὰ γὰρ ἄρχοντα Καλλιμαχον, ἐφ' οὗ τὰς εἰς Ὀλυνθον βοηθείας ἀπέστειλαν Ἀθηναῖοι, πεισθέντες ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους, &c.

He connects the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenès with the three Athenian armaments sent to Olynthus in the year following Midsummer 349 B.C.; for which armaments he had just before cited Philochorus.

<sup>2</sup> This is evident from the sneers of Meidias: see the oration of

Demosthenès cont. Meidiam, p. 575, 576 (spoken in the year following—349-348 B.C.).

I observe, not without regret, that Demosthenès himself is not ashamed to put the like sneers into the mouth of a client speaking before the Dikastery—against Lakritus—"this very clever man who has paid ten minæ to Isokrates for a course of rhetoric, and thinks himself able to talk you over as he pleases," &c. (Demosth. adv. Lakrit. p. 938).

tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theoric expenditure.

The Athenians did not follow the counsel of Demosthenês. They accepted the Olynthian alliance, but took no active step to cooperate with Olynthus in the war against Philip.<sup>1</sup> Such unhappily was their usual habit. The habit of Philip was the opposite. We need no witness to satisfy us that he would not slacken in his attack—and that in the course of a month or two, he would master more than one of the Chalkidic cities, perhaps defeating the Olynthian forces also. The Olynthians would discover that they had gained nothing by their new allies; while the philippising party among themselves would take advantage of the remissness of Athens to depreciate her promises as worthless or insincere, and to press for accommodation with the enemy.<sup>2</sup> Complaints would presently reach Athens, brought by fresh envoys from the Olynthians, and probably also from the Chalkidians, who were the greatest sufferers by Philip's arms. They would naturally justify this renewed application by expatiating on the victorious progress of Philip; they would now call for aid more urgently, and might even glance at the possibility of Philip's conquest of Chalkidikê. It was in this advanced stage of the proceedings

Philip continues to press the Olynthian confederacy—increasing danger of Olynthus—fresh applications to Athens.

<sup>1</sup> An orator of the next generation (Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. p. 102. s. 99) taunts Demosthenês as a mere opposition talker, in contrast with the excellent administration of the finances and marine under Eubulus—ποῖαι γὰρ τριήρεις εἰσι κατεσκευασμέναι διὰ τοῦτον (Demosthenês) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Εὐβούλου, τῇ πόλει; ἢ ποῖοι νεώσοι; τοῦτου πολιτευομένου γεγόναι; The administration of Eubulus must have left a creditable remembrance, to be thus cited afterwards.

See Theopompus ap. Harpokr. s. Εὐβουλος; Plutarch, Reipubl. ferend. Præcept. p. 812. Compare also Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 435; and Æschines adv. Ktesiph. p. 57. s. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9. ὥς ἔστι μάλιστα τοῦτο δέος, μὴ πανούργος ὢν καὶ δεινὸς ἄνθρωπος (Philip) πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τὰ μὲν εἰκὼν ἥνικ' ἂν τύγῃ, τὰ δ' ἀπειλῶν, τὰ δ' ἡμᾶς διαβάλλων καὶ τὴν ἀπουσίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν τρέψῃ τε καὶ παρασπᾶσθαι τι τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων.

This occurs in the next subsequent speech of Demosthenês, intimating what Philip and his partisans had already deduced as inference from the past neglect of the Athenians to send any aid to Olynthus. Of course no such inference could be started until some time had been allowed for expectation and disappointment; which is one among many reasons for believing the first Olynthiac to be posterior in time to the second.

that Demosthenês again exerted himself in the cause, delivering that speech which stands first in the printed order of the Olynthiacs.

Here we have, not a Philippic, but a true Olynthiac. Olynthus is no longer part and parcel of a larger theme, upon the whole of which Demosthenês intends to discourse; but stands out as the prominent feature and specialty of his pleading. It is now pronounced to be in danger and in pressing need of succour; moreover its preservation is strenuously pressed upon the Athenians, as essential to their own safety. While it stands with its confederacy around it, the Athenians can fight Philip on his own coast; if it falls, there is nothing to prevent him from transferring the war into Attica, and assailing them on their own soil.<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês is wound up to a higher pitch of emphasis, complaining of the lukewarmness of his countrymen on a crisis which calls aloud for instant action.<sup>2</sup> He again urges that a vote be at once passed to assist Olynthus, and two armaments despatched as quickly as possible; one to preserve to Olynthus her confederate cities—the other, to make a diversion by simultaneous attack on Philip at home. Without such twofold aid (he says) the cities cannot be preserved.<sup>3</sup> Advice of aid generally he had already given, though less emphatically, in his previous harangue; but he now superadds a new suggestion—that Athenian envoys shall be sent thither, not merely to announce the coming of the force, but also to remain at Olynthus and watch over the course of events. For he is afraid, that unless such immediate encouragement be sent, Philip may, even without the tedious process of a siege, frighten or cajole the Olynthian confederacy into submission; partly by reminding them that Athens had done nothing for them, and by denouncing her as a treacherous and worthless ally.<sup>4</sup> Philip would be glad to entrap them into some plausible capitulation.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 14. Φημί δὴ διχῇ βοηθητέον εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ὑμῖν τῷ τε τὰς πόλεις Ὀλυνθίοις σωζειν, καὶ τοὺς τοῦτο ποιήσοντας στρατιώτας ἐκπέμπειν—

καὶ τῷ τῇ ἑκείνου χώρᾳ κακῶς ποιεῖν καὶ τριῆρσι καὶ στρατιωταῖς ἑτέροις· εἰ δὲ θατέρου τούτων ὀλιγορήσετε, ὅκνῳ μὴ μάταιος ὑμῶν ἡ στρατεία γένηται.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 9, 10.

lation; and though they knew that they could have no security for his keeping the terms of it afterwards, still he might succeed, if Athens remained idle. Now, if ever, was the time for Athenians to come forward and do their duty without default; to serve in person and submit to the necessary amount of direct taxation. They had no longer the smallest pretence for continued inaction; the very conjuncture which they had so long desired, had turned up of itself—war between Olynthus and Philip, and that too upon grounds special to Olynthus—not at the instigation of Athens.<sup>1</sup> The Olynthian alliance had been thrown in the way of Athens by the peculiar goodness of the gods, to enable her to repair her numerous past errors and shortcomings. She ought to look well and deal rightly with these last remaining opportunities, in order to wipe off the shame of the past; but if she now let slip Olynthus, and suffer Philip to conquer it, there was nothing else to hinder him from marching whithersoever he chose. His ambition was so insatiable, his activity so incessant, that, assuming Athens to persist in her careless inaction, he would carry the war forward from Thrace into Attica—of which the ruinous consequences were but too clear.<sup>2</sup>

“I maintain (continued the orator) that you ought to lend aid at the present crisis in two ways; by preserving for the Olynthians their confederated cities, through a body of troops sent out for that express purpose—and by employing at the same time other troops and other triremes to act aggressively against Philip’s own coast. If you neglect either of these measures, I fear that the expedition will fail.—As to the pecuniary provision, you have already more money than any other city, available for purposes of war; if you will pay that money to soldiers on service, no need exists for farther provision—if not, then need exists; but above all things, money *must* be found. What then! shall be asked—are you moving that the Theoric fund shall be devoted to war purposes? Not I, by Zeus. I merely express my conviction, that soldiers *must* be equipped, and that receipt of public money, and performance

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 12, 13, 16.

... εἰ δὲ προησόμεθα καὶ τούτους  
οὓς ἀνθρώπους, εἴτ' Ὀλυνθον ἐκεῖνος  
αταστρέψεται, φρασάτω τις ἐμοί, τί

τὸ καλῶν ἐτ' αὐτὸν ἔσται βαδίζειν  
ἔποι βούλεται.

... τίς οὕτως εὐήθης ἐστὶν ὑμῶν  
ὅστις ἀγνοεῖ τῶν ἐκείθεν πόλεμον δεῦρο  
ῤῥοντα, ἂν ἀμελήσωμεν;

of public service, ought to go hand in hand; but your practice is to take the public money, without any such condition, for the festivals. Accordingly, nothing remains except that all should directly contribute; much, if much is wanted—little, if little will suffice. Money must be had without it, not a single essential step can be taken. There are moreover different ways and means suggested by others. Choose any one of these which you think advantageous and lay a vigorous grasp on events while the opportunity still lasts.”<sup>1</sup>

It was thus that Demosthenês addressed his countrymen some time after the Olynthians had been received as allies, but before any auxiliary force had been either sent to them or even positively decreed—yet when such postponement of action had inspired them with mistrust, threatening to throw them, even without resistance into the hands of Philip and their own philippising party. We observe in Demosthenês the same sagacious appreciation, both of the present and the future, as we have already remarked in the first Philippic—foresight of the terrible consequences of this Olynthian war, while as yet distant and unobserved by others. We perceive the same good sense and courage in invoking the right remedies; though his propositions of personal military service, direct taxation, or the diversion of the Theoric fund—were all of them the most unpopular which could be made. The last of the three, indeed, he does not embody in a substantive motion; nor could he move it without positive illegality, which would have rendered him liable to the indictment called *Graphê Paranomon*. But he approaches near enough to raise in the public mind the question as it really stood—that money must be had; that there were only two ways of getting it—direct taxation, and appropriation of the festival fund; and that the latter of these ought to be resorted to as well as the former. We shall find this question about the Theoric Fund coming forward again more than once, and shall have presently to notice it more at large.

At some time after this new harangue of Demosthenês—how long after it, or how far in consequence of it, we cannot say—the Athenians commissioned and sent a body of

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 15.

foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and Chalcidians. The outfit and transport of these troops was in part defrayed by voluntary subscriptions from rich Athenian citizens. But no Athenian citizen-soldiers were sent; nor was any money assigned for the pay of the mercenaries. The expedition appears to have been sent towards the autumn of 350 B.C., as far as we can pretend to affirm anything respecting the obscure chronology of this period.<sup>1</sup> It presently gained some victory over

B.C. 350.

Assistance sent by Athens to Olynthus. Partial success against Philip.

<sup>1</sup> In my view, it is necessary to separate entirely the proceedings alluded to in the Demosthenic Olynthiacs, from the three expeditions to Olynthus, mentioned by Philochorus during the following year—349-348 B.C., the archonship of Kallimachus. I see no reason to controvert the statement of Philochorus, that there were three expeditions during that year, such as he describes. But he must be mistaken (or Dionysius must have copied him erroneously) in setting forth those three expeditions as *the whole Olynthian war*, and the first of the three as being the beginning of the war. The Olynthian war began in 350 B.C., and the three Olynthiacs of Demosthenès refer, in my judgement, to the first months of the war. But it lasted until the early spring of 347 B.C., so that the armaments mentioned by Philochorus may have occurred during the last half of the war. I cannot but think that Dionysius, being satisfied with finding *three* expeditions to Olynthus which might be attached as results to the *three* orations of Demosthenès, has too hastily copied out the three from Philochorus, and has assigned the date of 349-348 B.C. to the *three orations*, simply because he found that date given to the *three expeditions* by Philochorus.

The revolt in Eubœa, the expedition of Phokion with the battle

of Tamynæ and the prolonged war in that island, began about January or February 349 B.C., and continued throughout that year and the next. Mr. Clinton even places these events a year earlier; in which I do not concur, but which, if adopted, would throw back the beginning of the Olynthian war one year farther still. It is certain that there was one Athenian expedition at least sent to Olynthus *before the Eubœan war* (Demosthen. cont. Meidiam. p. 566-578)—an expedition so considerable, that voluntary donations from the rich citizens were obtained towards the cost. Here is good proof (better than Philochorus, if indeed it be inconsistent with what he really said) that the Athenians not only contracted the alliance of Olynthus, but actually assisted Olynthus, during the year 350 B.C. Now the Olynthiacs of Demosthenès present to my mind strong evidence of belonging to the earliest months of the Olynthian war. I think it reasonable therefore to suppose that the expedition of foreign mercenaries to Olynthus, which the third Olynthiac implies as having been sent, is the same as that for which the ἐπιδοσεις mentioned in the Meidiana were required. See Böhnecke, *Forschungen*, p. 202; and K. F. Herrmann, *De Anno Natali Demosthenis*, p. 9.

Philip or Philip's generals, and was enabled to transmit good news to Athens, which excited much exultation there, and led the people to fancy that they were in a fair way of taking revenge on Philip for past miscarriages. According to some speakers, not only were the Olynthians beyond all reach of danger, but Philip was in a fair way of being punished and humbled. It is indeed possible that the success may really have been something considerable, such as to check Philip's progress for the time. Though victorious on the whole, he must have experienced partial and temporary reverses, otherwise he would have concluded the war before the early spring of 347 B.C. Whether this success coincided with that of the Athenian general Charês over Philip's general Adæus,<sup>1</sup> we cannot say.

But Demosthenês had sagacity enough to perceive, and frankness to proclaim, that it was a success noway decisive of the war generally; worse than nothing, if it induced the Athenians to fancy that they had carried their point.

To correct the delusive fancy, that enough had been done—to combat that chronic malady under which the Athenians so readily found encouragement and excuses for inaction—to revive in them the conviction that they had contracted a debt, yet unpaid, towards their Olynthian allies and towards their own ultimate security—is the scope of Demosthenês in his third Olynthiac harangue; third in the printed order, and third also according to my judgement, in order of time; delivered towards the close of the year 350 B.C.<sup>2</sup> Like Periklês, he

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus ap. Athenæ. xii. p. 532. This victory would seem to belong more naturally (as Dr. Thirlwall remarks) to the operations of Charês and Onomarchus against Philip in Thessaly, in 353-352 B.C. But the point cannot be determined.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 29. μέμνησθε, ὅτ' ἀπηγγέλλθη Φίλιππος ὑμῖν ἐν Θράκῃ, τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος τοῦτ', Ἡραῖον τεῖχος πολιορκῶν· τότε τοῖνον μὲν ἦν Μαιμακτηριῶν, &c. This was the month Mæmakterion or November 352 B.C. Calculating

forward from that date, τρίτον ἔτος means the next year but one; that is the Attic year Olymp. 107. 3, or the year between Midsummer 350 and Midsummer 349 B.C. Dionysius of Halikarnassus says (p. 726)—Καλλιμάχου τοῦ τρίτου μετὰ Θέσσαλον ἄρξαντος—though there was only one archon between Thessalus and Kallimachus. When Demosthenês says τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἔτος—it is clear that both cannot be accurate; we must choose one or the other; and τρίτον ἔτος brings us to the year 350—349 B.C.

was not less watchful to abate extravagant and unseasonable illusions of triumph in his countrymen, than to raise their spirits in moments of undue alarm and despondency.<sup>1</sup>

"The talk which I hear about punishing Philip (says Demosthenês, in substance) is founded on a false basis. The real facts of the case teach us a very different lesson.<sup>2</sup> They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There *was* indeed a time—and that too within my remembrance not long ago—when we might have held our own and punished Philip besides; but now, our first care must be to preserve our own allies. After we have made this sure, then it will be time to think of punishing others. The present juncture calls for anxious deliberation. Do not again commit the same error as you committed three years ago. When Philip was besieging Heræum in Thrace, you passed an energetic decree to send an expedition against him: presently came reports that he was sick, and that he was dead: this good news made you fancy that the expedition was unnecessary, and you let it drop. If you had

Tenor and substance of the third Olynthiac.

To show that the oration was probably spoken during the first half of that year, or before February 349 B.C., another point of evidence may be noticed.

At the time when the third Olynthiac was spoken, no expedition of Athenian citizens had yet been sent to the help of Olynthus. But we shall see presently, that Athenian citizens *were* sent thither during the first half of 349 B.C.

Indeed, it would be singular, if the Olynthiacs had been spoken *after* the expedition to Eubœa, that Demosthenês should make no allusion in any one of them to that expedition, an affair of so much moment and interest, which kept Athens in serious agitation during much of the year, and was followed by prolonged war in that neighbouring island. In the third Olynthiac, Demosthenês alludes to making arms against Corinth and Megara (p. 34). Would he be likely

to leave the far more important proceedings in Eubœa unnoticed? Would he say nothing about the grave crisis in which the decree of Apollodorus was proposed? This difficulty disappears when we recognise the Olynthiacs as anterior to the Euboic war.

<sup>1</sup> Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθοιτό τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν (Periklês) εἰς τὸ φοβεῖσθαι· καὶ δεδιότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

Compare the argument of the third Olynthiac by Libanius.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 28, 29. Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ λόγους περὶ τοῦ τιμωρῆσασθαι Φίλιππον ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, τὰ δὲ πράγματα εἰς τοῦτο προήκοντα, ὥστε ὅπως μὴ πεισόμεθα αὐτοὶ πρότερον κακῶς σκέψασθαι δέον.

. . . . . τοῦθ' ἱκανὸν προλαβεῖν ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην, ὅπως τοὺς συμμάχους σώσομεν.

executed promptly what you resolved, Philip would have been put down *then*, and would have given you no farther trouble.<sup>1</sup>

"Those matters indeed are past, and cannot be mended. But I advert to them now, because the present war-crisis is very similar, and I trust you will not make the like mistake again. If you do not send aid to Olynthus with all your force and means, you will play Philip's game for him now, exactly as you did then. You have been long anxious and working to get the Olynthians into war with Philip. This has now happened: what choice remains except to aid them heartily and vigorously? You will be covered with shame, if you do not. But this is not all. Your own security at home requires it of you also; for there is nothing to hinder Philip, if he conquers Olynthus from invading Attica. The Phokians are exhausted in funds—and the Thebans are your enemies.

"All this is superfluous, I shall be told. We have already resolved unanimously to succour Olynthus, and we will succour it. We only want you to tell us how. You will be surprised, perhaps, at my answer. Appoint Nomenthæ at once.<sup>2</sup> Do not submit to them any proposition for new laws, for you have laws enough already—but only repeal such of the existing laws as are hurtful at the present juncture—I mean, those which regard the Theoric fund (I speak out thus plainly), and some which bear on the citizens in military service. By the former, you have over money, which ought to go to soldiers on service, in Theoric distribution among those who stay at home. By the latter, you let off without penalty those who evade service, and discourage those who wish to do their duty. When you have repealed these mischievous laws, and rendered it safe to proclaim salutary truths, then expect some one to come forward with a formal motion such as you all know to be required. But until you do this, expect not that any one will make these indispensable propositions on your behalf, with the certainty of ruin at your hands. You will find no such man; especially as he would only incur unjust punishment for himself without any benefit to the city—while his punishment would make him yet more formidable to speak out upon that subject in the future, than it is even now. Moreover, the same men who

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 30.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 31, 32.

proposed these laws should also take upon them to propose the repeal; for it is not right that these men should continue to enjoy a popularity which is working mischief to the whole city, while the unpopularity of a reform beneficial to us all, falls on the head of the reforming mover. But while you retain this prohibition, you can neither tolerate that any one among you shall be powerful enough to infringe a law with impunity—nor expect that any one will be fool enough to run with his eyes open into punishment.”

I lament that my space confines me to this brief and meagre abstract of one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered—the third Olynthiac of Demosthenês. The partial advantage gained over Philip being prodigiously over-rated, the Athenians seemed to fancy that they had done enough, and were receding from their resolution to assist Olynthus energetically. As on so many other occasions, so on this—Demosthenês undertook to combat a prevalent sentiment which he deemed unfounded and unseasonable. With what courage, wisdom, and dexterity—so superior to the insulting sarcasms of Phokion—does he execute this self-imposed duty, well knowing its unpopularity!

Courage of Demosthenês in combating the prevalent sentiment.

Whether any movement was made by the Athenians in consequence of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenês, we cannot determine. We have no ground for believing the affirmative; while we are certain that the specific measure which he recommended—the sending of an armament of citizens personally serving—was not at that time (before the end of 350 B.C.) carried into effect. At or before the commencement of 349 B.C., the foreign relations of Athens began to be disturbed by another supervening embarrassment—the revolt of Eubœa.

B.C. 350-349.  
Revolt of Eubœa from Athens.

After the successful expedition of 358 B.C., whereby the Athenians had expelled the Thebans from Eubœa, that island remained for some years in undisturbed connection with Athens. Chalkis, Eretria, and Oreus, its three principal cities, sent each a member to the synod of allies holding session at Athens, and paid their annual quota (seemingly five talents each)

Intrigues of Philip in Eubœa.

to the confederate fund.<sup>1</sup> During the third quarter of 352 B.C., Menestratus the despot or principal citizen of Eretria is cited as a particularly devoted friend of Athens.<sup>2</sup> But this state of things changed shortly after Philip conquered Thessaly and made himself master of the Pagasæan Gulf (in 353 and the first half of 352 B.C.). His power was then established immediately over against Oreus and the northern coast of Eubœa, with which island his means of communication became easy and frequent. Before the date of the first Philippic of Demosthenês (seemingly towards the summer of 351 B.C.) Philip had opened correspondences in Eubœa, and had despatched thither various letters some of which the orator reads in the course of that speech to the Athenian assembly. The actual words of the letters are not given; but from the criticism of the orator himself we discern that they were highly offensive to Athenian feelings; instigating the Eubœans probably to sever themselves from Athens, with offers of Macedonian aid towards that object.<sup>3</sup> Philip's naval warfare also brought his cruisers to Geræstus in Eubœa, where they captured several Athenian cornships;<sup>4</sup> insulting even the opposite coast of Attica at Marathon, so as to lower the reputation of Athens among her allies. Accordingly, in each of the Eubœan cities, parties were soon formed aiming at the acquisition of dominion through the support of Philip while for the same purpose detachments of mercenaries could also be procured across the western Eubœan strait out of the large numbers now under arms in Phokis.

About the beginning of 349 B.C.—while the war of Philip, unknown to us in its details, against the Olynthians and Chalkidians, was still going on with more or less of help from mercenaries sent by Athens—hostilities, probably raised by the intrigues of Philip, broke out at Eretria in Eubœa. An Eretrian named Plutarch (we do not know what had become of Menestratus) with a certain number of soldiers at his disposal but opposed by enemies yet more powerful professed to represent Athenian interests in his

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67, 68.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 661. φέρ', ἐάν δὲ δὴ καὶ Μενέστρατος ἡμᾶς ὁ Ἐρετριεὺς ἀξιοῖ τὰ αὐτὰ

καὶ αὐτῶ. ψηφισασθαι, ἢ Φάῦλλος Φωκεὺς, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 51

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. i. p. 46

ity, and sent to Athens to ask for aid. Demosthenês suspecting this man to be a traitor, dissuaded compliance with the application.<sup>1</sup> But Plutarch had powerful friends at Athens, seemingly among the party of Eubulus; one of whom, Meidias, a violent personal enemy of Demosthenês, while advocating the grant of aid, tried even to get up a charge against Demosthenês, of having himself fomented these troubles in Eubœa against the reputed philo-Athenian Plutarch.<sup>2</sup> The Athenian assembly determined to despatch a force under Phokion; who accordingly crossed into the island, somewhat before the time of the festival Anthesteria (February) with a body of hoplites.<sup>3</sup> The cost of fitting out triremes for this transport was in part defrayed by voluntary contributions from rich Athenians; several of whom, Nikêratus, Euktêmon, Euthydêmus, contributed each the outfit of one vessel.<sup>4</sup> A certain proportion of the horsemen of the city were sent also; yet the entire force was not very large, as it was supposed that the partisans were to be found would make up the deficiency.

This hope however turned out fallacious. After an apparently friendly reception and a certain stay at Eretria, Phokion found himself betrayed. Kallias, an ambitious leader of the Eubœan party, collected as much Eubœan force as he could, declared openly against Athens, and led in Macedonian aid (probably from Philip's commanders in the neighbouring Pagasæan Gulf); while his brother Taurosthenês hired a detachment of mercenaries out of Phokis.<sup>5</sup> The anti-Athenian force

Treachery  
of Plutarch  
—danger of  
Phokion  
and the  
Athenians  
in Eubœa—  
victory of  
Phokion at  
Tamynæ.

Demosthenês, De Pace, p. 58.

Demosthenês cont. Meidiam p. 58; cont. Bœotum de Nomine p. 99. . . . και τῶν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ πραγμάτων, ὃ Πλωτάρχος ὁ τούτου ξένος φίλος διεπράξατο, ὡς ἐγὼ αἰτίας κατασκευάσας, πρὸ τοῦ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι φανερόν διὰ Πλουτάρχου γένεσιν.

Demosthenês cont. Meidiam, p. 58; cont. Bœotum de Nomine p. 99. The mention of the χόες in the latter passage, being the second day of the festival called Anthesteria, identifies the month. Demosthenês cont. Meidiam, p. 567.

<sup>5</sup> Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. . . . Ταυροσθένης, τοῦς Φωκίους ξένους διαβιβάσας, &c. There is no ground for inferring from this passage (with Böhmke, p. 20, and others), that the Phokians themselves seconded Philip in organising Eubœan parties against Athens. The Phokians were then in alliance with Athens, and would not be likely to concur in a step alike injurious and offensive to her, without any good to themselves. But some of the mercenaries on service in Phokis might easily be tempted to change their service

thus became more formidable than Phokion could fairly cope with; while the support yielded to him in the island was less than he expected. Crossing the eminence named Kotylæum, he took a position near the town and hippodrome of Tamynæ, on high ground bordered by a ravine. Plutarch still professing friendship, and encamping with his mercenaries along with him. Phokion's position was strong; yet the Athenians were outnumbered and beleaguered so as to occasion great alarm.<sup>1</sup> Many of the slack and disorderly soldiers deserted; a loss which Phokion affected to despise—though at the same time sent to Athens to make known his difficulties and press for reinforcements. Meanwhile he kept on the defensive in his camp, which the enemy marched up to attack. Disregarding his order, an acting with a deliberate treason which was accounted at Athens unparalleled—Plutarch advanced forward out of the camp to meet them; but presently fled, drawing along with his flight the Athenian horse, who had also advanced in some disorder. Phokion with the infantry was now the greatest danger. The enemy, attacking vigorously, were plucking up the palisade, and on the point of forcing his camp. But his measures were so well taken, and his hoplites behaved with so much intrepidity and steadiness in this trying emergency, that he repelled the assailant with loss, and gained a complete victory. Thallus and Kineas distinguished themselves by his side; Kleophanes also was conspicuous in partially rallying the broken horsemen; while Æschinês the orator, serving among the hoplites, was complimented for his bravery, and sent to Athens to carry the first news of the victory.<sup>2</sup> Phokion pursued the

and cross to Eubœa, by the promise of a handsome gratuity.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 567. ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν Ταμύναις στρατιώτας ἐξηγγέλλετο, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 300. c. 53; cont. Ktesiphont. p. 399. c. 32; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13. Plutarch (the biographer) has no clear idea of the different contests carried on in the island of Eubœa. He passes on, without a note of transition, from this war in the island (in 349—348 B.C.) to the subsequent war in 341 B.C.

Nothing indeed can be more obscure and difficult to disentangle than the sequence of Eubœan transactions.

It is to be observed that Æschinês lays the blame of the treachery whereby the Athenian army was entrapped and endangered, on Eklas of Chalkis; while Demosthenes throws it on Plutarch of Eretria. Probably both Plutarch and Kallias deserve the stigma. But Demosthenês is on this occasion more worthy of credit than Æschinês, since the harangue against Meidias.

success, expelled Plutarch from Eretria, and captured a strong fort called Zaretra, near the narrowest part of the island. He released all his Greek captives, fearing that the Athenians, incensed at the recent treachery, should resolve upon treating them with extreme harshness.<sup>1</sup> Kallias seems to have left the island and found shelter with Philip.<sup>2</sup>

The news brought by Æschinês, (before the Dionysiac festival) of the victory of Tamynæ, relieved the Athenians from great anxiety. On the former despatch from Phokion, the Senate had resolved to send to Eubœa another armament, including the remaining half of the cavalry, a reinforcement of hoplites, and a fresh squadron of triremes. But the victory enabled them to dispense<sup>3</sup> with any immediate reinforcement, and to celebrate the Dionysiac festival with cheerfulness. The festival was on this year of more than usual notoriety. Demosthenês, serving in it as chorêgus for his tribe the Pandionis, was brutally insulted, in the theatre and amid the full pomp of the ceremony, by his enemy the wealthy Meidias: who, besides other outrages, struck him several times with his fist on the head. The insult was the more poignant, because Meidias at this time held the high office of Hipparch, or one of the commanders of the horse. It was the practice at Athens to convene a public assembly immediately after the Dionysiac festival, for the special purpose of receiving notifications and hearing complaints about matters which had occurred at the festival itself. At this special assembly Demosthenês preferred a complaint against Meidias for the unwarrantable outrage offered, and found warm sympathy among the people, who passed an

B.C. 349.

Dionysiac festival at Athens in March, 349 B.C.—  
Insult offered to Demosthenês by Meidias.

in which the assertion occurs, was delivered only a few months after the battle of Tamynæ; while the allegation of Æschinês is contained in his harangue against Ktesiphon, which was not spoken till many years afterwards.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês indeed says, that Kallias, having been forgiven by Athens on this occasion, afterwards, gratuitously, and from pure hostility and ingratitude to Athens,

went to Philip. But I think this is probably an exaggeration. The orator is making a strong point against Kallias, who afterwards became connected with Demosthenês, and rendered considerable service to Athens in Eubœa.

The treason of Kallias and Taurosthenês is alluded to by Deinarchus in his harangue against Demosthenês, s. 45.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês cont. Meidiam, p. 567.

unanimous vote of censure. This procedure (called *Probolê*) did not by itself carry any punishment, but served as a sort of *præjudicium*, or finding of a true bill; enabling Demosthenês to quote the public as a witness to the main fact of insult, and encouraging him to pursue Meidias before the regular tribunals; which he did a few months afterwards; but was induced to accept from Meidias the self-imposed fine of 30 minæ before the final passing of sentence by the Dikasts.<sup>1</sup>

From the despatches of Phokion, the treason of Plutarch of Eretria had become manifest; so that Demosthenês gained credit for his previous remarks on the impolicy of granting the armament: while the friends of Plutarch—Hegesilaus and others of the party of Eubulus—incurred displeasure; and some, as it appears, were afterwards tried.<sup>2</sup> But he was reproached by his enemies for having been absent from the battle of Tamynæ; and a citizen named Euktêmon, at the instigation of Meidias, threatened an indictment against him for desertion of his post.

Whether Demosthenês had actually gone over to Eubœa as a hoplite in the army of Phokion, and obtained leave of absence to come back for the Dionysia—or whether he did not go at all—we are unable to say. In either case, his duties as chorêgus for this year furnished a conclusive excuse; so that Euktêmon, though he formally hung up before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes a public proclamation of his intended indictment, never thought fit to take even the first step for bringing it

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês cont. Ktesiph. p. 61; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 12. Westermann and many other critics (De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse, p. 25–28) maintain that the discourse against Meidias can never have been really spoken by Demosthenês to the Dikastery, since if it had been spoken, he could not afterwards have entered into the compromise. But it is surely possible that he may have delivered the discourse and obtained judgment in his favour; and then afterwards—when the second vote of

the Dikasts was about to come on, for estimation of the penalty—may have accepted the offer of the defendant to pay a moderate fine (compare Demosth. cont. Neæram, p. 1348) in fear of exasperating too far the powerful friends around Meidias. The action of Demosthenês against Meidias was certainly an ἀγὼν τιμητός. About προβολή, see Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozess. p. 371.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, De Pace, p. 51. De Fals. Leg. p. 434—with the Scholion.

actual trial, and incurred legal disgrace for such non-performance of his engagement.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless the opprobrious and undeserved epithet of deserter was ever afterwards put upon Demosthenês by Æschinês and his other enemies; and Meidias even applied the like vituperation to most of those who took part in that assembly<sup>2</sup> wherein the Probolê or vote of censure against him had been passed. Not long after the Dionysiac festival, however, it was found necessary to send fresh troops, both horsemen and hoplites, to Eubœa; probably to relieve either some or all of those already serving there. Demosthenês on this occasion put on his armour and served as a hoplite in the island. Meidias also went to Argura in Eubœa, as commander of the horsemen; yet, when the horsemen were summoned to join the Athenian army, he did not join along with them, but remained as trierarch of a trireme the outfit of which he had himself defrayed.<sup>3</sup> How long the army stayed in Eubœa, we do not know. It appears that Demosthenês had returned to Athens by the time when the annual Senate was chosen in the last month of the Attic year (Skirrophorion—June); having probably by that time been relieved. He was named (by the lot) among the Five Hundred Senators for the coming Attic year (beginning Midsummer 349 B.C. = Olymp. 107, 4);<sup>4</sup> his old enemy Meidias in vain impugning his qualification as he passed through the Dokimasy or preliminary examination previous to entering office.

What the Athenian army did farther in Eubœa, we cannot make out. Phokion was recalled—we do not know when—and replaced by a general named Molossus; who is said to have managed the war very unsuccessfully, and even to have been made prisoner himself by the enemy.<sup>5</sup> The hostile parties in the island, aided by Philip, were not subdued,

Hostilities  
in Eubœa,  
during  
349-348 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 548. . . . ἐφ' ᾧ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Euklêmon) ἡτιμώκεν αὐτὸν οὐχ ἐπεξελέγων, οὐδεμιᾶς ἔγωγ' ἔτι προσδόμεναι εἰας, ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν ἔχω.

Æschinês says that Nikodemus entered an indictment against Demosthenês for deserting his place in the ranks; but that he was bought off by Demosthenês, and

refrained from bringing it before the Dikastery (Æsch. Fals. Leg. p. 292).

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Meid. p. 577.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês cont. Meid. p. 558-567.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês cont. Meid. p. 551.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch Phokion, c. 14; Pausanias, i. 36, 3.

nor was it until the summer of 348 B.C. that they applied for peace. Even then, it appears, none was concluded, so that the Eubœans remained unfriendly to Athens until the peace with Philip in 346 B.C.

But while the Athenians were thus tasked for the maintenance of Eubœa, they found it necessary to undertake more effective measures for the relief of Olynthus, and they thus had upon their hands at the same time the burthen of two wars. We know that they had to provide force for both Eubœa and Olynthus, at once;<sup>1</sup> and that the occasion which called for these simultaneous efforts was one of stringent urgency. The Olynthian requisition and communications made themselves so strongly felt, as to induce Athens to do, what Demosthenês in his three Olynthiacs had vainly insisted on during the preceding summer and autumn—to send thither a force of native Athenians, in the first half of 349 B.C. Of the horsemen who had gone from Athens to Eubœa under Meidias, to serve under Phokion, either all, or a part, crossed by sea from Eubœa to Olynthus, during that half-year.<sup>2</sup> Meidias did not cross

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês cont. Neæram, p. 1346. . . . συμβάντος τῇ πόλει καιροῦ τοιοῦτου καὶ πολέμου, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ἡ κρατήσασιν ὑμῖν μεγίστος τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἶναι, καὶ ἀναμφισβητήτως τά τε ὑμέτερα αὐτῶν κεκομίσθαι καὶ καταπεπολεμηχέναι Φίλιππον—ἡ ὑστερήσασι τῇ βοηθείᾳ καὶ προεμένοις τοὺς συμμάχους, δι' ἀπορίαν χρημάτων καταλυθέντος τοῦ στρατοπέδου, τούτους τ' ἀπολέσαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν ἀπίστους εἶναι δοκεῖν, καὶ κινδυνεύειν περὶ τῶν ὑπολοίπων, περὶ τε Ἀθήνων καὶ Ἰμβρου καὶ Σκύρου καὶ Χερρόνησου—καὶ μελλοντῶν στρατεύεσθαι ὑμῶν πανδημεῖ εἰς τε Εὐβοίαν καὶ Ὀλυνθον—ἔγραψε ψήφισμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδωρος βουλευών, &c."

This speech was delivered before the Dikastery by a person named Theomnestus, in support of an indictment against Neæra—perhaps six or eight years after 349 B.C. Whether Demosthenês was the author of the speech or not, its

value as evidence will not be materially altered.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, p. 578. . . . οὗτος τῶν μεθ' αὐτοῦ στρατευσαμένων ἰππέων, ὅτε εἰς Ὀλυνθον διέβησαν, ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κατηγορεῖ. Compare the same oration, p. 568—περὶ δὲ τῶν συστρατευσαμένων εἰς Ἀργουραν (in Eubœa) ἵστε δῆποι πάντες οἳ ἐδημηγόρησε παρ' ὑμῖν, ὅτ' ἦκεν ἐκ Χάλκιδος, κατηγορῶν καὶ φάσων δνειδος ἐξελθεῖν τὴν στρατιάν ταύτην τῇ πόλει.

This transit of the Athenian horsemen to Olynthus, which took place after the battle of Tamynæ is an occurrence distinct from the voluntary contributions at Athens towards an Olynthian expedition (ἐπιδόσεις εἰς Ὀλυνθον—Demosth. cont. Meidiam, p. 566); which contributions took place before the battle of Tamynæ, and before the expedition to Eubœa, of which the battle made part.

These horsemen went from Eubœa

with them, but came back as trierarch in his trireme to Athens. Now the Athenian horsemen were not merely citizens, but citizens of wealth and consequence; moreover the transport of them by sea was troublesome as well as costly. The sending of such troops implies a strenuous effort and sense of urgency on the part of Athens. We may rather conclude that a more numerous body of hoplites were sent along with the horsemen at the same time; for horsemen would hardly under any circumstances be sent across sea alone; besides which Olynthus stood most in need of auxiliary hoplites, since her native force consisted chiefly of horsemen and peltasts.<sup>1</sup>

The evidence derived from the speech against Neæra being thus corroborated by the still better evidence of the speech against Meidias, we are made certain of the important fact, that the first half of the year 349 B.C. was one in which Athens was driven to great public exertions—even to armaments of native citizens—for the support of Olynthus as well as for the maintenance of Eubœa. What the Athenians achieved, indeed, or helped to achieve, by these expeditions to Olynthus—or how long they stayed there—we have no information. But we may reasonably presume—though Philip during this year 349 B.C., probably conquered a certain number of the thirty-two Chalkidic towns—that the allied forces, Olynthian, Chalkidic and Athenian, contended against him with no inconsiderable effect, and threw back his conquest of Chalkidikê into the following year. After a summer's campaign in that peninsula, the Athenian citizens would probably come home. We learn

Great efforts of Athens in 349 B.C., for the support of Olynthus and the maintenance of Eubœa at the same time.

to Olynthus before Meidias returned to Athens. But we know that he returned to Athens before the beginning of the new Attic or Olympic year (Olymp. 107, 4, 349-348 B.C.); that is, speaking approximately, before the 1st of July 349 B.C. For he was present at Athens and accused Demosthenês in the senatorial Dokimasy, or preliminary examination, which all senators underwent before they took their seats with the beginning of

the new year (Demosth. cont. Meid. p. 551).

It seems therefore clear that the Athenian expedition—certainly horsemen, and probably hoplites also—went to Olynthus before July 1, 349 B.C. I alluded to this expedition of Athenian citizens to Olynthus in a previous note—as connected with the date of the third Olynthiac of Demosthenês.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 2, 41; v. 3, 3-6.

that the Olynthians made prisoner a Macedonian of rank named Derdas, with other Macedonians attached to him.

So extraordinary a military effort, however, made by the Athenians in the first half of 349 B.C.—to recover Eubœa and to protect Olynthus at once—naturally placed them in a state of financial embarrassment. Of this, one proof is to be found in the fact, that for some time there was not sufficient money to pay the *Dikasteries*, which accordingly sat little; so that few causes were tried for some time—for how long we do not know.<sup>2</sup>

To meet in part the pecuniary wants of the moment, a courageous effort was made by the senator Apollodorus. He moved a decree in the Senate that it should be submitted to the vote of the public assembly, whether the surplus of revenue over and above the ordinary and permanent peace establishment of the city, should be paid to the *Theoric Fund* for the various religious festivals—or should be devoted to the pay, outfit, and transport of soldiers for the actual war. The Senate approved the motion of Apollodorus and adopted a (*probouleuma*) preliminary resolution authorising him to submit it to the public assembly. Under such authority, Apollodorus made the motion in the assembly, where also he was fully successful. The assembly (without a single dissentient voice, we are told) passed a decree enjoining that the surplus of revenue should under the actual pressure of war be devoted to the pay and other wants of soldiers. Notwithstanding such unanimity, however, a citizen named Stephanus impeached both the decree and its mover on the score of illegality, under the *Graphê Paranomon*. Apollodorus was brought before the *Dikastery*, and there found guilty; mainly (according to his friend and relative the prosecutor of Neæra) through suborned witnesses and false allegations foreign to the substance of the impeachment. When the verdict of guilty had been pronounced, Stephanus as accuser assessed the measure of punishment at the

<sup>1</sup> Theopompus, Fragm. 155; ap. *Athenæum*, x. p. 436; *Ælian*, V. H. ii. 41.

<sup>2</sup> See Demosthenês, *adv. Bœotum De Nomine*, p. 999. . . . . *xai ei*

*μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις εἰσῆγον ἂν δῆλον ὅτι.* This oration was spoken shortly after the battle of Tamynæ, p. 999.

large fine of fifteen talents, refusing to listen to any supplications from the friends of Apollodorus, when they entreated him to name a lower sum. The Dikasts however, more lenient than Stephanus, were satisfied to adopt the measure of fine assessed by Apollodorus upon himself—one talent—which he actually paid.<sup>1</sup>

There can hardly be a stronger evidence both of the urgency and poverty of the moment, than the fact, that both Senate and people passed this decree of Apollodorus. That fact there is no room for doubting. But the additional statement—that there was not a single dissident, and that every one, both at the time and afterwards, always pronounced the motion to have been an excellent one<sup>2</sup>—is probably an exaggeration. For it is not to be imagined that the powerful party, who habitually resisted the diversion of money from the Theoric Fund to war purposes, should have been wholly silent or actually concurrent on this occasion, though they may have been out-voted. The motion of Apollodorus was one which could not be made without distinctly breaking the law, and rendering the mover liable to those penal consequences which afterwards actually fell upon him. Now, that even a majority, both of senate and assembly, should have overleaped this illegality, is a proof sufficiently remarkable how strongly the crisis pressed upon their minds.

The diversion of the Theoric Fund proves the great anxiety of the moment at Athens.

The expedition of Athenian citizens, sent to Olynthus before Midsummer 349 B.C., would probably return after a campaign of two or three months, and after having rendered some service against the Macedonian army. The warlike operations of Philip against the Chalkidians and Olynthians were noway relaxed. He pressed the Chalkidians more and more closely throughout all the ensuing eighteen months (from Midsummer 349 B.C. to the early spring of 347 B.C.). During the year Olymp. 107, 4, if the citation from Philochorus<sup>3</sup> is to

B.C. 349-348.

Three expeditions sent by Athens to Chalkidike in 349-348 B.C.—according to Philochorus.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês cont. Near. p. 46, 1347. ad Amm. p. 734, 735. Philochorus tells us that the Athenians *now*

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês cont. Near. p. 46. ἀλλὰ καὶ νῦν ἔτι, ἂν ποὺ λόγος γνηται, ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ πάντων, ὅτι τὰ βέλτιστα εἶπας ἄδικα πάθοι. contracted the alliance with Olynthus; which certainly is not accurate. The alliance had been contracted in the preceding year.

<sup>3</sup> Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal.

be trusted, the Athenians despatched to their aid three expeditions; one at the request of the Olynthians, who sent envoys to pray for it—consisting of 2000 peltasts under Charês, in thirty ships partly manned by Athenian seamen. A second went thither under Charidêmus, at the earnest entreaty of the suffering Chalkidians; consisting of 18 triremes, 4000 peltasts and 150 horsemen. Charidêmus, in conjunction with the Olynthians, marched over Bottiæa and the peninsula of Pallênê, laying waste the country; whether he achieved any important success, we do not know. Respecting both Charês and Charidêmus, the anecdotes descending to us are of insolence, extortion, and amorous indulgences, rather than of military exploits.<sup>1</sup> It is clear that neither the one nor the other achieved anything effectual against Philip, whose arms and corruption made terrible progress in Chalkidikê. So grievously did the strength of the Olynthians fail, that they transmitted a last and most urgent appeal to Athens; imploring the Athenians not to abandon them to ruin, but to send them a force of citizens in addition to the mercenaries already there. The Athenians complied, despatching thither 12 triremes, 2000 hoplites, and 300 horsemen, all under the command of Charês.

To make out anything of the successive steps of this important war is impossible; but we discern that during this latter portion of the Olynthian war the efforts made by Athens were considerable. Demosthenês (in a speech six years afterwards affirms that the Athenians had sent to the aid of Olynthus 4000 citizens, 10,000 mercenaries and 50 triremes.<sup>2</sup> He represents the Chalkidic cities as having been betrayed successively to Philip by corrupt and traitorous citizens. That the conquest was achieved greatly by the aid of corruption, we cannot doubt; but the orator's language carries no accurate information. Mekyberna and Torônê are said to have been among the towns betrayed without resistance.<sup>3</sup> After Philip had captured the thirty-two Chalkidic cities, he marched against Olynthus itself, with its confederate neighbours—the Thracian Methônê and Apollonia. In forcing the passage of the river Sardon, he encountered such resistance

<sup>1</sup> Theopomp. Fragm. 183—238; Athenæus, xii. p. 532.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 426.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52.

that his troops were at first repulsed; and he was himself obliged to seek safety by swimming back across the river. He was moreover wounded in the eye by an Olynthian archer named Aster, and lost the sight of that eye completely, notwithstanding the skill of his Greek surgeon Kritobulus.<sup>1</sup> On arriving within forty furlongs of Olynthus, he sent to the inhabitants a peremptory summons, intimating that either they must evacuate the city, or he must leave Macedonia.<sup>2</sup> Rejecting this notice, they determined to defend their town to the last. A considerable portion of the last Athenian citizen-armament was still in the town to aid in the defence;<sup>3</sup> so that the Olynthians might reasonably calculate that Athens would strain every nerve to guard her own citizens against captivity. But their hopes were disappointed. How long the siege lasted—or whether there was time for Athens to send farther reinforcement—we cannot say. The Olynthians are said to have repulsed several assaults of Philip with loss; but according to Demosthenês, the philippising party, headed by the venal Euthykratês and Lasthenês, brought about the banishment of their chief opponent Apollonidês, nullified all measures for energetic defence, and treasonably surrendered the city. Two defeats were sustained near its walls, and one of the generals of this party, having 500 cavalry under his command, betrayed them designedly into the hands of the invader.<sup>4</sup> Olynthus, with all its inhabitants and property, at length fell into the hands of Philip. His mastery of the Chalkidic peninsula thus became complete—towards the end of winter 348-347 B.C.

Miserable was the ruin which fell upon this flourishing peninsula. The persons of the Olynthians—men, women, and children—were sold into slavery. The wealth of the city gave to Philip the means of recompensing his soldiers for the toils of the war; the city itself he is said to have destroyed, together with Apollonia, Methônê, Stageira, &c.—in all, thirty-two Chalkidic cities. Demosthenês,

B.C. 348.

Sale of the Olynthian prisoners—ruin of the Greek cities in Chalkidikê.

<sup>1</sup> Kallisthenês ap. Stobæum, t. ii. p. 92; Plutarch, Parallel. c. 8; Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117. Kritobulus could not save the sight of the eye, but he is said to have prevented any visible disfigurement. "Magna et Critobulo fama

est, extracta Philippi regis oculo sagitta et citra deformitatem oris curata, orbitate luminis" (Pliny, H. N. vii. 37).

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. iii. p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 30.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Philipp. iii. p.

speaking about five years afterwards, says that the were so thoroughly and cruelly ruined as to leave their very sites scarcely discernible.<sup>1</sup> Making every allowance for exaggeration, we may fairly believe, that they were dismantled and bereft of all citizen proprietors; that the buildings and visible marks of Hellenic city-life were broken up or left to decay; that the remaining houses, as well as the villages around, were tenanted by dependent cultivators or slaves—now working for the benefit of new Macedonian proprietors, in great part non-resident, and probably of favoured Grecian grantees also.<sup>2</sup> Though various Greeks thus received their recompense for service rendered to Philip, yet Demosthenês affirms that Euthykratês and Lasthenês, the traitors who had sold Olynthus were not among the number; or at least that not long afterwards they were dismissed with dishonour and contempt.<sup>3</sup>

In this Olynthian war—ruinous to the Chalkidic Greeks, terrific to all other Greeks, and doubling the power of Philip—Athens too must have incurred a serious amount of expense. We find it stated loosely, that in her entire war against Philip from the time of his capture of Amphipolis in 358-357 B.C. down to the peace of 346 B.C. or shortly afterwards, she had expended not less than 1500 talents.<sup>4</sup> O

125—128; Fals. Leg. p. 426; Diodor. xvi. 53.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 117; Justin, viii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês (Fals. Leg. p. 386) says, that both Philokratês and Æschinês received from Philip, not only presents of timber and corn, but also grants of productive and valuable farms in the Olynthian territory. He calls some Olynthian witnesses to prove his assertion; but their testimony is not given at length.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Chersones. p. 99. The existence of these Olynthian traitors, sold to Philip, proves that he could not have needed the aid of the Stageirite philosopher Aristotle to indicate to him who were the richest Olynthian citizens,

at the time when the prisoners were put up for sale as slaves. The Athenian Democharês, about forty years afterwards, in his virulent speech against the philosophers, alleged that Aristotle had rendered this disgraceful service to Philip (Aristotlês ap. Eusebius Præp. Ev. p. 792). Wesseling (ad Diodor. xvi. 53) refutes the charge by saying that Aristotle was at that time along with Hermias at Atarneus; a refutation not very conclusive, which I am glad to be able to strengthen.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 36. 24. Demosthenês (Olynth. iii. p. 36) mentions the same amount of public money as having been wasted *sic εὐδὲν δίων*—even in the early part of the Olynthian war.

these computations no great stress is to be laid; but we may well believe that her outlay was considerable. In spite of all reluctance, she was obliged to do something; what she did was both too little, too intermittent, and done behind-time, so as to produce no satisfactory result; but nevertheless the aggregate cost, in a series of years, was a large one. During the latter portion of the Olynthian war, as far as we can judge, she really seems to have made efforts, though she had done little in the beginning. We may presume that the cost must have been defrayed, in part at least, by a direct property-tax; for the condemnation of Apollodorus put an end to the proposition of taking from the Theôric Fund.<sup>1</sup> Means may also have been found of economising from the other expenses of the state.

Though the appropriation of the Theôric Fund to other purposes continued to be thus interdicted by any formal motion, yet in the way of suggestion and insinuation it was from time to time alluded at, by Demosthenês and others. And whenever money was wanted for war, the question whether it should be taken from this source or from direct property-tax, was indirectly revived. The appropriation of the Theôric Fund however remained unchanged until the very eve of the battle of Chæroneia. Just before that Dies Iræ, when Philip was actually fortifying Elateia, the fund was made applicable to war-purposes; the views of Demosthenês were realized, twelve years after he had begun to enforce them.

Theôric Fund—not appropriated to war purposes until a little before the battle of Chæroneia.

This question about the Theôric expenditure is rarely presented by modern authors in the real way that it affected the Athenian mind. It has been sometimes treated as a sort of alms-giving to the poor—and sometimes as an expenditure by

Views given respecting the Theôric Fund.

d before the Eubœan war. As evidences of actual amount, such statements are of no value.

<sup>1</sup> Ulpian, in his Commentary on the first Olynthiac, tells us that after the fine imposed upon Apollodorus, Eubulus moved and carried a law, enacting that any future motion to encroach on the Theôric Fund should be punished

with death.

The authority of Ulpian is not sufficient to accredit this statement. The fine inflicted by the Dikastery upon Apollodorus was lenient; we may therefore reasonably doubt whether the popular sentiment would go along with the speaker in making the like offence capital in future.

the Athenians upon their pleasures. Neither the one nor the other gives a full or correct view of the case; each only brings out a part of the truth.

Doubtless, the Athenian democracy cared much for the pleasures of the citizens. It provided for them the largest amount of refined and imaginative pleasures ever tasted by any community known to history; pleasure essentially social and multitudinous, attaching the citizen to each other, rich and poor, by the strong tie of community of enjoyment.

But pleasure, though an usual accessory, was not the primary idea or predominant purpose of the Theôric expenditure. That expenditure was essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honour of the gods. The ancient religion was not simply at Athens, but throughout Greece and the contemporary world—very different in this respect from the modern—included within itself and its manifestations nearly the whole range of social pleasures.<sup>1</sup> Now the Theôric Fund was essentially the Church-Fund at Athens, that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the worship of the gods. The Diobely, or distribution of two oboli to each present citizen, was one part of this expenditure given in order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of attending the festival, and doing honour to the god; never given to any one who was out of Attica—because of course he could not attend;<sup>2</sup> but given to a

It was the general fund of Athens for religious festivals and worship—distributions of one part of it—character of the ancient religious festivals.

<sup>1</sup> Among the many passages which illustrate this association in the Greek mind, between the idea of a religious festival, and that of enjoyment—we may take the expressions of Herodotus about the great festival at Sparta called Hyakinthia. In the summer of 479 B.C., the Spartans were tardy in bringing out their military force for the defence of Attica—being engaged in that festival. Οἱ γὰρ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔρταζόν τε τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον, καὶ σφι ἦν Ὑακινθία· περὶ πλείστου δ' ἤγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ

πορσύνειν (Herod. ix. 7). Presently the Athenian envoys come to Sparta to complain of the delay in the following language—Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, αὐτοῦ τῇ μένοντες, Ὑακινθία τε ἄγετε καὶ παίζετε, καταπροδόντες τοὺς συμμάχους.

Here the expressions “to fulfil the requirements of the god” and “to amuse themselves”—as used in description of the same festival, and almost as equivalent

<sup>2</sup> Harpokration, v. Θειρικά... διένειμεν Εὐβουλος εἰς τὴν θυσίαν.

like within the country, rich or poor.<sup>1</sup> It was essential to that universal communion which formed a prominent feature of the festival, not less in regard to the gods, than in regard to the city;<sup>2</sup> but it was only one portion of the total disbursements covered by the Theôric Fund. To this general religious fund it was provided by law that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost of the peace establishment had been defrayed. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each individual citizen.

We neither know the amount of the Theôric Fund, nor of the distributions connected with it. We cannot therefore say what proportion it formed of the whole peace-expenditure—itself unknown also. But we cannot doubt that it was large. To be sparing of expenditure in manifestations for the honour of the gods, was accounted the reverse of virtue by Greeks generally; and the Athenians especially, whose eyes were every day contemplating the glories of their acropolis, could learn a different lesson; moreover magnificent religious display was believed to conciliate the protection and favour of the gods.<sup>3</sup> We may affirm, however, upon the strongest presumptions, that this religious expenditure did not absorb any funds required for the other branches of a peace establishment. Neither naval, nor military, nor administrative exigences, were starved in order to augment the Theôric surplus. Eubulus was distinguished for his excellent keeping of the docks and arsenals, and for his

No other branch of the Athenian peace-establishment was impoverished or sacrificed to the Theôric expenditure.

ἅ πάντες ἐορτάζωσι, καὶ μηδεὶς ὅν πολιτῶν ἀπολίπηται δι' ἀσθένειαν τῶν ἰδίων . . . Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἦν τοῖς ἀποδημοῦσι θεωρικὸν λαμβάνειν, Ἰππερίδης δεδήλωκεν ἐν τῷ τ' Ἀρχεστρατίδου.

<sup>1</sup> See Demosth. adv. Leocharem, 1091, 1092; Philipp. iv. p. 141. Compare also Schömann, Antiq. Gr. Att. s. 69.

<sup>2</sup> See the directions of the oldacles quoted by Demosthenès in Meidiam, p. 531. ἱσάνα

ὠραίων Βρομίῳ χάριν ἄμμιγα πανταί, &c. στεφανηφορεῖν ἐλευθέρους καὶ δούλους, &c.

<sup>3</sup> See the boast of Isokratès, Orat. iv. (Panegyri.) s. 40; Plato, Alkibiad. ii. p. 148. Xenophon (Vectigal. vi. 1), in proposing some schemes for the improvement of the Athenian revenue, sets forth as one of the advantages, that "the religious festivals will be celebrated then with still greater magnificence than they are now."

care in replacing the decayed triremes by new ones. And after all the wants of a well-mounted peace-establishment were satisfied, no Athenian had scruple in appropriating what remained under the conspiring impulses of piety, pleasure, and social brotherhood.

It is true that the Athenians might have laid up that surplus annually in the acropolis, to form an accumulating war-fund. Such provision had been made half a century before, under the full energy and imperial power of Athens—when she had a larger revenue, with numerous tribute-paying allies—and when Periklês presided over her councils. It might have been better if she had done something of the same kind in the age after the Peloponnesian war. Perhaps if men, like Periklês, or even like Demosthenês, had enjoyed marked ascendancy, she would have been advised and prevailed on to continue such a precaution. But before we can measure the extent of improvidence with which Athens is here fairly chargeable, we ought to know what was the sum thus expended on the festivals. What amount of money could have been stored up for the contingency of war, even if all the festivals and all the distributions had been suppressed? How far would it have been possible, in any other case than that of obvious present necessity, to carry economy into the festival-expenditure—truly denominated by Demadês the cement of the political system—without impairing in the bosom of each individual, that sentiment of communion, religious, social, and patriotic which made the Athenians a City, and not a simple multiplication of units? These are points on which we ought to have information, before we can fairly graduate our censure upon Athens for not converting her Theôric Fund into an accumulated capital to meet the contingency of war. We ought also to ask, as matter for impartial comparison, how many governments, ancient or modern, have ever thought it requisite to lay up during peace a stock of money available for war?

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Question. Platonic.* ματος (erroneously written θεωρη p. 1011. ὡς ἔλεγε Δημάδης, πόλλαν τιτά).  
 δυναμάζων τὰ θεωρικά τοῦ πολιτεύ-

The Athenian peace-establishment maintained more ships of war, larger docks, and better-stored arsenals, than any city in Greece, besides extending forty talents annually upon the Horsemen of the state, and doubtless something further (though we know not how much) upon the other descriptions of military force. All this, let it be observed, and the Theoric expenditure besides, was defrayed without direct taxation, which was reserved for the extraordinary cost incident to a state of war, and was held to be sufficient to meet it, without any accumulated war-fund. When the war against Philip became serious, the proprietary classes at Athens, those included in the schedule of assessment, were called upon to defray the expense by a direct tax, from which they had been quite free in time of peace. They tried to evade this burthen by requiring that the festival-fund should be appropriated instead;<sup>1</sup> thus menacing what was dearest to the feelings of the majority of the citizens. The ground which they took was the same in principle, as if the proprietors in France or Belgium claimed to exempt themselves from direct taxation at the cost of a war, by first taking either all or half of the annual sum voted out of the budget for the maintenance of religion.<sup>2</sup> We may judge how strong a feeling would be raised among the Athenian public generally, by the

Attempt of the Athenian proprietary-classes to get clear of direct taxation by taking from the Theoric Fund.

According to the author of the oration against Neæra, the law did actually provide, that in time of war, the surplus revenue should be devoted to warlike purposes—*κελευόντων τῶν νόμων, ἔταναι μὲν τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς χρήσεως στρατιωτικῆς εἶναι* (p. 10). But it seems to me that this must be a misstatement, got to suit the speaker's case. If the law had been so, Apollodorus would have committed no illegality in his motion; moreover, all the plotting and manœuvring of Demosthenes in his first and third orations would have been to no purpose. The case here put, though analogous in principle, makes against the Athenian proprietors, in degree; for even in time of peace one half of the French revenue is raised by direct taxation. Voltaire observes very justly—“L'argent que le public employoit à ces spectacles étoit un argent sacré. C'est pourquoi Démosthène emploie tant de circonspection et tant de détours pour engager les Athéniens à employer cet argent à la guerre contre Philippe: c'est comme si on entreprenoit en Italie de soulever des troupes avec le trésor de Notre Dame de Lorette” (Voltaire, Des Divers changemens arrivés à l'Art Tragique. Œuvres, tom. 65. p. 73. ed. 1832, Paris).

proposal of impoverishing the festival expenditure in order to save a property-tax. Doubtless, after the proprietary class had borne a certain burthen of direct taxation, their complaints would become legitimate. The cost of the festivals could not be kept up undiminished under severe and continued pressure of war. As a secondary and subsidiary resource, it would become essential to apply the whole or a part of the fund in alleviation of the burthen of the war. But even if all had been so applied, the fund could not have been large enough to dispense with the necessity of a property-tax besides.

We see this conflict of interests—between direct taxation on one side and the festival-fund on the other, as a means of paying for war—running through the Demosthenic orations, and especially marked in the fourth Philippic.<sup>1</sup> Unhappily the conflict served as an excuse to both parties for throwing the blame on each other, and for starving the war; as well as for giving effect to the repugnance, shared by both rich and poor, against personal military service abroad. Demosthenes sides with neither—tries to mediate between them—and calls for patriotic sacrifice from both alike. Having before him an actual and living enemy, with the liberties of Greece as well as of Athens at stake—he urges every species of sacrifice once; personal service, direct tax-payments, abnegation of the festivals. Sometimes the one demand stands more prominent, sometimes the other; but oftenest of all, comes his appeal for personal service. Under such military necessities, in fact, the Theoric expenditure became more onerous, not merely because it absorbed the public money, but also because it chained the citizens to the home and disinclined them to active service abroad. The great charm and body of sentiment connected with the festival, essentially connected as it was with presence in Attica, operated as a bane; at an exigency when one-third or one-fourth of the citizens ought to have been doing home duty as soldiers on the coasts of Macedonia or Thrace.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iv. p. 141-143; But I allude to them with confidence as Demosthenic compositions; put together out of Demosthenic fragments and thought De Republicâ Ordinanda, p. 167. Whether these two orations were actually delivered in their present form may perhaps be doubted.

against an enemy who never slept. Unfortunately for the Athenians, they could not be convinced, by all the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenês, that the festivals which fed their piety and brightened their home-existence during peace, were unmaintainable during such a war, and must be renounced for a time, if the liberty and security of Athens were to be preserved. The same want of energy which made them shrink from the hardship of personal service, also rendered them indisposed to so great a sacrifice as that of their festivals; nor indeed would it have availed them to spare all the cost of their festivals, had their emissness as soldiers still continued. Nothing less could have saved them, than simultaneous compliance with all the three requisitions urged by Demosthenês in 350 B.C.; which compliance ultimately came, but came too late, in 339-338 B.C.

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APPENDIX.

ON THE ORDER OF THE OLYNTHIAC ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENÊS.

RESPECTING the true chronological order of these three harangues, dissentient opinions have been transmitted from ancient times, and still continue among modern critics.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus cites the three speeches by their initial words, but places them in a different chronological order from that in which they stand edited. He gives the second as being first in the series; the third, as second; and the first as third.

It will be understood that I always speak of and describe these speeches by the order in which they stand edited; though, as far as I can judge, that order is not the true one.

Edited Order . . . . . I. II. III.

Order of Dionysius . . . . . II. III. I.

The greater number of modern critics defend the edited order; the main arguments for which have been ably stated in a dissertation published by Petrenz in 1833. Dindorf, in his edition of Demosthenês, places this Dissertation in front of his notes to the Olynthiacs; affirming that it is conclusive, and sets the question at rest. Böhnecke also (*Forschungen*, p. 151), treats the question as no longer open to doubt.

On the other hand, Flathe (*Geschichte Makedoniens*, p. 183-187) expresses himself with equal confidence in favour of the order stated by Dionysius. A much higher authority, Dr. Thirlwall, agrees in the same opinion; though with less confidence, and with a juster appreciation

of our inadequate means for settling the question. See the Appendix iii. to the fifth volume of his History of Greece, p. 512.

Though I have not come to the same conclusion as Dr. Thirlwall I agree with him, that unqualified confidence, in any conclusion as to the order of these harangues, is unsuitable and not warranted by the amount of evidence. We have nothing to proceed upon except the internal evidence of the speeches, taken in conjunction with the contemporaneous history; of which we know little or nothing from information in detail.

On the best judgement that I can form, I cannot adopt wholly either the edited order or that of Dionysius, though agreeing in part with both I concur with Dionysius and Dr. Thirlwall in placing the second Olynthiac *first* of the three. I concur with the edited order in placing the third *last*. I observe, in Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix, that this arrangement has been vindicated in a Dissertation by Stueve. I have not seen this Dissertation; and my own conclusion was deduced—even before I knew that it had ever been advocated elsewhere—only from an attentive study of the speeches.

Edited Order . . . . . I. II. III.

Order of Dionysius . . . . . II. III. I.

Order of Stueve (which I think the most probable) II. I. III.

To consider first the proper place of the *second* Olynthiac (I mean that which stands *second* in the edited order).

The most remarkable characteristic of this oration is, that scarcely anything is said in it about Olynthus. It is, in fact, a Philippic rather than an Olynthiac. This characteristic is not merely admitted, but strongly put forward, by Petrenz, p. 11—"Quid! quod ipsorum Olynthiorum hac quidem in causâ tantum uno loco facta mentio est—ut un illo versiculo sublato, vix ex ipsâ oratione, quâ in causâ esset habitæ certis rationibus evinci posset." How are we to explain the absence of all reference to Olynthus? According to Petrenz, it is because the orator had already, in his former harangue, said all that could be necessary in respect to the wants of Olynthus, and the necessity of upholding that city even for the safety of Athens; he might now therefore calculate that his first discourse remained impressed on his countrymen and that all that was required was, to combat the extraordinary fear of Philip which hindered them from giving effect to a resolution already taken to assist the Olynthians.

In this hypothesis I am unable to acquiesce. It may appear natural to a reader of Demosthenes, who passes from the first printed discourse to the second without any intervening time to forget what he has just read. But it will hardly fit the case of a real speaker in busy Athens. Neither Demosthenes in the fluctuating Athenian assembly—nor even any orator in the more fixed English Parliament or American Congress—could be rash enough to calculate that a discourse delivered some time before had remained engraven on the minds of his audience. If Demosthenes had previously addressed the Athenians with so strong a conviction of the distress of Olynthus, and of the motives for Athens to assist Olynthus, as is embodied in the first discourse—if his speech however well received, was not acted upon, so that in the course of a certain time he had to address them again for the same purpose—he cannot believe that he would allude to Olynthus only once by the by

and that he would merely dilate upon the general chances and conditions of the war between Athens and Philip. However well calculated the second Olynthiac may be "ad concitandos exacerbandosque animos" (to use the words of Petrenz), it is not peculiarly calculated to procure aid to Olynthus. If the orator had failed to procure such aid by a discourse like the first Olynthiac, he would never sort to a discourse like the second Olynthiac to make good a deficiency; he would repeat anew, and more impressively than before, the danger of Olynthus, and the danger to Athens herself if she suffered Olynthus to fall. This would be the way to accomplish his object, and at the same time to combat the fear of Philip in the minds of the Athenians.

According to my view of the subject, the omission (or mere single passing notice) of Olynthus clearly shows that the wants of that city, and the urgency of assisting it, were not the main drift of Demosthenes the second Olynthiac. His main drift is, to encourage and stimulate his countrymen in their general war against Philip; taking in, frankly, the new ally Olynthus, whom they have just acquired—not taking her in only as a valuable auxiliary (ἐν προσθήκῃς μέρει), to operate with Athens against Philip as well as to receive aid from Athens—not presenting her either as peculiarly needing succour, or as likely, if allowed to perish, to expose the vitals of Athens.

Now a speech of this character is what I cannot satisfactorily explain, as following after the totally different spirit of the first Olynthiac; but it is natural and explicable, if we suppose it to precede the first Olynthiac. Olynthus does not approach Athens at first *in formâ supplexis*, as if she were in danger and requiring aid against an overwhelming enemy. She presents herself as an equal, offering to cooperate against a common enemy, and tendering an alliance which the Athenians had hitherto sought in vain. She will of course want aid—but she can give cooperation of equal value. Demosthenes advises to assist—this comes of course, when her alliance is accepted:—but he dwells more forcibly upon the value of what she will *give* to the Athenians, the way of cooperation against Philip. Nay, it is remarkable that the territorial vicinity of Olynthus to Philip is exhibited, not as a peril to *her* which the Athenians must assist her in averting, but as a pretext to enable *them* the better to attack Philip in conjunction with her. Moreover Olynthus is represented, not as apprehending any danger from Philip's arms, but as having recently discovered how dangerous it is to be in alliance with him. Let us thank the gods (says Demosthenes at the opening of the second Olynthiac)—τὸ τοὺς πολέμησοντας εὐπρὸς γεγενησθαι καὶ χώραν ἔμπορον καὶ δύναμιν τινα κεκτημένους, καὶ μέγιστον ἀπάντων, τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πολέμου γνώμην τοιαύτην ἔχοντας, ὥστε πρὸς ἐκείνους διαλλαγὰς, πρῶτον μὲν ἀπίστους, εἴτα τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος εἰς αὐτὴν ἀνάστασιν εἶναι, δαιμονίᾳ τινι καὶ θεαῖα παντάπασιν εὐοικεῖν εὐεργεσίᾳ (18).

The general tenor of the second Olynthiac is in harmony with this opening. Demosthenes looks forward to a vigorous aggressive war carried on by Athens and Olynthus jointly against Philip, and he enters at large into the general chances of such war, noticing the venerable as well as the odious points of Philip, and striving (as Petrenz justly remarks) to "excite and exasperate the minds of the citizens."

Such is the first bright promise of the Olynthian alliance with Athens. But Athens, as usual, makes no exertions; leaving the Olynthians and Chalkidians to contend against Philip by themselves. It is presently found that he gains advantages over them; bad news come from Thrace, and probably complaining envoys to announce them. It is then that Demosthenès delivers his first Olynthiac, so much more urgent in its tone respecting Olynthus. The main topic is now—"Protect the Olynthians; save their confederate cities; think what will happen if they are ruined; there is nothing to hinder Philip in this case from marching into Attica." The views of Demosthenès have changed from the offensive to the defensive.

I cannot but think, therefore, that all the internal evidence of the Olynthiacs indicates the second as prior in point of time both to the first and to the third. Stueve (as cited by Dr. Thirlwall) mentions another reason tending to the same conclusion. Nothing is said in the second Olynthiac about meddling with the Theoric Fund; whereas in the first, that subject is distinctly adverted to—and in the third forcibly and repeatedly pressed, though with sufficient artifice to save the illegality. This is difficult to explain, assuming the second to be posterior to the first; but noway difficult, if we suppose the second to be the earliest of the three, and to be delivered with the purpose which I have pointed out.

On the other hand, this manner of handling the Theoric Fund in the third oration, as compared with the first, is one strong reason for believing (as Petrenz justly contends) that the third is posterior to the first—and not prior, as Dionysius places it.

As to the third Olynthiac, its drift and purpose appear to me correctly stated in the argument prefixed by Libanius. It was delivered after Athens had sent some succour to Olynthus, whereas both the first and the second were spoken before anything at all had yet been done. I think there is good ground for following Libanius (as Petrenz and others do) in his statement that the third oration recognizes Athens as having done *something*, which the two first do not; though Dr. Thirlwall (p. 509) agrees with Jacobs in doubting such a distinction. The successes of mercenaries, reported at Athens (p. 38), must surely have been successes of mercenaries commissioned by her; and the triumphs and hopes noticed by Demosthenès as actually prevalent, are most naturally explained by supposing such news to have arrived. Demosthenès says no more than he can help about the success actually gained, because he thinks it of no serious importance. He wishes to set before the people, as a corrective to the undue confidence prevalent, that all the real danger yet remained to be dealt with.

Though Athens had done something, she had done little—sent no citizens—provided no pay. This Demosthenès urges her to do without delay, and dwells upon the Theoric Fund as one means of obtaining money along with personal service. Dr. Thirlwall indeed argues that the first Olynthiac is more urgent than the third, in setting forth the crisis; from whence he infers that it is posterior in time. His argument is partly founded upon a sentence near the beginning of the first Olynthiac, wherein the safety of Athens herself is mentioned as involved—τῶν πραγμάτων ὑμῶν αὐτοῖς ἀντιληπτῶν ἐστί, εἴπερ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν φροντίζετε: upon which I may remark, that the reader

ὁ τῶν is not universally admitted. Dindorf in his edition reads αὐτῶν, referring it to πραγμάτων: and stating in his note that αὐτῶν is the reading of the vulgate, first changed by Reiske into αὐτῶν on the authority of the Codex Bavaricus. But even if we grant that the first Olynthiac depicts the crisis as more dangerous and urgent than the third, we cannot infer that the first is posterior to the third. The third was delivered immediately after news received of success near Olynthus; Olynthian affairs did really prosper for the moment and to a certain extent—though the amount of prosperity was greatly exaggerated by the public. Demosthenês sets himself to combat this exaggeration; he assues as lightly as he can over the recent good news, but he cannot avoid allowing something for them, and throwing the danger of Olynthus a little back into more distant contingency. At the same time he states in the strongest manner, both section 2 and sections 9, 10.

Without being insensible, therefore, to the fallibility of all opinions founded upon such imperfect evidence, I think that the true chronological order of the Olynthiacs is that proposed by Stueve, II. I. III. With Dionysius I agree so far as to put the second Olynthiac first; and with the common order in putting the third Olynthiac last.

## CHAPTER LXXXIX.

## FROM THE CAPTURE OF OLYNTHUS TO THE TERMINATION OF THE SACRED WAR BY PHILIP.

It was during the early spring of 347 B.C., as far as we can make out, that Olynthus, after having previously seen the thirty Chalkidic cities conquered, underwent herself the like fate from the arms of Philip. Exile and poverty became the lot of such Olynthians and Chalkidians as could make their escape; while the greater number of both sexes were sold into slavery. A few painful traces present themselves of the diversities of suffering which befel these unhappy victims. Atrestidas, an Arcadian who had probably served in the Macedonian army, received from Philip a grant of thirty Olynthian slaves, chiefly women and children, who were seen following him in a string, as he travelled homeward through the Grecian cities. Many young Olynthian women were bought for the purpose of having their persons turned to account by their new proprietors. Of these purchasers, one, an Athenian citizen who had exposed his new purchase at Athens, was tried and condemned for the proceeding by the Dikastery.<sup>1</sup> Other anecdotes come before us, inaccurate probably as to names and details,<sup>2</sup> yet illustrating the general hardships brought upon this once free Chalkidic population.

<sup>1</sup> Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 93; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 439, 440. Demosthenês asserts also that Olynthian women were given as a present by Philip to Philokratês (p. 386—440). The outrage which he imputes (p. 401) to Æschinês and Phrynon in Macedonia, against the Olynthian woman—is not to be received as a fact, since it is indignantly denied by Æschinês (Fals. Leg. init. and p. 48). Yet

it is probably but too faithful a picture of real deeds, committed by others, if not by Æschinês.

<sup>2</sup> The story of the old man of Olynthus (Seneca, Controv. v. 10) bought by Parrhasius the painter and tortured in order to form a subject for a painting of the suffering Prometheus—is more than doubtful; since Parrhasius, already in high repute as a painter before 400 B.C. (see Xenoph. Mem. iii. 10),

Meanwhile the victor Philip was at the maximum of his glory. In commemoration of his conquests, he celebrated a splendid festival to the Olympian Zeus in Macedonia, with unbounded hospitality, and prizes of every sort, for matches and exhibitions, both gymnastic and poetical. His donations were munificent, as well to the Grecian and Macedonian officers who had served him, as to the eminent poets or actors who pleased his taste. Satyrus the comic actor, refusing all presents for himself, asked and obtained from him the release of two young women taken in Olynthus, daughters of his friend the Pydnæan Apollopheanês, who had been one of the persons concerned in the death of Philip's elder brother Alexander. Satyrus announced his intention not only of ensuring freedom to these young women, but likewise of providing portions for them and giving them out in marriage.<sup>1</sup> Philip also found at Olynthus his two exiled half-brothers, who had served as pretexts for the war—and put both of them to death.<sup>2</sup>

It has already been stated that Athens had sent to Olynthus more than one considerable reinforcement, especially during the last year of the war. Though we are ignorant what these expeditions achieved, or even how much was their exact force, we find reason to suspect that they were employed by Charês and other generals to no good purpose. The opponents of Charês accused him, as well as Deiarês and other mercenary chiefs, of having wasted the naval and military strength of the city in idle enterprises or rapacious extortions upon the traders of the Ægean. They summed up 1500 talents and 150 triremes thus lost to Athens, besides widespread odium incurred among the islanders by the unjust contributions levied upon them to enrich the general.<sup>3</sup> In addition to this disgraceful ill-success, came now the fearful ruin in Olynthus and Chalkidikê, and the great aggrandisement of their enemy Philip. The loss of Olynthus, with the miserable captivity of its population, would have been sufficient of themselves to excite powerful sentiment

Effect produced at Athens by the capture of Olynthus—especially by the number of Athenian captives taken in it.

can hardly have been still flourishing in 347 B.C. It discloses, however, at least, one of the many forms of slave-suffering occasionally realized.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 384—401; Diodor. xvi. 55.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, viii. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 37. c. 24.

among the Athenians. But there was a farther circumstance which came yet more home to their feelings. Many of their own citizens were serving in Olynthus as an auxiliary garrison, and had now become captives along with the rest.<sup>1</sup> No such calamity as this had befallen Athens for a century past, since the defeat of Tolmidês at Koroneia in Bœotia. The whole Athenian people, and especially the relations of the captives, were full of agitation and anxiety, increased by alarming news from other quarters. The conquest threatened the security of all the Athenian possessions in Lemnos, Imbros, and the Chersonese. This last peninsula, especially, was altogether unprotected against Philip, who was even reported to be on his march thither; insomuch that the Athenian settlers within it began to forsake their properties and transfer their families to Athens. Amidst the grief and apprehension which disturbed the Athenian mind, many special assemblies were held to discuss suitable remedies. What was done, we are not exactly informed. But it seems that no one knew where the general Charês with his armament was; so that it became necessary even for his friends in the assembly to echo the strong expressions of displeasure among the people, and to send a light vessel immediately in search of him.<sup>2</sup>

The gravity of the crisis forced even Eubulus, and others among the statesmen hitherto languid in the war, to hold a more energetic language than before against Philip. Denouncing him now as the common enemy of Greece,<sup>3</sup> they proposed missions into Peloponnesus and elsewhere for the purpose of animating the Grecian states into confederacy against him. Æschinês assisted strenuously in procuring the adoption of this proposition, and was himself named as one of the envoys into Peloponnesus.<sup>4</sup>

This able orator, immortalised as the rival of Demosthenês, has come before us hitherto only as a soldier in various Athenian expeditions—to Phlius in Peloponnesus (368)—to the battle of Mantinea (362)—and to Eubœa under Phokion

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 30. — Eubulus) Φιλίππῳ, καὶ κατὰ τῶν

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 37. παίδων ὤμνους ἢ μὴν ἀπολωλέναι

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 434. Φιλίππον ἂν βούλεσθαι, &c.  
καὶ ἐν μέν, τῷ δῆμῳ κατηρῶ (you

\* Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 438, 439.

(349 B.C.); in which last he had earned the favourable notice of the general, and had been sent to Athens with the news of the victory at Tamynæ. Æschinês was about six years older than Demosthenês, but born in a much humbler and poorer station. His father Atromêtus taught to boys the elements of letters; his mother Glaukothea made a living by presiding over certain religious assemblies and rites of initiation, intended chiefly for poor communicants; the boy Æschinês assisting both one and the other in a menial capacity. Such at least is the statement which comes to us, enriched with various degrading details, on the doubtful authority of his rival Demosthenês;<sup>1</sup> who also affirms, what we may accept as generally true, that Æschinês had passed his early manhood partly as an actor, partly as a scribe or reader to the official boards. For both functions he possessed some natural advantages—an athletic frame, a powerful voice, a ready flow of unpremeditated speech. After some years passed as scribe, in which he made himself useful to Eubulus and others, he was chosen public scribe to the assembly—acquired familiarity with the administrative and parliamentary business of the city—and thus elevated himself by degrees to influence as a speaker. In rhetorical power, he seems to have been surpassed only by Demosthenês.<sup>2</sup>

As envoy of Athens despatched under the motion of Eubulus, Æschinês proceeded into Peloponnesus B.C. 347.  
 in the spring of 347; others being sent at the same Æschinês  
 time to other Grecian cities. Among other places, as envoy of  
 he visited Megalopolis, where he was heard before Athens in  
 the Arcadian collective assembly called the Ten Thousand. Arcadia.  
 He addressed them in a strain of animated exhortation, ad-  
 juring them to combine with Athens for the defence of the  
 liberties of Greece against Philip, and inveighing strenuously  
 against those traitors who, in Arcadia as well as in other  
 parts of Greece, sold themselves to the aggressor and  
 paralysed all resistance. He encountered however much  
 opposition from a speaker named Hieronymus, who espoused

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês affirms this at two distinct times—*Fals. Leg.* p. 415—431; *De Coronâ*, p. 313.

Stechow (*Vita Æschiniæ*, p. 1—10) brings together the little which

can be made out respecting Æschinês.

<sup>2</sup> *Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dicend. Demosth.* p. 1063; *Cicero, Orator*, c. 9, 29.

the interest of Philip in the assembly: and though he professed to bring back some flattering hopes, it is certain that neither in Arcadia, nor elsewhere in Peloponnesus, was his influence of any real efficacy.<sup>1</sup> The strongest feeling among the Arcadians was fear and dislike of Sparta, which rendered them in the main indifferent, if not favourable, to the Macedonian successes. In returning from Arcadia to Athens, Æschinês met the Arcadian Atrestidas, with the unhappy troop of Olynthian slaves following; a sight which so deeply affected the Athenian orator, that he dwelt upon it afterwards in his speech before the assembly with indignant sympathy; deploring the sad effects of Grecian dissension, and the ruin produced by Philip's combined employment of arms and corruption.

Æschinês returned probably about the middle of the summer of 347 B.C. Other envoys, sent to more distant cities, remained out longer; some indeed even until the ensuing winter. Though it appears that some envoys from other cities were induced in return to visit Athens, yet no sincere or hearty cooperation against Philip could be obtained in any part of Greece. While Philip, in the fulness of triumph, was celebrating his magnificent Olympic festival in Macedonia, the Athenians were disheartened by finding that they could expect little support from independent Greeks, and were left to act only with their own narrow synod of allies. Hence Eubulus and Æschinês became earnest partisans of peace, and Demosthenês also seems to have been driven by the general despondency into a willingness to negotiate. The two orators, though they afterwards became bitter rivals, were at this juncture not very discordant in sentiment. On the other hand, the philippising speakers at Athens held a bolder tone than ever. As Philip found his ports greatly blocked up by the Athenian cruisers, he was likely to profit by his existing ascendancy for the purpose of strengthening his naval equipments. Now there was no place so abundantly supplied as Athens, with marine stores and muniments for armed ships. Probably there were agents or speculators

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 344—439; Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 38. The conduct of Æschinês at this juncture is much the same, as described by his rival, and as admitted by himself. It was in truth among the most honourable epochs of his life.

taking measures to supply Philip with these articles, and it was against them that a decree of the assembly was now directed, adopted on the motion of a senator named Timarchus—to punish with death all who should export from Athens to Philip either arms or stores for ships of war.<sup>1</sup> This severe decree, however, was passed at the same time that the disposition towards peace, if peace were attainable, was on the increase at Athens.

Some months before the capture of Olynthus, ideas of peace had already been started, partly through the indirect overtures of Philip himself. During the summer of 348 B.C., the Eubœans tried to negotiate an accommodation with Athens; the contest in Eubœa, though we know no particulars of it, having never wholly ceased for the last year and a half. Nor does it appear that any peace was even now concluded; for Eubœa is spoken of as under the dependence of Philip during

Indirect overtures for peace between Athens and Philip even before the fall of Olynthus—the Eubœans—Phrynon &c.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 433. This decree must have been proposed by Timarchus either towards the close of Olymp. 108, 1—or towards the beginning of the following year Olymp. 108, 2; that is, not long before, or not long after, Midsummer 347 B.C. But which of these two dates is to be preferred, is a matter of controversy. Franke Prolegom. ad Æschin. cont. Timarchum, p. xxxviii.-xli.) thinks that Timarchus was senator in Olymp. 108, 1—and proposed the decree then; he supposes the oration of Æschinês to have been delivered in the beginning of Olymp. 108, 3—and that the expression (p. 11) announcing Timarchus as having been senator "the year before" πρὸς, is to be construed loosely as signifying "the year but one before."

Mr. Clinton, Boeckh, and Westermann, suppose the oration of Æschinês against Timarchus to have been delivered in Olymp. 108, 1—not in Olymp. 108, 3. On that supposition, if we take the word πρὸς in its usual sense, Timar-

chus was senator in 108, 3. Now it is certain that he did not propose the decree forbidding the export of naval stores to Philip, at a date so late as 108, 3; because the peace with Philip was concluded in Elaphebolion Olymp. 108, 2 (March 346 B.C.). But the supposition might be admissible, that Timarchus was senator in two different years—both in Olymp. 108, 1, and in Olymp. 108, 3 (not in two consecutive years). In that case, the senatorial year of Timarchus, to which Æschinês alludes (cont. Timarch. p. 11) would be Olymp. 108, 3; while the other senatorial year in which Timarchus moved the decree prohibiting export, would be Olymp. 108, 1.

Nevertheless, I agree with the views of Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 294), who thinks that the oration was delivered Olymp. 108, 3—and that Timarchus had been senator and had proposed the decree prohibiting export of stores to Philip, in the year preceding—that is, Olymp. 108, 2; at the beginning of the year — Midsummer 347 B.C.

the ensuing year.<sup>1</sup> The Eubœan envoys, however, intimated that Philip had desired them to communicate from him a wish to finish the war and conclude peace with Athens.<sup>2</sup> Though Philip had at this time conquered the larger portion of Chalkidikê, and was proceeding successfully against the remainder, it was still his interest to detach Athens from the war, if he could. Her manner of carrying on war was indeed faint and slack; yet she did him much harm at sea, and she was the only city competent to organise an extensive Grecian confederacy against him; which, though it had not yet been brought about, was at least a possible contingency under her presidency.

An Athenian of influence named Phrynon had been captured by Philip's cruisers, during the truce of the Olympic festival in 348 B.C.: after a certain detention, he procured from home the required ransom and obtained his release. On returning to Athens, he had sufficient credit to prevail on the public assembly to send another citizen along with him, as public envoy from the city to Philip; in order to aid him in getting back his ransom, which he alleged to have been wrongfully demanded from one captured during the holy truce. Though this seems a strange proceeding during mid-war,<sup>3</sup> yet the Athenian public took up the case with sympathy; Ktesiphon was named envoy, and went with Phrynon to Philip, whom they found engaged in the war against Olynthus. Being received in the most courteous manner, they not only obtained restitution of the ransom, but were completely won over by Philip. With

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348-445.

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> There is more than one singularity in the narrative given by Æschinês about Phrynon. The complaint of Phrynon implies an assumption, that the Olympic truce suspended the operations of war everywhere throughout Greece, between belligerent Greeks. But such was not the maxim recognised or acted on; so far as we know the operations of warfare. Voemel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 246), feeling this difficulty, understands the Olympic truce, here mentioned, to refer to the

Olympic festival celebrated by Philip himself in Macedonia, in the spring or summer of 347 B.C. This would remove the difficulty about the effect of the truce; for Philip of course would respect his own proclaimed truce. But it is liable to another objection; the Æschinês plainly indicates the capture of Phrynon to have been anterior to the fall of Olynthus. Besides, Æschinês would hardly use the words ἐν ταῖς Ὀλυμπιακοῖς σπονδαῖς, without any special addition, to signify the Macedonian games.

his usual good policy, he had seized the opportunity of gaining (we may properly say, of bribing, since the restoration of ransom was substantially a bribe) two powerful Athenian citizens, whom he now sent back to Athens as his pronounced partisans.

Phrynon and Ktesiphon, on their return, expatiated warmly on the generosity of Philip, and reported much about his flattering expressions towards Athens, and his reluctance to continue the war against her. The public assembly being favourably disposed, a citizen named Philokratês, who now comes before us for the first time, proposed a decree, granting to Philip leave to send a herald and envoys, if he chose, to treat for peace; which was what Philip was anxious to do, according to the allegation of Ktesiphon. The decree was passed unanimously in the assembly, but the mover Philokratês was impeached some time afterwards before the Dikastery, as for an illegal proposition, by a citizen named Lykinus. On the cause coming to trial, the Dikastery pronounced an acquittal so triumphant, that Lykinus did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages. Philokratês being so sick as to be unable to do justice to his own case, Demosthenês stood forward as his supporter, and made a long speech in his favour.<sup>1</sup>

First proposition of Philokratês—granting permission to Philip to send envoys to Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. 7; cont. Ktesiph. p. 63. Our knowledge of these events is derived almost wholly from one, or other, or both, of the two rival orators, in their speeches delivered four or five years afterwards, on the trial *De Falsâ Legatione*. Demosthenês seeks to prove that before the embassy to Macedonia, in which he and Æschinês were jointly concerned—Æschinês was eager for continued war against Philip, and only became the partisan of Philip during and after the embassy. Æschinês does not deny that he made efforts at that juncture to get up more effective war against Philip; nor is the fact at all dishonourable to him. On the other hand, he seeks to prove against

Demosthenês, that he (Demosthen.) was at that time both a partisan of peace with Philip, and a friend of Philokratês to whom he afterwards became so bitterly opposed. For this purpose Æschinês adverts to the motion of Philokratês about permitting Philip to send envoys to Athens—and the speech of Demosthenês in the Dikastery in favour of Philokratês.

It would prove nothing discreditable to Demosthenês if both these allegations were held to be correct. The motion of Philokratês was altogether indefinite, pledging Athens to nothing; and Demosthenês might well think it unreasonable to impeach a statesman for such a motion.

The motion of Philokratês determined nothing positive, and only made an opening; of which, however, it did not suit Philip's purpose to avail himself. But we see that ideas of peace had been thrown out by some persons at Athens, even during the last months of the Olynthian war, and while a body of Athenian citizens were actually assisting Olynthus against the besieging force of Philip. Presently arrived the terrible news of the fall of Olynthus, and of the captivity of the Athenian citizens in garrison there. While this great alarm (as has been already stated) gave birth to new missions for anti-Macedonian alliances, it enlisted on the side of peace all the friends of those captives whose lives were now in Philip's hands. The sorrow thus directly inflicted on many private families, together with the force of individual sympathy widely diffused among the citizens, operated powerfully upon the decisions of the public assembly. A century before, the Athenians had relinquished all their acquisitions in Bœotia, in order to recover their captives taken in the defeat of Tolmidês at Koroneia; and during the Peloponnesian war, the policy of the Spartans had been chiefly guided for three or four years by the anxiety to ensure the restoration of the captives of Sphakteria. Moreover, several Athenians of personal consequence were taken at Olynthus; among them, Eukratus and Iatroklês. Shortly after the news arrived, the relatives of these two men, presenting themselves before the assembly in the solemn guise of suppliants, deposited an olive branch on the altar hard by, and entreated that care might be had for the safety of their captive kinsmen.<sup>1</sup> This touching

<sup>1</sup> *Æschinês*, *Fals. Leg.* p. 30. c. 8. Ὑπὸ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς Ὀλυνθοῦς ἦλω, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἐγκατελήφθησαν πολιτῶν, ὧν ἦν Ἰατροκλῆς καὶ Εὐκράτος. Ὑπὲρ δὲ τούτων ἰκετηρίαν θέντες οἱ οἰκεῖοι, ἐδέοντο ὑμῶν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσασθαι, παρελθόντες δ' αὐτοῖς συνηγόρουσι Φιλοκράτης καὶ Δημοσθένης, ἀλλ' οὐκ Αἰσχίνης.

To illustrate the effect of this impressive ceremony upon the Athenian assembly, we may recall the memorable scene mentioned

by Xenophon and Diodorus (*Xen. Hell.* i. 7, 8; *Diodor.* xiii. 101) after the battle of Arginusæ, when the relatives of the warriors who had perished on board of the foundered ships, presented themselves before the assembly with shaven heads and in mourning garb. Compare also, about presentments of solemn supplication to the assembly, *Demosthenês*, *De Coronâ*, p. 262—with the note of *Dissen*; and *Æschinês contra Timarchum*, p. 9. c. 13.

appeal, echoed as it would be by the cries of so many other citizens in the like distress, called forth unanimous sympathy in the assembly. Both Philokratês and Demosthenês poke in favour of it; Demosthenês probably, as having been a strenuous advocate of the war, was the more anxious to show that he was keenly alive to so much individual suffering. It was resolved to open indirect negotiations with Philip for the release of the captives, through some of the great tragic and comic actors; who, travelling in the exercise of their profession to every city in Greece, were everywhere regarded in some sort as privileged persons. One of these, Neoptolemus,<sup>1</sup> had already availed himself of his favoured profession and liberty of transit to assist in Philip's intrigues and correspondences at Athens; another, Aristodemus, was also in good esteem with Philip, both were probably going to Macedonia to take part in the splendid Olympic festival there preparing. They were charged to make application, and take the best steps in their power, for the safety or release of the captives.<sup>2</sup>

It would appear that these actors were by no means expeditious in the performance of their mission. They probably spent some time in their professional avocations in Macedonia; and Aristodemus, not being a responsible envoy, delayed some time even after his return before he made any report. That his mission had not been wholly fruitless, however, became presently evident from the arrival of the captive Iatroklês, whom Philip had released without ransom. The Senate then summoned Aristodemus before them, inviting him to make a general report of his proceedings; which he did, first before the Senate—next before the public assembly. He affirmed that

B.C. 347.

Mission of the actor Aristodemus from the Athenians to Philip, on the subject of the captives. Favourable dispositions reported from Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês (Fals. Leg. p. 30. c. mentions only Aristodemus. at from various passages in the oration of Demosthenês (De Fals. Leg. p. 344, 346, 371, 443), we gather that the actor Neoptolemus must have been conjoined with him; perhaps also the Athenian Ktesion, though this is less certain. Demosthenês mentions Aristode-

mus again, in the speech De Coronâ (p. 232) as the first originator of the peace.

Demosthenês (De Pace, p. 58) had, even before this, denounced Neoptolemus as playing a corrupt game for the purposes of Philip at Athens. Soon after the peace, Neoptolemus sold up all his property at Athens, and went to reside in Macedonia.

Philip had entertained his propositions kindly, and that he was in the best dispositions towards Athens; desiring not only to be at peace with her, but even to be admitted as her ally. Demosthenês, then a senator, moved a vote of thanks and a wreath to Aristodemus.<sup>1</sup>

This report, as far as we can make out, appears to have been made about September or October B.C. 347. 347 B.C.; Æschinês, and the other roving commissioners sent out by Athens to raise up anti-Macedonian combinations, had returned with nothing but disheartening announcement of refusal or lukewarmness. And there occurred also about the same time in Phokis and Thermopylæ other events of grave augury to Athens, showing that the Sacred War and the contest between the Phokians and Thebans was turning—as all events had turned for the last ten years—to the farther aggrandisement of Philip.

During the preceding two years, the Phokians, no longer under the command of Phalækus in place of Phayllus, had maintained their position against Thebes—had kept possession of the Bœotian towns Orchomenus, Koroneia, and Korsia—and were still masters of Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa, as well as of the important pass of Thermopylæ adjoining.<sup>2</sup> But though on the whole successful in regard to Thebes, they had fallen into dissension among themselves. The mercenary force necessary to their defence, could only be maintained by continued appropriation of the Delphian treasures; an appropriation becoming from year to year both less lucrative and more odious. By successive spoliation of gold and silver ornaments, the temple is said to have been stripped of 10,000 talents (= about 2,300,000*l.*), all its available wealth; so that the Phokian leaders were now reduced to dig for an unauthenticated treasure, supposed (on the faith of a verse in the *Iliad*, as well as on other grounds of similarity) to lie concealed beneath its stone floor. Their search however was not only unsuccessful, but arrested, as we are told, by violent earthquakes, significant of the anger of Apollo.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Æschin. *Fals. Leg.* p. 30. c. 8. *Leg.* p. 45. c. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 68; Demosth. *Fals.* <sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56. *Leg.* p. 385—387; Æschinês, *Fals.*

As the Delphian treasure became less and less, so the means of Phalækus to pay troops and maintain ascendancy declined. While the foreign mercenaries relaxed in their obedience, his opponents in Phokis manifested increased animosity against his continued sacrilege. So greatly did these opponents increase in power, that they deposed Phalækus, elected Deinokratês with two others in his place, and instituted a strict enquiry into the antecedent appropriation of the Delphian treasure. Gross peculation was found to have been committed for the profit of individual leaders, especially one named Philon; who, on being seized and put to the torture, disclosed the names of several accomplices. These men were tried, compelled to refund, and ultimately put to death.<sup>1</sup> Phalækus however still retained his ascendancy over the mercenaries, about 8000 in number, so as to hold Thermopylæ and the places adjacent, and even presently to be re-appointed general.<sup>2</sup>

Party opposed to Phalækus in Phokis —Phalækus is deposed —he continues to hold Thermopylæ with the mercenaries.

Such intestine dispute, combined with the gradual exhaustion of the temple-funds, sensibly diminished the power of the Phokians. Yet they still remained too strong for their enemies the Thebans; who, deprived of Orchomenus and Koroneia, impoverished by military efforts of nine years, and unable to terminate the contest by their own force, resolved to invoke foreign aid. An opportunity might perhaps have been obtained for closing the war by some compromise, if it had been possible now to bring about an accommodation between Thebes and Athens; which some of the philo-Theban orators (Demosthenês seemingly among them) attempted, under the prevalent easiness about Philip.<sup>3</sup> But the adverse sentiments in both cities, especially in Thebes, were found invincible; and the Thebans, little anticipating consequences, determined to invoke the ruinous intervention of the conqueror

B.C. 347.  
The Thebans invoke the aid of Philip to put down the Phokians.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 56. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. Fals. Leg. p. 62. c. 41; Diodor. xvi. 59. Φάλαικον, πάλιν στρατηγίας ἡξιωμένον, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês cont. Ktesiph. p. 73. c. Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 231. Demosthenês, in his oration De

Coronâ, spoken many years after the facts, affirms the contingency of alliance between Athens and Thebes at this juncture, as having been much more probable than he ventures to state in the earlier speech De Falsâ Legatione.

of Olynthus. The Thessalians, already valuable allies of Philip, joined them in soliciting him to crush the Phokians and to restore the ancient Thessalian privilege of the Pylæ (or regular yearly Amphiktyonic meeting at Thermopylæ) which the Phokians had suppressed during the last years. This joint prayer for intervention was preferred under the name of the Delphian god, investing Philip with the august character of champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly to rescue the Delphian temple from its sacrilegious plunderers.

The king of Macedon, with his past conquests and his well-known spirit of aggressive enterprise, was now a sort of present Deity, ready to lend for to all the selfish ambition, or blind fear and antipathy, prevalent among the discontented fractions of the Hellenic world. While his intrigues had procured numerous partisans even in the centre of Peloponnesus—as Æschin on return from his mission, had denounced, and having yet himself enlisted in the number—was now furnished with a pious pretence, and invited by powerful cities, to penetrate into the heart of Greece, within its last line of common defence, Thermopylæ.

The application of the Thebans to Philip excited much alarm in Phokis. A Macedonian army under Parmenion did actually enter Thessaly—where we find them, three months later, besieging Halus.<sup>1</sup> Reports seem to have been spread, about September 347 B.C., that the Macedonians were about to march to Thermopylæ; upon which the Phokians took alarm, and sent envoys to Athens as well as to Sparta, entreating aid to enable them to hold the pass, and offering to deliver up the three important towns near it—Alpônus, Thronium, and Nikæa. So much alarmed the Athenians by the message, that they not only ordered Proxenus, their general at Oreus, to take immediate possession of the pass, but also passed a decree to equip fifty triremes, and to send forth their military citizens under thirty years of age, with an energy like that displayed when they checked Philip before at the same place. It appears that the application had been made by the party in Phokis opposed to Phalækus. So vehemently did the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

chief resent the proceeding, that he threw the Phokian envoys into prison on their return; refusing to admit either Proxenus or Archidamus into possession of Thermopylæ, and even dismissing without recognition the Athenian heralds, who came in their regular rounds to proclaim the solemn truce of the Eleusinian mysteries.<sup>1</sup> This proceeding on the part of Phalækus was dictated seemingly by jealousy of Athens and Sparta, and by fear that they would support the party opposed to him in Phokis. It could not have originated (as Æschinês alleges) in superior confidence and liking towards Philip; for if Phalækus had entertained such sentiments, he might have admitted the Macedonian troops at once; which he did not do until ten months later, under the greatest pressure of circumstances.

Such insulting repudiation of the aid tendered by Proxenus at Thermopylæ, combined with the distracted state of parties in Phokis, menaced Athens with a new embarrassment. Though Phalækus still held the pass, his conduct had been such as to raise doubts whether he might not treat separately with Philip. Here was another circumstance operating on Athens—besides the refusal of cooperation from other Greeks and the danger of her captives at Olynthus—to dishearten her in the prosecution of the war, and to strengthen the case of those who advocated peace. It was a circumstance the more weighty because it really

B.C. 347.

Increased embarrassment at Athens—uncertainty about Phalækus and the pass of Thermopylæ.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.* p. 46. c. 41. It is this notice of the μυστηριαῖδες σπονδαὶ which serves as indication of time for the event. The Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated in the month Boëdromion (September). These events took place in September 347 B.C. Olymp. 108, 2—the archonship of Themistoklēs at Athens. There is also a farther indication of time given by Æschinês; that the event happened before he was nominated envoy—πρίν ἐμὲ χειροτονηθῆναι πρεσβευτήν (p. 46. c. 41). This refutes the supposition of Voemel (*Proleg.* and *Demosth. De Pace*, p. 255), who refers the proceeding to the follow-

ing month Elaphebolion (March), on the ground of some other words of Æschinês, intimating “that the news reached Athens while the Athenians were deliberating about the peace.” Böhnecke too, supposes that the mysteries here alluded to are the lesser mysteries, celebrated in Anthesterion—not the greater, which belong to Boëdromion. This supposition appears to me improbable and unnecessary. We may reasonably believe that there were many discussions on the peace at Athens, before the envoys were actually nominated. Some of these debates may well have taken place in the month Boëdromion.

involved the question of safety or exposure to her own territory, through the opening of the pass of Thermopylæ. It was here that she was now under the necessity of keeping watch; being thrown on the defensive for her own security at home—not, as before, stretching out a long arm for the protection of distant possessions such as the Chersonese or distant allies such as the Olynthians. So speedily had the predictions of Demosthenês been realized, that if the Athenians refused to carry on strenuous war against Philip on *his* coast, they would bring upon themselves the grave evil of having to resist him on or near their own frontier.

The maintenance of freedom in the Hellenic world against the extra-Hellenic invader, now turned once more upon the pass of Thermopylæ; as had turned 133 years before, during the onward march of the Persian Xerxes.

The defence of Greece now turned on Thermopylæ—importance of that pass both to Philip and to Athens. To Philip, that pass was of incalculable importance. It was his only road into Greece; it could not be forced by any land-army; while at sea the Athenian fleet was stronger than his.

In spite of the general remissness of Athens in warlike undertakings, she had now twice manifested her readiness for a vigorous effort to maintain Thermopylæ against him. To become master of the position, it was necessary that he should disarm Athens by concluding peace—keep her in ignorance or delusion as to his real purposes—prevent her from conceiving alarm or sending aid to Thermopylæ—and then overawe or buy off the isolated Phokians. How ably and cunningly his diplomacy was managed for this purpose, will presently appear.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is at this juncture, in trying to make out the diplomatic transactions between Athens and Philip, from the summer of 347 to that of 346 B.C.—that we find ourselves plunged amidst the contradictory assertions of the two rival orators—Demosthenês and Æschinês; with very little of genuine historical authority to control them. In 343-342 B.C., Demosthenês impeached Æschinês for corrupt betrayal of the interest of Athens in the second of his three embassies to Philip (in 346 B.C.). The long

harangue (*De Falsâ Legatione*) still remaining, wherein his character stands embodied, enters into copious details respecting the peace with its immediate antecedents and consequents. We possess also the speech delivered by Æschinês in his own defence, and in countering the accusation of Demosthenês; a speech going over the same ground suitable to his own purpose and point of view. Lastly, we have two speeches, delivered seven years later (in 330 B.C.), of Æschinês in prosecuting Ktesiphon, a

On the other hand, to Athens, to Sparta, and to the general cause of Pan-Hellenic independence, it was of capital moment that Philip should be kept on the outside of Thermopylæ. And here Athens had more at stake than the rest; since not merely her influence abroad, but the safety of her own city and territory against invasion, was involved in the question. The Thebans had already invited the presence of Philip, himself always ready even without invitation, to come within the pass; it was the first interest, as well as the first duty, of Athens, to counterwork them, and to keep him out. With tolerable prudence, her guarantee of the pass might have been made effective; but we shall find her measures ending only in shame and disappointment, through the flagrant improvidence, and apparent corruption, of her own negotiators.

The increasing discouragement as to war, and yearning for peace, which prevailed at Athens during the summer and autumn of 347 B.C., has been already described. We may be sure that the friends of the captives taken at Olynthus would be importunate in demanding peace, because there was no other way of procuring their release; since Philip did not choose to exchange them for money, reserving them as

B.C. 347.

Motion of Philokratês in the Athenian assembly—to send envoys to Philip for peace.

Demosthenês in defending him; herein the conduct of Demosthenês as to the peace of 346 B.C. again becomes matter of controversy. All these harangues are interesting, not merely as eloquent compositions, but also from the striking conception which they impart of the living sentiments and controversy of the time. But when we try to extract from them real and authentic matter of history, they become painfully embarrassing; so glaring are the contradictions not only between the two rivals, but also between the earlier and later discourses of the same orator himself, especially Æschinês; so evident is the spirit of perversion, so unscrupulous are the manifestations of hostile feeling on both sides. We can place little

faith in the allegations of either orator against the other, except where some collateral grounds of fact or probability can be adduced in confirmation. But the allegations of each as to matters which do not make against the other, are valuable; even the misrepresentations, since we have them on both sides, will sometimes afford mutual correction: and we shall often find it practicable to detect a basis of real matter of fact which one or both may seek to pervert, but which neither can venture to set aside, or can keep wholly out of sight. It is indeed deeply to be lamented that we know little of the history except so much as it suits the one or the other of these rival orators, each animated by purposes totally at

an item in political negotiation. At length, about the month of November, the public assembly decreed that envoys should be sent to Philip to ascertain on what conditions peace could be made; ten Athenian envoys, and one from the synod of confederate allies, sitting at Athens. The mover of the decree was Philokratês, the same who had moved the previous decree permitting Philip to send envoys if he chose. Of this permission Philip had not availed himself, in spite of all that the philippisers at Athens had alleged about his anxiety for peace and alliance with the city. It suited his purpose to have the negotiations carried on in Macedonia, where he could act better upon the individual negotiators of Athens.

The decree having been passed in the assembly, ten Athenian envoys were chosen—Philokratês, Demosthenês, Æschinês, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês, Demokyllus, Kimon, Nausiklês, and Aristodemus the actor. Aglaokreon of Tenedos was selected to accompany them, as representative of the allies and the synod. Of these envoys, Ktesiphon, Phrynon, and Iatroklês had already been gained over as partisans by Philip, while in Macedonia; moreover Aristodemus was a person to whom, in his histrionic profession, the favour of Philip was more valuable than the interests of Athens. Æschinês was proposed by Nausiklês; Demosthenês, by Philokratês the mover.<sup>1</sup> Though Demosthenês had been before so earnest in advocating vigorous prosecution of the war, it does not appear that he was now adverse to the opening of negotiations. Had he been ever so adverse he would probably have failed in obtaining even a hearing in the existing temper of the public mind. He thought indeed that Athens inflicted so much damage on her enemies by ruining the Macedonian maritime commerce, that she was not under the necessity of submitting to peace on base or humiliating terms.<sup>2</sup> But still he did not oppose the overtures, nor did his opposition begin until afterwards when he saw the turn which the negotiations were taking. Nor, on the other hand, was Æschinês as yet suspected

variance with that of the historian, to make known either by direct notice or oblique allusion.

9. p. 31. c. 10. p. 34. c. 20; Argumentum ii. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 4

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 80. s.

Compare p. 369, 387, 391.

a leaning towards Philip. Both he and Demosthenês obeyed, at this moment, the impulse of opinion generally prevalent at Athens. Their subsequent discordant views and bitter rivalry grew out of the embassy itself; out of its result and the behaviour of Æschinês.

The eleven envoys were appointed to visit Philip, not with any power of concluding peace, but simply to discuss with him and ascertain on what terms peace could be had. So much is certain; though we do not possess the original decree under which they were nominated. Having sent before them a herald to obtain a safe-conduct from Philip, they left Athens about December, 347 B.C., and proceeded by sea to Oreus on the northern coast of Eubœa, where they expected to meet the returning herald. Finding that he had not yet come back, they crossed the strait at once, without waiting for him, into the Pagasæan Gulf, where Parmenio with a Macedonian army was then besieging Halus. To him they notified their arrival, and received permission to pass on, first to Pagasæ, next to Larissa. Here they met their own returning herald, under whose safeguard they pursued their journey to Pella.<sup>1</sup>

B.C. 347-346.

Journey of the envoys to Pella.

Our information respecting this (first) embassy proceeds almost wholly from Æschinês. He tells us that Demosthenês was, from the very day of setting out, intolerably troublesome both to him and his brother envoys; malignant, faithless, and watching for such matters as might be turned against them in the way of accusation afterwards; lastly, boastful, even to absurd excess, of his own powers of eloquence. In Greece, it was the usual habit to transact diplomatic business, like other political matters, publicly before the governing number—the council, if the constitution happened to be oligarchical—the general assembly, if democratical. Pursuant to this habit, the envoys were called upon to appear before Philip in his full pomp and state, and there address to him formal harangues (either by one or more of their number as they chose), setting forth the case of Athens; after which Philip would deliver his reply in the like publicity, either with his own lips or by those of a chosen minister. The Athenian envoys

Statements of Æschinês about the conduct of Demosthenês—arrangements of the envoys for speaking before Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 392.

resolved among themselves, that when introduced, each of them should address Philip, in the order of seniority; Demosthenês being the youngest of the Ten, and Æschinês next above him. Accordingly, when summoned before Philip, Ktesiphon, the oldest envoy, began with a short address; the other seven followed with equal brevity, while the stress of the business was left to Æschinês and Demosthenês.<sup>1</sup>

Harangue addressed by Æschinês to Philip about Amphipolis. Failure of Demosthenês in his speech. Æschinês recounts in abridgement to the Athenians with much satisfaction, his own elaborate harangue, establishing the right of Athens to Amphipolis, the wrong done by Philip in taking it and holding it against her, and his paramount obligation to make restitution—but touching upon no other subject whatever.<sup>2</sup> He then proceeds to state—probably with yet greater satisfaction—that Demosthenês, who followed next, becoming terrified and confused, utterly broke down, forgot his prepared speech, and was obliged to stop short in spite of courteous encouragements from Philip.<sup>3</sup> Gross failure, after full preparation, on the part of the greatest orator of ancient or modern times, appears at first hearing so incredible, that we are disposed to treat it as pure fabrication of his opponent. Yet I incline to believe that the fact was substantially as Æschinês states it; and that Demosthenês was partially divested of his oratorical powers by finding himself not only speaking before the enemy whom he had so bitterly denounced, but surrounded by all the evidences of Macedonian power, and doubtless exposed to unequivocal marks of well-earned hatred, from those Macedonians who took less pains than Philip to disguise their real feelings.<sup>4</sup>

Answer of Philip—return of the envoys. Having dismissed the envoys after their harangues and taken a short time for consideration, Philip recalled them into his presence. He then delivered his reply with his own lips, combating especially the arguments of Æschinês, and

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 15. Demosthenês himself says little or nothing about this first embassy, and nothing at all either about his own speech or that of Æschinês.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 31. c. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 32. c. 13, 14.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 32, 33.

According to that orator, with such pertinence and presence of mind, as to excite the admiration of all the envoys, Demosthenês among the rest. What Philip said, we do not learn from Æschinês; who expatiates only on the shuffling, artifice, and false pretences of Demosthenês, to conceal his failure as an orator, and to put himself on a point of advantage above his colleagues. Of these personalities it is impossible to say how much is true; and even were they true, they are scarcely matter of general history.

It was about the beginning of March when the envoys returned to Athens. Some were completely fascinated by the hospitable treatment and engaging matters of Philip,<sup>1</sup> especially when entertaining them at the banquet: with others he had come to an understanding at once more intimate and more corrupt. They brought back a letter from Philip, which was read both in the Senate and the assembly; while Demosthenês, senator of that year, not only praised them all in the Senate, but also became himself the mover of a resolution, that they should be crowned with a wreath of honour, and invited to dine next day in the prytaneium.<sup>2</sup>

We have hardly any means of appreciating the real proceedings of this embassy, or the matters treated in discussion with Philip. Æschinês tells us nothing, except the formalities of the interview, and the speeches about Amphipolis. But we shall at any rate do him no injustice, if we judge him upon his own account; which, if it does not represent what he actually did, represents what he wished to be thought to have done. His own account certainly shows a strange misconception of the actual

Review of Æschinês and his conduct, as stated by himself.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 33. c. 17, 18. The effect of the manner and behaviour of Philip upon Ktesiphon the envoy, is forcibly stated here by Æschinês.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 19; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414. This vote of thanks, and invitation to dinner, appears to have been so uniform a custom, that Demosthenês (Fals. Leg. p. 350) comments upon the withholding of the compliment, when the second embassy returned, as a disgrace without

parallel. That Demosthenês should have proposed a motion of such customary formality, is a fact of little moment any way. It rather proves that the relations of Demosthenês with his colleagues during the embassy, cannot have been so ill-tempered as Æschinês had affirmed. Demosthenês himself admits that he did not begin to suspect his colleagues until the debates at Athens after the return of this first embassy.

situation of affairs. In order to justify himself for being desirous for peace, he lays considerable stress on the losing game which Athens had been playing during the war, and on the probability of yet farther loss if she persisted. He completes the cheerless picture by adding—what was doubtless but too familiar to his Athenian audience—that Philip on his side, marching from one success to another, had raised the Macedonian kingdom to an elevation truly formidable, by the recent extinction of Olynthus. Yet under this state of comparative force between the two contending parties, *Æschinês* presents himself before Philip with a demand of exorbitant magnitude—for the cession of Amphipolis. He says not a word about anything else. He delivers an eloquent harangue to convince Philip of the incontestable right of Athens to Amphipolis, and to prove to him that he was in the wrong for taking and keeping it. He affects to think, that by this process he should induce Philip to part with a town, the most capital and unparalleled position in all his dominions; which he had now possessed for twelve years, and which placed him in communication with his new foundation Philippi and the auriferous region around it. The arguments of *Æschinês* would have been much to the purpose, in an action tried between two litigants before an impartial *Dikaster* at Athens. But here were two belligerent parties, in a given ratio of strength and position as to the future debating terms of peace. That an envoy on the part of Athens, the losing party, should now stand forward to demand from a victorious enemy the very place which formed the original cause of the war, and which had become far more valuable to Philip than when he first took it—was a pretension altogether preposterous. When *Æschinês* reproduces his eloquent speech reclaiming Amphipolis, as having been the principal necessity and most honourable achievement of his diplomatic mission, he only shows how little qualified he was to render real service to Athens in that capacity—to say nothing as yet about corruption. The Athenian people, extremely retentive of past convictions, had it deeply impressed on their mind that Amphipolis was theirs by right; and probably the first envoys to Macedonia—*Aristodemus*, *Neoptolemus*, *Ktesiphon*, *Phrynon*,<sup>1</sup> &c.—had been so cajoled by the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *Fals. Leg.* p. 344. Compare p. 371. τοὺς περὶ τὴν

courteous phrases, deceptions, and presents of Philip, that they represented him on their return as not unwilling to purchase friendship with Athens by the restoration of Amphipolis. To this delusive expectation in the Athenian mind Æschinês addressed himself, when he took credit for his earnest pleading before Philip on behalf of Athenian right to the place, as if it were the sole purpose of his mission.<sup>1</sup> We shall see him throughout, in his character of envoy, not only fostering the actual delusions of the public at Athens, but even circulating gross fictions and impostures of his own, respecting the proceedings and purposes of Philip.

It was on or about the first day of the month of Elaphebolion<sup>2</sup> (March) when the envoys reached Athens on returning from the court of Philip. They brought a letter from him couched in the most friendly terms; expressing great anxiety not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to become her ally; stating moreover that he was prepared to render her valuable service, and that he would have specified more particularly what the service would be, if he could have felt certain that he should be received as her ally.<sup>3</sup> But in spite of such amenities of language, affording an occasion

B.C. 346.

Philip offers peace on the terms of *uti possidetis*—report made by the Athenian envoys on their return.

εἰρήνης πρέσβεις πέμπειν ὡς Φίλιππον ἐπεισθητε ὑπ' Ἀριστοδήμου καὶ Νεοπολέμου καὶ Κτησιφώντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλόντων οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν ὑγιές, &c.

<sup>1</sup> There is great contradiction between the two orators, Æschinês and Demosthenês, as to this speech of Æschinês before Philip respecting Amphipolis. Demosthenês represents Æschinês as having said in this report to the people on his return, "I (Æschinês) said nothing about Amphipolis, in order that I might leave that subject fresh for Demosthenês, &c.

Compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. . 421; Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 33, 34, c. 18, 19, 21.

As to this particular matter of fact, I incline to believe Æschinês rather than his rival. He probably

did make an eloquent speech about Amphipolis before Philip.

<sup>2</sup> The eighth day of Elaphebolion fell some little time after their arrival, so that possibly they may have even reached Athens on the last days of the month Anthestersion (Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24). The reader will understand that the Grecian lunar months do not correspond precisely, but only approximatively, with ours.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 353, 354. . . . . ὁ γὰρ εἰς τὴν προτέραν γράψας ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν ἡνέκα-μεν ἡμεῖς, ὅτι "ἐγγράφον τ' ἂν καὶ διαβρίχηδον, ἡνίκα ὑμᾶς εὖ ποιήσω, εἰ εὖ ᾔδειν καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν μοι γενησομένην, &c. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 86. Æschinês alludes to this letter, Fals. Leg. p. 34. c. 21.

for his partisans in the assembly—Æschinês, Philokratês Ktesiphon, Phrynon, Iatroklês, and others—to expatiate upon his excellent dispositions—Philip would grant no better terms of peace than that each party should retain what they already possessed. Pursuant to this general principle, the Chersonesus was assured to Athens, of which Æschinês appears to have made some boast.<sup>1</sup> Moreover at the moment when the envoys were quitting Pella to return home, Philip was also leaving it at the head of his army on an expedition against Kersobleptês in Thrace. He gave a special pledge to the envoys that he would not attack the Chersonese until the Athenians should have had an opportunity of debating, accepting, or rejecting the propositions of peace. His envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, received orders to visit Athens with little delay and a Macedonian herald accompanied the Athenian envoy on their return.<sup>2</sup>

Having ascertained on what terms peace could be had  
 B.C. 346. the envoys were competent to advise the Athenian people, and prepare them for a definite conclusion, as soon as this Macedonian mission should arrive. They first gave an account of their proceedings to the public assembly. Ktesiphon, the oldest, who spoke first, expatiated on the graceful presence and manners of Philip, as well as upon the charm of his company in wine drinking.<sup>3</sup> Æschinês dwelt upon his powerful and pertinent oratory;—after which he recounted the principal occurrences of the journey, and the debate with Philip, intimating that in the previous understanding of the envoys among themselves, the duty of speaking about Amphipolis had been confided to Demosthenês, in case any point should have been omitted by the previous speakers. Demosthenês then made his own statement, in language (according to Æschinês) censorious and even insulting towards his colleagues; especially affirming that Æschinês in his vanity chose to preoccupy at the best points in his own speech, leaving none open for

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365.

(Kersobleptês) ἤδη στρατεία, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 34.

26; Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. p. 63. c. 23. παρηγγέλλετο δ' ἐπ' αὐτὸν

20. τῆς ἐν τοῖς πότοις ἐπιδεινότητος —συμπιεῖν δαινὸς ἦν (c. 21).

any one else.<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês next proceeded to move various decrees; one, to greet by libation the herald who had accompanied them from Philip—and the Macedonian envoys who were expected; another, providing that the prytaneis should convene a special assembly on the eighth day of Elaphebolion (a day sacred to Æsculapius, on which generally no public business was ever transacted), in order that if the envoys from Macedonia had then arrived, the people might discuss without delay their political relations with Philip; a third, to commend the behaviour of the Athenian envoys (his colleagues and himself), and to invite them to dinner in the prytaneium. Demosthenês farther moved in the Senate, that when Philip's envoys came, they should be accommodated with seats of honour at the Dionysiac festival.<sup>2</sup>

Presently these Macedonian envoys—Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus—arrived: yet not early enough to allow the full debate to take place on the assembly of the eighth of Elaphebolion. Accordingly (as it would seem, in that very assembly), Demosthenês proposed and carried a fresh decree, fixing two later days for the special assemblies to discuss peace and alliance with Macedonia. The days named were, the eighteenth and nineteenth days of the current month Elaphebolion

Arrival of the Macedonian envoys at Athens—days fixed for discussing the peace.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35 c. 21; Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 421. Yet Æschinês, when describing the same facts in his oration against Ktesiphon (p. 62. c. 23), simply says that Demosthenês gave to the assembly an account of the proceedings of the first embassy, similar to that given by the other envoys—ταῦτα τοῖς ἄλλοις πρέσβεσιν ἀπήγγειλε, &c.

The point noticed in the text (that Demosthenês charged Æschinês with reluctance to let any one else have anything to say) is one which appears both in Æschinês and Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat., and may therefore in the main be regarded as having really occurred. But probably the statement made by Demosthenês to the people as to the proceedings of the embassy,

was substantially the same as that of his colleagues. For though the later oration of Æschinês is, in itself, less trustworthy evidence than the earlier—yet when we find two different statements of Æschinês respecting Demosthenês, we may reasonably presume that the one which is *least unfavourable* is the *most credible* of the two.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 34, 35, 42. c. 20, 21, 34; Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62, 63. c. 23, 24. In the first of the two speeches, Æschinês makes no mention of the decree proposed by Demosthenês relative to the assembly on the eighth of Elaphebolion. He mentions it in the speech against Ktesiphon, with considerable specification.

(March); immediately after the Dionysiac festival and the assembly in the temple of Dionysus which followed upon it.<sup>1</sup> At the same time Demosthenês showed great personal civility to the Macedonian envoys, inviting them to a splendid entertainment, and not only conducting them to their place of honour at the Dionysiac festival, but also providing for them comfortable seats and cushions.<sup>2</sup>

Besides the public assembly held by the Athenians themselves, to receive report from their ten envoys returned out of Macedonia, the synod of Athenian confederates was also assembled, to hear the report of Aglaokreon, who had gone as their representative along with the Ten. This synod agreed to a resolution, important in reference to the approaching debate in the Athenian assembly yet unfortunately nowhere given to us entire, but only in partial and indirect notice from the two rival orators. It has been already mentioned, that since the capture of Olynthus, the Athenians had sent forth envoys throughout a large portion of Greece, urging the various cities to unite with them either in conjoint war against Philip, or in conjoint peace to obtain some mutual guarantee against his farther encroachments. Of these missions, the greater number had altogether failed, demonstrating the hopelessness of the Athenian project. But some had been so far successful, that deputies, more or fewer, were actually present in Athens, pursuant to the invitation: while a certain number were still absent and expected to return—the same individuals having perhaps been sent to different places at some distance from each other. The resolution of the synod (noway binding upon the Athenian people, but merely commendatory) was adapted to this state of affairs, and to the dispositions recently manifested at Athens towards conjoint action with other Greeks against Philip. The synod advised, that immediately on the return of the envoys

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 36. c. 22. ἕτερον ψήφισμα, Æsch. adv. Ktesiph. p. 63. c. 24. This last decree, fixing the two special days of the month, could scarcely have been proposed until after Philip's envoys had actually reached Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c.

34; adv. Ktesiphont. p. 62. c. 2. Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 414; 1. Coronâ, p. 234. This courtesy and politeness towards the Macedonian envoys is admitted by Demosthenes himself. It was not a circumstance of which he had any reason to be ashamed.

ill absent on mission (when probably all such Greeks, as were willing even to talk over the proposition, would send their deputies also), the Athenian prytaneis should convene the public assemblies, according to the laws, for the purpose of debating and deciding the question of peace. Whatever decision might be here taken, the synod adopted it beforehand as their own. They farther recommended that an article should be annexed, reserving an interval of three months for any Grecian city not a party to the peace, to declare its adhesion, to inscribe its name on the column of record, and to be included under the same conditions as the rest. Apparently this resolution of the synod was adopted before the arrival of the Macedonian deputies in Athens, and before the last-mentioned decree proposed by Demosthenês in the public assembly; which decree, fixing ten days (the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion) for decision on the question of peace and alliance with Philip, coincided in part with the resolution of the synod.<sup>1</sup>

I insert in the text what appears to me the probable truth about the resolution of the confederate synod. The point is obscure, and has been differently viewed by different commentators.

Demosthenês affirms, in his earlier speech (De Fals. Leg. p. 346), that Æschinês held disgraceful language in his speech before the public assembly on the 19th Elaphebolion to the effect that Athens ought to fight for herself alone, and to take no thought for any other Greeks (except such as had assisted her); and that, too, in the presence and hearing of those envoys from other Grecian cities, whom the Athenians had sent for at the instigation of Æschinês himself. The presence of these envoys in the assembly, he implied, is not the main charge, but a collateral aggravation; nevertheless, Æschinês (as is often the case throughout his defence) bestows nearly all his care upon the aggravation, taking comparatively little notice of the main charge. He asserts with great emphasis

(Fals. Leg. p. 35), that the envoys sent out from Athens on mission had *not returned*, and that there were *no envoys present* from any Grecian cities.

It seems to me reasonable here to believe the assertion of Demosthenês, that there *were* envoys from other Grecian cities present: although he himself in his later oration (De Corona, p. 232, 233) speaks as if such were not the fact, as if all the Greeks had been long found out as recreants in the cause of liberty, and as if no envoys from Athens were then absent on mission. I accept the *positive* assertion of Æschinês as true—that there were Athenian envoys then absent on mission, who might possibly, on their return, bring in with them deputies from other Greeks; but I do not admit his *negative* assertion—that no Athenian envoys had returned from their mission, and that no deputies had come in from other Greeks. That among many Athenian envoys sent out, *all* should fail—appears

Accordingly, after the great Dionysiac festival, the two prescribed assemblies were held—on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion. The three ambassadors from Philip—Parmenio, Antipater, and Eurylochus—were present both at the festival and the assemblies.<sup>1</sup> The general question of the relations between Athens and Philip being here submitted for discussion, the resolution of the confederate synod was at the same time communicated. Of this resolution the most significant article was, that the synod accepted beforehand the decree of the Athenian assembly

B.C. 346.

(March.)

Assemblies held to discuss the peace, in presence of the Macedonian envoys—resolution of the synod communicated—factitious importance

to me very improbable.

If we follow the argument of Æschinês (in the speech *De Fals. Leg.*), we shall see that it is quite enough if we suppose *some* of the envoys sent out on mission, and not *all* of them, to be absent. To prove this fact, he adduces (p. 35, 36) the resolution of the confederate synod, alluding to the absent envoys, and recommending a certain course to be taken after their return. This does not necessarily imply that *all* were absent. Stechow remarks justly, that some of the envoys would necessarily be out a long time, having to visit more than one city, and perhaps cities distant from each other (*Vita Æschinîs*, p. 41).

I also accept what Æschinês says about the resolution of the confederate synod, as being substantially true. About the actual import of this resolution, he is consistent with himself, both in the earlier and in the later oration. Winiewski (*Comment. Historic. in Demosth. De Coronâ*, p. 74—77) and Westermann (*De Litibus quas Demosthenes oravit ipse*, p. 38—42) affirm, I think without reason, that the import of this resolution is differently represented by Æschinês in the earlier and in the later orations. What is really different in the two orations,

is the way in which Æschinês perverts the import of the resolution to inculcate Demosthenês; affirming in the later oration, that Athens had waited for the return of her envoys on mission, she might have made peace with Philip jointly with a large body of Grecian allies, and that it was Demosthenês who hindered her from doing this, by hurrying on the discussions about the peace (*Æsch. adv. Ktesiph.* p. 61—63), &c. Westermann thinks that the synod would not take upon them to prescribe how many assemblies the Athenians should convene for the purpose of debating about peace. But it seems to have been a common practice with the Athenians, about peace or other special and important matters, to convene two assemblies on two days immediately succeeding; all that the synod here recommended was, that the Athenians should follow the usual custom—προγράψαι τοὺς πρῶτα ἐκκλησίας δύο κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. That two assemblies, neither more nor more, should be convened for the purpose, was a point of material importance; except that it indicated a determination to decide the question at once—*désespérer*.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês *adv. Ktesiph.* p. 61.

whatever that might be; the other articles were recommendations, doubtless heard with respect, and constituting a theme for speakers to insist on, yet carrying no positive authority. But in the pleadings of the two rival orators some years afterwards (from which alone we know the facts), the entire resolution of the synod appears invested with a factitious importance; because each of them had an interest in professing to have supported it—each accuses the other of having opposed it; both wished to disconnect themselves from Philokratês, then a disgraced exile, and from the peace moved by him, which had become discredited. It was Philokratês who stood forward in the assembly as the prominent mover of peace and alliance with Philip. His motion did not embrace either of the recommendations of the synod, respecting absent envoys, and interval to be left for adhesions from other Greeks; nor did he confine himself, as the synod had done, to the proposition of peace with Philip. He proposed that not only peace, but alliance, should be concluded between the Athenians and Philip: who had expressed by letter his great anxiety both for one and for the other. He included in his proposition Philip with all his allies on one side—and Athens with all her allies on the other; making special exception, however, of two among the allies of Athens—the Phokians—and the town of Halus near the Pagasæan Gulf, recently under siege by Parmenio.<sup>1</sup>

attached to it afterwards by the two orators.

Philokratês moves to conclude peace and alliance with Philip. He proposes to exclude the Phokians specially.

What part Æschinês and Demosthenês took in reference to this motion, it is not easy to determine. In their speeches delivered three years afterwards, both denounce Philokratês; each accuses the other of having supported him; each affirms himself to have advocated the recommendations of the synod. The contradictions between the two, and between Æschinês in his earlier and Æschinês in his later speech, are here very glaring. Thus, Demosthenês accuses his rival of having, on the 18th of the month or on the first of the

Part taken by Æschinês and Demosthenês—in reference to motion. Contradictions between them.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 391. τῇ τε γὰρ εἰρήνῃ οὐχὶ δυνηθέντων ὡς ἐπεχείρησαν οὗτοι, "πλὴν Ἀλέων καὶ Φωκέων," γράψαι—ἀλλ' ἀναγκασ-

θέντος ὑπ' ὁμῶν τοῦ Φιλοκράτους ταῦτα μὲν ἀπαλείψαι, γράψαι δ' ἀντικρὺς ἂν Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίων συμμάχους," &c.

two assemblies, delivered a speech strongly opposed to Philokratês;<sup>1</sup> but of having changed his politics during the night, and spoken on the 19th in support of the latter so warmly, as to convert the hearers when they were previously disposed the other way. Æschinês altogether denies such sudden change of opinion; alleging that he made but one speech, and that in favour of the recommendation of the synod; and averring moreover that to speak on the second assembly-day was impossible, since that day was exclusively consecrated to putting questions and voting, so that no oratory was allowed.<sup>2</sup> Yet Æschinês, though in his earlier harangue (*De Fals. Leg.*) he insists so strenuously on this impossibility of speaking on the 19th—in his later harangue (against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenês of having spoken at great length on that very day the 19th, and of having thereby altered the temper of the assembly.<sup>3</sup>

In spite, however, of the discredit thus thrown by Æschinês upon his own denial, I do not believe the sudden change of speech in the assembly ascribed to him by Demosthenês. It is too unexplained, and in itself too improbable to be credited on the mere assertion of a rival. But I think it certain that neither he, nor Demosthenês, could have advocated the recommendations of the synod, though both profess to have done so—if we are to believe the statement of Æschinês (we have no statement from Demosthenês) as to the tenor of those recommendations. For the synod (according to Æschinês) had recommended to await the return of the absent envoys before the question of peace was debated. Now this proposition was impracticable under the circumstances; since it amounted to nothing less than an indefinite postponement of the question. But the Macedonian envoys Antipater and Parmenio were now in Athens, and actually present in the assembly; having come, by special invitation, for the purpose either of concluding peace or of breaking off the negotiation; as Philip had agreed (as Æschinês<sup>4</sup> himself states) to refrain from all attack on the Chersonese, while the Athenians were debating about peace. Under these conditions, it was imperatively necessary to give some decisive and immediate answer to the Macedonian envoys. To tell them—"We can say nothing positive at present; you must wait un-

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. *Fals. Leg.* p. 345, 346.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês *adv. Ktesiph.* p. 63.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.* p. 36.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.* p. 39.

our absent envoys return, and until we ascertain how many Greeks we can get into our alliance"—would have been not only in itself preposterous, but would have been construed by able men like Antipater and Parmenio as a mere dilatory manoeuvre for breaking off the peace altogether. Neither Demosthenês nor Æschinês can have really supported such a proposition, whatever both may pretend three years afterwards. For at that time of the actual discussion, not only Æschinês, himself, but the general public of Athens, were strongly anxious for peace; while Demosthenês, though less anxious, was favourable to it.<sup>1</sup> Neither of them was

<sup>1</sup> From the considerations here stated, we can appreciate the charges of Æschinês against Demosthenês, even on his own showing; though the precise course of either is not very clear.

He accuses Demosthenês of having accused himself to Philip (adv. Ktes. p. 63, 64); a charge utterly futile and incredible, refuted by the whole conduct of Demosthenês, both before and after. Whether Demosthenês received bribes from Parpalus—or from the Persian court—will be matter of future inquiry. But the allegation that he had been bribed by Philip is absurd. Æschinês himself confesses that it was quite at variance with the received opinion at Athens (adv. Ktes. p. 62. c. 22).

He accuses Demosthenês of having, under the influence of these bribes, opposed and frustrated the recommendation of the moderate synod—of having hurried in the debate about peace at once—and of having thus prevented Athens from waiting for the return of her absent envoys, which would have enabled her to make peace in conjunction with a powerful body of cooperating Greeks. His charge is advanced by Æschinês, first in the speech *De Fals. Leg.* p. 36—next, with greater length and emphasis, in the later

speech, adv. Ktesiph. p. 63, 64. From what has been said in the text, it will be seen that such indefinite postponement, when Antipater and Parmenio were present in Athens by invitation, was altogether impossible, without breaking off the negotiation. Not to mention, that Æschinês himself affirms, in the strongest language, the ascertained impossibility of prevailing upon any other Greeks to join Athens, and complains bitterly of their backward dispositions (*Fals. Leg.* p. 38. c. 25). In this point Demosthenês perfectly concurs with him (*De Coronâ*, p. 231, 232). So that even if postponement could have been had, it would have been productive of no benefit, nor of any increase of force, to Athens, since the Greeks were not inclined to cooperate with her.

The charge of Æschinês against Demosthenês is thus untenable, and suggests its own refutation, even from the mouth of the accuser himself. Demosthenês indeed replies to it in a different manner. When Æschinês says—"You hurried on the discussion about the peace, without allowing Athens to await the return of her envoys, then absent on mission"—Demosthenês answers—"There were no Athenian envoys then absent on mission.

at all disposed to frustrate the negotiations by insidious delay; nor, if they had been so disposed, would the Athenian public have tolerated the attempt.

On the best conclusion which I can form, Demosthenês supported the motion of Philokratês (enacting both peace and alliance with Philip), except only that special clause which excluded both the Phokians and the town of Halus, and which was ultimately negatived by the assembly.<sup>1</sup> That *Æschinês* supported the same motion entire and in a still more unqualified manner, we may infer from his remarkable admission in the oration against Timarchus<sup>2</sup> (delivered in the year after the peace, and three years before his own trial), wherein he acknowledges himself as joint author of the peace along with Philokratês, and avows his hearty approbation of the conduct and language of Philip, even after the ruin of the Phokians. Eubulus the friend and partisan of *Æschinês*, told the Athenians

All the Greeks had been long ago detected as incurably apathetic" (De Coronâ, p. 233). This is a slashing and decisive reply, which it might perhaps be safe for Demosthenês to hazard, at an interval of thirteen years after the events. But it is fortunate that another answer can be provided; for I conceive the assertion to be neither correct in point of fact, nor consistent with the statements of Demosthenês himself in the speech de Falsâ Legatione.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 391—430.

*Æschinês* affirms strongly, in his later oration against Ktesiphon (p. 63), that Demosthenês warmly advocated the motion of Philokratês for alliance as well as peace with Philip. He professes to give the precise phrase used by Demosthenês—which he censures as an inelegant phrase—οὐ δεῖν ἀπορρῆξαι τῆς εἰρήνης τὴν συμμαχίαν, &c. He adds that Demosthenês called up the Macedonian ambassador Antipater to the rostrum, put a

question to him, and obtained an answer concerted beforehand. How much of this is true, I cannot say. The version given by *Æschinês* in his later speech, is, as usual, different from that in his earlier.

The accusation against Demosthenês, of corrupt collusion with Antipater, is incredible and absurd.

<sup>2</sup> *Æschin.* adv. Timarch. p. 25. c. 34. παρεμβάλλων (*Demosthenês*) τὰς ἐμὰς κατηγορίας, καὶ φέγων τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν δ' ἐμοῦ καὶ Φιλοκράτους γεγενημένην, ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀπαντήσεσθαι ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον ἀπολογησόμενον, ὅταν τὰς τῆς πρεσβείας εὐθύναι διδῶ, &c. . . . Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφρομένην ἐπαινοῦ, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 43 φῆσας (*Eubulus*) καταβαίνειν εἰς Πειραιᾶ δεῖν ᾗδ' ἔχειν καὶ χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν καὶ τὰ θεωρικά στρατιωτικὰ ποιεῖν—ἢ χειροτονεῖν ἃ συνέπει μὲν οὕτως (*Æschinês*) ἔγραψε δ' ὁ βέλυστος Φιλοκράτης.

he plain alternative: "You must either march forthwith to Peiræus, serve on shipboard, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theoric Fund to military purposes—or else you must vote the terms of peace moved by Philokratês." Our inference respecting the conduct of Æschinês is strengthened by what is here affirmed respecting Eubulus. Demosthenês had been vainly urging upon his countrymen, for the last five years, at a time when Philip was less formidable, the real adoption of these energetic measures: Eubulus his opponent now holds them out *in terrorem*, as an arduous and intolerable necessity, constraining the people to vote for the terms of peace proposed. And however painful it might be to acquiesce in the *statu quo*, which recognised Philip as master of Amphipolis and of so many other possessions once belonging to Athens—I do not believe that even Demosthenês, at the time when the peace was actually under debate, would put the conclusion of it to hazard, by denouncing the shame of such unavoidable session, though he professes three years afterwards to have vehemently opposed it.<sup>1</sup>

I suspect therefore that the terms of peace proposed by Philokratês met with unqualified support from one of our two rival orators, and with only partial opposition to one special clause, from the other. However this may be, the proposition passed, with no other modification (so far as we know) except the omission of that clause which specially excepted Halus and the Phokians. Philokratês provided—that all the possessions actually in the hands of each of the belligerent parties, should remain to each, without disturbance from the other:<sup>2</sup> that on these principles, there should be both peace and alliance between Athens with all her allies on the one side, and Philip with all his allies on the other. These were the only parties

Motion of Philokratês carried in the assembly, for peace and alliance with Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 385.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81–83. Demosthenês in one passage (Fals. Leg. p. 385) speaks as if it were a part of the Athenian oath—that they would oppose and treat as enemies all who should try to save from Philip and to restore to Athens the places now recognised as Philip's pos-

sessions for the future. Though Vœmel (Proleg. ad Demosth. De Pace, p. 265) and Böhnecke (p. 303) insert these words as a part of the actual formula, I doubt whether they are anything more than a constructive expansion, given by Demosthenês himself, of the import of the formula.

included in the treaty. Nothing was said about other Greeks, not allies either of Philip or of Athens.<sup>1</sup> Nor was any special mention made about Kersobleptês.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the decree of peace and alliance, enacted on B.C. 346. the second of the two assembly-days—the ninth (March.)<sup>3</sup>teenth of the month Elaphebolion. Of course—without the fault of any one—it was all to the advantage of Philip. He was in the superior position; and it sanctioned his retention of all his conquests. For Athens, the inferior party, the benefit to be expected was, that she would prevent these conquests from being yet farther multiplied and protect herself against being driven from bad to worse.

But it presently appeared that even thus much was not realized. On the twenty-fifth day of the same month<sup>3</sup> (six days after the previous assembly), a fresh assembly was held, for the purpose of providing ratification by solemn oath for the treaty which had been just decreed. It was now moved and enacted, that the same ten citizens who had been before accredited to Philip, should again be sent to Macedonia for the purpose of receiving the oaths from him and his allies.<sup>4</sup> Next, it was resolved

<sup>1</sup> This fact we learn from the subsequent discussions about *amending* the peace, mentioned in Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26.

<sup>3</sup> This date is preserved by Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 64. c. 27. ἔχτη φθίνοντος τοῦ Ἐλαφηβολιῶνος μηνός, &c. In the earlier oration (De Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29) Æschinês states that Demosthenês was among the Proedri or presiding senators of a public assembly held ἐβδόμη φθίνοντος—the day before. It is possible that there might have been two public assemblies held, on two successive days (the 23rd and 24th, or the 24th and 25th, according as the month Elaphebolion happened in that year to have 30 days or 29 days), and that Demosthenês may have been among the Proedri in both. But the trans-

action described (in the oration against Ktesiphon) as having happened on the later of the two days—must have preceded that which is mentioned (in the Oration I Fals. Leg.) as having happened on the earlier of the two days; or at least cannot have followed it; so that there seems to be an inaccuracy in one or in the other. The word ἔχτη, in the oration against Ktesiphon, and ἐβδόμη in the speech on the False Legation, are both correct, the transaction mentioned in the one cannot be reconciled chronologically with those narrated in the other. Various conjectural alterations have been proposed. See Vömel, Prolegg. Demosth. Orat. De Pace, p. 25. Böhmcke, Forschungen, p. 399.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 39. ἥ δὲ ἡμῶν χειροτονημένων εἰς τοὺς ῥήτους, οὕτω δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ τῷ

that the Athenians, together with the deputies of their allies then present in Athens, should take the oath forthwith, in the presence of Philip's envoys.

But now arose the critical question, Who were to be included as allies of Athens? Were the Phokians and Kersobleptês to be included? The one and the other represented those two capital positions — Thermopylæ and the Hellespont — which Philip was sure to covet, and which it most behoved Athens to ensure against him. The assembly, by its recent vote, had struck out the special exclusion of the Phokians proposed by Philokratês, thus by implication admitting them as allies along with the rest. They were in truth allies of old standing and valuable; they had probably envoys present in Athens, but no deputies sitting in the synod. Nor had Kersobleptês any such deputy in that body; but a citizen of Lampsakus, named Kritobulus, claimed on this occasion to act for him, and to take the oaths in his name.

As to the manner of dealing with Kersobleptês, Æschinês tells us two stories (one in the earlier oration, the other in the later) quite different from each other; and agreeing only in this — that in both Demosthenês is described as one of the presiding magistrates of the public assembly, and as having done all that he could to prevent the envoy of Kersobleptês from being admitted to take the oaths as an ally of Athens. Amidst such discrepancies, to state in detail what passed is impossible. But it seems clear — both from Æschinês (in his earliest speech) and Demosthenês — first, that the envoy from Kersobleptês, not having a seat in the confederate synod, but presenting himself and claiming to be sworn as an ally of Athens, found his claim disputed; secondly, that upon this dispute arising, the question was submitted to the vote of the public assembly, who decided that Kerso-

Question, Who were to be received as allies of Athens? — about the Phokians and Kersobleptês.

The envoy of Kersobleptês is admitted, both by the Athenian assembly and by the Macedonian envoys.

ὕστεραν πρεσβειαν, ἐκκλησία γίνε-  
ται, &c.

This ἐκκλησία seems to be the same as that which is named by Æschinês in the speech against Ktesiphon, as having been held on the 25th Elaphebolion.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 397.  
καίτοι δύο χρησιμωτέρους τόπους τῆς  
οἰκουμένης οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐπιδείξει τῇ  
πόλει, κατὰ μὲν γῆν, Πυλῶν — ἐκ θα-  
λάττης δὲ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου ἃ συναμ-  
φότερα οὗτοι πεπράκασιν αἰσχροῦς καὶ  
καθ' ὁμῶν ἐγκχευρίχασι Φιλίππῳ.

bleptês was an ally, and should be admitted to take the oath as such.<sup>1</sup>

Antipater and Parmenio, on the part of Philip, did not refuse to recognise Kersobleptês as an ally of Athens, and to receive his oath. But in regard to the Phokians, they announced a determination distinctly opposite. They gave notice, at or after the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, that Philip positively refused to admit the Phokians as parties to the convention.

This determination, formally announced by Antipater at Athens, must probably have been made known by Philip himself to Philokratês and Æschinês when on mission in Macedonia. Hence Philokratês, in his motion about the terms of peace had proposed that the Phokians and Halus should be specially excluded (as I have already related). Now, however, when the Athenian assembly, by expressly repudiating such exclusion, had determined that the Phokians should be received as parties, while the envoys of Philip were not less express in rejecting them—the leaders of the peace, Æschinês and Philokratês, were in great embarrassment. They had no other way of surmounting the difficulty, except by holding out mendacious promises and unauthorised assurances of future intention in the name of Philip. Accordingly, they confidently announced that the king of Macedon, though precluded by his relations with the Thebans and Thessalians (necessary to him while he remained at war with Athens) from openly receiving the Phokians as allies, was nevertheless in his

<sup>1</sup> Compare Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 39. c. 26, with Æschinês cont. Ktesiphont. p. 64. c. 27.

Franke (Proleg. ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 30, 31) has some severe comments on the discrepancy between the two statements.

That the question was put, and affirmed by vote, to admit Kersobleptês, appears from the statement of Æschinês in the speech De Fals. Leg. τὸ ψήφισμα ἐψηφισθῆναι—ἐψηφισθῆναι δὲ τοῦ ἐγγύου. Compare Demosth. De Fals. Leg. p. 398, and

Demosthen. Philipp. iv. p. 133.

Philip, in his letter some year afterwards to the Athenians, affirmed that Kersobleptês wished to be admitted to take the oaths, but was excluded by the Athenian generals, who declared him to be an enemy of Athens (Epist. Phil. ap. Demosth. p. 160). If it be true that the generals tried to exclude him, their exclusion must have been overruled by the vote of the assembly.

heart decidedly adverse to the Thebans; and that, if his hands were once set free by concluding peace with Athens, he would interfere in the quarrel just in the manner that the Athenians would desire; that he would uphold the Phokians, put down the insolence of Thebes, and even break up the integrity of the city—restoring also the autonomy of Thespiæ, Plataea and the other Bœotian towns, now in Theban dependence. The general assurances—previously circulated by Aristodemus, Ktesiphon, and others—of Philip's anxiety to win favourable opinions from the Athenians—were now still farther magnified into a supposed community of antipathy against Thebes; and even into a disposition to compensate Athens for the loss of Amphipolis, by making her complete mistress of Eubœa as well as by recovering for her Orôpus.

By such glowing fabrications and falsehoods, confidently asseverated, Philokratês, Æschinês, and the other partisans of Philip present, completely eluded the assembly; and induced them, not indeed to decree the special exclusion of the Phokians, as Philokratês had at first proposed—but to swear the convention with Antipater and Parmenio without the Phokians.<sup>1</sup> These latter were thus shut out in fact, though by the

The Phokians are tacitly excluded—the Athenians and their allies swear to the peace without them.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês, Fals. Leg. p. 444. ταῦθεν οἱ μὲν παρ' ἐκείνου εὐσβεῖς προὔλεγον ὑμῖν ὅτι Φωκέας οὐ προσδέχεται Φίλιππος συμμάχους, οὗτοι δ' ἐδεχόμενοι τοιαῦτ' ἐδημηγόρουν, ὡς φανερώς μὲν οὐχὶ κλῶς ἔχει τῷ Φιλίππῳ προσδεῖσθαι τοὺς Φωκέας συμμάχους, διὰ τοὺς Θηβαίους, ἀνδρὲς γένηται τῶν πραγμάτων κύριος καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης τύχη, ἅπερ ἂν συνθέσθαι νῦν βιώσαιμεν αὐτόν, ταῦτα ποιήσειτε. Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν εἰρήνην αὐταῖς ταῖς ἐλπίσι καὶ ταῖς ταγwartais εὐρόντο παρ' ὑμῶν νεύει Φωκέων.

Ibid. p. 409. Εἰ δὲ πάντα τὰνανατοῦτων καὶ πολλὰ καὶ φιλόανθρωπα πόντες Φίλιππον, φιλεῖν τὴν πόλιν, σκέας σώσειν, Θηβαίους παύσειν τῆς πρῶτης, ἐπὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις μετίζονα ἡ

κατ' Ἀμφίπολιν εὖ ποιήσειν ὑμᾶς, εἰάν τύχη τῆς εἰρήνης, Εὐβοίαν, Ὀρωπὸν ἀποδώσειν—εἰ ταῦτ' εἰπόντες καὶ ὑποσχόμενοι πάντ' ἐξηπατήχασιν καὶ πεφαναχίχασιν, &c.

Compare also, p. 346, 388, 391, about false promises under which the Athenians were induced to consent to the peace—τῶν ὑποσχέσεων, ἐφ' αἷς εὐρίσχετο (Philip) τὴν εἰρήνην. The same false promises put forward before the peace and determining the Athenians to conclude it, are also noticed by Demosthenês in the second Philippic (p. 69), τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ' αἷς τῆς εἰρήνης ἔτυχεν (Philip) — p. 73. τοὺς ἐνεγκόντας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, ἐφ' αἷς ἐπεισέθητε ποιήσασθαι τὴν εἰρήνην. This second Philippic is one year earlier in date than the oration de Falsâ Legatione, and is

general words of the peace, Athens had recognised the right to be included. Their deputies were probably presented to be admitted, and were refused by Antipater without any peremptory protest on the part of Athens.

This tissue, not of mere exaggerations, but of impudent and monstrous falsehood, respecting the purpose of Philip—will be seen to continue until he has carried his point of penetrating within the pass of Thermopylæ, and even afterwards. We can hardly wonder that the people believed it, who proclaimed and guaranteed to them by Philokratês, Æschinês, and the other envoys, who had been sent into Macedonia for the express purpose of examining on the spot and reporting, and whose assurance was the natural authority for the people to rely upon. In this case, the deceptions found easier credence and welcome, because they were in complete harmony with the wishes and hopes of Athens, and with the prevalent thirst for peace. To betray allies like the Phokians appeared of little consequence, when once it became a settled conviction that the Phokians themselves would be no losers by it. But this plea, though sufficient as a tolerable excuse for the Athenian people, will not serve for a statesman like Demosthenês; who, on the occasion (as far as we can make out even from his own language), did not enter any emphatic protest against the tacit omission of the Phokians, though he had opposed the clause (in the motion of Philokratês) which formally omitted them by name. Three months afterwards, when the ruin of the isolated Phokians was about to be consummated: as a fact, we shall find Demosthenês earnest in warning and denunciation; but there is reason to presume that his opposition<sup>1</sup> was at best only faint, when the positive refusal

better authority than that oration, not merely on account of its earlier date, but because it is a parliamentary harangue, not tainted with an accusatory purpose, nor mentioning Æschinês by name.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês speaks of the omission of the Phokians in taking the oaths at Athens, as if it were a matter of small importance (Fals. Leg. p. 387, 388: compare p. 372):

that is, on the supposition that the promises made by Æschinês turned out to be realized.

In his speech *De Pace* (p. 59) he takes credit for his protests on behalf of the Phokians; but only for protests made *after his return* from the second embassy—not for protests made when Antipater refused to admit the Phokians to the oaths.

f Antipater was first proclaimed against that acquiescence in the part of Athens, whereby the Phokians were really surrendered to Philip. Yet in truth this was the great diplomatic turning-point, from whence the sin of Athens, against duty to allies as well as against her own security, took its rise. It was a false step of serious magnitude, difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve afterwards. Probably the temper of the Athenians—then eager for peace, trembling for the lives of their captives, and prepossessed with the positive assurances of Æschinês and Philokratês—would have heard with repugnance any strong protest against abandoning the Phokians, which threatened to send Antipater home in disgust and intercept the coming peace; the more so as Demosthenês, if he called in question the assurances of Æschinês as to the projects of Philip, would have no positive facts to produce in refuting them, and could be constrained to take the ground of mere scepticism and negation;<sup>1</sup> of which a public, charmed with hopeful auguries and already disarmed through the mere comfortable anticipations of peace, would be very impatient. Nevertheless, we might have expected from a statesman like Demosthenês, that he would have begun his energetic opposition to the disastrous treaty of 346 B.C., at that moment when the most disastrous and disgraceful portion of it—the abandonment of the Phokians—was first suffered in.

Vestermann (De Litibus quas Demosthenês oravit ipse, p. 48) expects that Demosthenês did not see through the deception of Æschinês until the Phokians were utterly ruined. This, perhaps, goes beyond the truth; but at the time when the oaths were exchanged at Athens, he either had not clearly detected the consequences of that terrible shuffle into which Athens was tricked by Philokratês, &c.—or he was afraid to proclaim them emphatically.

Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 355. χέως δ' ὑμῶν τῷ "μηδὲ προσ-  
αῖ" σχόντων &c. (the Athenian public were displeased with Demosthenês when he told them that

he did not expect the promises of Æschinês to be realized; this was after the second embassy, but it illustrates the temper of the assembly even before the second embassy)—ibid. p. 349. τίς γὰρ ἂν ἠνέσχετο, τηλικαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔσσεσθαι προσδοκῶν ἀγαθὰ, ἢ ταυθ' ὥς οὐκ ἔσται λέγοντός τινος, ἢ κατηγοροῦντος τῶν πεπραγμένων τούτοις;

How unpopular it was to set up mere negative mistrust against glowing promises of benefits to come is here strongly urged by Demosthenês.

Respecting the premature disarming of the Athenians, see Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 234.

After the assembly of the 25th Elaphebolion, Antipater administered the oaths of peace and alliance to Athens and to all her other allies (seemingly including the envoy of Kersobleptês) in the Board room of the Generals.<sup>1</sup> It now became the duty of the ten Athenian envoys, with one more from the confederate synod—the same persons who had been employed in the first embassy—to go and receive the oaths from Philip. Let us see how the duty was performed.

The decree of the assembly, under which these envoys held their trust, was large and comprehensive. They were to receive an oath of amity and alliance with Athens and her allies, from Philip as well as from the chief magistrate in each city allied with him. They were forbidden (by curious restriction) to hold any intercourse singly and individually with Philip;<sup>2</sup> but they were farther enjoined, by a comprehensive general clause, "to do anything else which might be within their power for the advantage of Athens."—"It was our duty as prudent envoys (says Æschinês to the Athenian people) to take a right measure of the whole state affairs, as they concerned either you or Philip."<sup>3</sup> Upon these rational views of the duties of the envoys, however Æschinês unfortunately did not act. It was Demosthenes who acted upon them, and who insisted, immediately after the departure of Antipater and Parmenio, on going straight to the place where Philip actually was, in order that they might administer the oath to him with as little delay as possible. It was not only certain that the king of Macedonia the most active of living men, would push his conquests to the last moment; but it was farther known to Æschinês and the envoys that he had left Pella to make war against Kersobleptês in Thrace, at the time when they returned from their first embassy.<sup>4</sup> Moreover on the day of, or

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, *Fals. Leg.* p. 39. c. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenes, *Fals. Leg.* p. 430. οὐ τὸ μὲν φίλημα, "οὐδαμοῦ μόνους ἐντυγχάνειν Φιλίππῳ," οὗτοι δ' οὐκ ἐπαύσαντο ἰδίᾳ χρηματίζοντες;

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.* p. 41. c. 32. Τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἑλῶν ὁρθῶς βουλευσασθαι, ἔσται, καθ' ὅμας

ἔστιν ἡ Φιλίππον, τοῦτο ἤδη ἔστι πρεσβέων φρονίμων. . . . Ἀμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς ἔχοντες τοῦ δήμου φίλημα, ἐν ᾧ γέγραπται, Πράττειν δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις, καὶ ἄλλ' ἀνδρῶν νῦν ἀγαθόν.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.* p. 39.

lay after, the public assembly last described (that is, on the 25th or 26th of the month Elaphebolion), a despatch had reached Athens from Charês, the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, intimating that Philip had gained important advantages in Thrace, had taken the important place called the Sacred Mountain, and deprived Kersobleptês of great part of his kingdom.<sup>1</sup> Such successive conquests on the part of Philip strengthened the reasons for despatch on the part of the envoys, and for going straight to Thrace to arrest his progress. As the peace just concluded was based on the *uti possidetis*, dating from the day on which the Macedonian envoys had administered the oaths at Athens—Philip was bound to restore all conquests made after that day. But it did not escape Demosthenês that this was an obligation which Philip was likely to evade; and which the Athenian people, bent as they were on peace, were very unlikely to enforce.<sup>2</sup> The more quickly the envoys reached him, the fewer would be the places in dispute, the sooner would he be reduced to inaction—or at least, if he still continued to act, the more speedily would his insincerity be exposed.

Impressed with this necessity for an immediate interview with Philip, Demosthenês urged his colleagues to set out at once. But they resisted his remonstrances, and chose to remain at Athens; which, we may remark, was probably in a state of rejoicing and festivity in consequence of the recent peace. So reckless was their procrastination and reluctance to depart, that on the third of the month Munychion (April—nine days after the solemnity of oath-taking before Antipater and Parmenio) Demosthenês made complaint and moved a resolution in the Senate, peremptorily ordering them to begin their journey forthwith, and enjoining Proxenus, the Athenian commander at

Demo-  
sthenês  
urges the  
envoys to  
go im-  
mediately to  
Thrace in  
order to  
administer  
the oath to  
Philip—  
they refuse  
—their de-  
lay on the  
journey and  
at Pella.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 9. ὅτι Κερσοβλέπτης ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ὄρος κατείχετο Φίλιππος.

There is no fair ground for supposing that the words ἀπολώλεκε τὴν ἀρχήν are the actual words used by Charês, or that Kersobleptês was affirmed by Charês to have

lost every thing that he had. It suited the argument of Æschinês to give the statement in a sweeping and exaggerated form.

<sup>2</sup> See the just and prudent reasoning of Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 388, and De Coronâ, p. 234.

Compare also Pseudo-Demosthenês, De Halonneso, p. 85, 86.

Oreus in Eubœa, to transport them without delay to the place where Philip was, wherever that might be.<sup>1</sup> But though the envoys were forced to leave Athens and repair to Oreus, nothing was gained in respect to the main object for they, as well as Proxenus, took upon them to disobey the express order of the Senate, and never went to find Philip. After a certain stay at Oreus, they moved forward by leisurely journeys to Macedonia; where they remained inactive at Pella until the return of Philip from Thrace, fifty days after they had left Athens.<sup>2</sup>

Had the envoys done their duty as Demosthenês recommended, they might have reached the camp of Philip in Thrace within five or six days after the conclusion of the peace at Athens; had they been even content to obey the express orders of the Senate, they might have reached it within the same interval after the third of Munychion; so that from pure neglect, or deliberate collusion, on their part Philip was allowed more than a month to prosecute his conquests in Thrace, after the Athenians on their side had sworn to peace. During this interval, he captured Doriskus with several other Thracian towns; some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers; and completely reduced Kersobleptês, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage. The manner in which these envoys, employed in an important mission at the public expense, wasted six weeks of a critical juncture in doing nothing—and that too in defiance of an express order from the Senate—confirms the

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 389; De Coronâ, p. 234. Æschinês (Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29, 30) recognises the fact that this decree was passed by the Senate on the third of Munychion, and that the envoys left Athens in consequence of it. He does not mention that it was proposed by Demosthenês. Æschinês here confirms, in a very important manner, the fact of the delay, as alleged by Demosthenês, while the explanation which he gives, why the envoys did not go to Thrace, is altogether without value.

A document purporting to be

this decree, is given in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 234; but the authenticity is too doubtful to admit of citing it.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 38. c. 26; Demosth. De Halonneseo, p. 85. Fals. Leg. p. 390—448; compar. Philippic. iii. p. 114. Among the Thracian places captured by Philip during this interval, Demosthenês enumerates the Sacred Mountain. But this is said to have been captured before the end of Elaphebe lion, if Æschinês quotes correctly from the letter of Charês, Fals. Leg. p. 40. c. 29.

opposition before stated, and would even of itself raise a strong presumption, that the leaders among them were ending themselves corruptly to the schemes of Philip.

The protests and remonstrances addressed by Demosthenês to his colleagues became warmer and more unmeasured as the delay was prolonged.<sup>1</sup> His colleagues doubtless grew angry on their side, so that the harmony of the embassy was overthrown. Æschinês affirms that none of the other envoys would associate with Demosthenês, either on the road or at the resting-places.<sup>2</sup>

B.C. 346.  
(May.)

Embassies  
from many  
Grecian  
states at  
Pella.

Pella was now the centre of hope, fear, and intrigue, for the entire Grecian world. Ambassadors were already there from Thebes, Sparta, Eubœa, and Phokis; moreover a large Macedonian army was assembled around, ready for immediate action.

At length the Athenian envoys, after so long a delay of their own making, found themselves in the presence of Philip. And we should have expected that they would forthwith perform their special commission by administering the oaths. But they still went on postponing this ceremony, and saying nothing about the obligation incumbent on him, to restore all the places captured since the day of making the oaths to Antipater at Athens;<sup>3</sup> places, which had now indeed become so numerous, through waste of time on the part of the envoys themselves, that Philip was not likely to yield the point even if demanded.

At a conference held with his colleagues, Æschinês—assuming credit to himself for a view, larger than that taken by them, of the ambassadorial duties—treated the administration of the oath as merely secondary; he insisted on the propriety of addressing Philip on the subject of the intended expedition to Thermopylæ, which he was on the point of undertaking, as well as plain from the large force mustered near

Consultations and  
dissension  
among the  
Ten Athenian envoys  
—views  
taken by  
Æschinês  
of the  
ambas-  
sadorial  
duties.

Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390.

Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 41. c.

Demosthenês (and doubtless other envoys also) walked on their journey, with two slaves to carry his clothes and bedding. In a pack carried by one slave, was

a talent in money, destined to aid some of the poor prisoners towards their ransom.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 388. ἡ γὰρ παρόντων (we the envoys) κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα αὐτὸν (Philip) ἐξορκωσάντων, ἃ μὲν εἰλήφει τῆς

Pella), and exhorting him to employ it so as to humble Thebes and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. The envoy (he said) ought not to be afraid of braving any ill-will that might be manifested by the Thebans. Demosthenês (according to the statement of Æschinês) opposed this recommendation—insisting that the envoys ought not to mingle in disputes belonging to other parts of Greece, but to confine themselves to their special mission—and declared that he should take no notice of Philip's march to Thermopylæ. At length, after much discussion, it was agreed among the envoys, that each of them, when called before Philip, should say what he thought fit, and that the youngest should speak first.

According to this rule, Demosthenês was first heard and delivered a speech (if we are to believe the envoys address Philip—harangue of Æschinês) not only leaving out all useful comment upon the actual situation, but so spiteful towards his colleagues, and so full of extravagant flattery to Philip, as to put the hearers to shame.<sup>2</sup> The turn now came to Æschinês, who repeats in abridgement his own long oration delivered to Philip. We can reason upon it with some confidence, in our estimate of Æschinês though we cannot trust his reports about Demosthenês. Æschinês addressed himself exclusively to the subject Philip's intended expedition to Thermopylæ. He exhorted Philip to settle the controversy, pending with respect to the Amphiktyons and the Delphian temple, by peaceful arbitration and not by arms. But if armed interference was inevitable, Philip ought carefully to inform himself of the ancient and holy bond whereby the Amphiktyonic synod was held together. That synod consisted of twelve different nations or sections of the Hellenic name, each including many cities, small as well as great; each holding two votes and no more; each binding itself by an impressive oath, to uphold and protect every other Amphiktyon

πόλεως, ἀποδώσειν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀφ᾽ ἑσθαι—ἢ μὴ ποιούντος ταῦτα ἀπαγγελεῖν ἡμᾶς εὐθέως δεῦρο, &c.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 42. c. 33. πορεύεται Φύλιππος εἰς Πύλας· ἐγὼ δ' ἐγκαλύπτομαι, &c. This is the language which Æschinês affirms to have been held by Demosthenês during the embassy. It is

totally at variance with all that Demosthenês affirms, over and over again, respecting his own proceedings; and (in my judgment) with all the probabilities of the case.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 42. 34.

city. Under this venerable sanction, the Bœotian cities, being Amphiktyonic like the rest, were entitled to protection against the Thebans their destroyers. The purpose of Philip's expedition, to restore the Amphiktyonic council, was (Æschinês admitted) holy and just.<sup>1</sup> He ought to carry it through in the same spirit; punishing the individuals originally concerned in the seizure of the Delphian temple, but not the cities to which they belonged, provided those cities were willing to give up the wrongdoers. But if Philip should go beyond this point, and confirm the unjust dominion of Thebes over the other Bœotian towns, he would do wrong on his own side, add to the number of his enemies, and reap no gratitude from those whom he favoured.<sup>2</sup>

Demosthenês, in his comments upon this second embassy, touches little on what either Æschinês or himself said to Philip. He professes to have gone on the second embassy with much reluctance, having detected the treacherous purposes of Æschinês and Philokratês. Nay, he would have positively refused to go (he tells us) had he not bound himself by a promise made during the first embassy, to some of the poor Athenian prisoners in Macedonia, to provide for them the means of release. He dwells much upon his disbursements for their ransom during the second embassy, and his efforts to obtain the consent of Philip.<sup>3</sup> This (he says) was all that lay in his power to do, as an individual; in regard to the collective proceedings of the embassy, he was constantly outvoted. He affirms that he detected the foul play of Æschinês and the rest with Philip; that he had written a despatch to send home for the purpose of exposing it; that his colleagues not only prevented him from forwarding it, but sent another despatch of their own with false information.<sup>4</sup> Then, he had resolved to come home personally,

Position of Demosthenês in this second embassy—he wished to send word home, or to come home, but was prevented.

<sup>1</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴν τῆς στρατείας αὐτῆς ὅσιαν καὶ δίκαιαν ἀπεφηνάμην εἶναι, &c.

Ἀπεφηνάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, μὴ περιορᾶν κατασχαμμένους τὰς ἐν Βοιωτοῖς πόλεις, ὅτι δὴ ἦσαν Ἀμφικτυονίδες καὶ ἑνερχοί.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37: compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 393, 394, 395.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 396. καὶ τὴν μὲν γραφεῖσαν ἐπιστολὴν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπεψηφίσαντο μὴ

for the same purpose, sooner than his colleagues, and has actually hired a merchant-vessel—but was hindered by Philip from sailing out of Macedonia.<sup>1</sup>

The general description here given by Demosthenês, of his own conduct during the second embassy, is probably true. Indeed it coincides substantially with the statement of Æschinês, who complains of him as in a state of constant and vexatious opposition to his colleagues. We must recollect that Demosthenês had no means of knowing what the particular projects of Philip really were. This was secret to every one except Philip himself, with his confidential agents or partisans. Whatever Demosthenês might suspect, he had no public evidence by which to impress his suspicions upon others, or to countervail confident assertions on the favourable side transmitted home by his colleagues.

The army of Philip was now ready, and he was on the point of marching southward towards Thessaly and Thermopylæ. That pass was still held by the Phokians, with a body of Lacedæmonian auxiliaries;<sup>2</sup> a force quite sufficient to maintain it against Philip's open attack, and likely to be strengthened by Athens from seaward, if the Athenians came to penetrate his real purposes. It was therefore essential to Philip to keep alive a certain belief in the minds of others that he was marching southward with intentions favourable to the Phokians—though not to proclaim it in any such authentic manner as to alienate his actual allies the Thebans and Thessalians. And the Athenian envoys were his most useful agents in circulating the imposture.

Some of the Macedonian officers round Philip gave explicit assurance, that the purpose of his march was to conquer Thebes, and reconstitute the Bœotian cities. So far indeed was this deception carried, that (according to

πέμπειν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτιοῦν ὀγιές γράψαντες ἐπεμψαν. Compare p. 419.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 445. ἐγὼ δ', ὥσπερ ἀνηγόατ' ἤδη πολλάκις, οὐχὶ δυνήθεις προαπελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μισθωσάμενος πλοῖον κατακλυθεῖς ἐκπλεῦσαι. Compare

p. 357—οὐδ' ἂν ἐμὲ, ἡνίκα δεῦρ ἀποπλεῖν ἐβουλόμην, κατακλωε (Philip), &c.

<sup>2</sup> The Lacedæmonian troops remained at Thermopylæ until little time before Philip reached it (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365).

Æschinês) the Theban envoys in Macedonia, and the Thebans themselves, became seriously alarmed.<sup>1</sup> The movements of Philip were now the pivot on which Grecian affairs turned, and Pella the scene wherein the greatest cities in Greece were bidding for his favour. While the Thebans and Thessalians were calling upon him to proclaim himself openly Amphiktyonic champion against the Phocians—the Phokian envoys,<sup>2</sup> together with those from Sparta and Athens, were endeavouring to enlist him in their cause against Thebes. Wishing to isolate the Phocians from such support, Philip made many tempting promises to the Lacedæmonian envoys; who on their side came to open quarrel, and indulged in open menace, against those of Thebes.<sup>3</sup> Such was the disgraceful auction wherein these once great states, in prosecution of their mutual antipathies, bartered away to a foreign prince the dignity of the Hellenic name and the independence of the Hellenic world:<sup>4</sup> following the example set by Sparta in her

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c.

1. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἠπόρουσαν καὶ φοβούντο οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις; . . . τῶν δ' ἐταίρων σὺν ἐν τῶν Φιλίππου οὐ διαῤῥῆσθαι πρὸς τινὰς ὑμῶν ἔλεγον, καὶ τὰς ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις κατατοικισαὶ Φίλιππος; Θηβαῖοι δ' οὐκ ἐξέληλύθσαν πανδημεί, ἀπιστοῦντες τοῖς πράγμασιν;

Demosthenês greatly eulogises the incorruptibility and hearty efforts of the Theban envoys (Fals. Leg. p. 384); which assertion is probably nothing better at bottom than a rhetorical contrast, to discredit Æschinês—fit to be inserted in the numerous list of oratorical exaggerations and perversions of history, collected in the interesting Treatise of Weiske, *De Hyperbole, errorum in Historiâ Philippi commissorum genitrice* (Meissen, 1819).

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113; Justin, viii. 4. "Contra Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedæmoniis et Atheniensibus, bellum deprecabantur, cujus ab eo dilationem ter-

jam emerant." I do not understand to what facts Justin refers, when he states, that the Phokians "had already purchased thrice from Philip a postponement of war."

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 365. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μετεπέμπετο, πάντα τὰ πράγματα ὑποσχόμενος πρᾶξιν ἐκείνοις, &c.

Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ οὐ μεθ' ἡμῶν τὰναντία Θηβαίοις ἐπρέσβευον, καὶ τελευτώντες προσέχρουν φανερώς ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, καὶ διηπειλουν τοῖς τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεσιν;

<sup>4</sup> This thought is strikingly presented by Justin (viii. 4), probably from Theopompus—"Fœdum prorsus miserandumque spectaculum, Græciam, etiam nunc et viribus et dignitate orbis terrarum principem, regum certe gentiumque semper victricem et multarum adhuc urbium dominam, alienis excubare sedibus, aut rogantem bellum aut deprecantem: in alterius ope omnem spem posuisse orbis terrarum vindices; eoque discordia sua civilibusque bellis redactos, ut adu-

applications to the Great King, during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, and at the peace of Antalkidas. Amidst such a crowd of humble petitioners and expectants, a trembling to offend him—with the aid too of Æschinê Philokratês, and the other Athenian envoys who consented to play his game—Philip had little difficulty in keeping alive the hopes of all, and preventing the formation of a common force or decisive resolution to resist him.<sup>1</sup>

After completing his march southward through Thessaly, he reached Phæræ near the Pagasæan Gulf at the head of a powerful army of Macedonian and allies. The Phokian envoys accompanied his march, and were treated, if not as friends at least in such manner as to make it appear doubtful whether Philip was going to attack the Phokians or the Thebans.<sup>2</sup> It was at Phæræ that the Athenian envoys at length administered the oath both to Philip and to his allies.<sup>3</sup> This was done the last thing before they returned to Athens, which city they reached on the 13th of the month Skirphorion;<sup>4</sup> after an absence of seventy days, comprising the intervening month Thargelion, and the remnant (from the third day) of the month Munychion. They accepted as representatives of the allied cities, all whom Philip sent to them; though Demosthenês remarks that their instructions directed them to administer the oath to the chi-

*lentur ultro sordidam paulo ante clientelæ suæ partem: et hæc potissimum facere Thebanos Lacedæmoniosque, antea inter se imperii, nunc gratiæ imperantis, æmulos.*"

<sup>1</sup> Justin, viii. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 113. τοῦτο δ' εἰς Φωκέας ὡς πρὸς συμμαχοὺς ἐπορεύετο, καὶ πρέσβεις Φωκέων ἦσαν οἱ παρηκολούθουν αὐτῷ πορευομένων· καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν ἦριζον πολλοί, Θηβαίους οὐ λυσitelῆσειν τὴν ἐκείνου πᾶροδον. The words παρ' ἡμῖν denote the Athenian envoys (of whom Demosthenês was one) and the persons around them, marching along with Philip; the oaths not having been yet taken.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 390. The oath was administered in the temple in front of the chapel of the Dictæa Kuri, near Phæræ.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. In more than one passage, he states their absence from Athens to have lasted three entire months (p. 359; also De Coronâ, p. 235). But this is an exaggeration of the time. The decree of the Senate, which constrained them to depart, was passed on the third of Munychion. Assuming that they set out on that very day (though it is more probable that they did not set out until the ensuing day), their absence would only have lasted seventy days.

magistrate in each city respectively<sup>1</sup>. And among the cities whom they admitted to take the oath as Philip's allies, was comprised Kardia, on the borders of the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians considered Kardia as within the limits of the Chersonese, and therefore as belonging to them.<sup>2</sup>

It was thus that the envoys postponed both the execution of their special mission, and their return, until the last moment, when Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ. That they so postponed it, in corrupt connivance with him, is the allegation of Demosthenês, sustained by all the probabilities of the case. Philip was anxious to come upon Thermopylæ by surprise,<sup>3</sup> and to leave as little time as possible either to the Phokians or to Athens for organising defence. The oath which ought to have been administered in Thrace—but at any rate at Pella—was not taken until Philip had got as near as possible to the important pass; nor had the envoys visited one single city among his allies in execution of their mandate. And as Æschinês was well aware that this would provoke inquiry, he took the precaution of bringing with him a letter from Philip to the Athenian people, couched in the most friendly terms; wherein Philip took upon himself any blame which might fall upon the envoys, affirming that they themselves had been anxious to go and visit the allied cities, but that he had detained them in order that they might assist him in accommodating the difference between the cities of Halus and Pharsalus. This letter, affording farther presumption of the connivance between the envoys and Philip, was besides founded on a false pretence; for Halus was

Plans of Philip on Thermopylæ—corrupt connivance of the Athenian envoys—letter from Philip which they brought back to Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 430. The Magnesians and Achæan cities round the Pagasæan Gulf, all except Halus, were included in the oath as allies of Philip (Epistola Philippi ap. Demosthen. p. 159).

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 395. Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 351. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀπάντων τῶν ἀδικημάτων, τὸ τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπι-

στήσαι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῦτοις, καὶ δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀκούσαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, εἴτα βουλευσασθαι, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ πράττειν ὅ,τι δόξαι, ἅμα ἀκούειν καὶ καχεῖνον παρεῖναι, καὶ μὴδ' ὅ,τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ῥᾶδιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι. Compare Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 236. πάλιν ὠνεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἀπίωμεν ἐκ Μακεδονίας ἕως τὰ τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Φωκίας εὐτρεπῆ ποιήσαιο, &c.

(either at that very time or shortly afterwards) conquered by his arms, given up to the Pharsalians, and its population sold or expelled.<sup>1</sup>

In administering the oaths at Pheræ to Philip and his allies, Æschinês and the majority of the Athenian envoys had formally and publicly pronounced the Phokians to be excluded and out of the treaty, and had said nothing about Ker sobleptês. This was, if not a departure from their mandate, at least a step beyond it; for the Athenian people had expressly rejected the same exclusion when proposed by Philokratês at Athens; though when the Macedonian envoy declared that he could not admit the Phokians the Athenians had consented to swear the treaty without them. Probably Philip and his allies would not consent to take the oath, to Athens and her allies, without an express declaration that the Phokians were out of the pale.<sup>2</sup> But though Philokratês and Æschinês thus openly repudiated the Phokians, they still persisted in affirming that the intentions of Philip towards that people were highly favourable. They affirmed this probably to the Phokians themselves, as an excuse for having pronounced the special exclusion; they repeated it loudly and emphatically at Athens, immediately on their return. It was then that Demosthenês also, after having been outvoted and silenced during the mission, obtained an opportunity for making his own protest public. Being among the senators of that year, he made his report to the Senate

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 352, 353; ad Philipp. Epistol. p. 152. Demosthenês affirms farther that Æschinês himself wrote the letter in Philip's name. Æschinês denies that he wrote it, and sustains his denial upon sufficient grounds. But he does not deny that he brought it (Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 44. c. 40, 41).

The inhabitants of Pharsalus were attached to Philip; while those of Pheræ were opposed to him as much as they dared, and even refused (according to Demo-

sthenês, Fals. Leg. p. 444) to join his army on this expedition. The old rivalry between the cities here again appears.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 355 ἐκ τοῦ, ὅτε τοὺς ἑρκους ἤμελλε Φίλιππος ὁμνῶναι τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐκσπόνδους ἀποφανθῆναι τοῦ Φωχέας ὑπὸ τούτων, ὃ σωπῆν καὶ ἂν εἰκός ᾔν, εἴπερ ἤμελλον σώζεσθαι Compare p. 395. Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν Φωχεῖς ἐκσπόνδους καὶ Ἀλεῖ ἀπέφηναν καὶ Κερσοβλέπτην, παρὰ τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ τὰ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένα, &c.; also p. 430.

forthwith, seemingly on the day, or the day next but one, after his arrival, before a large audience of private citizens standing by to witness so important a proceeding. He recounted all the proceedings of the embassy—recalling the hopes and promises under which Æschinês and others had persuaded the Athenians to agree to the peace—arraigning these envoys as fabricators, in collusion with Philip, of falsehoods and delusive assurances—and accusing them of having already by their unwarrantable delays betrayed Kersobleptês to ruin. Demosthenês at the same time made known to the Senate the near approach and rapid march of Philip; entreating them to interpose even now at the eleventh hour, for the purpose of preventing what yet remained, the Phokians and Thermopylæ, from being given up under the like treacherous fallacies.<sup>1</sup> A fleet of fifty triremes had been voted, and were ready at a moment's notice to be employed on sudden occasion.<sup>2</sup> The majority of the Senate went decidedly along with Demosthenês, and passed a resolution in that sense to be submitted to the public assembly. So adverse was this resolution to the envoys, that it neither commended them or invited them to dinner in the prytaneium; an insult (according to Demosthenês) without any former precedent.<sup>3</sup>

On the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, three days after the return of the envoys, the first public assembly was held; where, according to usual form, the resolution just passed by the Senate ought to have been discussed. But it was not even read to the assembly; for immediately on the opening of business (so Demosthenês tells us), Æschinês rose and proceeded to address the people, who were naturally impatient to hear him before any one else, speaking as he

B.C. 346.  
(June.)  
Public assembly at Athens—successful address made to it by Æschinês—his false assurances to the people.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 346.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 444. ἐφ' αὐτῇ πεντήκοντα τριήρεις ὅμως ἐρώρουν, &c. Compare Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 350, 351. Demosthenês causes this resolution of the Senate (προβούλευμα) to be read to the Dikasts, together with a testimony of the senator who

moved it. The document is not found *verbatim*, but Demosthenês comments upon it before the Dikasts after it has been read, and especially points out that it contains neither praise nor invitation, which the Senate was always in the habit of voting to returning envoys. This is sufficient to refute the allegation of Æschinês (Fals.

did in the name of his colleagues generally.<sup>1</sup> He said nothing either about the recent statements of Demosthenês before the Senate, or the senatorial resolution following, or even the past history of the embassy—bypassed at once to the actual state of affairs, and the coming future. He acquainted the people that Philip, having sworn the oaths at Pheræ, had by this time reached Thermopylæ with his army. "But he comes there (said Æschinês) as the friend and ally of Athens, the protector of the Phokians, the restorer of the enslaved Bœotian cities, and the enemy of Thebes alone. We your envoys have satisfied him that the Thebans are the real wrong-doers, not only in their oppression towards the Bœotian cities, but also in regard to the spoliation of the temple, which they had conspired to perpetrate earlier than the Phokians. I (Æschinês) exposed in an emphatic speech before Philip the iniquities of the Thebans, for which proceeding they have set a price on my life. You Athenians will hear, in two or three days, without any trouble of your own, that Philip is vigorously prosecuting the siege of Thebes. You will find that he will capture and break up that city—that he will exact from the Thebans compensation for the treasure ravished from Delphi—and that he will restore the subjugated communities of Plataea and Thespiæ. Moreover, you will hear of benefits still more direct, which have determined Philip to confer upon you, but which would not be prudent as yet to particularize. Eubœa will be restored to you as a compensation for Amphipolis: the Eubœans have already expressed the greatest alarm at the confidential relations between Athens and Philip, and the probability of his ceding to you their island. There are other matters too, on which I do not wish to speak fully, because I have false friends even among my own colleagues." These last ambiguous allusions were generally understood, and proclaimed by the persons round the orator, to refer to Oropus, the ancient possession of Athens now in the hands of Thebes.<sup>2</sup> Such glowing promises,

Leg. p. 44. c. 38), that Demosthenês himself moved a resolution to praise the envoys and invite them to a banquet in the Prytaneium. Æschinês does not produce such resolution, nor cause it to be read before the Dikasts.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 347, 352. τοῦτο μὲν οὐδεὶς ἀνέγνω δῆμοφτὸ προβούλευμα, οὐδ' ἤκουσε δῆμος, ἀναστὰς δ' οὗτος ἐδημηγύησε. The date of the 16th Skirrophoria is specified, p. 359.

<sup>2</sup> I have here condensed

benefits to come, were probably crowned by the announcement, more worthy of credit, that Philip had engaged to send back all the Athenian prisoners by the coming Panathenaic festival,<sup>1</sup> which fell during the next month Hekatombæon.

The first impression of the Athenians, on hearing Æschinês, was that of surprise, alarm, and displeasure, at the unforeseen vicinity of Philip;<sup>2</sup> which left no time for deliberation, and scarcely the minimum of time for instant precautionary occupation of Thermopylæ, if such a step were deemed necessary. But the sequel of the speech—proclaiming to them the speedy accomplishment of such favourable results, together with the gratification of their antipathy against Thebes—effaced his sentiment, and filled them with agreeable prospects. It was in vain that Demosthenês rose to reply, arraigned the assurances as fallacious, and tried to bring forward the same statement as had already prevailed with the Senate. The people refused to hear him; Philokratês with the other

The Athenian people believe the promises of Philokratês and Æschinês—proof of Demosthenês not listened to.

substance of what is stated by Demosthenês, Fals. Leg. p. 347, 348, 351, 352, 364, 411, &c. Another statement, to the same effect, made by Demosthenês in the Oration De Pace (delivered only a few months after the assembly here described, and not a judicial accusation against Æschinês, but a deliberative harangue before the public assembly), is even better evidence than the accusatory speech De Falsa Legatione—ήνιστα τοὺς ἔρχους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀπειληρότες ἴκουμεν οἱ πρέσβεις, τότε Θεοπιάς τινων καὶ Πλαταιάς ὑπισχνουμένων λικισθῆσθαι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας τὸν Φιλίππον, ἃν γένηται κύριος, πωσειν, τὴν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλιν διοικεῖν, καὶ τὸν Ὀρωπὸν ὑμῖν ὑπάρξειν, καὶ τὴν Εὐβοίαν ἀντ' Ἀμφιπόλεως ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ τοιαύτας ἐλπίδας καὶ φανατισμούς, οἷς ἐπαχθέντες ὑμεῖς οὐτε συμφόρως οὐτ' ἴσως οὐτε καλῶς προείθετε Φωκέας . . . οὐδὲν τούτων οὐτ' ἐξαπατήσας οὐτε σιγήσας ἐγὼ σιγήσομαι, ἀλλὰ προσιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὡς

οἶδ' ὅτι μνημονεύετε, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐτε οἶδα οὐτε προσδοκῶ, νομίζω δὲ τὸν λέγοντα ληρσεῖν (De Pace, p. 59).

Compare also Philippic ii. p. 72, 73, where Demosthenês repeats the like assertion: also De Chersoneso, p. 105; De Coronâ, p. 286, 237.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthenês states (Fals. Leg. p. 394. εἰς τὰ Παναθηναῖα φήσας ἀποπέμψειν) that he received this assurance from Philip, while he was busying himself during the mission in efforts to procure the ransom or liberation of the prisoners. But we may be sure that Æschinês, so much more in the favour of Philip, must have received it also, since it would form so admirable a point for his first speech at Athens, in this critical juncture.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 352. ὥσθ' ὑμᾶς ἐκπεπληγμένους τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Φιλίππου, καὶ τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προηγγελχέναι, προτέρους γενέσθαι τινός, πάνθ' ὅς' ἐβούλεσθ' ὑμῖν ἔσσεσθαι προσδοκῆσαντας, &c.

friends of Æschinês hooted him off; and the majority were so full of the satisfactory prospect opened to them, that all mistrust or impeachment of its truth appeared spiteful and vexatious.<sup>1</sup> It is to be remembered that these were the same promises previously made to them by Philokratês and others, nearly three months before, when the peace with Philip was first voted. The immediate accomplishment of them was now again promised on the same authority—by envoys who had communicated a second time with Philip, and thus had farther means of information—so that the comfortable anticipation previously raised was confirmed and strengthened. No one thought of the danger of admitting Philip within Thermopylæ, when the purpose of his coming was understood to be the protection of the Phokians, and the punishment of the hated Thebans. Demosthenês was scarcely allowed even to make a protest, or to disclaim responsibility as to the result. Æschinês triumphantly assumed the responsibility to himself; while Philokratês amused the people by saying—"No wonder, Athenians, that Demosthenês and I should not think alike. He is an ungenial water-drinker; I am fond of wine."<sup>2</sup>

It was during this temper of the assembly that the letter of Philip, brought by the envoys, was produced and read. His abundant expressions of regard, and promises of future benefit, to Athens, were warmly applauded; while, proposed as the hearers were, none of them discerned, nor was any speaker permitted to point out, that these expressions were thoroughly vague and general, and that not a word was said about the Thebans or the Phokians.<sup>3</sup> Philokratês next proposed a decree, extolling Philip for his just and beneficent promises—providing that the peace and alliance with him should be extended, not merely to the existing Athenians but also to their posterity—and enacting that if the Phokians should still refuse to yield possession of the Delphian temple to the Amphiktyons, the people of Athens would compel them to do so by armed intervention.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 348, 349, 352. οἱ δ' ἀντιλέγοντες ὅχλος ἄλλως καὶ βασκανία κατεψαι-  
υστο, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 355; Pl. ii. p. 73.

<sup>3</sup> Dem. Fals. Leg. p. 353.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 3

During the few days immediately succeeding the return of the envoys to Athens (on the 13th of Skirro-phorion), Philip wrote two successive letters, inviting the Athenian troops to join him forthwith at Thermopylæ.<sup>1</sup> Probably these were sent at the moment when Phalækus, the Phokian leader at that pass, answered his first summons by a negative reply.<sup>2</sup> The two letters must have been despatched one immediately after the other, betraying considerable anxiety on the part of Philip; which it is not difficult to understand. He could not be at first certain what effect would be produced by his unforeseen arrival at Thermopylæ on the public mind at Athens. In spite of all the persuasions of Æschinês and Philokratês, the Athenians might conceive so much alarm as to obstruct his admission within that important barrier; while Phalækus and the Phokians—having a powerful mercenary force, competent, even unaided, to a resistance of some length—were sure to attempt resistance, if any hope of aid were held out to them from Athens. Moreover it would be difficult for Philip to carry on prolonged military operations in the neighbourhood, from the want of provisions; the lands having been unsown through the continued antecedent war, and the Athenian triremes being at hand to intercept his supplies by sea.<sup>3</sup> Hence it was important to him to keep the Athenians in illusion and quiescence for the moment; to which purpose his letters were well

Letters of Philip to the Athenians inviting them to send forces to join him at Thermopylæ—policy of these letters—the Athenians decline.

ἵτος (Æschinês) ἦν ὁ λέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ καὶ ὑπισχνούμενος· πρὸς δὲ ὅς παρὰ τούτου λόγους ὠρμηχότας βῶν ὑμᾶς ὁ Φιλοκράτης, ἐγγράφει ὅτ' εἰς τὸ ψήφισμα, ἐάν μὴ ποιῶσι οὕτως ἂν δεῖ, καὶ παραδίδωσι τοῖς μφικτούσι τὸ ἱερόν, ὅτι βοηθήσει ὁ υἱος ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τοὺς διαχω-  
ντας ταῦτα γίνεσθαι.

The fact, that by this motion of Philokratês the peace was extended "the posterity" of the Athenians dwell upon by Demosthenês "the greatest disgrace of all;" than an intensity of emphasis which is difficult to enter into (Philippicus 11. p. 73).

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 357. Demosthenês causes the two letters to be read, and proceeds—Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἐπιστολαὶ καλοῦσιν αὐται, καὶ νῆ Δία ἥδη γε.

So also Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41. ὑμῖν δὲ ταῦθ' ὁρῶν οὐκ ἔγραψεν ἐπιστολὴν ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐξιέναι πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει, βοηθήσοντας τοῖς δίκαιοις; Æschinês only notices one of the two letters. Böhmcke (Forschungen, p. 412) conceives the letters as having been written and sent between the 16th and 23rd of the month Skirro-phorion.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 379.

adapted, in whichever way they were taken. If the Athenians came to Thermopylæ, they would come as his allies—not as allies of the Phokians. Not only they would be in the midst of his superior force, and therefore as it were hostages;<sup>1</sup> but they would be removed from contact with the Phokians, and would bring to bear upon the latter an additional force of intimidation. If, on the contrary, the Athenians determined not to come, they would at any rate interpret his desire for their presence as a proof that he contemplated no purposes at variance with their wishes and interests, and would trust the assurances, given by Æschines and his other partisans at Athens, that he secretly meant well towards the Phokians. This last alternative was what Philip both desired and anticipated. He wished only to deprive the Phokians of all chance of aid from Athens, and to be left to deal with them himself. His letters served to blind the Athenian public, but his partisans took care not to move the assembly<sup>2</sup> to a direct compliance with their invitation. Indeed the proposal of such an expedition (besides the strong dislike of the citizens towards military service) would have been singularly repulsive, seeing that the Athenians would have had to appear, ostensibly at least, in arms against their Phokian allies. The conditional menace of the Athenian assembly against the Phokians (in case of refusal to surrender the temple to the Amphiktyons), decreed on the motion of Philokratês, was in itself sufficiently harsh against allies of ten years' standing; and was tantamount at least to a declaration that Athens would not interfere in their behalf—which was all that Philip wanted.

Among the hearers of these debates at Athens were Phokian deputies from these very Phokians, whose faithless envoys now hung in suspense. It has already been stated that during the preceding September the Phokians were torn by intestine dissensions, Phalækus, the chief of the mercenary troops, had repudiated aid (invited by his Phokian opponents) both from Athens and Sparta;<sup>3</sup> feeling

<sup>1</sup> This was among the grounds of objection, taken by Demosthenes and his friends, against the despatch of forces to Thermopylæ in compliance with the letter of Philip—according to the assertion of Æschines (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 41); who treats the objection with contempt, though it seems well grounded and reasonable.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356.

<sup>3</sup> Æschines, Fals. Leg. p. 46.

41.

strong enough to hold Thermopylæ by his own force. During the intervening months, however, both his strength and his pride had declined. Though he still occupied Thermopylæ with 8000 or 10,000 mercenaries, and still retained superiority over Thebes, with possession of Orchomenus, Koroneia, and other places taken from the Thebans<sup>1</sup>—yet his financial resources had become so insufficient for a numerous force, and the soldiers had grown so disorderly from want of regular pay,<sup>2</sup> that he thought it prudent to invite aid from Sparta—during the spring, while Athens was deserting the Phokians to make terms with Philip. Archidamus accordingly came to Thermopylæ, with 1000 Lacedæmonian auxiliaries.<sup>3</sup> The defensive force thus assembled was amply sufficient against Philip by land; but that important pass could not be held without the cooperation of a superior fleet at sea.<sup>4</sup> Now the Phokians had powerful enemies even within the pass—the Thebans; and there was no obstacle, except the Athenian fleet under Proxenus at Oreus,<sup>5</sup> to prevent Philip from landing troops in the rear of Thermopylæ, joining the Thebans, and making himself master of Phokis from the side towards Bœotia.

To the safety of the Phokians, therefore, the continued maritime protection of Athens was indispensable; and they doubtless watched with trembling anxiety the deceitful phases of Athenian diplomacy during the winter and spring of 347-346 B.C. Their deputies must have been present at Athens when the treaty was concluded

Dependence of the Phokians upon Athenian aid to hold Thermopylæ.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 387.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinès, Fals. Leg. p. 46. c.

<sup>3</sup> 1. This statement of Æschinès—about the declining strength of the Phokians and the causes thereof—has every appearance of being correct in point of fact; though it will not sustain the conclusions which he builds upon it.

Compare Demosth. Olynth. iii. 30. (delivered four years earlier).

περιργότων δὲ χρήμασι Φωκέων, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 365; Diodor xvi. 59.

<sup>5</sup> For the defence of Thermopylæ, at the period of the invasion of Xerxes, the Grecian fleet at Arte-

misium was not less essential than the land force of Leonidas encamped in the pass itself.

<sup>5</sup> That the Phokians could not maintain Thermopylæ without the aid of Athens—and that Philip could march to the frontier of Attica, without any intermediate obstacle to prevent him, if Olynthus were suffered to fall into his hand—is laid down emphatically by Demosthenès in the first Olynthiac, nearly four years before the month of Skirrophorion, 346 B.C.

“Αν δ’ ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος λάβῃ, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Θη-

and sworn in March 346 B.C. Though compelled endure not only the refusal of Antipater excluding them from the oath, but also the consent of their Athenian allies, tacitly acted upon without being formally pronounced, to take the oath without them—they nevertheless heard the assurances, confidently addressed by Philokrates and Æschinês to the people, that this refusal was a mere feint to deceive the Thessalians and Thebans—that Philip would stand forward as the protector of the Phokians and that all his real hostile purposes were directed against Thebes. How the Phokians interpreted such tortuous and contradictory policy, we are not told. But their fate hung upon the determination of Athens; and during the time when the Ten Athenian envoys were negotiating or intriguing with Philip at Pella, Phokian envoys were there also, trying to establish some understanding with Philip through Lacedæmonian and Athenian support. Both Philip and Æschinês probably amused them with favourable promises. And though, when the oaths were at last administered to Philip at Pheræ, the Phokians were formally pronounced to be excluded—still the fair words of Æschinês, and his assurances of Philip's good intentions towards them, were not discontinued.

While Philip marched straight from Pheræ to Thermopylæ—and while the Athenian envoys returned to Athens—Phokian deputies visited Athens also, to learn the last determination of the Athenian people, upon which their own destiny turned. Though Philip, on reaching the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, summoned the Phokian leader Phalækus to surrender to him, and offered him terms—Phalækus would make no reply until his deputies returned from Athens.<sup>1</sup> The deputies, present at the public assembly of the 16 Skirro-phorion, heard the same fallacious assurances

βαῖτοι; οἱ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἐτοιμῶς. Ἀλλὰ Φωκεῖς; οἱ τὴν οἰκειὰν οὐχ οἶοι τε ὄντες φυλάττειν, ἐὰν μὴ βοηθήσῃ ὑμεῖς" (Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16).

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359. ἤχομεν δὲ δεῦρο ἀπὸ τῆς πρεσβείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἔρχους τρίτῃ ἐπὶ δέκα τοῦ Σκιρρόφοριῶνος μηνός, καὶ παρῆν

ὁ Φίλιππος ἐν Πύλαις ἤδη καὶ τὸ Φωκεῦσιν ἐπηγγέλλετο ὧν οὐδὲν ἐστευον ἐκεῖνοι. Σημεῖον δὲ—οὐδ' ἂν δεῦρ' ἦγον ὡς ὑμᾶς. . . . παρῆ γάρ οἱ τῶν Φωκέων πρέσβεις ἐνθάδε καὶ ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ τί ἀπαγγελοῦν οὗτοι (Æschinês, Philokratês, &c.) καὶ τί ψηφισέθε ὑμεῖς, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αἰδέναί.

ore, respecting Philip's designs, repeated by Philokra- and Æschinês with unabated impudence, and still epted by the people. But they also heard, in the very e assembly, the decree proposed by Philokratês and pted, that unless the Phokians restored the Delphian ple forthwith to the Amphiktyons, the Athenian people uld compel them to do so by armed force. If the Pho- ns still cherished hopes, this conditional declaration of e, from a city which still continued in name to be ir ally, opened their eyes, and satisfied them that no e was left except to make the best terms they could h Philip.<sup>1</sup> To defend Thermopylæ successfully without ens—much more against Athens—was impracticable.

Leaving Athens after the assembly of the 16th rrophorion, the Phokian deputies carried k the tidings of what had passed to Phalækus, om they reached at Nikæa near Thermopylæ ut the 20th of the same month.<sup>2</sup> Three s afterwards, Phalækus, with his powerful y of 8000 or 10,000 mercenary infantry and 0 cavalry, had concluded a convention with lip. The Lacedæmonian auxiliaries, per- ing the insincere policy of Athens and the ain ruin of the Phokians, had gone away a le before.<sup>3</sup> It was stipulated in the conven- a that Phalækus should evacuate the territory,

B.C. 346.

(June.)

Phalækus surrenders Thermo- pylæ under convention to Philip. He with- draws all his forces, and all Phokians who chose to accom- pany him.

Demosth. Fals. Leg. 357. οἱ τοῖνον Φωκεῖς, ὡς τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν ὄντο ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὸ τε σμα τοῦτ' ἔλαβον τὸ τοῦ Φιλο- ους, καὶ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπύθοντο οὔτου καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις—κατὰ ας τοὺς τρόπους ἀπώλοντο.

schinês (Fals. Leg. p. 45. c. touches upon the statements e by Demosthenês respecting nvoys of Phalækus at Athens, the effect of the news which arried back in determining apitulation. He complains em generally as being "got gainst him" (ὁ κατήγορος με- νηται), but he does not con- ct them upon any specific t. Nor does he at all succeed

in repelling the main argument, brought home with great precision of date by Demosthenês.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 359: compare Diodor. xvi. 59. In this passage, Demosthenês reckons up seven days between the final assembly at Athens and the capi- tulation concluded by the Phokians. In another passage, he states the same interval at only five days (p. 365); which is doubtless in- accurate. In a third passage, the same interval, seemingly, stands at five or six days, p. 379.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 356-365. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἦκεν (Philip) εἰς Πύλας, Λαχεδαιμόνιοι δ' αἰσθόμενοι τὴν ἐνέδραν ὑπεχώρησαν, &c.

and retire wherever else he pleased, with his entire mercenary force and with all such Phokians as chose to company him. The remaining natives threw themselves on the mercy of the conqueror.

All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number together with the pass of Thermopylæ, were placed in the hands of Philip; all surrendering at discretion; all without resistance. The moment Philip was thus master of the country, he joined his forces with those of the Thebans, and claimed his purpose of acting thoroughly to their policy; of transferring to them a considerable portion of Phokis; of restoring to them Orchomenus, Korsisæ, and Koroneia, Bœotian towns which the Phokians had taken from them, and of keeping the rest of Bœotia in their dependence, just as he found it.<sup>1</sup>

In the meantime, the Athenians, after having passed the decree above mentioned, re-appointed the very same assembly of the 16th Skironion—June) the same ten envoys to carry intelligence of it to Philip, and to be witnesses of the accomplishment of the splendid promise made in his name. But Demosthenês immediately swore off, and refused to serve; while Æschinês, though he did not swear off, was nevertheless so much indisposed as to be unable to do so. This at least is his own statement; though Demosthenês affirms, that the illness was a concerted pretence, in order that Æschinês might remain at home to counterwork any reaction of public opinion at Athens, likely to arise on the arrival of the bad news.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 360, 365, 379, 413. ὁ δὲ (Æschinês) τοσούτον δεῖ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τινὰ αἰχμάλωτον σῆσαι, ὥσθ' ἔλθον τόπον καὶ πλεῖν ἢ μυρίους μὲν ὀπλίτας, ὁμοῦ δὲ χίλιους ἱππέας τῶν ὑπαρχόντων συμμάχων, ὅπως αἰχμάλωτοι γένωνται Φιλίππῳ συμπαρασκευάσας.

Diodorus (xvi. 59) states the mercenaries of Phalækus at 8000 men.

Because the Phokians capitulated to Philip and not to the Thebans (p. 360)—because not one of their

towns made any resistance. Demosthenês argues that this was their confidence in the favorable dispositions of Philip, as testified by Æschinês. But he overstates this argument against Æschinês. The Phokians had no choice but to surrender, as soon as all aid of Athenian aid was manifestly shut out. The belief of favorable dispositions on the part of Philip was doubtless an auxiliary motive, but not the primary or predominant one.

which Æschinês knew to be at hand, from Phokis.<sup>1</sup> Others having been chosen in place of Æschinês and Demosthenês,<sup>2</sup> the ten envoys set out, and proceeded as far as Chalkis in Eubœa. It was there that they learned the fatal intelligence from the mainland on the other side of the Eubœan trait. On the 23rd of Skirrophorion, Phalækus and all the Phokian towns had surrendered; Philip was master of Thermopylæ, had joined his forces with the Thebans, and proclaimed an unqualified philo-Theban policy; on the 27th of Skirrophorion, Derkyllus, one of the envoys, arrived in haste back at Athens, having stopped short in his mission on hearing the facts.

At the moment when he arrived, the people were holding an assembly in the Peiræus, on matters connected with the docks and arsenal; and to his assembly, actually sitting, Derkyllus made his unexpected report.<sup>3</sup> The shock to the public of Athens was prodigious. Not only were all their splendid anticipations of anti-Theban policy from Philip (hitherto believed and welcomed by the people on the positive assurances of Philokratês and Æschinês) now dashed to the ground—not only were the Athenians smitten with the consciousness that they had been overreached by Philip, that they had played into the hands of their enemies the Thebans, and that they had betrayed their allies the Phokians to ruin—but they felt also that they had yielded up Thermopylæ, the defence at once of Attica and of Greece, and that the road to Athens lay open to their worst enemies the Thebans, now aided by Macedonian force. Under this pressure of surprise, sorrow, and terror, the Athenians, on the motion of Kallisthenês, passed these votes—To put the Peiræus, as well as the fortresses throughout Attica, in immediate defence—To bring within these walls for safety all the women and children, and all the moveable property, now spread abroad in Attica—To celebrate the approaching

Alarm and displeasure at Athens—motion of Kallisthenês for putting the city in a good state of defence.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 378; αὐτοῦ, &c.

Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 40, c. 30.

It appears that the ten envoys were not all the same—τῶν ἄλλων τοῦς

καὶ τοὺς τοῦς αὐτοῦς, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 380.

οὗ ὅτι πρῶτος ἄλλος ἤρηντο ἀνθ'

Æschinês (Fals. Leg. p. 46, c. 43) does not seem to deny this distinctly.

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 359, 360, 365, 379.

festival of the Herakleia, not in the country, as was usual but in the interior of Athens.<sup>1</sup>

Such were the significant votes, the like of which had not been passed at Athens since the Peloponnesian war, attesting the terrible reaction of feeling occasioned at Athens by the disastrous news from Phokis. Æschinês had now recovered from his indisposition; or (if we are to believe Demosthenês) found it convenient to lay aside the pretence. He set out as self-appointed envoy, without any new nomination by the people—probably with such of the Ten as were favourable to his views—to Philip and to the joint Macedonian and Theban army in Phokis. And what is yet more remarkable, he took his journey thither through Thebes itself though his speeches and his policy had been for months past (according to his own statement) violently anti-Theban;<sup>3</sup> and though he had affirmed (this however rests upon the testimony of his rival) that the Thebans had set a price upon his head. Having joined Philip, Æschinês took part in the festive sacrifices and solemn pæans celebrated to the Macedonians, Thebans, and Thessalians,<sup>4</sup> in commemoration and thanksgiving for their easy, though long-deferred triumph over the Phokians, and for the conclusion of the Ten-Years Sacred War.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 368-379. Æschinês also acknowledges the passing of this vote, for bringing in the moveable property of Athens into a place of safety; though he naturally says very little about it (Fals. Leg. p. 46. c. 42).

In the oration of Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 238, this decree, moved by Kallisthenês, is not only alluded to, but purports to be given *verbatim*. The date as we there read it—the 21st of the month of Mæmakterion—is unquestionably wrong; for the real decree must have been passed in the concluding days of the month Skirrophorion, immediately after hearing the report of Derkyllus. This manifest error

of date will not permit us to believe in the authenticity of the document. Of these supposed original documents, inserted in the oration De Coronâ, Droysen and other critics have shown some to be decidedly spurious; and all so doubtful that I forbear to treat them as authority.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 38.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 41-32. p. 43. c. 36. Æschinês accuses Demosthenês of traitorous partiality for Thebes.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 321. Æschinês (Fals. Leg. p. 49, 50) admits, and tries to justify, the proceeding.

Shortly after Philip had become master of Thermopylæ and Phokis, he communicated his success in a letter to the Athenians. His letter betokened full consciousness of the fear and repugnance which his recent unexpected proceedings had excited at Athens:<sup>1</sup> but in other respects, it was conciliatory and even seductive; expressing great regard for them as his sworn allies, and promising again that they should reap solid fruits from the alliance. It allayed that keen apprehension of Macedonian and Theban attack, which had induced the Athenians recently to sanction the precautionary measures proposed by Kallisthenês. In his subsequent communications also with Athens, Philip found his advantage in continuing to profess the same friendship and to intersperse similar promises;<sup>2</sup> which, when enlarged on by his partisans in the assembly, contributed to lull the Athenians and lull them into repose, thus enabling him to carry on without opposition real measures of insidious or hostile character. Even shortly after Philip's passage of Thermopylæ, when he was in full cooperation with the Thebans and Thessalians, Æschinês boldly justified him by the assertion, that these Thebans and Thessalians had been too strong for him, and had constrained him against his will to act on their policy, both to the ruin of the Phokians and to the offence of Athens.<sup>3</sup> And we cannot doubt that the restoration of the prisoners taken at

Fair professions of Philip to the Athenians, after his conquest of Thermopylæ: language of his partisans at Athens.

Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 237, 239. It is evident that Demosthenês found little in the letter which could be turned against Philip. Its tone must have been usable and winning.

The letter is inserted *verbatim* in the oration, professing to be the letter of Philip to the Athenians. I agree with those critics who doubt or disbelieve the genuineness of this letter, and therefore I do not cite it. If Demosthenês had before him a letter so peremptory and insolent in its tone, he would have animadverted upon it much more severely.

Æschinês went on boasting

about the excellent dispositions of Philip towards Athens, and the great benefits which Philip promised to confer upon her, for at least several months after this capture of Thermopylæ. Æschinês, cont. Timarch. p. 24. c. 33. Φίλιππον δὲ νῦν μὲν διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν ἐπαινώ· ἐάν δ' αὐτὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔργοις γένηται, οἷος νῦν ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς ὑποσχέσεσιν, ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ῥᾷδιον τὸν καθ' αὐτοῦ ποιήσεται ἔπαινον.

This oration was delivered apparently about the middle of Olymp. 108, 3; some months after the conquest of Thermopylæ by Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 62; Philippic ii. p. 63.

Olynthus, which must soon have occurred, diffused a lively satisfaction at Athens, and tended for the time to counterbalance the mortifying public results of her recent policy.

Master as he now was of Phokis, at the head of an irresistible force of Macedonians and Thebans Philip restored the Delphian temple to its inhabitants, and convoked anew the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had not met since the seizure of the temple by Philomelus. The Amphiktyons reassembled under feelings of vindictive antipathy against the Phokians, and of unqualified devotion to Philip. Their first vote was to dispossess the Phokians of their place in the assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphiktyonic races, and to confer upon Philip the place and two votes (each of the twelve races had two votes) thus left vacant. All the rights to which the Phokians laid claim over the Delphian temple were formally cancelled. All the towns in Phokis, twenty-two in number, were dismantled and broken up into villages. Abæ alone was spared; being preserved by its ancient oracular temple of Apollo, and by the fact that its inhabitants had taken no part in the spoliation of Delphi.<sup>1</sup> No village was allowed to contain more than fifty houses, not to be nearer to another than a minimum distance of one furlong. Under such restriction, the Phokians were still allowed to possess and cultivate their territory, with the exception of a certain portion of the frontier transferred to the Thebans;<sup>2</sup> but they were required to pay to the Delphian temple an annual tribute of fifty talents, until the wealth taken away should have been made good. The horses of the Phokians were directed to be sold; their arms were to be cast down the precipices of Parnassus, or buried. Such Phokians as had participated individually in the spoliation, were proclaimed accursed, and rendered liable to arrest wherever they were found.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

<sup>2</sup> This transfer to the Thebans is not mentioned by Diodorus, but seems contained in the words of Demosthenês (Fals. Leg. p. 385)—*τῆς τῶν Φωκίων χώρας ὁπόσῃν βούλονται*: compare p. 340.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 60; Demosth. Fals.

Leg. p. 385. *ἔλων τῶν τειχῶν τῶν πόλεων ἀναιρέσεις*. Demosthenês causes this severe sentence of the Amphiktyonic council to be referred to the Dikastery (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361). Unfortunately it has not been preserved.

By the same Amphiktyonic assembly, farther, the Lacedæmonians, as having been allies of the Phokians, were dispossessed of their franchise, that is, of their right to concur in the Amphiktyonic suffrage of the Dorian nation. This vote probably emanated from the political antipathies of the Argeians and Messenians.<sup>1</sup>

The sentence, rigorous as it is, pronounced by the Amphiktyons against the Phokians, was merciful as compared with some of the propositions made in the assembly. The Cætæans went so far as to propose, that all the Phokians of military age should be cast down the precipice; and Æschinês takes credit to himself for having induced the assembly to bear their defence, and thereby preserved their lives.<sup>2</sup> But though the terms of the sentence may have been thus softened, we may be sure that the execution of it by Theans, Thessalians, and other foreigners quartered on the country—all bitter enemies of the Phokian name, and living vent to their antipathies under the mask of pious indignation against sacrilege—went far beyond the literal terms in active cruelty. That the Phokians were stripped and slain<sup>3</sup>—that children were torn from their parents, wives from their husbands, and the images of the gods from their temples—that Philip took for himself the lion's share of the plunder and moveable property—all these are facts naturally to be expected, as incidental to the violent measure of breaking up the cities and scattering the inhabitants. Of those, however, who had taken known part in the spoliation of the temple, the greater number went into exile with Phalækus; and not they alone, but even all such of the moderate and meritorious citizens as could find means to emigrate.<sup>4</sup> Many of them obtained shelter at Athens. The poorer Phokians remained at home by

Ruin and  
wretched-  
ness of the  
Phokians.

<sup>1</sup> Pausanias, x. 8, 2.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, viii. 5. "Victi igitur necessitate, pactâ salute se dederunt. Sed pactio ejus fidei fuit, ejus antea fuerat deprecâti belli commissio. Igitur cæduntur passim piunturque: non liberi parentis, non conjuges maritis, non eorum simulacra templis suis re-aquuntur. Unum tantum miseris

solatium fuit, quod cum Philippus portione prædæ socios fraudasset, nihil rerum suarum apud inimicos viderunt."

Compare Demosthen. Fals. Leg. p. 366.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 47. c. 44; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 366; Demosthen. De Pace, p. 61. ὅτι τοῖς Φωκίων φυγάδας σώζομεν, &c.

necessity. But such was the destruction inflicted by the conquerors, that even two or three years afterwards, when Demosthenês and other Athenian envoys passed through the country in their way to the Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi, they saw nothing but evidences of misery; old men, women, and little children, without adults—ruined houses, impoverished villages, half-cultivated fields.<sup>1</sup> Well might Demosthenês say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors.<sup>2</sup>

It was but two years since the conquest and ruin of Olynthus, and of thirty-two Chalkidic Grecian cities besides, had spread abroad everywhere the terrors and majesty of Philip's name. But he was now exalted to a still higher pinnacle by the destruction of the Phokians, the capture of Thermopylæ, and the sight of a permanent Macedonian garrison, occupying from hence forward Nikæa and other places commanding the pass.<sup>3</sup> He was extolled as restorer of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and as avenging champion of the Delphian god, against the sacrilegious Phokians. That he should have acquired possession of an unassailable pass, dismissed the formidable force of Phalaïkus, and become master of the twenty-two Phokian cities all without striking a blow—was accounted the most wonderful of all his exploits. It strengthened more than ever the prestige of his constant good fortune. Having been now, by the vote of the Amphiktyons, invested with the right of Amphiktyonic suffrage previously exercised by the Phokians, he acquired a new Hellenic rank, with increased facilities for encroachment and predominance in

Irresistible  
ascendency  
of Philip.  
He is named  
by the  
Amphik-  
tyons pre-  
siding  
celebrator  
of the  
Pythian  
festival of  
346 B.C.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361. θέαμα  
δεινὸν καὶ ἔλαεινόν· ὅτε γὰρ νῦν ἐπο-  
ρευόμεθα εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας  
κατεσχαμμένας, τεῖχη περιηρημένα,  
χώραν ἔρημον τῶν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, γύ-  
ναϊα δὲ καὶ παιδάρια ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσ-  
βύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτρούς, οὐδ' ἂν  
εἰς δύναιτ' ἐφικέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν  
ἐκεῖ κακῶν νῦν ὄντων.

As this oration was delivered in  
343-342 B.C., the adverb of time νῦν

may be reasonably referred to the  
early part of that year, and the  
journey to Delphi was perhaps  
undertaken for the spring meeting  
of the Amphiktyonic council  
that year; between two and three  
years after the destruction of the  
Phokians by Philip.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 361.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. ad Philipp. Epistolai  
p. 153. Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρὰν κατέχουσιν  
&c.

Hellenic affairs. Moreover, in the month of August 346 B.C., about two months after the surrender of Phokis to Philip, the season recurring for celebrating the great Pythian festival, after the usual interval of four years, the Amphiktyons conferred upon Philip the signal honour of nominating him president to celebrate this festival, in conjunction with the Thebans and Thessalians;<sup>1</sup> an honorary pre-eminence, which ranked among the loftiest aspirations of ambitious Grecian despots, and which Jason of Pheræ had prepared to appropriate for himself twenty-four years before, at the moment when he was assassinated.<sup>2</sup> It was in vain that the Athenians, mortified and indignant at the unexpected prostration of their hopes and the utter ruin of their allies, refused to send deputies to the Amphiktyons—affected even to disregard the assembly as irregular—and refrained from despatching their sacred legation as usual, to sacrifice at the Pythian festival.<sup>3</sup> The Amphiktyonic vote did not the less pass; without the concurrence, indeed, either of Athens or of Sparta, yet with the hearty support not only of Thebans and Thessalians, but also of Argeians, Messenians, Arcadians, and all those who counted upon Philip as a probable auxiliary against their dangerous Spartan neighbour.<sup>4</sup> And when envoys from Philip and from the Thessalians arrived at Athens, notifying that he had been invested with the Amphiktyonic suffrage, and inviting the concurrence of Athens

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 60. τιθέναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Πυθίων Φίλιππον μετὰ Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θετταλῶν, διὰ τὸ Κορινθίους μετεσχηκέναι τοῖς Φωκεῦσι εἰς τὸ θεῖον παρανομίας.

The reason here assigned by Diodorus, why the Amphiktyons placed the celebration of the Pythian festival in the hands of Philip, cannot be understood. It may be true, as matter of fact, that the Corinthians had allied themselves with the Phokians during the Sacred War—though there is no other evidence of the fact except this passage. But the Corinthians were never invested with any authoritative character in reference to the Pythian festival. They were the

recognised presidents of the *Isthmian* festival. I cannot but think that Diodorus has been misled by a confusion of these two festivals one with the other.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 380—398. οὕτω δεινὰ καὶ σχέτλια ἡγουμένων τούτοις τάλαιπῶρους πάσχειν Φωκέας, ὥστε μήτε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς θεωροὺς μήτε τοὺς θεσμοθέτας εἰς τὰ Πύθια πέμψαι, ἀλλ' ἀποστῆναι τῆς πατρῴου θεωρίας, &c. Demosth. De Pace, p. 60. τοὺς συνελθελυθότας τούτους καὶ φάσκοντας Ἀμφικτύοντας εἶναι, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 68, 69.

in his reception, prudential considerations obliged the Athenians, though against their feelings, to pass a vote of concurrence. Even Demosthenês was afraid to break the recent peace, however inglorious, and to draw upon Athens a general Amphiktyonic war, headed by the king of Macedon.<sup>1</sup>

Here then was a momentous political change doubly fatal to the Hellenic world: first, in the new position of Philip both as master of the keys of Greece and as recognised Amphiktyonic leader, with means of direct access and influence even on the inmost cities of Peloponnesus; next, in the lowered banner and uncovered frontier of Athens, disgraced by the betrayal both of her Phokian allies and of the general safety of Greece, and recompensed only in so far as she regained her captives.

How came the Athenians to sanction a peace at once dishonourable and ruinous, yielding to Philip that important pass, the common rampart of Attica and of Southern Greece, which he could never have carried in war at the point of the sword? Doubtless the explanation of this proceeding is to be found, partly, in the general state of the Athenian mind; repugnance to military cost and effort—sickness and shame at their past war with Philip—alarm from the prodigious success of his arms—and pressing anxiety to recover the captives taken at Olynthus. But the feelings here noticed, powerful as they were, would not have ended in such a peace, had they not been seconded by the deliberate dishonesty of Æschinês and a majority of his colleagues, who deceived their countrymen with a tissue of false assurances as to the purposes of Philip, and delayed their proceedings on the second embassy in such manner that he was actually at Thermopylæ before the real danger of the pass was known at Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 60—63; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375. In the latter passage, p. 375, Demosthenês accuses Æschinês of having been the only orator in the city who spoke in favour of the proposition, there being a strong feeling in the assembly and in the people against it. Demosthenês must have forgot-

ten, or did not wish to remember, his own harangue De Pace, delivered three years before. In spite of the repugnance of the people, very easy to understand, I conclude that the decree must have passed; since, if it had been rejected, consequences must have arisen which would have come to our knowledge.

Making all just allowance for mistrust of Demosthenês as a witness, there appears in the admissions of Æschinês himself sufficient evidence of corruption. His reply to Demosthenês, though successfully meeting some collateral aggravations, seldom touches, and never repels, the main articles of impeachment against himself. The dilatory measures of the second embassy—the postponement of the oath-taking until Philip was within three days' march of Thermopylæ—the keeping back of information about the danger of that pass, until the Athenians were left without leisure for deliberating on the conjuncture—all these grave charges remain without denial or justification. The refusal to depart at once on the second embassy, and to go straight to Philip in Thrace for the protection of Kersobleptês, is indeed explained, but in a manner which makes the case rather worse than better. And the gravest matter of all—the false assurances given to the Athenian public respecting Philip's purposes—are plainly admitted by Æschinês.<sup>1</sup>

Demosthenês and Æschinês—proof of dishonesty and fraud in Æschinês, even from his own admissions.

In regard to these public assurances given by Æschinês about Philip's intentions, corrupt mendacity appears to me the only supposition admissible. There is nothing, even in his own account, to explain how he came to be beguiled into such flagrant misjudgement; while the hypothesis of honest error is yet farther refuted by his own subsequent conduct. "If (argues Demosthenês) Æschinês had been sincerely misled by Philip, so as to pledge his own veracity and character to the truth of positive assurances given publicly before his countrymen, respecting Philip's designs—then on finding that the result belied him, and that he had fatally misled those whom he undertook to guide, he would be smitten with compunction, and would in particular abominate the name of Philip as one who had disgraced him and made him an unconscious instrument of treachery. But the fact has been totally otherwise; immediately after the peace, Æschinês visited Philip to share his triumph, and has been ever since his avowed partisan

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 37. Τοῦτο οὐκ ἀπαγγεῖλαι, ἀλλ' ὑποσχέσθαι μὲν φησὶν.

Compare p. 43. c. 36. p. 40. c. 41. p. 52. c. 54—also p. 31—41—also the

speech against Ktesiphon, p. 65. c. 30. ὡς τάχιστα εἰσω Πυλῶν Φίλιππος παρῆλθε καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Φωκεύσι πόλεις παραδόξως ἀναστάτους ἐποίησε, &c.

and advocate."<sup>1</sup> Such conduct is inconsistent with the supposition of honest mistake, and goes to prove—what the proceedings of the second embassy all bear out—that Æschinês was the hired agent of Philip for deliberately deceiving his countrymen with gross falsehood. Even as reported by himself, the language of Æschinês betokens his ready surrender of Grecian freedom, and his recognition of Philip as a master; for he gives not only his consent but his approbation, to the entry of Philip within Thermopylæ,<sup>2</sup> only exhorting him, when he comes there, to act against Thebes and in defence of the Bœotian cities. This in an Athenian envoy, argues a blindness little short of treason. The irreparable misfortune, both for Athens and for free Greece generally, was to bring Philip within Thermopylæ, with power sufficient to put down Thebes and reconstitute Bœotia—even if it could have been made sure that such would be the first employment of his power. The same negotiator, who had begun his mission by the preposterous flourish of calling upon Philip to give up Amphipolis, ended by treacherously handing over to him a new conquest which he could not otherwise have acquired. Thermopylæ, betrayed once before by Ephialtês the Malian to Xerxês, was now betrayed a second time by the Athenian envoys to an extra-Hellenic power yet more formidable.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 373, 374. I translate the substance of the argument, not the words.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 43. c. 36. In rebutting the charge against him of having betrayed the Phokians to Philip, Æschinês (Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47) dwells upon the circumstance, that none of the Phokian exiles appeared to assist in the accusation, and that some three or four Phokians and Bœotians (whom he calls by name) were ready to appear as witnesses in his favour.

The reason why none of them appeared against him appears to me sufficiently explained by Demosthenês. The Phokians were in a state far too prostrate and terror-stricken to incur new enmities, or to come forward as accusers of one

of the Athenian partisans of Philip whose soldiers were in possession of their country.

The reason why some of them appeared in his favour is also explained by Æschinês himself, when he states that he had pleaded for them before the Amphiktyonic assembly, and had obtained for them a mitigation of that extreme penalty which their most violent enemies urged against them. To captives at the mercy of their opponents, such an interference might well appear deserving of gratitude; quite apart from the question, how far Æschinês as an envoy, by his previous communications to the Athenian people had contributed to betray Thermopylæ and the Phokians to Philip

The ruinous peace of 346 B.C. was thus brought upon Athens not simply by mistaken impulses of her own, but also by the corruption of Æschinês and the major part of her envoys. Demosthenês had certainly no hand in the result. He stood in decided opposition to the majority of the envoys: a fact manifest as well from his own assurances, as from the complaints vented against him, as a colleague insupportably troublesome, by Æschinês. Demosthenês affirms too, that after fruitless opposition to the policy of the majority, he tried to make known their misconduct to his countrymen at home both by personal return and by letter; and that in both cases his attempts were frustrated. Whether he did all that he could towards this object, cannot be determined; but we find no proof of any shortcoming. The only point upon which Demosthenês appears open to censure, is, on his omission to protest emphatically during the debates of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, when the Phokians were first practically excluded from the treaty. I discover no other fault established on probable grounds against him, amidst the multifarious accusations, chiefly personal and foreign to the main issue, preferred by his opponent.

This disgraceful peace was brought upon Athens by the corruption of her own envoys.

Respecting Philokratês—the actual mover, in the Athenian assembly, of all the important resolutions tending to bring about this peace—we learn, that being impeached by Hyperidês<sup>1</sup> not long afterwards, he retired from Athens without standing trial, and was condemned in his absence. Both he and Æschinês (so Demosthenês asserts) had received from Philip bribes and grants out of the spoils of Olynthus; and Philokratês, especially, displayed his newly-acquired wealth at Athens with impudent ostentation.<sup>2</sup> These are allegations in themselves probable, though

Impeachment and condemnation of Philokratês.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 376. This impeachment is alluded to by Hyperidês himself in his oration in defence of Euxenippus, recently discovered in an Egyptian papyrus, and edited by Mr. Churchill Babington, along with fragments from another oration of Hyperidês (Cambridge, 1853, p. 13). Hyperidês takes some credit to himself for

having made his accusation very special. Having set forth the express words of the decree proposed and carried in the public assembly by Philokratês, he denounces the decree as mischievous to the people, and the proposer as having been bribed.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 375, 376, 377, 386.

coming from a political rival. The peace, having disappointed every one's hopes, came speedily to be regarded with shame and regret, of which Philokratês bore the brunt as its chief author. Both Æschinês and Demosthenês sought to cast upon each other the imputation of confederacy with Philokratês.

The pious feeling of Diodorus leads him to describe with peculiar seriousness, the divine judgement which fell on all those concerned in despoiling the Delphian temple. Phalækus, with his mercenaries out of Phokis, retired first into Peloponnesus; from thence seeking to cross to Tarentum, he was forced back when actually on shipboard by a mutiny of his soldiers, and passed into Krete. Here he took service with the inhabitants of Knossus against those of Lyktus. Over the latter he gained a victory, and their city was only rescued from him by the unexpected arrival of the Spartan king Archidamus. That prince, recently the auxiliary of Phalækus in Phokis, was now on his way across the sea towards Tarentum, near which city he was slain a few years afterwards. Phalækus, repulsed from Lyktus, next laid siege to Kydonia, and was bringing up engines to batter the walls, when a storm of thunder and lightning arose, so violent that his engines "were burnt by the divine fire,"<sup>1</sup> and he himself with several soldiers perished in trying to extinguish the flames. His remaining army passed into Peloponnesus, where they embraced the cause of some Eleian exiles against the government of Elis but were vanquished, compelled to surrender, and either sold into slavery or put to death.<sup>2</sup> Even the wives of the Phokian leaders, who had adorned themselves with some of the sacred donatives out of the Delphian temple, were visited with the like extremity of suffering. And while the gods dealt thus rigorously with the authors of the sacrilege, they exhibited favour no less manifest towards their champion Philip, whom they exalted more and more towards the pinnacle of honour and dominion.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 63. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς κατεφλέγησαν, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 61, 62, 63.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 64; Justin, viii. 2. "Dignum itaque qui a Diis proximus habeatur, per quem Deorum

majestas vindicata sit."

Some of these mercenaries, however, who had been employed in Phokis, perished in Sicily in the service of Timoleon—as has been already related.

## CHAPTER XC.

FROM THE PEACE OF 346 B.C., TO THE BATTLE OF  
CHÆRONEIA AND THE DEATH OF PHILIP.

I HAVE described in my last chapter the conclusion of the Sacred War, and the re-establishment of the Amphiktyonic assembly by Philip; together with the dishonourable peace of 346 B.C., whereby Athens, after a war feeble in management and inglorious in result, was betrayed by the treachery of her own envoys into the abandonment of the pass of Thermopylæ—a new sacrifice, not required by her actual position, and more fatal to her future security than any of the previous losses. This important pass, the key of Greece, had now come into possession of Philip, who occupied it, together with the Phokian territory, by a permanent garrison of his own troops.<sup>1</sup> The Amphiktyonic assembly had become an instrument for his exaltation. Both Thebans and Thessalians were devoted to his interest; rejoicing in the ruin of their common enemies the Phokians, without reflecting on the more formidable power now established on their frontiers. Though the power of Thebes had been positively increased by regaining Orchomenus and Koroneia, yet, comparatively speaking, the new position of Philip brought upon her, as well as upon Athens and the rest of Greece, a degradation and extraneous mastery such as had never before been endured.<sup>2</sup>

Position of  
Philip after  
the conclu-  
sion of the  
Sacred War.

This new position of Philip, as champion of the Amphiktyonic assembly, and within the line of common Grecian defence, was profoundly felt by Demosthenês. A short time after the surrender of Thermopylæ, when the Thessalian and Macedonian envoys had arrived at Athens, announcing the recent determination of the Amphiktyons to confer upon Philip the place in that assembly from whence the Phokians had been just expelled, concurrence of Athens in this vote was invited; but the Athenians, mortified and exasperated

Sentiments  
of Demo-  
sthenês—he  
recom-  
mends ac-  
quiescence  
in the  
peace, and  
acceptance  
of the new  
Amphik-  
tyonic dig-  
nity of  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 119.

κεχομίσθαι, κάλλιστα πέπραχται, πρὸς

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 62. νυνὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν, αἰσχιστα, &c.

ἐπὶ Θηβαίοις πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὴν χώραν

at the recent turn of events, were hardly disposed to acquiesce. Here we find Demosthenês taking the cautious side, and strongly advising compliance. He insists upon the necessity of refraining from any measure calculated to break the existing peace, however deplorable may have been its conditions; and of giving no pretence to the Amphiktyons for voting conjoint war against Athens to be executed by Philip.<sup>1</sup> These recommendations, prudent under the circumstances, prove that Demosthenês though dissatisfied with the peace, was anxious to keep it now that it was made; and that if he afterwards came to renew his exhortations to war, this was owing to new encroachments and more menacing attitude on the part of Philip.

We have other evidences, besides the Demosthenic speech just cited, to attest the effect of Philip's new position on the Grecian mind. Shortly after the peace, and before the breaking up of the Phokian towns into villages had been fully carried into detail, Isokratês published his letter addressed to Philip—the *Oratio ad Philippum*. The purpose of this letter is, to invite Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece—Sparta, Athens, Thebes and Argos; to put himself at the head of their united force as well as of Greece generally; and to invade Asia, for the purpose of overthrowing the Persian empire, of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and of providing new homes for the unsettled wanderers in Greece. The remarkable point here is, that Isokratês puts the Hellenic world under subordination and pupilage to Philip, renouncing all idea of it as a self-sustaining and self-regulating system. He extols Philip's exploits, good fortune, and power, above all historical parallels—treats him unequivocally as the chief of Greece—and only exhorts him to make as good use of his power, as his ancestor Heraklês had made in early times.<sup>2</sup> He recommends him, by impartial and conciliatory behaviour towards all, to acquire for himself the same devoted esteem among the Greeks as that which now prevailed among his own Macedonian officers—or as that which existed among the Lacedæmonians towards the Spartan kings.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 60, 61.

<sup>2</sup> Isokratês, Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 128-135.

<sup>3</sup> Isokrat. Or. v. ad Philipp. s. 91  
 ὅταν οὕτω διαθῇ τοὺς Ἕλληνας  
 ὥσπερ ὁρᾷ Λακεδαιμονίους τε πρὸ

Great and melancholy indeed is the change which had come over the old age of Isokratês, since he published the Panegyric Oration (380 B.C.—thirty-four years before), wherein he invokes a united Pan-hellenic expedition against Asia, under the joint guidance of the two Hellenic chiefs by land and sea—Sparta and Athens; and wherein he indignantly denounces Sparta for having, at the peace of Antalkidas, introduced for her own purposes a Persian rescript to impose laws on the Grecian world. The prostration of Grecian dignity, serious as it was, involved in the peace of Antalkidas, was far less disgraceful than that recommended by Isokratês towards Philip—himself indeed personally of Hellenic parentage, but a Macedonian or barbarian (as Demosthenês<sup>1</sup> terms him) by power and position. As Eschinês, when employed in embassy from Athens to Philip, thought that his principal duty consisted in trying to persuade him by eloquence to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and put down Thebes—so Isokratês relies upon his skilful pen to dispose the new chief to a good use of imperial power—to make him protector of Greece, and conqueror of Asia. If copious and elegant flattery could work such a miracle, Isokratês might hope for success. But it is painful to note the increasing subservience, on the part of estimable Athenian freemen like Isokratês, to foreign potentate; and the declining sentiment of Hellenic independence and dignity, conspicuous after the peace of 346 B.C. in reference to Philip.

From Isokratês as well as from Demosthenês, we thus obtain evidence of the imposing and intimidating effect of Philip's name in Greece after the peace of 346 B.C. Ochus, the Persian king, was at this time embarrassed by unsubdued revolt among his subjects; which Isokratês urges as the motive for Philip to attack him. Not only Egypt, but also Phenicia and Cyprus, were in revolt against the Persian king. One expedition (if not so) on a large scale, undertaken by him for the purpose of reconquering Egypt, had been disgracefully repulsed, in consequence of the ability of the generals (Diophantus an Athenian and Lamius a Spartan) who commanded the

Position of the Persian king Ochus—his measures against revolters in Phenicia and Egypt.

ἡ αὐτῶν βασιλέας ἔχοντας, τοὺς τούτων, ἣν ἐβελήσης κοινὸς ἅπασιν αἰσχροῖς τοὺς σοὺς πρὸς σὲ διακαί- γενέσθαι, &c.  
 Ἦστι δ' οὐ χαλεπὸν τυχεῖν <sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 118.

Grecian mercenaries in the service of the Egyptian prince Nektanebus.<sup>1</sup> About the time of the peace of 346 B.C. Greece, however, Ochus appears to have renewed with better success his attack on Cyprus, Phenicia, and Egypt. To reconquer Cyprus, he put in requisition the force of the Karian prince Idrieus (brother and successor of Mausolus and Artemisia), at this time not only the most powerful prince in Asia Minor, but also master of the Grecian islands Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, probably by means of internal oligarchy in each, who ruled in his interest and through his soldiers.<sup>2</sup> Idrieus sent to Cyprus a force of 40 triremes and 8000 mercenary troops, under the command of the Athenian Phokion and of Evagoras, an exiled member of the dynasty reigning at Salamis in the island. After a long siege of Salamis itself, which was held against the Persian king by Protagoras, probably another member of the same dynasty—and after extensive operations throughout the rest of this rich island, affording copious plunder to the soldiers, so as to attract numerous volunteers from the mainland—all Cyprus was again brought under Persian authority.<sup>3</sup>

The Phenicians had revolted from Ochus at the same time as the Cypriots, and in concert with Nektanebus prince of Egypt, from whom they received a reinforcement of 4000 Greek mercenaries under Mentor the Rhodian. Of the three great Phenician cities, Sidon, Tyre, and Aradus, each a separate political community, but ministering their common affairs at a joint town council.

<sup>1</sup> Isokratēs, Or. v. Philipp. s. 118; Diodor. xv. 40, 44, 48. Diodorus alludes three several times to this repulse of Ochus from Egypt. Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libert. p. 193.

Trogus mentions three different expeditions of Ochus against Egypt (Argument. ad Justin. lib. x.).

<sup>2</sup> Isokratēs, Or. v. Philipp. s. 102. Ἰδριέα γε τὸν εὐπορώτατον τῶν νῦν περὶ τὴν ἡπείρου, &c.

Demosth. De Pace, p. 63. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐώμεν—καὶ τὸν Κάρα τὰς νήσους καταλαμβάνειν, Χίον καὶ Κῶν καὶ Πόδον, &c. An oration delivered

in the latter half of 346 B.C. the peace.

Compare Demosth. De Rhod. Libertat. p. 121, an oration four years earlier.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvi. 42-46. In the inscription No. 87 of Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptt.*, we find a decree passed by the Athenians recognizing friendship and hospitality with the Sidonian prince Strato—from which they seem to have received a donation of ten talents. The date in this decree is not preserved, but M. Boeckh conceives it to be between Olympiad 101-104.

Tripolis, composed of three separate walled circuits, a furlong apart from each other — Sidon was at once the oldest, the richest, and the greatest sufferer from Persian oppression. Hence the Sidonian population, with their prince Tennês, stood foremost in the revolt against Ochus, employing their great wealth in hiring soldiers, preparing arms, and accumulating every means of defence. In the first outbreak they expelled the Persian garrison, seized and punished some of the principal officers, and destroyed the adjoining palace and park reserved for the satrap or king. Having farther defeated the neighbouring satraps of Cilikia and Syria, they strengthened the defences of the city by triple ditches, heightened walls, and a fleet of 100 biremes and quinqueremes. Incensed at these proceedings, Ochus marched with an immense force from Babylon. But his means of corruption served him better than his arms. The Sidonian prince Tennês, in combination with Mentor, entered into private bargain with him, betrayed to him first one hundred of the principal citizens, and next placed the Persian army in possession of the city-walls. Ochus, having slain the hundred citizens surrendered to him, together with five hundred more who came to him with prayers of supplication, intimated his purpose of taking signal revenge on the Sidonians generally; who took the desperate resolution, first of burning their fleet that no one might escape—next, of shutting themselves up with their families, and setting fire each man to his own house. In this deplorable conflagration 40,000 persons are said to have perished; and such was the wealth destroyed, that the privilege of searching the ruins was purchased for a large sum of money. Instead of rewarding the traitor Tennês, Ochus concluded the tragedy by putting him to death.<sup>1</sup>

Flushed with this unexpected success, Ochus marched with an immense force against Egypt. He had with his army 10,000 Greeks: 6000 by requisition from the Greek cities in Asia Minor; 3000 by request from Argos; and 1000 from Thebes.<sup>2</sup> To Athens and Sparta, he had sent a like request, but had received from both a courteous refusal.

Reconquest of Egypt by the Persian force under Mentor and Bagôas.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 42, 43, 45. "Occisio stimatibus Sidona cepit Ochus"  
<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 47; Isokratês, Or. xii. Panathenaic. s. 171.  
 (argus, Argum. ad Justin. lib. x.).

His army, Greek and Asiatic, the largest which Persia has sent forth for many years, was distributed into three divisions, each commanded by one Greek and one Persian general; one of the three divisions was confided to Mentor and the eunuch Bagôas, the two ablest servants of the Persian king. The Egyptian prince Nektanebus, having been long aware of the impending attack, had also assembled a numerous force; not less than 20,000 mercenary Greeks, with a far larger body of Egyptians and Libyan. He had also taken special care to put the eastern branch of the Nile, with the fortress of Pelusium at its mouth, in a full state of defence. But these ample means of defence were rendered unavailing, partly by his own unskillfulness and incompetence, partly by the ability and cunning of Mentor and Bagôas. Nektanebus was obliged to retire into Ethiopia; all Egypt fell with little resistance into the hands of the Persians; the fortified places capitulated—the temples were pillaged, with an immense booty to the victors—and even the sacred archives of the temples were carried off, to be afterwards resold to the priests for an additional sum of money. The wealthy territory of Egypt again became a Persian province, under the satrap Pharendatês; while Ochus returned to Babylon, with a large increase both of dominion and of reputation. The Greek mercenaries were dismissed to return home, with an ample harvest both of pay and plunder.<sup>1</sup> They constituted in fact the principal element of force on both sides; some Greek enabled the Persian king to subdue revolters,<sup>2</sup> while others lent their strength to the revolters against him.

By this re-conquest of Phenicia and Egypt, Ochus relieved himself from that contempt into which he had fallen through the failure of his former expedition,<sup>3</sup> and even exalted the Persian empire in force and credit to a point nearly as high as it had ever occupied before. The Rhodian Mentor, and the Persian Bagôas, both of whom had distinguished themselves in the Egyptian campaign, became from this time among his most

B.C. 345-344.

Power of  
Mentor as  
Persian  
viceroy of  
the Asiatic  
coast—he  
seizes Her-  
meias of  
Atarneus.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 47-51. Ley, *Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Regno Persarum*, p. 25, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Isokratês, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 149. καὶ τοὺς ἀφισταμένους τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς

βασιλέως συγκαταστρεφόμεθα, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Isokratês, Or. iv. Philipp. s. 121, 160. Diodorus places the successful expeditions of Ochus against Phenicia and Egypt during 1

effective officers. Bagôas accompanied Ochus into the interior provinces, retaining his full confidence: while Mentor, rewarded with a sum of 100 talents, and loaded with Egyptian plunder, was invested with the satrapy of the Asiatic seaboard.<sup>1</sup> He here got together a considerable body of Greek mercenaries, with whom he rendered signal service to the Persian king. Though the whole coast was understood to belong to the Persian empire, yet there were many separate strong towns and positions, held by chiefs who had their own military force; neither paying tribute nor obeying orders. Among these chiefs, one of the most conspicuous was Hermeias, who resided in the stronghold of Atarneus (on the mainland opposite to Lesbos), but had in any many troops and kept garrisons in many neighbouring places. Though partially disabled by accidental injury in childhood,<sup>2</sup> Hermeias was a man of singular energy and ability, and had conquered for himself this dominion. But what has contributed most to his celebrity, is, that he was the attached friend and admirer of Aristotle; who passed three years with him at Atarneus, after the death of Plato in 348-347 B.C.—and who has commemorated his merits in a noble ode. By treachery and false promises, Mentor seduced Hermeias into an interview, seized his person, and

three years between 351-348 B.C. (Diodor. xvi. 40-52). In my judgment, they were not executed until after the conclusion of the peace between Philip and Athens in March 346 B.C.; they were probably brought to a close in the two summers of 346-345 B.C. The Discourse or Letter of Isokratês to Philip appears better evidence on this point of chronology, than the assertion of Diodorus. The Discourse of Isokratês was published shortly after the peace of March 346 B.C., and addressed to a prince perfectly well informed of all the public events of his time. One of the main arguments used by Isokratês to induce Philip to attack the Persian empire, is the weakness of Ochus in consequence of Egypt and Phœnicia being still in revolt and unobdured—and the contempt into

which Ochus had fallen from having tried to reconquer Egypt and having been ignominiously repulsed—ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖθεν (Ochus) οὐ μόνον ἡττηθεὶς ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγελασθεὶς, καὶ δόξας οὕτε βασιλεῦσιν οὕτε στρατηγοῖν ἄξιός εἶναι (s. 118) . . . οὕτω σφόδρα μεμισημένος καὶ καταπεφρονημένος ὑπ' ἀπάντων ὥς οὐδεὶς πώποτε τῶν βασιλευσάντων (s. 160).

The reconquest of Egypt by Ochus, with an immense army and a large number of Greeks engaged on both sides, must have been one of the most impressive events of the age. Diodorus may perhaps have confounded the date of the *first* expedition, wherein Ochus failed, with that of the *second*, wherein he succeeded.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 50-52.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, xiv. p. 610. Suidas v. Aristotelis—θλιβίας ἐκ παιδός.

employed his signet-ring to send counterfeit orders whereb he became master of Atarneus and all the remaining place held by Hermeias. Thus, by successful perfidy, Mento reduced the most vigorous of the independent chiefs on the Asiatic coast; after which, by successive conquests of the same kind, he at length brought the whole coast effectivel under Persian dominion.<sup>1</sup>

The peace between Philip and the Athenians lasted without any formal renunciation on either side for more than six years; from March 346 B.C. to beyond Midsummer 340 B.C. But though never formally renounced during that interval, it became gradually more and more violated in practice by both parties. To furnish a consecutive history of the events of these few years, is beyond our power. We have nothing to guide us but a few orations of Demosthenês;<sup>2</sup> which, while conveyin

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus places the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast, and his seizure of Hermeias, in Olymp. 107, 4 (349-348 B.C.), immediately after the successful invasion of Egypt.

But this date cannot be correct, since Aristotle visited Hermeias at Atarneus after the death of Plato, and passed three years with him—from the archonship of Theophilus (348-347 B.C. Olymp. 108, 1), in which year Plato died—to the archonship of Eubulus (345-344 B.C. Olymp. 108, 4) (*Vita Aristotelis ap. Dionys. Hal. Epist. ad Ammaum*, c. 5; *Scriptt. Biographici*, p. 397. ed. Westermann); *Diogen. Laert. v. 7.*

Here is another reason confirming the remark made in my former note, that Diodorus has placed the conquest of Egypt by Ochus three or four years too early; since the appointment of Mentor to the satrapy of the Asiatic coast follows naturally and immediately after the distinguished part which he had

taken in the conquest of Egypt.

The seizure of Hermeias at Atarneus. Mentor must probably have taken place about 343 B.C. The stay of Aristotle with Hermeias will probably have occupied the three years between 347 and 344 B.C.

Respecting the chronology of these events, Mr. Clinton follows Diodorus: Böhnecke dissents from him—rightly, in my judgment (*Forschungen*, p. 460-734, note 1). Böhnecke seems to think that the person mentioned in *Demos. Philipp. iv.* (p. 139, 140) as having been seized and carried up prisoner to the king of Persia, accused of plotting with Philip measures hostility against the latter—is Hermeias. This is not in itself improbable, but the authority of the commentator Ulpian seems hardly sufficient to warrant us in positively asserting the identity.

It is remarkable that Diodorus makes no mention of the peace of 346 B.C. between Philip and the Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, <i>Philippic ii.</i> . . . . .	Delivered in . . . . .
De Halonneso, not genuine . . . . .	B.C. 344—343
De Falsâ Legatione . . . . .	B.C. 343—342
	ib.

a lively idea of the feeling of the time, touch, by way of allusion and as materials for reasoning, upon some few facts; yet hardly enabling us to string together those facts into an historical series. A brief sketch of the general tendencies of this period is all that we can venture upon.

Philip was the great aggressor of the age. The movement everywhere, in or near Greece, began with him, and with those parties in the various cities, who acted on his instigation and looked up to him for support. We hear of his direct intervention, or of the effects of his exciting suggestions, everywhere; in Peloponnesus, at Ambrakia and Leukas, in Eubœa, and in Thrace. The inhabitants of Megalopolis, Messênê and Argos, were soliciting his presence in Peloponnesus, and his active cooperation against Sparta. Philip intimated a purpose of going there himself, and sent in the mean time soldiers and money, with a formal injunction to Sparta that she must renounce all pretension to Messênê.<sup>1</sup> He established a footing in Elis,<sup>2</sup> by furnishing troops to an oligarchical faction, and enabling them to become masters of the government, after a violent revolution. Connected probably with this intervention in Elis, was his capture of the three Eleian colonies, Pandosia, Bucheta, and Elateia, on the coast of the Epirotic Kassopia, near the Gulf of Ambrakia. He made over these three towns to his brother-in-law Alexander, whom he exalted to be prince of the Epirotic Molossians<sup>3</sup>—deposing the reigning prince Arrhybas. He farther attacked the two principal Grecian cities in that region—Ambrakia and Leukas; but here he appears to have failed.<sup>4</sup> Detachments of his troops showed themselves near

Movements  
and in-  
trigues of  
Philip  
everywhere  
throughout  
Greece.

Æschinês, De Falsâ Legatione . . . . .	B.C. 343—342
Demosthenês De Chersoneso . . . . .	B.C. 342—341
Philip. iii. . . . .	ib.
Philip. iv. . . . .	B.C. 341—340
ad Philip. Epist. . . . .	B.C. 340—339

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Pace, p. 61; Philippic ii. p. 69. p. 84; Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424-435; Philippic iii. p. 117-120; Philippic iv. p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 424; Pausan. iv. 28, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, viii. 6. Diodorus states that Alexander did not become prince until after the death of Arrhybas (xvi. 72).

<sup>4</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso,

As these enterprises of Philip against Ambrakia and Leukas are not noticed in the second Philippic, but only in orations of later date, we may perhaps presume that they did not take place till

Megara and Eretria, to the aid of philippising parties in these cities and to the serious alarm of the Athenians Philip established more firmly his dominion over Thessaly distributing the country into four divisions, and planting a garrison in Pheræ, the city most disaffected to him.<sup>1</sup> We also read, that he again overran and subdued the Illyrian Dardanian, and Pæonian tribes on his northern and western boundary; capturing many of their towns, and bringing back much spoil; and that he defeated the Thracian prince Kersobleptês, to the great satisfaction of the Grecian cities on and near the Hellespont.<sup>2</sup> He is said farther to have redistributed the population of Macedonia, transferring inhabitants from one town to another according as he desired to favour or discourage residence—to the great misery and suffering of the families so removed.<sup>3</sup>

Such was the exuberant activity of Philip, felt everywhere from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian sea and the Corinthian Gulf. Every year his power increased; while the cities of the Grecian world remained passive, uncombined, and without recognising any one of their own number as leader. The philippising factions were everywhere rising in arms or conspiring to seize the governments for their own account under Philip's auspices; while those who clung to free and popular Hellenism were discouraged and thrown on the defensive.<sup>4</sup>

It was Philip's policy to avoid or postpone any breach of peace with Athens; the only power under whom Grecian combination against him was practicable. But a politician like Demosthenes foresaw clearly enough the coming absorption of the Grecian world, Athens included, into the dominion of Macedonia, unless some means could

after Olymp. 109, 1=B.C. 344—343. But this is not a very certain inference.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 424, 436; Philipp. iii. 117, 118. iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 84.

Compare Harpokration, v. Δεσποδῶν.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 69, 71.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, viii. 6, 6. "Reversus in regnum, ut pecora pastores nunc in hybernos, nunc in æstivos saltus

trajiciunt—sic ille populos et urbes ut illi vel replenda vel derelinquenda quæquæ loca videbantur ad libidinem suam transfert. Miseranda ubique facies et similis excidio erat," &c. Compare Livy, xl. 3, where similar proceedings of Philip son of Demetrius (B.C. 182) are described.

<sup>4</sup> See a striking passage in the fourth Philippic of Demosthenes p. 132.

be found of reviving among its members a spirit of vigorous and united defence. In or before the year 344 B.C., we find this orator again coming forward in the Athenian assembly, persuading his countrymen to send a mission into Peloponnesus, and going himself among the envoys.<sup>1</sup> He addressed both to the Messenians and Argeians emphatic remonstrances on their devotion to Philip; reminding them that from excessive fear and antipathy towards Sparta, they were betraying to him their own freedom, as well as that of all their Hellenic brethren.<sup>2</sup> Though heard with approbation, he does not flatter himself with having worked any practical change in their views.<sup>3</sup> But it appears that envoys reached Athens (in 344-343 B.C.) to whom some answer was required, and it is in suggesting that answer that Demosthenês delivers his second Philippic. He denounces Philip anew, as an aggressor stretching his power on every side, violating the peace with Athens, and preparing ruin for the Grecian world.<sup>4</sup> Without advising immediate war, he calls on the Athenians to keep watch and ward, and to organise defensive alliance among the Greeks generally.

The activity of Athens, unfortunately, was shown in nothing but words; to set off against the vigorous deeds of Philip. But they were words of Demosthenês, the force of which was felt by Philip's partisans in Greece, and occasioned such annoyance to Philip himself that he sent to Athens more than once envoys and letters of remonstrance. His envoy, an eloquent Byzantine named Python,<sup>5</sup> addressed the Athenian assembly with much success, complaining of the calumnies of the orators against Philip — asserting

Mission of Python to Athens by Philip — amendments proposed in the recent peace — fruitless discussions upon them.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 71, 72. Demosthenês himself reports to the Athenian assembly (in 344-343 B.C.) what he had said to the Messenians and Argeians.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 72.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. Philipp. ii. p. 66-72. Who these envoys were, or from whence they came, does not appear from the oration. Libanius in his argument says that they had come jointly from Philip, from the Argeians, and from the Messenians.

Dionysius Hal. (ad Ammæum, p. 737) states that they came out of Peloponnesus.

I cannot bring myself to believe, on the authority of Libanius, that there were any envoys present from Philip. The tenor of the discourse appears to contradict that supposition.

<sup>5</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 82. Winiewski (Comment. Hist. in Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 140) thinks that the embassy of Python to Athens is the very

emphatically that Philip was animated with the best sentiments towards Athens, and desired only to have an opportunity of rendering service to her—and offering to review and amend the terms of the late peace. Such general assurances of friendship, given with eloquence and emphasis, produced considerable effect in the Athenian assembly, as they had done from the mouth of Æschinés during the discussions on the peace. The proposal of Pytho was taken up by the Athenians, and two amendments were proposed. 1. Instead of the existing words of the peace—"That each party should have what they actually had"—it was moved to substitute this phrase—"That each party should have their own."<sup>1</sup> 2. That not merely the allies of Athens and of Philip, but also all the other Greeks, should be included in the peace; That all of them should remain free and autonomous; That if any of them were attacked the parties to the treaty on both sides would lend them armed assistance forthwith. 3. That Philip should be required to make restitution of those places, Doriskus, Serreium, &c., which he had captured from Kersobleptés after the day when peace was sworn at Athens.

The first amendment appears to have been moved by a citizen named Hegesippus, a strenuous anti-philippian politician, supporting the same views as Demosthenés. Pytho, with the other envoys of Philip, present in the assembly, either accepted these amendments, or at least did not protest against them. He partook of the public hospitality of the city as upon an understanding mutually settled.<sup>2</sup> Hegesippus with other Athenians was sent to Macedonia to procure the ratification of Philip; who admitted the justice of the second amendment, offered arbitration respecting the third, but refused to ratify the first—disavowing both the general proposition and the subsequent acceptance of his envoys at Athens.<sup>3</sup> Moreover the

embassy to which the second Philippic of Demosthenés provides or introduces a reply. I agree with Böhncke in regarding this supposition as improbable.

<sup>1</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. Περί δὲ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἣν ἔδοσαν ἡμῖν οἱ πρέσβεις οἱ παρ' ἐκείνου πεμφθέντες ἐπανορθώσασθαι, ὅτι ἐπὶ νωρθωσάμεθα, ὃ παρά πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις

ὁμολογεῖται δίκαιον εἶναι, ἐκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν, ἀμφισβητεῖ (Philip) μὴ δεδωκέναι, μὴ δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις ταύτ' εἰρηκέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς, &c. Compare Demosth. Fals. Leg. 398.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81. See Ulpian ad Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 364.

<sup>3</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 81, 84, 85. ἀμφισβητεῖ

isplayed great harshness in the reception of Hegesippus and his colleagues; banishing from Macedonia the Athenian poet Xenokleidês, for having shown hospitality towards them.<sup>1</sup> The original treaty therefore remained unaltered.

Hegesippus and his colleagues had gone to Macedonia, not simply to present for Philip's acceptance he two amendments just indicated, but also to demand from him the restoration of the little island of Halonnesus (near Skiathos), which he had taken since the peace. Philip denied that the island belonged to the Athenians, or that they had any right to make such a demand; affirming that he had taken it, not from them, but from a pirate named Sostratus, who was endangering the navigation of the neighbouring sea—and that it now belonged to him. If the Athenians disputed this, he offered to submit the question to arbitration; to restore the island to Athens, should the arbitrators decide against him—or to *give* it to her, even should they decide in his favour.<sup>2</sup>

Since we know that Philip treated Hegesippus and the other envoys with peculiar harshness, it is probable that the diplomatic argument between them, about Halonnesus as well as about other matters, was conducted with angry feeling on both sides. Hence an island, in itself small and insignificant, became the subject of prolonged altercation for two or three years. When Hegesippus and Demosthenês maintained that Philip

B.C. 343.

Dispute about Halonnesus.

The Athenians refuse to accept cession of Halonnesus as a favour, claiming restitution of it as their right.

ἐδωχέναι (Philip contends that he never tendered the terms of peace or amendment) μηδὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις αὐτ' εἰρηχέναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς . . . . . τοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπῳ (the second amendment) ὁμολογῶν ἐν τῇ ἐπιτολῇ, ὡς ἀκούετε, δίκαιόν τ' εἶναι καὶ ἐχέσθαι, &c.

Hegesippus was much denounced by the philippising orators at Athens (Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 44). His embassy to Philip has been treated by some authors as enforcing a "grossly sophistical construction of an article in the peace," which Philip justly re-

sented. But in my judgement it was no construction of the original treaty, nor was there any sophistry on the part of Athens. It was an amended clause, presented by the Athenians in place of the original. They never affirmed that the amended clause meant the same thing as the clause prior to amendment. On the contrary, they imply that the meaning is *not* the same—and it is on that ground that they submit the amended form of words.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 77, and the Epistola

had wronged the Athenians about Halonnesus, and that it could only be received from him in restitution of rightful Athenian ownership, not as a gift *proprio motu*—Æschinês and others treated the question with derision, as a controversy about syllables.<sup>1</sup> “Philip (they said) offers to give us Halonnesus. Let us take it and set the question at rest. What need to care whether he *gives it* to us, or *gives it back* to us?” The comic writers made various jests on the same verbal distinction, as though it were a mere silly subtlety. But though party-orators and wits might here find a point to turn or a sarcasm to place, it is certain that well-conducted diplomacy, modern as well as ancient, has been always careful to note the distinction as important. The question here had no reference to capture during war, but during peace. No modern diplomatist will accept restitution of what has been unlawfully taken, if he is called upon to recognise it as gratuitous cession from the captor. The plea of Philip—that he had taken the island, not from Athens, but from the pirate Sostratus—was not a valid excuse, assuming that the island really belonged to Athens. If Sostratus had committed piratical damage, Philip ought to have applied to Athens for redress, which he evidently did not do. It was only in case of redress being refused that he could be entitled to right himself by force; and even then, it may be doubted whether his taking of the island could give him any right to it against Athens. The Athenians refused his proposition of arbitration; partly because they were satisfied of their own right to the island—partly because they were jealous of admitting Philip to any recognised right of interference with their insular ascendancy.<sup>2</sup>

Halonnesus remained under garrison by Philip, forming one among many topics of angry communication taken and retaken—reprisals between Philip and the Athenians. by letters and by envoys, between him and Athens—until at length (seemingly about 340 B.C.) the inhabitants of the neighbouring island of Peparêthus retook it and carried off his garrison. Upon this proceeding Philip addressed

Philippi, p. 162. The former says, ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιοῦτους λόγους, ὅτε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν, ὡς ληστὰς ἀφελόμενος ταύτην τὴν νῆσον κτήσαιοτο, καὶ προσήγειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι.

Philip's letter agrees as to the main facts.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 65. c. 30. περὶ συλλαβῶν διαφερομένος, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 78.90.

several remonstrances, both to the Peparethians and to the Athenians. Obtaining no redress, he attacked Peparêthus, and took severe revenge upon the inhabitants. The Athenians then ordered their admiral to make reprisals upon him, so that the war, though not yet actually declared, was approaching nearer and nearer towards renewal.<sup>1</sup>

But it was not only in Halonnesus that Athens found herself beset by Philip and the philippising factions. Even her own frontier on the side towards Bœotia now required constant watching, since the Thebans had been relieved from their Phokian enemies; so that she was obliged to keep garrisons of hoplites at Drymus and Panaktum.<sup>2</sup> In Megara an insurgent party under Perilaus had laid plans for seizing the city through the aid of a body of Philip's troops, which could easily be sent from the Macedonian army now occupying Phokis, by sea to Pegæ, the Megarian port on the Krissæan Gulf. Apprised of this conspiracy, the Megarian government solicited aid from Athens. Phokion, conducting the Athenian hoplites to Megara with the utmost celerity, assured the safety of the city, and at the same time re-established the Long Walls to Nisæa, so as to render it always accessible to Athenians by sea.<sup>3</sup> In Eubœa, the cities of Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the philippising leaders, and became hostile to Athens. In Oreus, the greater part of the citizens were persuaded to second the views of Philip's chief adherent Philistidês; who prevailed on them to silence the remonstrances, and imprison the person, of the opposing leader Euphræus, as a disturber of the public peace. Philistidês then, watching his opportunity, procured the introduction of a body of Macedonian troops, by means of

Movements  
of the philippising  
factions  
at Megara  
—at Oreus  
—at  
Eretria.

<sup>1</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 162. The oration of Pseudo-Demosthenês De Halonneso is a discourse addressed to the people on one of these epistolary communications of Philip, brought by some envoys who had also addressed the people *vivâ voce*. The latter of Philip adverted to several other topics besides, but that of Halonnesus came first.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 446. I take these words to denote, not

any one particular outmarch to these places, but a standing guard kept there since the exposure of the northern frontier of Attica after the peace. For the great importance of Panaktum, as a frontier position between Athens and Thebes, see Thucydidês, v. 35, 36, 39.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. Fals. Leg. p. 368, 435, 446, 448; Philippic iv. p. 133; De Coronâ, p. 324; Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

whom he assured to himself the rule of the city as Philip's instrument; while Euphræus, agonised with grief and alarm, slew himself in prison. At Eretria, Kleitarchus with others carried on the like conspiracy. Having expelled their principal opponents, and refused admission to Athenian envoys, they procured 1000 Macedonian troops under Hipponikus; they thus mastered Eretria itself, and destroyed the fortified seaport called Porthmus, in order to break the easy communication with Athens. Oreus and Eretria are represented by Demosthenês as suffering miserable oppression under these two despots, Philistidês and Kleitarchus. On the other hand, Chalkis, the chief city in Eubœa, appeared to have been still free, and leaning to Athens rather than to Philip, under the predominant influence of a leading citizen named Kallias.

At this time, it appears, Philip was personally occupied with operations in Thrace, where he passed at least eleven months, and probably more,<sup>2</sup> leaving the management of affairs in Eubœa to his commanders in Phokis and Thessaly. He was now seemingly preparing his schemes for mastering the important outlets from the Euxine into the Ægean—the Bosphorus and Hellespont—and the Greek cities on those coasts. Upon these straits depended the main supply of imported corn for Athens and a large part of the Grecian world; and hence the great value of the Athenian possession of the Chersonese.

Respecting this peninsula, angry disputes now arose. To protect her settlers there established, Athens had sent Diopeithês with a body of mercenaries—unprovided with pay, however, and left to levy contributions where they could while Philip had taken under his protection and garrisoned Kardias—a city situated within the peninsula near its isthmus, but ill-disposed to Athens, asserting

<sup>1</sup> The general state of things, as here given, at Oreus and Eretria, existed at the time when Demosthenês delivered his two orations—the third Philippic and the oration on the Chersonese; in the late spring and summer of 341 B.C.

—De Chersoneso, p. 98, 99, 104. Philipp. iii. p. 112, 115, 125, 126.

... δουλεύουσι γεμαστιγούμεναι καὶ στραβλοόμεναι (the people of Eretria under Kleitarchus, p. 128).

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 9.

independence and admitted at the peace of 346 B.C., by Æschinês and the Athenian envoys, as an ally of Philip to take part in the peace-oaths.<sup>1</sup> In conjunction with the Kardiens, Philip had appropriated and distributed lands which the Athenian settlers affirmed to be theirs; and when they complained he insisted that they should deal with Kardia as an independent city, by reference to arbitration.<sup>2</sup> This they refused, though their envoy Æschinês had recognised Kardia as an independent ally of Philip when the peace was sworn.

Here was a state of conflicting pretensions out of which hostilities were sure to grow. The Macedonian troops overran the Chersonese, while Diopeithês on his side made excursions out of the peninsula, invading portions of Thrace subject to Philip; who sent letters of remonstrance to Athens.<sup>3</sup> While thus complaining at Athens, Philip was at the same time pushing his conquests in Thrace against the Thracian princes Kersobleptês, Terês, and Sitalkês,<sup>4</sup> upon whom the honorary grant of Athenian citizenship had been conferred.

The complaints of Philip, and the speeches of his partisans at Athens, raised a strong feeling against Diopeithês at Athens, so that the people seemed disposed to recall and punish him. It was against this step that Demosthenês protests in his speech on the Chersonese. Both that speech, and his third Philippic were delivered in 341-340 B.C.; seemingly in the last half of 41 B.C. In both, he resumes that energetic and uncompromising tone of hostility towards Philip, which had characterized the first Philippic and the Olynthiacs. He calls upon his countrymen not only to sustain Diopeithês, but also to renew the war vigorously against Philip in every other way. Philip (he says), while pretending in words to keep the peace, had long ago broken it by acts, and by aggressions in numberless quarters. If Athens chose to imitate him by keeping the peace in name, let her do so; but at any rate, let her imitate him also by prosecuting a

Accusations against Diopeithês at Athens, by the philippising orators—Demosthenês defends him—speech on the Chersonese, and third Philippic.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. p. 677; De Fals. Leg. p. 396; De Chersoneso, . 104, 105.

<sup>2</sup> Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, . 87.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Chersoneso, p. 93; Pseudo-Demosth. De Halonneso, p. 87; Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 161.

<sup>4</sup> Epistol. Philipp. 1. c.

strenuous war in reality.<sup>1</sup> Chersonesus, the ancient possession of Athens, could be protected only by encouraging and reinforcing Diopieithês; Byzantium also was sure to become the next object of Philip's attack, and ought to be preserved, as essential to the interests of Athens, though hitherto the Byzantines had been disaffected towards her. But even these interests, important as they were, must be viewed only as parts of a still more important whole. The Hellenic world altogether was in imminent danger;<sup>2</sup> over-riden by Philip's prodigious military force; torn in pieces by local factions leaning upon his support; and sinking every day into degradation more irrecoverable. There was no hope of rescue for the Hellenic name except from the energetic and well-directed military action of Athens. She must stand forth in all her might and resolution; her citizens must serve in person, pay direct taxes readily and forego for the time their festival-fund; when they have thus shown themselves ready to bear the real pinch and hardship of the contest, then let them send round envoys to invoke the aid of other Greeks against the common enemy.

Such, in its general tone, is the striking harangue known as the third Philippic. It appears that the Athenians were now coming round more into harmony with Demosthenês than they had ever been before. They perceived—what the orator had long ago pointed out—that Philip went on pushing from one acquisition to another, and became only the more dangerous in proportion as others were quiescent. They were really alarmed for the safety of the two important positions of the Hellespont and Bosphorus.

From this time to the battle of Chæronea the positive influence of Demosthenês in determining the proceedings of his countrymen, becomes very considerable. He had already been employed several times as envoy—to Peloponnesus (344 B.C.), to Ambrakia, Leukas, Korkyra, the Illyrians, and Thessaly. He now moved, first a mission of envoys to Eubœa, where a plan of operations was probably concerted with Kallias and the Chalkidians—and subsequently, the despatch of a military force to the same island, again

B.C. 341-340.  
Increased  
influence  
of Demo-  
sthenês at  
Athens—  
Athenian  
expedition  
sent upon  
his motion  
to Eubœa  
—Oreus  
and Eretria  
are liber-  
ated, and  
Eubœa is  
detached  
from  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Philippic iii. p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Philippic iii. p. 118, 119.

<sup>3</sup> Philippic iii. p. 129, 130.

Oreus and Eretria.<sup>1</sup> This expedition, commanded by Phokion, was successful. Oreus and Eretria were liberated; Kleitarchus and Philistidês, with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island, though both in vain tried to propitiate Athens.<sup>2</sup> Kallias also, with the Chalkians of Eubœa, and the Megarians, contributed as auxiliaries to this success.<sup>3</sup> On his proposition, supported by Demosthenês, the attendance and tribute from deputies of the Euboic cities to the synod at Athens, were renounced; and in place of it was constituted an Euboic synod, sitting at Chalkis; independent of, yet allied with, Athens.<sup>4</sup> In this Euboic synod Kallias was the leading man; forward both as a partisan of Athens and as an enemy of Philip. He pushed his attack beyond the limits of Eubœa to the Gulf of Pagasæ, from whence probably came the Macedonian troops who had formed the garrison of Oreus under Philistidês. He here captured several of the towns allied with or garrisoned by Philip; together with various Macedonian vessels, the crews of which he sold as slaves. For these successes the Athenians awarded to him a public vote of thanks.<sup>5</sup> He also employed himself (during the autumn and winter of 341-340 B.C.) in travelling as missionary through Peloponnesus, to organise a confederacy against Philip. In that mission he strenuously urged the cities to send deputies to a congress at Athens, in the ensuing month Anthesterion (February), 340 B.C. But though he made flattering announcement at Athens of concurrence and support promised to him, the projected congress came to nothing.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 74.

<sup>3</sup> Stephanus Byz. v. Ὀρεός.

<sup>4</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> Æschinês greatly stigmatises Demosthenês for having deprived the Athenian synod of these important members. But the Eubœan members certainly had not been productive of any good to Athens: their attendance, real or nominal, at the synod, for some years past, was a formation of a free Euboic synod probably afforded the best chance of ensuring real harmony between the island and Athens.

Æschinês gives here a long detail of allegations, about the corrupt intrigues between Demosthenês and Kallias at Athens. Many of these allegations are impossible to reconcile with what we know of the course of history at the time. We must recollect that Æschinês makes the statement eleven years after the events.

<sup>5</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159.

<sup>6</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. l. c. Æschinês here specifies the month, but not the year. It appears to

B.C. 340  
(Spring).  
Mission  
of Demo-  
sthenês  
to the  
Chersonese  
and Byzan-  
tium—his  
important  
services in  
detaching  
the Byzan-  
tines from  
Philip, and  
bringing  
them into  
alliance  
with  
Athens.

While the important success in Eubœa relieved Athens from anxiety on that side, Demosthenês was sent as envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. He would doubtless encourage Diopeithês, and may perhaps have carried to him some reinforcements. But his services were principally useful at Byzantium. That city had long been badly disposed towards Athens—from recollections of the Social War, and from jealous about the dues on corn-ships passing the Bosphorus; moreover, it had been for some time in alliance with Philip; who was now exerting all his efforts to prevail on the Byzantines to join him in active warfare against Athens. So effectively did Demosthenês employ his eloquence at Byzantium, that he frustrated this purpose, overcame the unfriendly sentiment of the citizens, and brought them to see how much it concerned both their interest and their safety to combine with Athens in resisting the farther preponderance of Philip. The Byzantines, together with their allies and neighbours the Perinthians, contracted alliance with Athens. Demosthenês takes just pride in having achieved for his countrymen this success as a statesman and diplomatist, in spite of adverse probabilities. Had Philip been able to obtain the active cooperation of Byzantium and Perinthus, he would have become master of the corn-supply and probably of the Hellespont also, so that war in those regions would have become almost impracticable for Athens.<sup>1</sup>

As this unexpected revolution in the policy of Byzantium was eminently advantageous to Athens, it was proportionally mortifying to Philip; w

me that Anthesterion, 340 B.C. (Olymp. 109, 4), is the most likely date; though Böhnecke and others place it a year earlier.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 254, 304, 308. βουλόμενος τῆς σιτοπομπίας κύριος γενέσθαι, (Philip,) παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θράκης Βυζαντίους συμμάχους ὄντας αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡΐσις συμπολεμεῖν τὸν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον, &c.  
ἡ μὲν ἐμὴ πολίτευς . . . ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἔχειν Φίλιππον,

λαβόντα Βυζάντιον, συμπολεμεῖν τὸ Βυζαντίους μεθ' ἡμῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν (ἐποίησεν) . . . Τίς ὁ κωλύσας Ἑλλήσποντον ἄλλοτριωθῆναι κατ' ἐνοῦς τοὺς χρόνους; (p. 255.)

Compare Æschinês adv. Ktes. p. 90.

That Demosthenês foresaw, several months earlier, the plan of Philip upon Byzantium, is evident from the orations De Cherson. p. 98-106, and Philippic iii. p.

presented it so much, that he shortly afterwards commenced the siege of Perinthus by land and sea,<sup>1</sup> a little before Midsummer 340 B.C. He brought up his fleet through the Hellespont into the Propontis, and protected it in its passage, against the attack of the Athenians in the Chersonese,<sup>2</sup> by causing his land-force to traverse and lay waste that peninsula. This was a violation of Athenian territory, adding one more to the already accumulated causes of war. At the same time, it appears that he now let loose his cruisers against the Athenian merchantmen, many of which were captured and appropriated. These captures, together with the incursions on the Chersonese, served as last additional provocations, working up the minds of the Athenians to a positive declaration of war.<sup>3</sup> Shortly after Midsummer 340 B.C., at the beginning of the archonship of Theophrastus, they passed a formal decree<sup>4</sup> to remove the column on which the peace of 346 B.C. stood recorded, and to renew the war openly and explicitly against Philip. It seems probable that this was done while Demosthenês was still absent on his mission at the Hellespont and Bosphorus; for he expressly states that none of the decrees immediately bringing on hostilities were moved by him, but all of them by other citizens;<sup>5</sup> a statement which we

commences the siege of Perinthus—he marches through the Chersonesus—declaration of war by Athens against him.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 74.

<sup>2</sup> Epistola Philippi ap. Demosth. p. 163.

<sup>3</sup> That these were the two last causes which immediately preceded and determined the declaration of war, we may see by Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 249—Καὶ μὲν τὴν ἰσθμὸν γ' ἐκεῖνος ἔλυσε τὰ πλοῖα αὐτῶν, οὐχ ἡ πόλις, &c.

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ φανερώς ἤδη τὰ πλοῖα πορεύετο, Χερρόνησος ἐπορεύετο, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ' ἄνθρωπος, οὐκέτ' ἐν ἀμφισβητησίμῳ τὰ πράγματα ἦν, ἀλλ' ἐνειστῆχει πόλεμος, &c. p. 274).

<sup>4</sup> Philochorus, Frag. 135, ed. Diot; Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 38-741; Diodorus, xvi. 77. The citation given by Dionysius out of Philochorus is on one point not

quite accurate. It states that Demosthenês moved the decisive resolution for declaring war; whereas Demosthenês himself tells us that none of the motions at this juncture were made by him (De Coronâ, p. 250).

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250. It will be seen that I take no notice of the two decrees of the Athenians, and the letter of Philip, embodied in the oration De Coronâ, p. 249, 250, 251. I have already stated that all the documents which we read as attached to this oration are so tainted either with manifest error or with causes of doubt, that I cannot cite them as authorities in this history, wherever they stand alone. Accordingly, I take no account either of the supposed

may reasonably believe, since he would be rather proud than ashamed of such an initiative.

About the same time, as it would appear, Philip on his side addressed a manifesto and declaration of war to the Athenians. In this paper he enumerated many wrongs done by them to him, and still remaining unredressed in spite of former remonstrance; for which wrongs he announced his intention of taking a just revenge by open hostilities.<sup>1</sup> He adverted to the seizure, on Macedonian soil, of Nikias his herald carrying despatches; the Athenian (he alleged) had detained this herald as prisoner for ten months and had read the despatches publicly in their assembly. He complained that Athens had encouraged the inhabitants of Thasos, in harbouring triremes from Byzantium and privateers from other quarters, to the annoyance of Macedonian commerce. He dwelt on the aggressive proceedings of Diopieithês in Thrace, and of Kallias in the Gulf of Pagasæ. He denounced the application made by Athens to the Persians for aid against him, as a departure from Hellenic patriotism, and from the Athenian maxim of aforetime. He alluded to the unbecoming intervention

of the siege of Selymbria, mentioned in Philip's pretended letter, but mentioned nowhere else—nor of the twenty Athenian ships captured by the Macedonian admiral Amyntas, and afterwards restored by Philip on the remonstrance of the Athenians, mentioned in the pretended Athenian decree moved by Eubulus. Neither Demosthenês, nor Philochorus, nor Diodorus, nor Justin, says anything about the siege of Selymbria, though all of them allude to the attacks on Byzantium and Perinthus. I do not believe that the siege of Selymbria ever occurred. Moreover, Athenian vessels captured, but afterwards restored by Philip on remonstrance from the Athenians, can hardly have been the actual cause of war.

The pretended decrees and letter do not fit the passage of Demosthenês to which they are attached.

<sup>1</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demost. p. 165. This Epistle of Philip to the Athenians appears here inserted among the orations of Demosthenês. Some critics reject it as spurious, but I see no sufficient ground for such an opinion. Whether it be the composition of Philip himself, or of some Greek employed in Philip's cabinet, is a point which we have no means of determining.

The oration of Demosthenês which is said to be delivered in reply to this letter of Philip (Orat. xi.), is, in my judgement, wrongly described. Not only it has no peculiar bearing on the points contained in the letter—but it must also be two or three months late in date, since it mentions the assistance by the Persian satraps to Perinthus, and the raising of the siege of that city by Philip (p. 163).

of Athens in defence of the Thracian princes Terês and Kersobleptês, neither of them among the sworn partners in the peace, against him; to the protection conferred by Athens on the inhabitants of Peparêthus, whom he had punished for hostilities against his garrison in Halonnesus; to the danger incurred by his fleet in sailing up the Hellespont, from the hostilities of the Athenian settlers in the Chersonese, who had cooperated with his enemies the Byzantines, and had rendered it necessary for him to guard the ships by marching a land-force through the Chersonese. He vindicated his own proceedings in aiding his allies the inhabitants of Kardia, complaining that the Athenians had refused to submit their differences with that city to an equitable arbitration. He repelled the Athenian pretensions of right to Amphipolis, asserting his own better right to the place, on all grounds. He insisted especially on the offensive behaviour of the Athenians, in refusing, when he had sent envoys conjointly with all his allies, to "conclude a just convention on behalf of the Greeks generally."—"Had you acceded to this proposition (he said), you might have placed out of danger all those who really suspected my purposes, or you might have exposed me publicly as the most worthless of men. It was to the interest of your people to accede, but not to the interest of your orators. To them—as those affirm who know your government best—peace is war, and war, peace; for they always make money at the expense of your generals, either as accusers or as defenders; moreover, by reviling in the public assembly your leading citizens at home, and other men of eminence abroad, they acquire with the multitude credit for popular dispositions. It would be easy for me, by the most trifling presents, to silence their invectives and make them trumpet my praises. But I should be ashamed of appearing to purchase your good-will from *them*."<sup>1</sup>

It is of little moment to verify or appreciate the particular complaints here set forth, even if we had adequate information for the purpose. Under the feeling which had prevailed during the last two years between the Athenians and Philip, we cannot doubt that many detached acts of a

Complaints  
of Philip  
against  
the Athe-  
nians—  
his policy  
towards

<sup>1</sup> Epistol. Philipp. ap. Demosth. p. 159, 164; compare Isokratês, Or. v. (Philip.) s. 82.

Athens—  
his lecture  
on the  
advantages  
of peace.

hostile character had been committed on their side as well as on his. Philip's allegation—that he had repeatedly proposed to them amicable adjustment of differences—whether true or not, is little to the purpose. It was greatly to his interest to keep Athens at peace and tranquil, while he established his ascendancy everywhere else, and accumulated a power for ultimate employment such as she would be unable to resist. The Athenians had at length been made to feel, that farther acquiescence in these proceedings would only ensure to them the amount of favour tendered by Polyphemus to Odysseus—that they should be devoured last. But the lecture, which he thinks fit to administer both to them and to their popular orators, is little better than insulting derision. It is strange to read encomiums on peace—as if it were indisputably advantageous to the Athenian public, and as if recommendations of war originated only with venal and calumnious orators for their own profit—pronounced by the greatest aggressor and conqueror of his age, whose whole life was passed in war and in the elaborate organisation of great military force; and addressed to a people whose leading infirmity then was, an aversion almost unconquerable to the personal hardships and pecuniary sacrifices of effective war. This passage of the manifesto may probably be intended as a theme for Æschinês and the other philippising partisans in the Athenian assembly.

B.C. 340  
(Autumn).  
Open war  
between  
Philip and  
the Athe-  
nians.  
Siege of  
Perinthus  
by Philip.  
His

War was now an avowed fact on both sides. At the instigation of Demosthenês and others, the Athenians decreed to equip a naval force, which was sent under Charês to the Hellespont and Propontis.

Meanwhile Philip brought up to the siege of Perinthus an army of 30,000 men, and a stock of engines and projectiles such as had never before been seen.<sup>1</sup> His attack on this place was

<sup>1</sup> How much improvement Philip had made in engines for siege, as a part of his general military organisation—is attested in a curious passage of a later author on mechanics. Athenæus, *De Machinis* ap. Auctor. *Mathem. Veter.* p. 3, ed. Paris. — ἐπίδοσιν δὲ ἔλαβεν ἡ τοιαύτη μηχανοποιία ἅπασα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ Διονυσίου τοῦ Σικελιώτου ταραν-

νίδα, κατὰ τε τὴν Φιλίππου τοῦ Ἀμόντου βασιλείαν, ὅτε ἐπολιόρχε Βυζαντίους Φίλιππος. Εὐήμεραι δι τῇ τοιαύτῃ τέχνῃ Παλύειδος ὁ θεσσαλός, οὗ οἱ μαθηταὶ συνεστρατεύοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ.

Respecting the engines employed by Dionysius of Syracuse, see *Diodor.* xiv. 42, 48, 50.

remarkable not only for great bravery and perseverance on both sides, but also for the extended scale of the military operations.<sup>1</sup> Perinthus was strong and defensible; situated on a promontory terminating in abrupt cliffs southward towards the Propontis, unassailable from seaward, but sloping, though with a steep declivity towards the land, with which it was joined by an isthmus of not more than a furlong in breadth. Across this isthmus stretched the outer wall, behind which were seen the houses of the town, lofty, strongly built, and rising one above the other in terraces up the ascent of the promontory. Philip pressed the place with repeated assaults on the outer wall; battering it with rams, undermining it by sap, and rolling up moveable towers said to be 120 feet in height (higher even than the towers of the Perinthus wall), so as to chase away the defenders by missiles, and to attempt an assault by boarding-planks hand to hand. The Perinthians, defending themselves with energetic valour, repelled him for a long time from the outer wall. At length the besieging engines, with the reiterated attacks of Macedonian soldiers animated by Philip's promises, overpowered this wall, and drove them back into the town. It was found, however, that the town itself supplied a new defensible position to its citizens. The lower range of houses, united by strong barricades across the streets, enabled the Perinthians still to hold out. In spite of all their efforts, however, the town would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had they not been sustained by effective foreign aid. Not only did their Byzantine kinsmen exhaust themselves to furnish every sort of assistance by sea, but also the Athenian fleet, and Persian satraps on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, cooperated. A body of Grecian mercenaries under Apollodorus, sent across from Asia by the Phrygian satrap Arsitês, together with ample supplies of stores by sea, placed Perinthus in condition to defy the besiegers.<sup>2</sup>

numerous  
engines  
for siege—  
great scale  
of oper-  
ations.  
Obstinacy  
of the  
defence.  
The town  
is relieved  
by the  
Byzantines  
and by  
Grecian  
mercen-  
aries  
from the  
Persian  
satraps.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 74-76; Plutarch, Vit. Alexandri, c. 70; also Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 215, and De Fortuna Alexand. p. 339.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. ad Philip. Epistol. p. 153; Diodor. xvi. 75; Pausanias, i. 29, 7.

B.C. 340.  
Philip  
attacks  
Byzantium  
—danger of  
the place—  
it is  
relieved  
by the  
fleets of  
Athens,  
Chios,  
Rhodes,  
&c. Suc-  
cess of the  
Athenian  
fleet in  
the Pro-  
pontis  
under  
Phokion.  
Philip  
abandons  
the sieges  
both of  
Perinthus  
and By-  
zantium.

After a siege which can hardly have lasted less than three months, Philip found all his efforts against Perinthus baffled. He then changed his plan, withdrew a portion of his forces, and suddenly appeared before Byzantium. The walls were strong, but inadequately manned and prepared; much of the Byzantine force being in service at Perinthus. Among several vigorous attacks, Philip contrived to effect a surprise on a dark and stormy night, which was very near succeeding. The Byzantines defended themselves bravely, and even defeated his fleet; but they too were rescued chiefly by foreign aid. The Athenians—now acting under the inspirations of Demosthenês, who exhorted them to bury in a generous oblivion all their past grounds of offence against Byzantium—sent a still more powerful fleet to the rescue, under the vigorous guidance of Phokion<sup>1</sup> instead of the loose and rapacious Charês. Moreover the danger of Byzantium called forth strenuous efforts from the chief islanders of the Ægean—Chians, Rhodians, Koans, &c., to whom it was highly important that Philip should not become master of the great passage for imported corn into the Grecian seas. The large combined fleet thus assembled was fully sufficient to protect Byzantium.<sup>2</sup> Compelled to abandon the siege of that city as well as of Perinthus, Philip was farther baffled in an attack on the Chersonese. Phokion not only maintained against him the full security of the Propontis

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 848-851. To this fleet of Phokion, Demosthenês contributed the outfit of a trireme, while the orator Hyperidês sailed with the fleet as trierarch. See Boeckh, Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen, p. 441, 442, 498. From that source the obscure chronology of the period now before us derives some light; since it becomes certain that the expedition of Charês began during the archonship of Nicomachidês; that is, in

the year *before* Midsummer 340 B.C.; while the expedition of Phokion and Kephisophon began in the year following—*after* Midsummer 340 B.C.

See some anecdotes respecting this siege of Byzantium by Philip, collected from later authors (Dionysius Byzantinus, Hesychius Milesius and others) by the diligence of Böhnecke—Forschungen, p. 479 *seqq.*

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 77; Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 17.

and its adjoining straits, but also gained various advantages over him both by land and sea.<sup>1</sup>

These operations probably occupied the last six months of 340 B.C. They constituted the most important success gained by Athens, and the most serious reverse experienced by Philip, since the commencement of war between them. Coming as they did immediately after the liberation of Eubœa in the previous year, they materially improved the position of Athens against Philip. Phokion and his fleet not only saved the citizens of Byzantium from all the misery of a capture by Macedonian soldiers, but checked privateering, and protected the traders so efficaciously, that corn became unusually abundant and cheap both at Athens and throughout Greece:<sup>2</sup> and Demosthenês, a statesman and diplomatist, enjoyed the credit of having converted Eubœa into a friendly and covering neighbour for Athens, instead of being a shelter for Philip's marauding cruisers—as well as of bringing round Byzantium from the Macedonian alliance to that of Athens, and thus preventing both the Hellespont and the corn-trade from passing into Philip's hands.<sup>3</sup> The warmest votes of thanks, together with wreaths in token of gratitude, were decreed to Athens by the public assemblies of Byzantium, Perinthus, and the various towns of the Chersonese;<sup>4</sup> while the Athenian public assembly also decreed and publicly proclaimed a similar vote of thanks and admiration to Demosthenês. The decree, moved by Aristonikûs, was so unanimously popular at the time, that neither Æschinês nor any of the other enemies of Demosthenês thought it safe to impeach the mover.<sup>5</sup>

B.C. 340.  
Votes of  
thanks  
from By-  
zantium  
and the  
Chersones-  
us to  
Athens  
for her  
aid—  
honours  
and com-  
pliments to  
Demo-  
sthenês.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255;

Plutarch, De Glor. Athen. p. 350.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 305, 306, 307: comp. p. 253. μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ ἀποστόλους πάντας ἀπέστειλα, ὅς οὗς Χερρόνησος ἐσώθη, καὶ Βυζαντίον καὶ πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι, &c.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 255, 257.

<sup>5</sup> That these votes of thanks were passed, is authenticated by the words of the oration itself. Documents are inserted in the oration,

purporting to be the decree of the Byzantines and Perinthians, and that of the Chersonese cities. I do not venture to cite these as genuine, considering how many of the other documents annexed to this oration are decidedly spurious.

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. p. 253. Aristonikûs is again mentioned, p. 302. A document appears, p. 253, purporting to be the vote of the Athenians to thank and crown Demosthenês, proposed by Aristonikûs. The

B.C. 339.

Philip  
withdraws  
from By-  
zantium,  
concludes  
peace with  
the Byzan-  
tines,  
Chians  
and others;  
and attacks  
the Scy-  
thians.  
He is  
defeated  
by the  
Triballi,  
and  
wounded,  
on his  
return.

In the recent military operations, on so large a scale against Byzantium and Perinthus, Philip found himself in conflict not merely with Athens but also with Chians, Rhodians and others; and an unusually large muster of confederate Greeks. To break up this confederacy, he found it convenient to propose peace, and to abandon his designs against Byzantium and Perinthus—the point on which the alarm of the confederates chiefly turned. By withdrawing his forces from the Propontis, he was enabled to conclude peace with the Byzantines and most of the maritime Greeks who had joined in relieving them. The combination against him was thus dissolved, though with Athens<sup>1</sup> and her more intimate allies his naval war still continued. While he multiplied cruisers and privateers to make up by prizes his heavy outlay during the late sieges, he undertook with his land-force an enterprise, during the spring of 339 B.C., against the Scythian king Atheas; who, in his country, between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, he invaded with success, bringing away as spoil a multitude of youthful slaves of both sexes, as well as cattle. On his return however across Mount Hæmus, he was attacked on a sudden by the Thracian tribe Triballi, and sustained defeat; losing all his accompanying captives, and being

name of the Athenian archon is wrong, as in all the other documents embodied in this oration, where the name of an Athenian archon appears.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus (xvi. 77) mentions this peace; stating that Philip raised the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus, and made peace πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας τοὺς ἐναντιούμενους.

Wesseling (ad loc.) and Weiske (De Hyperbolé, ii. p. 41) both doubt the reality of this peace. Neither Böhnecke nor Winiewski recognises it. Mr. Clinton admits it in a note to his Appendix 16. p. 292; though he does not insert it in his column of events in the tables.

I perfectly concur with these

authors in dissenting from Diodorus, so far as Athens is concerned. The supposition that peace was concluded between Philip and Athens at this time is distinctly negatived by the language of Isocrates (De Corona, p. 275, 276) and Demosthenês (De Corona, p. 275, 276) indirectly also by Æschinês. Both from Demosthenês and from Philochorus it appears sufficiently clear in my judgement, that the war between Philip and the Athenians went on without interruption from the summer of 340 B.C., to the battle of Chæroneia in August 338.

But I see no reason for disbelieving Diodorus, in so far as he states that Philip made peace with the other Greeks—Byzantines, Perinthians, Chians, Rhodians, &c.

himself badly wounded through the thigh.<sup>1</sup> This expedition and its consequences occupied Philip during the spring and summer of 339 B.C.

Meanwhile the naval war of Athens against Philip was more effectively carried on, and her marine better organised, than ever it had been before. This was chiefly owing to an important reform proposed and carried by Demosthenês, immediately on the declaration of war against Philip the summer of 340 B.C. Enjoying as he did, now after long public experience, the increased confidence of his fellow-citizens, and being named superintendent of the navy,<sup>2</sup> he employed his influence not only in procuring energetic interference both to Eubœa and Byzantium, but also in correcting deep-seated abuses which nullified the efficiency of the Athenian marine department.

B.C. 340-339.  
Important reform effected by Demosthenês in the administration of the Athenian marine.

The law of Periander (adopted in 357 B.C.) had distributed the burden of the trierarchy among the 100 richest citizens on the taxable property-rolle, arranged in twenty fractions called symmories, of sixty persons each. Among these, the 300 richest, standing distinguished, as heads of the Symmories, were invested with the direction and enforcement of all that concerned their collective agency and duties. The purpose of this law had been to transfer the cost of trierarchy—a sum of about 40, 50, or 60 mænæ for each trireme, defraying more or less the outfit—which had originally been borne by a single rich man as his turn came round, and afterwards by two rich men in conjunction—to a partnership more or less numerous, consisting of five, six, or even fifteen or sixteen members of the same symmory. The number of such partners varied according to the number of triremes required by the state to be fitted out in any one year. If only a few triremes were required, sixteen contributors might be allotted to defray collectively the trierarchic cost of each; if on the other hand many triremes were needed,

Abuses which had crept into the trierarchy—unfair apportionment of the burthen—undue exemption which the rich administrators had acquired for themselves.

Justin, ix. 2, 3. Æschinês alludes to this expedition against the Scythians during the spring of archon Theophrastus, or 339 B.C. (Æschin. cont. Ktesiph. p. 71).  
<sup>2</sup> Æschinês cont. Ktesiph. p. 85. c. 80. ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ναυτικοῦ.

a less number of partners, perhaps no more than five six, could be allotted to each—since the total number citizens whose turn it was to be assessed in that particular year was fixed. The assessment upon each partner was of course heavier, in proportion as the number of partners assigned to a trireme was smaller. Each member of the partnership, whether it consisted of five, of six, or of sixteen, contributed in equal proportion towards the cost. The richer members of the partnership thus paid no greater sum than the poorer; and sometimes even evaded the payment of their own, by contracting with some one to discharge the duties of the post, on condition of a total sum not greater than that which they had themselves collected from these poorer members.

According to Demosthenês, the poorer members of these trierarchic symmories were sometimes pressed down almost to ruin by the sums commanded; so that they complained bitterly, and even planted themselves in the characteristic attitude of suppliants at Munychia or elsewhere in the city. When their liabilities to the state were not furnished in time, they became subject to imprisonment by the officers superintending the outfit of the armament. In addition to such private hardships there arose great public mischief from the money being at once forthcoming; the armament being delayed in its departure, and forced to leave Peiræus either in bad condition or without its full numbers. Hence arose, in great part, the ill-success of Athens in her maritime enterprises against Philip, before the peace of 346 B.C.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. *De Corona*, p. 260-262. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς (τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τῶν συμμοριῶν) ἐκ μὲν τῶν προτέρων νόμων συνεκχαίδεα λειτούργειν—αὐτοῖς μὲν μικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν ἀναλίσκουσιν, τοὺς δ' ἀπόρους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπιτρίβουσιν... ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ νόμου τὸ γιγνόμενον κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἕκαστον τιθέναι καὶ δυοῖν ἐφάνη τριτάρχος ὁ τῆς μῆδος ἕκτος καὶ δέκατος πρότερον συντελής· οὐδὲ γὰρ τριτάρχους ἐτι ὠνόμαζον ἑαυτούς, ἀλλὰ συντελεῖς.

The trierarchy, and the trierarchic symmories, at Athens, are subjects not perfectly known; the

best expositions respecting them are to be found in Boeckh's *Public Economy of Athens* (b. iv. 11-13), and in his other work *Urkunden über das Attische Staatswesen* (ch. xi. xii. xiii.); see Parreidt, *De Symmoriis*, part i. 22, *seq.*

The fragment of Hyperidês (cited by Harpokration v. Συμμορία), alluding to the trierarchic reform of Demosthenês, though briefly and obscurely, is an interesting confirmation of the oration *De Corona*.

<sup>2</sup> There is a point in the early oration of Demosthenês *De Symmoria*

The same influences, which had led originally to the introduction of such abuses, stood opposed to the orator in his attempted amendment. The body of Three Hundred, the richest men in the state—the leader or richest individual in each symmory, with those who stood second or third in order of wealth—employed every effort to throw out the proposition, and tendered large bribes to Demosthenês (if we may credit his assertion) as inducements for dropping it. He was impeached moreover under the *Graphê Paranomon*, as mover of an unconstitutional or illegal decree. It required no small share of firmness and public spirit, combined with approved eloquence and an established name, to enable Demosthenês to contend against these mighty enemies.

Opposition offered by the rich citizens and by Æschinês to the proposed reform of Demosthenês—difficulties which he had to overcome.

His new law caused the charge of trierarchy to be levied upon all the members of the symmories, upon all above a certain minimum of property, in proportion to their rated property; but it seems, if we rightly make out, to have somewhat lightened the minimum, so that the aggregate

His new reform distributes the burthen of trierarchy equitably.

wealth, illustrating the grievance which he now reformed. That grievance consisted, for one main reason, in the fact, that the richest citizen in a trierarchic partnership paid a sum no greater (sometimes even less) than the poorest. Now it is remarkable that this unfair portionment of charge might have occurred, and is noway guarded against, in the symmories proposed by Demosthenês himself. His symmories, each comprising sixty persons or  $\frac{1}{20}$ th of the total active 1200, are directed to divide themselves into five sections of twelve persons each,  $\frac{1}{100}$ th of the 1200. Each group of twelve is to comprise the richest alongside of the poorest members—the sixty (ἀνταναπληροῦντας πρὸς εὐπορωτάτων ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀπορωτάτας, p. 182), so that each group would contain individuals very

unequal in wealth, though the aggregate wealth of one group would be nearly equal to that of another. These twelve persons were to defray collectively the cost of trierarchy for one ship, two ships, or three ships, according to the number of ships which the state might require (p. 183). But Demosthenês nowhere points out in what proportions they were to share the expense among them; whether the richest citizens among the twelve were to pay only an equal sum with the poorest, or a sum greater in proportion to their wealth. There is nothing in his project to prevent the richer members from insisting that all should pay equally. This is the very abuse that he denounced afterwards (in 340 B.C.), as actually realized—and corrected by a new law. The oration of Demosthenês

number of persons chargeable was diminished.<sup>1</sup> Every citizen rated at ten talents was assessed singly for the charge of trierarchy belonging to one trireme; if rated at twenty talents, for the trierarchy of two; at thirty talents, for the trierarchy of three; if above thirty talents for that of three triremes and a service boat—which was held to be the maximum payable by any single individual. Citizens rated at less than ten talents, were grouped together into ratings of ten talents in the aggregate, in order to bear collectively the trierarchy of one trireme; the contributions furnished by each person in the group being proportional to the sum for which he stood rated. The new proposition, while materially relieving the poor citizens, made large addition to the assessments of the rich. A man rated at twenty talents, who had before been chargeable for only the sixteenth part of the expense of one trierarchy, along with partners much poorer than himself but equally assessed—now became chargeable with the entire expense of two trierarchies. All persons liable were assessed in fair proportion to the sum for which they stood rated in the schedule. When the impeachment against Demosthenês came to be tried before the Dikasteria he was acquitted by more than four-fifths of the Dikastes, so that the accuser was compelled to pay the establishment fine. And so animated was the temper of the public at that moment, in favour of vigorous measures for prosecuting the war just declared, that they went heartily along with him, and adopted the main features of his trierarchy reform. The resistance from the rich, however, though insufficient to throw out the measure, constrained him to modify it more than once, during the progress of the discussion;<sup>2</sup> partly in consequence of the opposition

De Symmoriis, omitting as it does all positive determination as to proportions of payment, helps us to understand how the abuse grew up.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 85) charges Demosthenês with "having stolen away from the city the trierarchs of 65 swift-sailing vessels." This implies, I imagine, that the new law diminished the total number of persons chargeable with trierarchy.

<sup>2</sup> Deinarchus adv. Demosthen. 95. s. 43. Εἰσὶ τινες ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τριακοσίοις γεγενημένων ὅθ' οὗτος (Demosthenês) ἐτίθει περὶ τῶν τριηράρχων νόμον. Οὐκ ἔσπευτε τοῖς πλεῖστον ὅτι τρία τάλαντα λαβὼν μετέγραψε καὶ μετεσχεύαζε νόμον καθ' ἑκάστην ἐκκλησίαν, καὶ μὲν ἐπώλει ὧν εἰλήρει τὴν τιμὴν δ' ἀποδόμενος οὐκ ἐβεβαίοντο;

Without accepting this assertion of a hostile speaker, so far as it goes to accuse Demosthenês

Eschinês, whom he accuses of having been hired by the rich for the purpose.<sup>1</sup> It is deeply to be regretted that the speeches of both of them—especially those of Demosthenês, which must have been numerous—have not been preserved.

Thus were the trierarchic symmories distributed and assessed anew upon each man in the ratio of his wealth, and therefore most largely upon the Three Hundred richest.<sup>2</sup> How long the law remained unchanged, we do not know. But it was found to work admirably well; and Demosthenês boasts that during the entire war (that is, from the renewal of the war about August 40 B.C., to the battle of Chæroneia in August 38 B.C.) all the trierarchies named under the law were ready in time without complaint or suffering; while the ships, well equipped and exempt from the previous causes of delay, were found prompt and effective for all exigences. Not one was either left behind, or lost at sea, throughout these two years.<sup>3</sup>

Its complete success. Improved efficiency of the naval armaments under it.

having accepted bribes—we may safely accept it so far as it affirms that he made several changes and modifications in the law before it was finally passed; a fact not at all surprising, considering the intense opposition which it called forth.

Some of the Dikasts, to whom the speech written by Deinarchus was addressed, had been included among the Three Hundred (that is, the richest citizens in the state) when Demosthenês proposed his trierarchic reform. This will show, among various other proofs which might be produced, that the Athenian Dikasts did not always belong to the poorest class of citizens, as the jests of Aristophanês would lead us to believe.

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 329. Boeckh (Attisch. Seewesen, p. 183, and Publ. Econ. Ath. iv. 14) thinks that this passage—διτάλαντον δ' ἔχας ἔρανον δωρεάν παρὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων τῶν συμμοριῶν, ἐφ' οἷς ἐλυμῆναι τὸν τριηραρχικὸν νόμον—must allude to injury done by Æschinês

to the law in later years, after it became a law. But I am unable to see the reason for so restricting its meaning. The rich men would surely bribe most highly, and raise most opposition, against the *first passing* of the law, as they were then most likely to be successful; and Æschinês, whether bribed or not bribed, would most naturally as well as most effectively stand out against the novelty introduced by his rival, without waiting to see it actually become a part of the laws of the state.

<sup>2</sup> See the citation from Hyperidês in Harpokrat. v. Συμμορία. The Symmories are mentioned in Inscription xiv. of Boeckh's Urkunden über das Attische Seewesen (p. 465), which Inscription bears the date of 325 B.C. Many of these Inscriptions name individual citizens, in different numbers, three, five, or six, as joint trierarchs of the same vessel.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 262.

Probably the first fruits of the Demosthenic reform in Athenian naval administration, was, the fleet equipped under Phokion, which acted so successfully at and near Byzantium. The operations of Athens at sea, though not known in detail, appear to have been better conducted and more prosperous in their general effect than they had ever been since the Social War.

But there arose now a grave and melancholy dispute in the interior of Greece, which threw her upon her defence by land. This new disturbing cause was nothing less than another Sacred War, declared by the Amphiktyonic assembly against the Lokrians of Amphissa. Kindled chiefly by the Athenian Æschinês, it more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium and his defeat by the Triballi; bringing, like the former Sacred War, aggravation and disement to him alone, and ruin to Grecian liberty.

I have recounted, in an earlier portion of this work, the first Sacred War recorded in Grecian history (590-580 B.C.), about two centuries before the birth of Æschinês and Demosthenês. That war had been undertaken by the Amphiktyonic Greeks to punish, and ended by destroying, the flourishing sea-port of Kirrha, situated near the mouth of the river Pleistus, on the coast of the fertile plain stretching from the southern declivity of Delphi to the sea. Kirrha was originally the port of Delphi; and of the ancient Phokian town of Krissa, to which Delphi was once an annexed sanctuary.<sup>2</sup> But in process of time Kirrha increased at the expense of both; through profits accumulated from the innumerable visitors by whom she was approached, who landed there as the nearest access to the temple. The prosperous Kirrhæans, inspiring jealousy at Delphi and Krissa, were accused of extortion in the tolls levied from visitors, as well as of other guilty or offensive proceedings.

An Amphiktyonic war, wherein the Athenian Solon stood prominently forward, being declared against them, Kirrha was taken and destroyed. Its fertile plain was consecrated to the Delphian god, under an oath taken by all the

<sup>1</sup> Chap. XXVIII.

<sup>2</sup> For the topography of the country round Delphi, see the instructive work of Ulrichs, *Reisen*

und Forschungen in Griechenland (Bremen, 1840), chapters i. and ii. about Kirrha and Krissa.

Amphiktyonic members, with solemn pledges and formidable imprecations against all disturbers. The entire space between the temple and the sea now became, as the oracle had required, sacred property of the god; that is, incapable of being tilled, planted, or occupied in any permanent way, by man, and devoted only to spontaneous herbage with pasturing animals.

But though the Delphians thus procured the extirpation of their troublesome neighbours at Kirrha, it was indispensable that on or near the same spot there should exist a town and port, for the accommodation of the guests who came from all quarters to Delphi; the more so, as such persons, not merely visitors, but also traders with goods to sell, now came in greater multitudes than ever, from the increased attractions imparted out of the rich spoils of Kirrha itself, at the Pythian festival. How this want was at first supplied, while the remembrance of the death was yet fresh, we are not informed. But

Necessity of a port at Kirrha, for the convenience of visitors to Delphi. Kirrha grows up again, and comes into the occupation of the Lokrians of Amphissa.

in the process of time Kirrha became re-occupied and re-fortified by the western neighbours of Delphi—the Lokrians of Amphissa—on whose borders it stood, and for whom probably it served as a port not less than for Delphi. These new occupants received the guests coming to the temple, enriched themselves by the accompanying profit, and took to cultivation a certain portion of the plain around the town.<sup>1</sup>

At what period the occupation by the Lokrians had its origin, we are unable to say. So much however we take out—not merely from Demosthenês, but even from Æschinês—that in their time it was an ancient and established occupation—not a recent intrusion or novelty. The town was fortified; the space immediately adjacent being held and claimed by the Lokrians as their own.<sup>2</sup> This indeed was a departure from the oath, sworn by Solon and his Amphiktyonic contemporaries, to consecrate Kirrha

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 69; stadia.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Livy, xlii. 5; Pausanias 7, 4. The distance from Delphi to Kirrha is given by Pausanias at 70 stadia, or about seven English miles, by Strabo at eighty

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês, l. c.; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. τὴν χώραν ἣν οἱ μὲν Ἀμφισσειεὶς σφῶν αὐτῶν γεωργεῖν ἔφεσαν, οὗτος δὲ (Æschinês) τῆς ἐκτῆς χώρας ἡτιᾶτο εἶναι, &c.

and its lands to the Delphian god. But if that oath had been literally carried out, the god himself, and the Delphians among whom he dwelt, would have been the principal losers; because the want of a convenient port would have been a serious discouragement, if not a positive barrier, against the arrival of visitors, most of whom came by sea. Accordingly the renovation of the town and port of Kirrha, doubtless on a modest scale, together with a space of adjacent land for tillage, was at least tolerated, if not encouraged. Much of the plain, indeed, still remained untilled and unplanted, as the property of Apollo; the boundaries being perhaps not accurately drawn.

While the Lokrians had thus been serviceable to the Delphian temple by occupying Kirrha, they had been still more valuable as its foremost auxiliaries and protectors against the Phokians, their enemies of long standing.<sup>1</sup> One of the first objects of Philomelus the Phokian, after defeating the Lokrian armed force, was to fortify the sacred precinct of Delphi on its western side against their attacks;<sup>2</sup> and we cannot doubt that their position in close neighbourhood to Delphi must have been one of positive suffering as well as of danger, during the years when the Phokian leaders, with their numerous mercenary bands, remained in victorious occupation of the temple, and probably of the harbour of Kirrha also. The subsequent turn of fortune—when Philip crushed the Phokians and when the Amphiktyonic assembly was reorganised, with him as its chief—must have found the Amphissian Lokrians among the warmest allies and sympathisers. Resuming possession of Kirrha, they may perhaps have been emboldened, in such a moment of triumphant reaction, to enlarge their occupancy round the walls to a greater extent than they had done before. Moreover they were animated with feelings attached to Thebes; and were hostile to Athens, the ally and upholder of their enemies the Phokians.

Matters were in this condition when the spring meeting of the Amphiktyonic assembly (February or March 339 B.C.) was held at Delphi. Iphikletus was named by the Athenians to attend as Hieromnemon, or chief legate; with the

B.C. 339.

Amphiktyonic meeting at Delphi—

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 24; Thucyd. iii. 101.    <sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 25.

lagoræ or vice-legates, Æschinês, Meidias, and Thrasyklês.<sup>1</sup> We need hardly believe Demosthenês, when he states that the name of Æschinês was put up without foreknowledge on the part of any one; and that though it passed, yet not more than two or three hands were held up in its favour.<sup>2</sup> Soon after they reached Delphi, Diognetus was seized with a fever, so that the task of speaking in the amphiktyonic assembly was confided to Æschinês.

There stood in the Delphian temple some golden or silver shields dedicated as an offering out of the spoils taken at the battle of Plataea, a century and a half before—with an inscription to this effect—"Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks." It appears that these shields had recently been set up afresh (having been perhaps stript of their gilding by the Phokian plunderers) in a new cell or chapel, without the full customary forms of prayer or solemnities;<sup>3</sup> which perhaps might be supposed unnecessary, as the offering was not now dedicated for the first time. The inscription, little noticed and perhaps obscured by the lapse of time on the original shields, would now stand forth brightly and conspicuously on the new gilding; reviving historical recollections highly offensive to the Thebans,<sup>4</sup> and to the Amphiſſian Lokrians and friends of Thebes. These latter not only remonstrated against it in the Amphiktyonic assembly, but were even preparing (if we are to believe Æschinês) to accuse Athens of impiety; and to invoke against her a fine of fifty talents, for omission of the religious solemnities.<sup>5</sup> But this is denied

February  
339 B.C.  
Æschinês,  
one of the  
legates  
from  
Athens.

Language  
of an Am-  
phiſſian  
speaker  
among the  
Amphik-  
tyons  
against  
Athens—  
new dedica-  
tion of  
an old  
Athenian  
donative  
in the  
temple.

Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.

Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

This must have been an ἀποκαταστάσις τῶν ἀναθημάτων (compare *Antich. arch.* Demetr. c. 13), requiring to be preceded by solemn ceremonies, sometimes specially dictated by the oracle.

How painfully the Thebans of the Demosthenic age felt the recollection of the alliance of their ancestors with the Persians at Plataea, we may read in Demosthenês,

De Symmoriis, p. 187.

It appears that the Thebans also had erected a new chapel at Delphi (after 346 B.C.) out of the spoils acquired from the conquered Phokians—ὁ ἀπὸ Φωκίων ναός, ὃν ἱδρύσαντο Θηβαῖοι (Diodor. xvii. 10).

<sup>5</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 70.

The words of his speech do not however give either a full or a clear account of the transaction; which I have endeavoured, as well as I can, to supply in the text.

by Demosthenês;<sup>1</sup> who states that the Lokrians could bring any such accusation against Athens without sending a formal summons—which they never had sent. Demosthenês would be doubtless right as to the regular form, probably also as to the actual fact; though Æschinês accuses him of having received bribes<sup>2</sup> to defend the iniquities of the Lokrians. Whether the Lokrians went so far as to invoke a penalty, or not—at any rate they spoke in terms of complaint against the proceeding. Such complaint was not without real foundation; since it was better for the common safety of Hellenic liberty against the Macedonian aggressor, that the treason of Thebes at the battle of Plataea should stand as matter of past antiquity, rather than be republished in a new edition. But this was not the ground taken by the complainants, nor could they directly impeach the right of Athens to burnish up her donatives. Accordingly they assailed the act on the allegation of impiety, as not having been preceded by proper religious solemnities; whereby they obtained the opportunity of inveighing against Athens, as ally of the Phokians in their recent sacrilege, and enemy of Thebes, the steadfast champion of the god.

“The Amphiktyons being assembled (I here give the main recital, though not the exact words, Æschinês), a friendly person came to acquaint us that the Amphissians were bringing on the accusation against Athens. My sick colleague requested me immediately to enter the assembly and undertake her defence. I made haste to comply, and was just beginning to speak, when an Amphissian—of extreme rudeness and brutality—perhaps even under the influence of some misguiding divine impulse—interrupted me, and exclaimed—‘Do not hear him, men of Hellas! do not permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season! Turn them out of the sacred ground, like men under a curse.’ With that he denounced us for our alliance with the Phokians, and poured out many other outrageous invectives against the city.

“To me (continues Æschinês) all this was intolerable to hear: I cannot even now think on it with calmness—at the moment, I was provoked to anger such as I had never felt in my life before. The thought crossed me that

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277. <sup>2</sup> Æschinês, adv. Ktesiph. p. 6

would retort upon the Amphissians for their impious invasion of the Kirrhæan land. That plain, lying immediately below the sacred precinct in which we were assembled, was visible throughout. 'You see, Amphiktyons (said I), that plain cultivated by the Amphissians, with buildings erected in it for farming and pottery! You have before your eyes the harbour, consecrated by the oath of your forefathers, now occupied and fortified. You now of yourselves, without needing witnesses to tell you, at these Amphissians have levied tolls and are taking profit out of the sacred harbour!' I then caused to be read publicly the ancient oracle, the oath, and the imprecations (pronounced after the first Sacred War, wherein Kirrha was destroyed). Then continuing, I said—'Here am I, ready to defend the god and the sacred property, according to the oath of our forefathers, with hand, foot, voice, and all the powers that I possess. I stand prepared, to clear my own city of her obligations to the gods: do you take counsel forthwith for yourselves. You are here about to offer sacrifice and pray to the gods for good things, publicly and individually. Look well then—where will you find voice, or soul, or eyes, or courage, to pronounce such supplications if you permit these accursed Amphissians to remain unpunished, when they have come under the imprecations of the recorded oath? Recollect that the oath distinctly proclaims the sufferings awaiting all impious transgressors, and even menaces those who tolerate their proceedings, by declaring,—They who do not stand forward to vindicate Apollo, Artemis, Latona, and Athênê Konæa, may not sacrifice undefiled or with favourable acceptance.'"<sup>1</sup>

Such is the graphic and impressive description, given by Æschinês himself some years afterwards to the Athenian assembly, of his own address to the Amphiktyonic meeting in spring 339 B.C.; at the lofty site of the Delphian Pylæa, with Kirrha and its plain spread out before his eyes, and with the ancient oath and all its fearful imprecations recorded on the brass plate hard by, readable by every eye. His speech, received with loud shouts, roused violent passion in the bosoms of the Amphiktyons, as well as of the hearers assembled round. The audience at Delphi was

Passion  
and  
tumult,  
excited  
by his  
speech.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 70.

not like that of Athens. Athenian citizens were accustomed to excellent oratory, and to the task of balancing opposite arguments: though susceptible of high-wrought intellectual excitement—admiration or repugnance as the case might be—they discharged it all in the final vote, and then went home to their private affairs. But to the comparative rude men at Delphi, the speech of a first-rate Athenian orator was a rarity. When Æschinês, with great rhetorical force, unexpectedly revived in their imaginations the ancient and terrific history of the curse of Kirrha<sup>1</sup>—assisted by all the force of visible and local association—they were worked up to madness; while in such minds as theirs, the emotion raised would not pass off by simple voting, but required to be discharged by instant action.

How intense and ungovernable that emotion became is shown by the monstrous proceedings which followed. The original charge of impiety brought against Athens, set forth by the Amphiktyonic speaker coarsely and ineffectively, and indeed noway lending itself to rhetorical aggragation—was now altogether forgotten in the more heinous impiety of which Æschinês had accused the Amphissians themselves. About the necessity of punishing them, there was but one language. The Amphissian speakers appear to have fled—since even their persons would hardly have been safe amidst such an excitement. And if the day had not been already far advanced, the multitude would have rushed at once down from the scene of debate to Kirrha.<sup>2</sup> On account of the lateness of the hour, a resolution was passed, which the herald formally proclaimed,—That on the morrow at daybreak, the whole Delphian population, of sixteen years and upwards, free as well as slaves, should muster at the sacrificing place provided with spades and pickaxes; That the assembly of Amphiktyonic legates would there meet them, to act

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277. ὡς δὲ τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀξίωμα λαβὼν (Æschinês) ἀφίκετο εἰς τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πάντα τὰλλ' ἀφείς καὶ παριδὼν ἐπέβαινεν ἐφ' οἷς ἐμισθώθη, καὶ λόγους εὐπροσώπους καὶ μύθους, ἔθεν ἢ Κιρράϊα χώρα καθιερωθῆ, συνθεῖς καὶ διεξελθὼν, ἀνθρώπους ἀπειρούς λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προ-

ορωμένους, τοὺς Ἀμφικτύονας, πεισφύσασθαι, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. χραιγὴ πολλή καὶ θόρυβος ἦν Ἀμφικτύωνων, καὶ λόγος ἦν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀσπίδων ἀς ἡμεῖς ἀνέθετο ἀλλ' ἥδη περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσίων τιμωρίας. Ἦδη δὲ πόρρω τῆς ἡμετέρας, προελθὼν ὁ κήρυξ, &c.

defence of the god and the sacred property; That if there were any city whose deputies did not appear, it should be excluded from the temple, and proclaimed unholy and accursed.<sup>1</sup>

At daybreak, accordingly, the muster took place. The Delphian multitude came with their implements for demolition:—the Amphiktyons with Æschinês placed themselves at the head:—and all marched down to the port of Kirrha. Those there resident—probably astounded and terrified at so furious an inroad from an entire population, with whom, a few hours before, they had been on friendly terms—abandoned the place without resistance, and ran to acquaint their fellow-citizens at Amphissa. The Amphiktyons with their followers then entered Kirrha, demolished all the harbour-conveniences, and even set fire to the houses in the town. This Æschinês himself tells us; and we may be very sure (though he does not tell us) that the multitude thus set on were not contented with simply demolishing, but plundered and carried away whatever they could lay hands on. Presently, however, the Amphissians, whose town was on the high ground about seven or eight miles west of Delphi, apprised of the destruction of their property and seeing their houses in flames, arrived in haste to the rescue, with their full-armed force. The Amphiktyons and the Delphian multitude were obliged in their turn to evacuate Kirrha, and hurry back to Delphi at their best speed. They were in the greatest personal danger. According to Demosthenês, some were actually seized; but they must have been set at liberty almost immediately.<sup>2</sup> None were

The Amphiktyons with the Delphian multitude march down to destroy Kirrha—interference of the Amphissians to rescue their property. They drive off the Amphiktyons.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277.

According to the second decree of the Amphiktyons cited in this oration (p. 278), some of the Amphiktyons were wounded. But I concur with Droysen, Franke and others, in disputing the genuineness of these decrees; and the assertion, that some of the Amphiktyons were wounded, is one among the grounds for disputing it; for if such had been the fact, Æschinês could

hardly have failed to mention it; since it would have suited exactly the drift and purpose of his speech.

Æschinês is by far the best witness for the proceedings at this springmeeting of the Amphiktyons. He was not only present, but the leading person concerned; if he makes a wrong statement, it must be by design. But if the facts as stated by Æschinês are at all near the truth, it is hardly possible that the two decrees cited in Demosthenês

put to death; an escape which they probably owed to the respect borne by the Amphissians, even under such exasperating circumstances, to the Amphiktyonic function.

On the morning after this narrow escape, the president a Thessalian of Pharsalus named Kottyphus convoked a full Amphiktyonic Ekklesia; that is, not merely the Amphiktyons proper, or the legates and co-legates deputed from the various cities—but also, along with them, the promiscuous multitude present for purpose of sacrifice and consultation of the oracle. Loud and indignant were the denunciations pronounced in this meeting against the Amphissians; while Athens was eulogised as having taken the lead in vindicating the rights of Apollo. It was finally resolved that the Amphissians should be punished as sinners against the god and the sacred domain, as well as against the Amphiktyons personally; that the legates should now go home, to consult each his respective city; and that as soon as some positive resolution for executory measures could be obtained, each should come to a special meeting appointed at Thermopylæ for a future day—seemingly no far distant, and certainly prior to the regular season of autumnal convocation.

Thus was the spark applied, and the flame kindled of a second Amphiktyonic war, between six and seven years after the conclusion of the former in 346 B.C. What has been just recounted comes to us from Æschinês, himself the witness as well as the incendiary. We here judge him not from accusations preferred by his rival Demosthenês, but from his own depositions and from facts which he details not simply

B.C. 339.

Unjust violence of the Amphiktyons—public mischief done by Æschinês.

can have been the real decrees passed by the Amphiktyons. The substance of what was resolved, as given by Æschinês, pp. 70, 71, is materially different from the first decree quoted in the oration of Demosthenês, p. 278. There is no mention, in the latter, of those vivid and prominent circumstances—the summoning of all the Delphians, freemen and slaves above 26 years of age, with spades and

mattocks—the exclusion from the temple, and the cursing, of an city which did not appear to take part.

The compiler of those decrees appears to have had only Demosthenês before him, and to have known nothing of Æschinês. Of the violent proceedings of the Amphiktyons, both provoked and described by Æschinês, Demosthenês says nothing.

without regret, but with a strong feeling of pride. It is impossible to read them without becoming sensible of the profound misfortune which had come over the Grecian world; since the unanimity or dissidence of its component portions were now determined, not by political congresses at Athens or Sparta, but by debates in the religious convocation at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Here we have the political sentiment of the Amphissian Lokrians—their sympathy for Thebes, and dislike to Athens—dictating complaint and invective against the Athenians on the allegation of impiety. Against every one, it was commonly easy to find matter for such an allegation, if parties were on the look-out for it; while defence was difficult, and the fuel for kindling religious antipathy all at the command of the accuser. Accordingly Æschinês troubles himself little with the defence, but plants himself at once on the vantage-ground of the accuser, and retorts the like charge of impiety against the Amphissians, on totally different allegations. By superior oratory, as well as by the appeal to an ancient historical fact of a character peculiarly terror-striking, he exasperates the Amphihtyons to a pitch of religious ardour, in vindication of the god, such as to make them disdain alike the suggestions either of social justice or of political prudence. Demosthenês—giving credit to the Amphihtyons for something like the equity of procedure, familiar to Athenian ideas and practice—affirmed that no charge against Athens could have been made before them by the Lokrians, because no charge would be entertained without previous notice given to Athens. But Æschinês, when accusing the Lokrians,—on a matter of which he had given no notice, and which it first crossed his mind to mention at the moment when he made his speech<sup>1</sup>—found these Amphihtyons so inflammable in their religious antipathies, that they forthwith call out and head the Delphian mob armed with pickaxes for demolition. To evoke, from a far-gone and half-forgotten past, the memory of that fierce religious feud, for the purpose of extruding established proprietors, friends and defenders of the temple, from an occupancy wherein they rendered essential service to the numerous visitors of Delphi—to execute this purpose with brutal violence, creating the

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 70. μὴν μνησθῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἀμφισσέων  
πᾶσι θεοῖς οὐκ οὖν μοι ἐπὶ τὴν γνῶ- περὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν ἱερὰν ἀσεβείας, &c.

maximum of exasperation in the sufferers, endangering the lives of the Amphiktyonic legates, and raising another Sacred War pregnant with calamitous results—this was an amount of mischief such as the bitterest enemy of Greece could hardly have surpassed. The prior imputations of irreligion, thrown out by the Lokrian orator against Athens may have been futile and malicious; but the retort of Æschinês was far worse, extending as well as embittering the poison of pious discord, and plunging the Amphiktyonic assembly in a contest from which there was no exit except by the sword of Philip.

Some comments on this proceeding appeared requisite partly because it is the only distinct matter known to us, from an actual witness, respecting the Amphiktyonic council—partly from its ruinous consequences, which will presently appear. At first, indeed, these consequences did not manifest themselves; and when Æschinês returned to Athens, he told his story to the satisfaction of the people. We may presume that he reported the proceedings at the time in the same manner as he stated them afterwards, in the oration now preserved. The Athenians, indignant at the accusation brought by the Lokrians against Athens, were disposed to take part in that movement of pious enthusiasm which Æschinês had kindled on the subject of Kirrha, pursuant to the ancient oath sworn by their forefathers.<sup>1</sup> So forcible was the religious point of view of this question thrust upon the public mind, that the opposition of Demosthenês was hardly listened to. He laid open at once the consequences of what had happened, saying—“Æschinês, you are bringing war into Attica—an Amphiktyonic war. But his predictions were cried down as illusions or mere manifestations of party feeling against a rival.<sup>2</sup> Æschinês denounced him openly as the hired agent of the impious Lokrians;<sup>3</sup> a charge sufficiently refuted by the conduct of these Lokrians themselves, who are described by Æschinês as gratuitously insulting Athens.

Effect of the proceeding of Æschinês at Athens. Opposition of Demosthenês at first fruitless.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 71. καὶ τὰς πράξεις ἡμῶν ἀποδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου, καὶ τῆς πόλεως πάσης προαιρουμένης εὐσεβεῖν, &c. Οὐκ ἐγὼ (Demosthenês) μεμνησθαι τῶν ἔργων,

οὐδὲ οἱ πρόγονοι ὤμοσαν, οὐδὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ μαντείας.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 275.

<sup>3</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 69.

But though the general feeling at Athens, immediately after the return of Æschinês, was favourable to his proceedings at Delphi, it did not long continue so. Nor is the change difficult to understand. The first mention of the old oath, and the original devastation of Kirrha, sanctioned by the name and authority of Solon, would naturally turn the Athenian mind into a strong feeling of pious sentiment against the tenants of that accursed spot. But farther information would tend to prove that the Lokrians were more sinned against than sinning; that the occupation of Kirrha as a harbour was a convenience to all Greeks, and most of all to the temple itself; lastly, that the imputations said to have been cast by the Lokrians upon Athens had either never been made at all (so we find Demosthenês affirming), or were nothing worse than an unauthorised burst of ill-temper from some rude individual. Though Æschinês had obtained at first a vote of approbation for his proceedings, yet when his proposition came to be made—that Athens should take part in the special Amphiktyonic meeting convened for punishing the Amphisians—the opposition of Demosthenês was found more effective. Both the Senate and the public assembly passed a resolution peremptorily forbidding all interference on the part of Athens at that special meeting. “The Hieromnemon and the Pylagoræ of Athens (so the decree prescribed) shall take no part, either in word or deed or resolution, with the persons assembled at that special meeting. They shall visit Delphi and Thermopylæ at the regular times fixed by our forefathers.” This important decree marks the change of opinion at Athens. Æschinês indeed tells us that it was only procured by crafty manœuvre on the part of Demosthenês, being hurried through in a thin assembly, at the close of business, when most citizens (and Æschinês among them) had gone away. But there is nothing to confirm such insinuations; moreover Æschinês, if he had still retained the public sentiment in his favour, could easily have baffled the tricks of his rival.<sup>1</sup>

The special meeting of Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ accordingly took place, at some time between the two regular periods of spring and autumn.

Change of feeling at Athens—the Athenians resolve to take no part in the Amphiktyonic proceedings against Amphisia.

Special meeting of the

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 71.

Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, held without Athens. Vote passed to levy a force for punishing Amphissa. Kottyphus president.

No legates attended from Athens, nor any from Thebes—a fact made known to us by Æschinês, and remarkable as evincing an incipient tendency towards concurrence, such as had never existed before, between these two important cities. The remaining legates met, determined to levy a joint force for the purpose of punishing the Amphissians, and chose the president Kottyphus general. According to Æschinês, this force was brought together, marched against the Lokrians, and reduced them to submission, but granted to them indulgent terms; requiring from them a fine to the Delphian god, payable at stated intervals—sentencing some of the Lokrian leaders to banishment as having instigated the encroachment on the sacred domain—and recalling others who had opposed it. But the Lokrians (he says), after the force had retired, broke faith, paid nothing, and brought back all the guilty leaders. Demosthenês, on the contrary, states that Kottyphus summoned contingents from the various Amphiktyonic states; but some never came at all, while those who did come were lukewarm and inefficient; so that the purpose altogether miscarried.<sup>1</sup> The account of Demosthenês is the more probable of the two; for we know from Æschinês himself that neither Athens nor Thebes took part in the proceeding, while Sparta had been excluded from the Amphiktyonic council in 346 B.C. There remained therefore only the secondary and smaller states. Of these, the Peloponnesians, even if inclined, could not easily come, since they could neither march by land through Bœotia, nor come with ease by sea while the Amphissians were masters of the port of Kirrha; and the Thessalians and their neighbours were not likely to take so intense an interest in the enterprise as to carry it through without the rest. Moreover, the party who were only waiting for a pretext to invite the interference of Philip, would rather prefer to do nothing, in order to show how impossible it was to act without him. Hence we may fairly assume that what Æschinês represents as indulgent terms granted to the Lokrians and afterwards violated by them, was at best nothing more than a temporary accommodation, concluded because Kottyphus could not do anything—probably

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 277; Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

did not wish to do anything—without the intervention of Philip.

The next Pylæa, or the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons at Thermopylæ, now arrived; yet the Lokrians were still unsubdued. Kottyphus and his party now made the formal proposition to invoke the aid of Philip. "If you do not consent (they told the Amphiktyons<sup>1</sup>), you must come forward personally in force, subscribe ample funds, and fine all defaulters. Choose which you prefer." The determination of the Amphiktyons was taken to invoke the interference of Philip; appointing him commander of the combined force, and champion of the god, in the new Sacred War, as he had been in the former.

B.C. 339.

(September).

The Amphiktyons invoke the intervention of Philip.

At the autumnal meeting,<sup>2</sup> where this fatal measure

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 277, 278.

<sup>2</sup> The chronology of events here accounted has been differently conceived by different authors. According to my view, the first motion raised by Æschinês against the Amphissian Lokrians, occurred in the spring meeting of the Amphiktyons at Delphi in 339 B.C. (the year of the archon Theophrastus at Athens); next, there was held a special or extraordinary meeting of the Amphiktyons, and a warlike manifestation against the Lokrians; after which came the regular autumnal meeting at Thermopylæ (B.C. 339—September—the year of the archon Lysimachidês at Athens), where the vote was passed to call for the military interference of Philip.

This chronology does not indeed agree with the two so-called decrees of the Amphiktyons, and with the documentary statement—Ἀρχων Μνησιθείδης, Ἀνθεστηριῶνος ἔκτῃ ἐπέταξα—which we read as incorporated in the oration De Coronâ, p. 279. But I have already stated that I think these documents spurious. The archon Mnesitheidês (like

all the other archons named in the documents recited in the oration De Coronâ) is a wrong name, and cannot have been quoted from any genuine document. Next, the first decree of the Amphiktyons is not in harmony with the statement of Æschinês, himself the great mover of what the Amphiktyons really did. Lastly, the second decree plainly intimates that the person who composed the two decrees conceived the nomination of Philip to have taken place in the very same Amphiktyonic assembly as the first movement against the Lokrians. The same words, ἐπὶ ἰστέως Κλειναγόρου, ἑαρινῆς πυλαίας—prefixed to both decrees, must be understood to indicate the same assembly. Mr. Clinton's supposition that the first decree was passed at the spring meeting of 339 B.C.—and the second at the spring meeting of 338 B.C.—Kleinagoras being the Eponymus in both years—appears to me nowise probable. The special purpose and value of an Eponymus would disappear, if the same person served in that capacity for two successive years. Boeckh adopts

Motives  
which dic-  
tated the  
vote—de-  
pendence of  
most of the  
Amphik-  
tyonic  
voters upon  
Philip.

of calling in Philip was adopted, legates from Athens were doubtless present (*Æschinês* among them), according to usual custom; for the decree of *Demosthenês* had enacted that the usual custom should be followed, though it had forbidden the presence of legates at the special or extraordinary meeting. *Æschinês*<sup>1</sup> was not backward in advocating the application to Philip; nor indeed could he take any other course, consistently with what he had done at the preceding spring meeting. He himself only laments that Athens suffered herself to be deterred, by the corrupt suggestions of *Demosthenês*, from heading the crusade against *Amphissa* when the gods themselves had singled her out for that pious duty.<sup>2</sup> What part *Thebes* took in the nomination of Philip, or whether her legates attended at the autumnal Amphiktyonic meeting, we do not know. But it is to be remembered that one of the twelve Amphiktyonic double suffrages now belonged to the *Macedonians* themselves while many of the remaining members had become dependent on *Macedonia*—the *Thessalians*, *Phthiot Achæans*, *Perrhæbians*, *Dolopians*, *Magnetês*, &c.<sup>3</sup> It was probably not very difficult for *Kottyphus* and *Æschinês* to procure a vote investing Philip with the command. Even those who were not favourable might dread the charge of impiety if they opposed it.

the conjecture of *Reiske*, altering *ἐαρινῆς πυλαίας* in the second decree into *ὁπωρινῆς πυλαίας*. This would bring the second decree into better harmony with chronology; but there is nothing in the state of the text to justify such an innovation. *Böhnecke* (*Forsch.* p. 498-508) adopts a supposition yet more improbable. He supposes that *Æschinês* was chosen *Pylagoras* at the beginning of the Attic year 340-339 B.C., and that he attended first at *Delphi* at the autumnal meeting of the Amphiktyons 340 B.C.; that he there raised the violent storm which he himself describes in his speech; and that afterwards, at the subsequent

spring meeting, came both the two decrees which we now read in the oration *De Coronâ*. But the first of those two decrees can never have come after the outrageous proceeding described by *Æschinês*. I will add, that in the former decree, the president *Kottyphus* is called an *Arcadian*, whereas *Æschinês* designates him as a *Pharsalian*.

<sup>1</sup> *Demosth. De Coronâ*, p. 278.

<sup>2</sup> *Æschinês* adv. *Ktesiph.* p. 7. . . . τῶν μὲν θεῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἡμῖν παραδεωκότων τῆς δὲ Δημοσθένους δωροδοχίας ἐκ ποδῶν γεγεννημένης.

<sup>3</sup> See *Isokratês*, *Orat. V.* (*Philippus*) s. 22, 23.

During the spring and summer of this year 339 B.C. the interval between the two Amphiktyonic meetings), Philip had been engaged in his expedition against the Scythians, and in his battle, while returning, against the Triballi, wherein he received the severe wound already mentioned. His recovery from this wound was completed, when the Amphiktyonic vote, conferring upon him the command, was passed. He readily accepted a mission which his partisans, and probably his bribes, had been mainly concerned in procuring. Immediately collecting his forces, he marched southward through Thessaly and Thermopylæ, proclaiming his purpose of avenging the Delphian god upon the unholy Lokrians of Amphissa. The Amphiktyonic deputies, and the Amphiktyonic contingents, in greater or less numbers, accompanied his march. In passing through Thermopylæ, he took Nikæa (one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass) from the Thebans, in whose hands it had remained since his conquest of Phokis in 346 B.C., though with a Macedonian garrison sharing in the occupation.<sup>1</sup> Not being yet assured of the concurrence of the Thebans in his farther projects, he thought it safer to consign this important town to the Thessalians, who were thoroughly in his dependence.

B.C. 339.

Philip accepts the command—marches southward through Thermopylæ.

His march from Thermopylæ, whether to Delphi and Amphissa, or into Bœotia, lay through Phokis. That unfortunate territory still continued in the defenceless condition to which it had been condemned by the Amphiktyonic sentence of 346 B.C., without a single fortified town, occupied merely by small dispersed villages and by a population scanty as well as poor. On reaching Elateia, once the principal Phokian town, but now dismantled, Philip halted his army, and began forthwith to re-establish the walls, converting it into a strong place for permanent military occupation. He at the same time occupied Kytinium,<sup>2</sup> the principal town in the little

Philip enters Phokis—he suddenly occupies, and begins to refortify, Elateia.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Θηβαίων Νικαίαν μὲν φρουρᾷ κατέχει, &c.  
 παιδὲ Φίλιππος αὐτῶν ἀφελόμενος Νικαίαν Θετταλοῖς παρέδωκε, &c.  
 Compare Demosthen. ad Philipp. p. 153. ὑποπτεύεται δὲ ὑπὸ

<sup>2</sup> Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

territory of Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus, situated in the short mountain road from Thermopylæ to Amphissa.

The seizure of Elateia by Philip, coupled with his operations for reconstituting it as a permanent military post, was an event of the gravest moment, exciting surprise and uneasiness throughout a large portion of the Grecian world. Hitherto he had proclaimed himself as general acting under the Amphiktyonic vote of nomination, and as on his march simply to vindicate the Delphian god against sacrilegious Lokrians. Had such been his real purpose, however, he would have had no occasion to halt at Elateia, much less to re-fortify and garrison it. Accordingly it now became evident that he meant something different, or at least something ulterior. He himself indeed no longer affected to conceal his real purposes. Sending envoys to Thebes, he announced that he had come to attack the Athenians, and earnestly invited her cooperation as his ally, against enemies odious to her as well as to himself. But if the Thebans, in spite of an excellent opportunity to crush an ancient foe, should still determine to stand aloof, he claimed of them at least a free passage through Bœotia, that he might invade Attica with his own forces.<sup>1</sup>

The relations between Athens and Thebes at this moment were altogether unfriendly. There had indeed been no actual armed conflict between them since the conclusion of the Sacred War in 346 B.C.; yet the old sentiment of enmity and jealousy, dating from earlier days and aggravated during that war, still continued unabated. To soften this reciprocal dislike, and to bring about cooperation with Thebes, had always been the aim of some Athenian politicians—Eubulus—

B.C. 339.  
(October).  
Unfriendly relations subsisting between Athens and Thebes.  
Strong hopes of Philip that

<sup>1</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 293-299. Justin, ix. 3, "diu dissimulatum bellum Atheniensibus infert." This expression is correct in the sense, that Philip, who had hitherto pretended to be on his march against Amphissa, disclosed his

real purpose to be against Athens at the moment when he seized Elateia. Otherwise, he had been at open war with Athens, even since the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus in the preceding year.

ristophon—and Demosthenês himself, whom Æschinês tries to discredit as having been complimented and corrupted by the Thebans.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, in spite of various visits and embassies to Thebes, where a philo-Athenian minority also subsisted, nothing had ever been accomplished.<sup>2</sup> The enmity still remained, and had been even artificially aggravated (if we are to believe Demosthenês<sup>3</sup>) during the six months which elapsed since the breaking out of the Amphissian quarrel, by Æschinês and the partisans of Philip in both cities.

Thebes would act in concert with him against Athens.

The ill-will subsisting between Athens and Thebes at the moment when Philip took possession of Elateia, was acknowledged that he had good reason for looking upon confederacy of the two against him as impossible.<sup>4</sup> To enforce the request, that Thebes, already his ally, would continue to act as such at this critical juncture, he detached thither envoys not merely Macedonian, but also Thessalian, Dolopian, Phthiot Achæan, Ætolian, and Ælian—the Amphiktyonic allies who were accompanying his march.<sup>5</sup>

If such were the hopes, and the reasonable hopes, of Philip, we may easily understand how intense was the alarm among the Athenians, when they first heard of the occupation of Elateia. Should the Thebans comply, Philip would be in three days on the frontier of Attica; and from the sentiment understood as well as felt to be prevalent, the Athenians could not but anticipate that free passage, and a Theban reinforcement besides, would be readily granted. Ten years before, Demosthenês himself (in his first Olynthiac) had asserted that the Thebans would gladly join Philip in an attack on

B.C. 339.

Great alarm at Athens, when the news arrived that Philip was fortifying Elateia.

Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 46, 47.

Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 73; Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 281.

Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 276, 284. 'Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖσε ἐπάνειμι, ὅτι

ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον τούτου (Æschinês) μὲν ποιήσαντος, συμπαράμενων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συνέργων αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἐχθρὰν, ἐβῆ τὸν Φίλιππον ἐλθεῖν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς,

οὐπερ ἕνεκα τὰς πόλεις οὗτοι συνέχρουον, &c. Οὕτω μέχρι πόρρω προήγαγον οὗτοι τὴν ἐχθρὰν.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ—ἦκεν ἔχων (Philip) τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάττειαν κατέλαβεν, ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἔτι συμπευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

<sup>5</sup> Philochorus ap. Dionys. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

Attica.<sup>1</sup> If such was then the alienation, it had been increasing rather than diminishing ever since. As the march of Philip had hitherto been not merely rapid, but understood as directed towards Delphi and Amphissa, the Athenians had made no preparations for the defence of their frontier. Neither their families nor their moveable property had yet been carried within walls. Nevertheless they had now to expect, within little more than forty-eight hours, an invading army as formidable and desolating as any of those during the Peloponnesian war, under a command far abler than Archidamus or Agis.<sup>2</sup>

Though the general history of this important period can be made out only in outline, we are fortunate enough to obtain from Demosthenês a striking narrative, in some detail, of the proceedings at Athens immediately after the news of the capture of Elateia by Philip. It was evening when the messenger arrived, just at the time when the prytanes (or senators of the presiding tribe) were at supper in their official residence. Immediately breaking up their meal, some ran to call the generals whose duty it was to convoke the public assembly with the trumpeter who gave public notice thereof; that the Senate and assembly were convoked for the next morning at daybreak. Others bestirred themselves clearing out the market-place, which was full of booths and stands for traders selling merchandise. They even set fire to these booths, in their hurry to get the space clear. Such was the excitement and terror throughout the city, that the public assembly was crowded at the early dawn, even before the Senate could go through their forms and present themselves for the opening ceremony. At length the Senate joined the assembly, and the prytanes came forward to announce the news, producing the messenger with his public deposition. The herald then proclaimed the usual words—"Who wishes to speak?" a man came forward. He proclaimed the words again and again, yet still no one rose.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. i. p. 16. "Ἄν δ' ἐκεῖνα Φίλιππος ἄλαβη, τίς αὐτὸν κωλύσει δεῦρο βαδίζειν; Ἑθβαῖοι; οἱ, εἰ μὴ λίαν πικρὸν εἰπεῖν, καὶ συνεισβαλοῦσιν ἐτοιμῶς.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304.

ἡ γὰρ ἐμὴ πολιτεία, ἥς οὗτος (Ἄννης) κατηγορεῖ, ἀντί μὲν τοῦ Θηριεῖ μετὰ Φιλίππου συνεμβάλλειν εἰς χάραν, δὲ πάντες ὦνοντο, μεθ' ὧν παραταξαμένους ἐκείνον κωλύειν ἤσεν, &c.

At length, after a considerable interval of silence, Demosthenês rose to speak. He addressed himself to that alarming conviction which beset the minds of all, though no one had yet given utterance—that the Thebans were in hearty sympathy with Philip. “Suffer not yourselves (he said) to believe any such thing. If the fact had been so, Philip would have been already on your frontier, without halting at Elateia. He has a large body of partisans at Thebes, procured by fraud and corruption; but he has not the whole city. There is yet a considerable Theban party, adverse to him and favourable to you. It is for the purpose of emboldening his own partisans in Thebes, overawing his opponents, and thus extorting a positive declaration from the city in his favour, that he is making display of his force at Elateia. And in this he will succeed, unless you, Athenians, shall exert yourselves vigorously and prudently in counteraction. If you, acting on your old aversion towards Thebes, shall now hold aloof, Philip’s partisans in the city will become all-powerful, so that the whole Theban force will march along with him against Attica. For your own security, you must shake off these old feelings, however well grounded—and stand forward for the protection of Thebes, as being in greater danger than yourselves. March forth your entire military strength to the frontier, and thus embolden your partisans in Thebes to speak out openly against their philippising opponents, who rely upon the army at Elateia. Next, send ten envoys to Thebes; giving them full powers, in conjunction with the generals, to call in your military force whenever they think fit. Let your envoys demand neither concessions nor conditions from the Thebans; let them simply tender the full force of Athens to assist the Thebans in their present straits. If the offer be accepted, you will have secured an ally inestimable for your own safety, while acting with a generosity worthy of Athens; if it be refused, the Thebans will have themselves to blame, and you will at least stand unimpeached on the score of honour as well as of policy.”<sup>1</sup>

Advice of Demosthenês to despatch an embassy immediately to Thebes, and to offer alliance on the most liberal terms.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 286, Demosthenês represents himself to have said. Diodor. xvi. 84. I have given the substance, in brief, of what

The recommendation of Demosthenês, alike wise and generous, was embodied in a decree and adopted by the Athenians without opposition.<sup>1</sup> Neither Æschinês, nor any one else, said a word against it. Demosthenês himself, being named chief of the ten envoys, proceeded forthwith to Thebes; while the military force of Attica was at the same time marched to the frontier.

The advice of Demosthenês is adopted—he is despatched with other envoys to Thebes.

<sup>1</sup> This decree, or a document claiming to be such, is given *verbatim* in Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 289, 290. It bears date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion (June), under the archonship of Nausiklês. This archon is a wrong or pseud-eponymous archon: and the document, to say nothing of its verbosity, implies that Athens was now about to pass out of pacific relations with Philip, and to begin war against him—which is contrary to the real fact.

There also appear inserted, a few pages before, in the same speech (p. 282), four other documents, purporting to relate to the time immediately preceding the capture of Elateia by Philip. 1. A decree of the Athenians, dated in the month Elaphebolion of the archon *Heropythus*. 2. Another decree, in the month Munychion of the same archon. 3. An answer addressed by Philip to the Athenians. 4. An answer addressed by Philip to the Thebans.

Here again, the archon called *Heropythus* is a wrong and unknown archon. Such manifest error of date would alone be enough to preclude me from trusting the document as genuine. Droysen is right, in my judgement, in rejecting all these five documents as spurious. The answer of Philip to the Athenians is adapted to the two decrees of the Athenians, and cannot be genuine if they are spurious.

These decrees, too, like that dated in Skirrophorion, are not consistent with the true relations between Athens and Philip. They imply that she was at peace with him, and that hostilities were first undertaken against him by her after his occupation of Elateia; whereas open war had been prevailing between them for more than a year ever since the summer of 340 B.C. and the maritime operations against him in the Propontis. That the war was going on without interruption, during all this period—that Philip could not get near to Athens to strike a blow at her and close the war, except by bringing the Thebans and Thessalians into cooperation with him—and that for the attainment of this last purpose he caused the Amphisian war to be kindled, through the corrupt agency of Æschinês—is the express statement of Demosthenês, De Coronâ, p. 275, 276. Hence I find it impossible to believe in the authenticity either of the four documents here quoted, or of this suppose very long decree of the Athenians on forming their alliance with Thebes, bearing date on the 16th of the month Skirrophorion, and cite De Coronâ, p. 289. I will add, that the two decrees which we read in p. 282, profess themselves as having been passed in the months Elaphebolion and Munychion, and bear the name of the archon *Heropythus*; while the decree cited, p. 289, bears date the 16th of Skirrophorion, and

At Thebes they found the envoys of Philip and his allies, and the philippising Thebans full of triumph.

the name of a different archon, *Nausiklēs*. Now if the decrees were genuine, the events which are described in both must have happened under the same archon, at an interval of about six weeks between the last day of Munychion and the 16th of Skirrophorion. It is impossible to suppose an interval of one year and six weeks between them.

It appears to me, on reading attentively the words of Demosthenēs himself, that the *falsarius*, or person who composed these four first documents, has not properly conceived what it was that Demosthenēs caused to be read by the public secretary. The point which Demosthenēs is here making is to show how ably he had managed, and how well he had deserved of his country, by bringing the Thebans into alliance with Athens immediately after Philip's capture of Elateia. For this purpose he dwells upon the bad state of feeling between Athens and Thebes before that event, brought about by the secret instigations of Philip through corrupt partisans in both places. Now it is to illustrate this hostile feeling *between Athens and Thebes*, that he causes the secretary to read certain decrees and answers—ἐν οἷς δ' ἦτε ἤδη τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τουτωνῶν τῶν ψηφισμάτων ἀκούσαντες καὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων εἰσεσθε. Καὶ μοι λέγε ταῦτα λαβὼν . . . (p. 282). The documents here announced to be read do not bear upon the relations between *Athens and Philip* (which were those of active warfare, needing no illustration)—but to the relation between *Athens and Thebes*. There had plainly been interchanges of bickering and ungracious feeling between the two

cities, manifested in public decrees or public answers to complaints or remonstrances. Instead of which, the two Athenian decrees, which we now read as following, are addressed, not to the Thebans, but to Philip; the first of them does not mention Thebes at all, the second mentions Thebes only to recite as a ground of complaint against Philip, that he was trying to put the two cities at variance; and this too, among other grounds of complaint much more grave and imputing more hostile purposes. Then follow two answers—which are not answers between Athens and Thebes, as they ought to be—but answers from Philip, the first to the Athenians, the second to the Thebans. Neither the decrees, nor the answers, as they here stand, go to illustrate the point at which Demosthenēs is aiming—the bad feeling and mutual provocations which had been exchanged a little before between Athens and Thebes. Neither the one nor the other justifies the words of the orator immediately after the documents have been read—Οὕτω διαθείς ὁ Φίλιππος τὰς πόλεις πρὸς ἀλλήλας διὰ τούτων (through Æschinēs and his supporters), καὶ τούτοις ἐπαρθείς τοῖς ψηφίσμασι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν, ἤκεν ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν Ἐλάτειαν κατέλαβεν, ὥς οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο ἐτι συμπενευσάντων ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν Θηβαίων.

Demosthenēs describes Philip as acting upon Thebes and Athens through the agency of corrupt citizens in each; the author of these documents conceives Philip as acting by his own despatches.

The decree of the 16th Skirrophorion enacts, not only that there shall be alliance with Thebes, but

while the friends of Athens were so dispirited, that the first letters of Demosthenês, sent home immediately on reaching Thebes, were of a gloomy cast.<sup>1</sup> According to Grecian custom, the two opposing legations were heard in turn before the Theban assembly. Amyntas and Klearchus were the Macedonian envoys, together with the eloquent Byzantine Python, as chief spokesman, and the Thessalians Daochus and Thrasylaus.<sup>2</sup> Having the first word, as established allies of Thebes, these orators found it an easy theme to denounce Athens, and to support their case by the general tenor of past history since the battle of Leuktra. The Macedonian orator contrasted the perpetual hostility of Athens with the valuable aid furnished to Thebes by Philip, when he rescued her from the Phokians, and confirmed her ascendancy over Bœotia. "If (said the orator) Philip had stipulated, before he assisted you against the Phokians, that you should grant him in return a free passage against Attica, you would have gladly acceded. Will you refuse it now, when he has rendered to you the service without stipulation? Either let us pass through to Attica—or join our march; whereby you will enrich yourself with the plunder of that country, instead of being impoverished by having Bœotia as the seat of war."<sup>3</sup>

All these topics were so thoroughly in harmony with the previous sentiments of the Thebans, that they must have made a lively impression. How Demosthenês replied to them, we are not permitted to know. His powers of oratory must have been severely tasked; for the pre-established

also that the right of *intermarriage* between the two cities shall be established. Now at the moment when the decree was passed, the Thebans both had been, and still were, on bad terms with Athens, so that it was doubtful whether they would entertain or reject the proposition; nay, the chances even were, that they would reject it and join Philip. We can hardly believe it possible, that under such a state of probabilities, the Athenians would go so far as to pro-

nounce for the establishment of *intermarriage* between the two cities.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Demosthenês c. 18. Daochus and Thrasylaus are named by Demosthenês as Thessalian partisans of Philip (Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 324).

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 298, 299; Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 23; Dion. Hal. ad Ammaeum, p. 744; Diodor. xvi. 85.

feeling was all adverse, and he had nothing to work upon, except fear, on the part of Thebes, of too near contact with the Macedonian arms—combined with her gratitude for the spontaneous and unconditional tender of Athens. And even as to fears, the Thebans had only to choose between admitting the Athenian army or that of Philip; a choice in which all presumption was in favour of the latter, as present ally and recent benefactor—against the former, as standing rival and enemy. Such was the result anticipated by the hopes of Philip as well as by the fears of Athens. Yet with all the chances thus against him, Demosthenês carried his point in the Theban assembly; determining them to accept the offered alliance of Athens and to brave the hostility of Philip. He boasts, with good reason, of such a diplomatic and oratorical triumph;<sup>1</sup> by which he not only obtained a powerful ally against Philip, but also—a benefit yet more important—rescued Attica from being overrun by a united Macedonian and Theban army. Justly does the contemporary historian Theopompus extol the unrivalled eloquence whereby Demosthenês kindled in the bosoms of the Thebans a generous flame of Pan-hellenic patriotism. But it was not simply by superior eloquence<sup>2</sup>—though that doubtless was an essential condition—that his triumph at Thebes was achieved. It was still more owing to the wise and generous offer which he carried with him, and which he had himself prevailed on the Athenians to make—of unconditional alliance without any reference to the jealousies and animosities of the past, and on terms even favourable to Thebes, as being more exposed than Athens in the war against Philip.<sup>3</sup>

Thebans to  
contract  
alliance  
with Athens  
against  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 304-307.  
 εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μετέγνωσαν εὐθὺς,  
 ὡς ταῦτ' εἶδον, οἱ Θηβαῖοι, καὶ μεθ'  
 ὑμῶν ἐγένοντο, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Theopompus, Frag. 239, ed.  
 Didot; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 18.

<sup>3</sup> We may here trust the more  
 fully the boasts made by Demo-  
 sthenês of his own statesmanship  
 and oratory, since we possess the  
 comments of Æschinês, and there-  
 fore know the worst that can be  
 said by an unfriendly critic. Æschi-  
 nês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 73, 74) says

that the Thebans were induced to  
 join Athens, not by the oratory of  
 Demosthenês, but by their fear of  
 Philip's near approach, and by their  
 displeasure in consequence of hav-  
 ing Nikæa taken from them. De-  
 mosthenês says in fact the same.  
 Doubtless the ablest orator must  
 be furnished with some suitable  
 points to work up in his pleadings.  
 But the orators on the other side  
 would find in the history of the  
 past a far more copious collection  
 of matters, capable of being

The answer brought back by Demosthenês was cheering. The important alliance, combining Athens and Thebes in defensive war against Philip, had been successfully brought about. The Athenian army, already mustered in Attica, was invited into Bœotia, and marched to Thebes without delay. While a portion of them joined the Theban force at the northern frontier of Bœotia to resist the approach of Philip, the rest were left in quarters at Thebes. And Demosthenês extols not only the kindness with which they were received in private houses, but also their correct and orderly behaviour amidst the families and properties of the Thebans; not a single complaint being preferred against them.<sup>1</sup> The antipathy and jealousy between the two cities seemed effaced in cordial cooperation against the common enemy. Of the cost of the joint operations, on land and sea, two-thirds were undertaken by Athens. The command was shared equally between the allies; and the centre of operations was constituted at Thebes.<sup>2</sup>

In this as well as in other ways, the dangerous vicinity of Philip, giving increased ascendancy to Demosthenês, impressed upon the counsels of Athens a vigour long unknown. The orator prevailed upon his countrymen to suspend the expenditure going on upon the improvement of their docks and the construction of a new arsenal, in order that more money might be devoted to military operations. He also carried a farther point which he had long aimed at accomplishing by indirect means, but always in vain; the conversion of the Theôric Fund to military purposes.<sup>3</sup> So preponderant was the impression of danger at Athens, that Demosthenês was now able to propose this motion directly, and with success. Of course, he must first have moved to suspend the standing enactment, whereby it was made penal even to submit the motion.

appealed to as causes of antipathy against Athens, and of favour to Philip; and against this superior case Demosthenês had to contend.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 299, 300.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 74.

<sup>3</sup> Philochorus, Frag. 135, ed. Didot; Dion. Hal. ad Ammæum, p. 742.

To Philip, meanwhile, the new alliance was a severe disappointment and a serious obstacle. Having calculated on the continued adhesion of Thebes, to which he conceived himself entitled as a return for benefits conferred—and having been doubtless assured by his partisans in the city that they could promise him Theban cooperation against Athens, as soon as he should appear on the frontier with an overawing army—he was disconcerted at the sudden junction of these two powerful cities, unexpected alike by friends and enemies. Henceforward we shall find him hating Thebes, as guilty of desertion and ingratitude, worse than Athens, his manifest enemy.<sup>1</sup> But having failed in inducing the Thebans to follow his lead against Athens, he thought it expedient again to resume his profession of acting on behalf of the Delphian god against Amphissa,—and to write to his allies in Peloponnesus to come and join him, for this specific purpose. His letters were pressing, often repeated, and implying much embarrassment, according to Demosthenès.<sup>2</sup> As far as we can judge, they do not seem to have produced much effect; nor was it easy for the Peloponnesians to join Philip—either by land, while Bœotia was hostile—or by sea while the Amphissians held Kirrha, and the Athenians had a superior navy.

Disappointment of Philip—he remains in Phokis, and writes to his Peloponnesian allies to come and join him against Amphissa.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinès adv. Ktesiph. p. 73. Æschinès remarks the fact—but perverts the inferences deducible from it.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthen. De Coronâ, p. 279. ὅς δὲ μοι τὴν ἐπιστολὴν, ἣν, ὡς οὐχ ἰσχυροὶν οἱ Θηβαῖοι, πέμπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ συμμαχοὺς ὁ Φίλιππος, ἐν εἰδητῇ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης σαφῶς ὅτι τὴν μὲν ἀληθῆ πρόφασιν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὸ ταῦτ' ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τοὺς Θηβαίους καὶ ὑμᾶς ῥάττειν, ἀπεκρύπτετο, κοινὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοσι δόξαντα ποιεῖν προσποιεῖτο, &c.

Then follows a letter, purporting to be written by Philip to the Peloponnesians. I concur with Droysen in mistrusting its authenticity. I

do not rest any statements on its evidence. The Macedonian month Lous does not appear to coincide with the Attic Boedromion; nor is it probable that Philip, in writing to Peloponnesians, would allude at all to Attic months. Various subsequent letters written by Philip to the Peloponnesians, and intimating much embarrassment, are alluded to by Demosthenès, further on—'Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἷας τότε ἤφιει φωνὰς ὁ Φίλιππος καὶ ἐν οἷαις ἦν παραχαῖς ἐπὶ τοῦτοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν ἐκείνου μαθήσεσθε ὧν εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἔπεμπεν (p. 301, 302). Demosthenès causes the letters to be read publicly, but no letters appear *verbatim*.

War was now carried on, in Phokis and on the frontiers of Boeotia, during the autumn and winter of 339-338 B.C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintained their ground against Philip but even gained some advantages over him, especially in two engagements—called the battle on the river, and the winter-battle—of which Demosthenês finds room to boast, and which called forth manifestations of rejoicing and sacrifice, when made known at Athens.<sup>1</sup> To Demosthenês himself, as the chief adviser of the Theban alliance, a wreath of gold was proposed by Demomelês and Hyperidês, and decreed by the people; and though a citizen named

Diondas impeached the mover for an illegal decree, yet he did not even obtain the fifth part of the suffrages of the Dikastery, and therefore became liable to the fine of 1000 drachms.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês was crowned with public proclamation at the Dionysiac festival of March 338 B.C.

But the most memorable step taken by the Athenians and Thebans, in this joint war against Philip, was that of reconstituting the Phokians as an independent and self-defending section of the Hellenic name. On the part of the Thebans hitherto the bitterest enemies of the Phokians, this proceeding evinced adoption of an improved and generous policy, worthy of the Pan-hellenic cause in which they had now embarked. In 346 B.C., the Phokians had been conquered and ruined by the arms of Philip under condemnation pronounced by the Amphiktyon. Their cities had all been dismantled, and their population distributed in villages, impoverished, or driven into exile. These exiles, many of whom were at Athens, now returned, and the Phokian population were aided by the Athenians and Thebans in re-occupying and securing their towns.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 300.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 302; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator., p. 848.

<sup>3</sup> That Demosthenês was crowned at the Dionysiac festival (March 338 B.C.) is contended by Böhnecke (Forschungen, p. 534, 535); upon grounds which seem sufficient,

against the opinion of Boeckh and Winiewski (Comment. ad Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 250), who think that he was not crowned until the Panathenaic festival, in the ensuing July.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias, x. 3, 2.

Some indeed of these towns were so small, such as Parapotamii<sup>1</sup> and others, that it was thought inexpedient to re-constitute them. Their population was transferred to the others, as a means of increased strength. Ambrysus, in the south-western portion of Phokis, was re-fortified by the Athenians and Thebans with peculiar care and solidity. It was surrounded with a double circle of wall of the black tone of the country; each wall being fifteen feet high and nearly six feet in thickness, with an interval of six feet between the two.<sup>2</sup> These walls were seen, five centuries afterwards, by the traveller Pausanias, who numbers them among the most solid defensive structures in the ancient world.<sup>3</sup> Ambrysus was valuable to the Athenians and Thebans as a military position for the defence of Bœotia, inasmuch as it lay on that rough southerly road near the sea, which the Lacedæmonian king Kleombrotus<sup>4</sup> had forced when he marched from Phokis to the position of Leuktra; eluding Epaminondas and the main Theban force, who were posted to resist him on the more frequented road by Koroneia. Moreover, by occupying the south-eastern parts of Phokis on the Corinthian Gulf, they prevented the arrival of reinforcements to Philip by sea out of Peloponnesus.

The war in Phokis, prosecuted seemingly upon a large scale and with much activity, between Philip and his allies on one side, and the Athenians and Thebans with their allies on the other—ended with the fatal battle of Chæroneia, fought in August 338 B.C.; having continued about ten months from the time when Philip, after being named general at the Amphiktyonic assembly (about the autumnal equinox), marched southward and occupied Elateia.<sup>5</sup> But respecting

B.C. 339-338.

War against Philip in Phokis—great influence of Demosthenes—auxiliaries which he procured.

Pausanias, x. 33, 4.

Pausanias, x. 36, 2.

Pausanias, iv. 31, 5. He places the fortifications of Ambrysus in class with those of Byzantium and Rhodes.

Pausan. ix. 13, 2; Diodor. xv.

Xenoph. Hell. vi. 4, 3.

The chronology of this period has caused much perplexity, and has been differently arranged by

different authors. But it will be found that all the difficulties and controversies regarding it have arisen from resting on the spurious decrees embodied in the speech of Demosthenes De Corona, as if they were so much genuine history. Mr. Clinton, in his *Fasti Hellenici*, cites these decrees as if they were parts of Demosthenes himself. When we once put aside these documents,

the intermediate events, we are unfortunately without distinct information. We pick up only a few hints and allusions which do not enable us to understand what passed. We cannot make out either the auxiliaries engaged, or the total numbers in the field, on either side. Demosthenes boasts of having procured for Athens as allies, the Eubœan Achæans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leukadians and Korkyræans—arraying along with the Athenian soldiers not less than 15,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry.

the general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, though they are not precise or specific, will appear perfectly clear and consistent respecting the chronology of the period.

That the battle of Chæroneia took place on the 7th of the Attic month Metageitnion (August) B.C. 338 (the second month of the archon Chærondas at Athens)—is affirmed by Plutarch (Camill. c. 19) and generally admitted.

The time when Philip first occupied Elateia has been stated by Mr. Clinton and most authors as the preceding month of Skirrophorion, fifty days or thereabouts earlier. But this rests exclusively on the evidence of the pretended decree, for alliance between Athens and Thebes, which appears in Demosthenes De Coronâ, p. 289. Even those who defend the authenticity of the decree, can hardly confide in the truth of the month-date, when the name of the archon Nausiklès is confessedly wrong. To me neither this document, nor the other so-called Athenian decrees professing to bear date in Munychion and Elaphebolion (p. 282), carry any evidence whatever.

The general statements both of Demosthenes and Æschines, indicate the appointment of Philip as Amphiktyonic general to have been made in the autumnal convocation of Amphiktyons at Ther-

mopylæ. Shortly after this appointment, Philip marched his army into Greece with the professed purpose of acting upon it. In his march he came upon Elateia, began to fortify it; probably about the month of October B.C. The Athenians, Thebans, and other Greeks carried on the war against him in Phokis for about ten months until the battle of Chæroneia. That this war must have lasted as long as ten months we may see by the facts mentioned in my last page—the re-establishment of the Phokians and their towns, and especially the elaborate fortification of Ambrysus. Bœcke (Forschungen, p. 593) points out justly (though I do not agree with his general arrangement of the events of the war) that the restoration of the Phokian towns implies a considerable interval between the occupation of Elateia and the battle of Chæroneia. There have also two battles given against Philip, one of them a *χαρμηνὴ*, which perfectly agrees with this arrangement.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 289. Plutarch, Demosth. c. 17. The decree of the Athenian people (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 10) passed after the death of Demosthenes, granting various honours and a statue to his memory, is recorded that he brought his persuasions not only the ones enumerated in the text, but

and pecuniary contributions besides, to no inconsiderable amount, for the payment of mercenary troops. Whether all these troops fought either in Phokis or at Chæroneia, we cannot determine; we verify the Achæans and the Dorinthians.<sup>1</sup> As far as we can trust Demosthenês, the autumn and winter of 339-338 B.C. was a season of advantages gained by the Athenians and Thebans over Philip, and of rejoicing in their two cities; not without much embarrassment to Philip, testified by his urgent requisitions of aid from his Peloponnesian allies, with which they did not comply. Demosthenês was the war-minister of the day, exercising greater influence than the generals—deliberating at Thebes in concert with the Bœotarchs—advising and swaying the Theban public assembly as well as the Athenian—and probably in mission to other cities also, for the purpose of pressing military efforts.<sup>2</sup> The crown bestowed upon him at the Dionysiac festival (March 38 B.C.) marks the pinnacle of his glory and the meridian of his hopes, when there seemed a fair chance of successfully resisting the Macedonian invasion.

Philip had calculated on the positive aid of Thebes; but the very worst, upon her neutrality between him and Athens. That she would cordially join Athens, neither he nor any one else imagined; or could so improbable a result have been thought about, had not the game of Athens been played with unusual decision and judgement by Demosthenês. Accordingly, when opposed by the unexpected junction of the Theban and Athenian force, it is not wonderful that Philip should have been at first repulsed. Such disadvantages would hardly indeed drive him to send instant propositions of peace;<sup>3</sup> but they would

B.C. 338.  
Increased  
efforts of  
Philip in  
Phokis.

the Lokrians and the Messenians; and that he procured from the allies a total contribution of above 10 talents. The Messenians, however, certainly did not fight at Chæroneia; nor is it correct to say that Demosthenês induced the Phokian Lokrians to become allies of Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, ix. p. 414; Pausanias, i. 6, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Demosthenês c. 18. Demosthenês (adv. Ktesiph. p. 74) puts

these same facts—the great personal ascendancy of Demosthenês at this period—in an invidious point of view.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch; Demosthenês c. 18. ὥστε ἐπικηρυχέσθαι δεόμενον εἰρήνης, &c.

It is possible that Philip may have tried to disunite the enemies assembled against him, by separate propositions addressed to some of them.

admonish him to bring up fresh forces, and to renew his invasion during the ensuing spring and summer with means adequate to the known resistance. It seems probable that the full strength of the Macedonian army, now brought to a high excellence of organisation after the continued improvements of his twenty years' reign—would have marched into Phokis during the summer of 338 B.C., and put down the most formidable combination of enemies that Philip had ever encountered. His youthful son Alexander, now eighteen years of age, came along with them.

It is among the accusations urged by Æschinês against Demosthenês, that in levying mercenary troops he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and farther, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of 10,000 mercenary troops, then withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Bœotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschinês affirms that he himself strenuously opposed the separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.<sup>1</sup> It would appear that Philip attacked and took Amphissa. We recollect his having deceived the Athenians and Thebans by a false despatch intended to be intercepted; so as to induce them to abandon their guard of the road which led to the place.<sup>2</sup> The sacred domain was restored, and the Amphissians, or at least such of them as had taken a leading part against Delphi, were banished.<sup>3</sup>

It was on the seventh day of the month Metageitnion (the second month of the Attic year, corresponding nearly to August) that the allied Greek army met Philip near Chæroneia; the last Bœotian town on the frontiers of Phokis. He seemed to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Bœotia, and is said to have

B.C. 338.

No eminent general on the side of the Greeks—Demosthenês

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 74. Deinarchus mentions a Theban named Proxenus, whom he calls a traitor, as having commanded these mercenary troops at Amphissa (Dei-

narchus adv. Demosth. p. 99).

<sup>2</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 8.

<sup>3</sup> We gather this from the account issued by Polysperchon some years afterwards (Diodor. xviii. 56).

drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain, by laying waste the neighbouring fields.<sup>1</sup> His numbers are stated by Diodorus at 30,000 foot and 2000 horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from Northern Greece; but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known.<sup>2</sup> We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organisation is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysiklês and Charês—and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenês; there were, besides, Phokians, Achæans, and Corinthians—probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleians, and Argeians, took no part in the war.<sup>3</sup> All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides; by Demosthenês as well as by the partisans of Philip. But jealousy and fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her—though on this occasion they took no positive part.

keeps up  
the spirits  
of the  
allies, and  
holds them  
together.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and Thebans, and its movements determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenês at least ensured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible. It was the sad fortune of Greece, that at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphikratês was at hand. Phokion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean.<sup>4</sup> Portents were said to have occurred—oracles, and prophecies, were in circulation—calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenês, animated by the sight of so numerous an army hearty and combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference<sup>5</sup> as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuktra, and accused the

<sup>1</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Pausanias, iv. 2, 82; v. 4, 5;

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus affirms that Philip's army was superior in number; Justin states the reverse (Diodor. xvi. 85; Justin, ix. 3).

viii. 6, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

<sup>5</sup> Plutarch, Demosth. c. 19, 20; Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 72.

Delphian priestess of philippising. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of *Æschinês*), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Bœotarchs inclined to accept them—*Demosthenês* alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor any one who should broach the proposition of peace,<sup>1</sup> and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Bœotia to attack Philip single-handed. This is advanced as an accusation by *Æschinês*; who however himself furnishes the justification of his rival, by intimating that the Bœotarchs were so eager for peace, that they proposed, even before the negotiations had begun, to send home the Athenian soldiers into Attica, in order that deliberations might be taken concerning the peace. We can hardly be surprised that *Demosthenês* “became out of his mind”<sup>2</sup> (such is the expression of *Æschinês*) on hearing a proposition so fraught with imprudence. Philip would have gained his point even without a battle if, by holding out the lure of negotiation for peace, he could have prevailed upon the allied army to disperse. To have united the full force of Athens and Thebes, with other subordinate states, in the same ranks and for the same purpose, was a rare good fortune, not likely to be reproduced, should it once slip away. And if *Demosthenês*, by warm or even passionate remonstrance, prevented such premature dispersion, he rendered the valuable service of ensuring to Grecian liberty a full trial of strength under circumstances not unpromising; and at the very worst, a catastrophe worthy and honourable.

In the field of battle near Chæroneia, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing; opposed to the Athenians; while his youthful son Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything. It is

B.C. 338

(August).

Battle of  
Chæroneia  
— complete  
victory of  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> *Æschin. adv. Ktesiph. p. 74, 75.*

<sup>2</sup> *Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 75.*

Ὡς δ' οὐ προσεῖχον αὐτῷ (Δημοσθένης)  
οἱ ἄρχοντες οἱ ἐν ταῖς θύβαις, ἀλλὰ  
καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς ὑμετέρους  
πάλιν ἀνέστρεψαν ἐξεληλυθότας, ἵνα

βουλευσάσθε περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης, ἡ  
ταῦθα παντάπασιν ἔκφρων ἐγένετο, &c.

It is seemingly this disposition  
on the part of Philip to open negotiations which is alluded to by  
Plutarch as having been (Plutarch

said to have been so obstinately contested, that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander<sup>1</sup> here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks,<sup>2</sup> while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia."<sup>3</sup> It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement, more likely to be true—that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks.<sup>4</sup> Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts; so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.<sup>5</sup>

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organized by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuktra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training, in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred

Macedonian  
phalanx—  
its long  
pikes—  
superior in  
front

Phokion, c. 16) favourably received Phokion.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 85. Alexander himself, after his vast conquests in Asia and shortly before his death, alludes briefly to his own presence at Chæroneia, in a speech delivered to his army (Arrian, vii. 9, 5).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 2. He mentions Stratoklês as the Athenian general from whom this exclamation came. We know from Æschinês (adv.

Ktesiph. p. 74) that Stratoklês was general of the Athenian troops at or near Thebes shortly after the alliance with the Thebans was formed. But it seems that Charês and Lysiklês commanded at Chæroneia. It is possible therefore that the anecdote reported by Polyænus may refer to one of the earlier battles fought, before that of Chæroneia.

<sup>4</sup> Polyænus, iv. 2, 7; Frontinus.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvi. 85, 86.

charge to the Grecian hoplites. Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the Macedonian pike or sarissa—in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers—and the long practice of the men to manage the impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip's improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæroneia.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organization of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops beside the phalanx; the body-guards, horse as well as foot—the hypaspistæ, or light hoplites—the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, &c. When we read the military operations of Alexander, three years afterwards, in the very first year of his reign, before he could have made any addition of his own to the force inherited from Philip; and when we see with what efficiency all these various descriptions of troops are employed in the field;<sup>1</sup> we may feel assured that Philip both had them near him and employed them at the battle of Chæroneia.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners.<sup>2</sup> The Theban loss is said also to have been as heavy as the Achæan.<sup>3</sup> But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals, Charês and Leisiklês, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the orator Lykurgus

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* i. 2, 3, 10.

<sup>2</sup> This is the statement of the contemporary orators—Demadês (*Frag.* p. 179), Lykurgus (ap. Diodor. xvi. 85; adv. Leokratem, p. 236. c. 36), and Demosthenês (*De*

*Coronâ*, p. 314). The latter does not specify the number of prisoners, though he states the slain at 1000. Compare Pausanias, vii. 10, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Pausanias, vii. 6, 3.

—a citizen highly respected for his integrity and diligence in the management of the finances, and severe in arraigning political delinquents. Lysiklês was condemned to death by the Dikastery.<sup>1</sup> What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Charês—who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused—we do not know. The memory of the Theban general Theagenês<sup>2</sup> also, though he fell in the battle, was assailed by charges of treason.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens, on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days' march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle.<sup>3</sup> The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible—yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nikias in Sicily.

Distress  
and alarm  
at Athens  
on the news  
of the  
defeat.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly,<sup>4</sup> wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in arms to Peiræus, and put that harbour

Resolu-  
tions taken  
at Athens  
for energetic  
defence.  
Respect  
and confi-  
dence  
shown to  
Demosthe-  
nês.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 88.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 12; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 99. Compare the Pseudo-Demosthenic Oration Funer. p. 1395.

<sup>3</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 164, 61, c. 11; Deinarchus cont. De-

mosth. p. 99.

<sup>4</sup> Lykurg. adv. Leokrat. p. 146.

Γεγενημένης γάρ τῆς ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ μάχης, καὶ συνδραμόντων ἀπάντων ὁμῶν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν ἐψηφίσατο ὁ δήμος, παῖδας μὲν καὶ γυναῖκας ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν εἰς τὰ τείχη κατακομίζειν, &c.

in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence, and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled;<sup>1</sup> enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the full privileges of citizen those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. This last mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperidês but several others were moved by Demosthenês, who, notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. The general measures requisite for strengthening the walls, opening ditches, distributing military posts and constructing earthworks, were decreed on his motion; and he seems to have been named member of a special Board for superintending the fortifications.<sup>3</sup> Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment.<sup>4</sup> Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres<sup>5</sup>—as had been done after the Persian war when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistoklês.<sup>6</sup> The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens.<sup>7</sup> By such earnest and unanimous efforts the defences of the city and of Peiræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen, Epidaurus, Andros, Keos, and other places, to solicit aid, and collect money; in one or other of

<sup>1</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 177. c. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c. 11. ἦντιχ' ὅρῳ ἦν τὸν δῆμον ψηφισάμενον τοὺς μὲν δούλους ἐλευθέρους, τοὺς δὲ ξένους Ἀθηναίους, τοὺς δὲ ἀτίμους ἐντίμους. The orator causes this decree, proposed by Hyperidês, to be read publicly by the secretary, in court.

Compare Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit.

X. Orator. p. 849, and Demosth. cont. Aristog. p. 803.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 30. Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 100.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 32. Deinarchus adv. Demosth. p. 10. Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 851.

<sup>5</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 170. c. 11; Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 8.

<sup>6</sup> Thucyd. i. 93.

<sup>7</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. l. c.

which embassies Demosthenês served, after he had provided for the immediate exigences of defence.<sup>1</sup>

What was the immediate result of these applications to other cities, we do not know. But the effect produced upon some of the Ægean islands by the reported prostration of Athens, is remarkable. An Athenian citizen named Leokratês, instead of staying at Athens to join in the defence, listened only to a disgraceful timidity,<sup>2</sup> and fled forthwith from Peiræus with his family and property. He hastened to Rhodos, where he circulated the false news that Athens was already taken and the Peiræus under siege. Immediately on hearing this intelligence, and believing it to be true, the Rhodians with their triremes began a cruise to seize the merchant-vessels at sea.<sup>3</sup> Hence we learn, indirectly, that the Athenian naval power constituted the standing protection for these merchant-vessels; insomuch that so soon as that protection was removed, armed cruisers began to prey upon them from various islands in the Ægean.

Effect produced upon some of the islanders in the Ægean by the defeat—conduct of the Rhodians.

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days' march from the field of Chæroneia; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behaviour of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation

Conduct of Philip after the victory—harshness towards Thebes—greater lenity to Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Lykurgus (adv. Leokrat. p. 171. . 11) mentions these embassies; Deinarchus (adv. Demosth. p. 100) affirms that Demosthenês provided for himself an escape from the city as an envoy—αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πρεσβεύον κατασκευάσας, ἵν' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ποδρῆζῃ, &c. Compare Æschinês dv. Ktesiph. p. 76.

The two hostile orators treat such temporary absence of Demosthenês on the embassy to obtain aid, as if it were a cowardly desertion of his post. This is a construction altogether unjust.

nian who fled, or tried to flee. Another was seized in the attempt (according to Æschinês) and condemned to death by the Council of Areopagus (Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 89). A member of the Areopagus itself, named Autolykus (the same probably who is mentioned with peculiar respect by Æschinês cont. Timarchum, p. 12), sent away his family for safety; Lykurgus afterwards impeached him for it, and he was condemned by the Dikastery (Harpokration v. Αὐτόλυκος).

<sup>3</sup> Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. p. 149. Οὕτω δὲ σφόδρα ταῦτ' ἐπίστευσαν οἱ

<sup>2</sup> Leokratês was not the only Athe-

on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenês; a temper, from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demadês, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.<sup>1</sup> At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadeia to make the customary demand.<sup>2</sup> According to another account, the demeanour of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing.<sup>3</sup> However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain—which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused, and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any farther resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip's power. He put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippising Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one.<sup>4</sup> The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiadês, surprised the Kadmeia. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Kadmeia, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison the philippising Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenus and Plateæa, probably also Thespiæ and Koroneia—to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes.<sup>5</sup>

At Athens also, the philippising orators raised their

<sup>1</sup> Ρόδιοι, ὥστε τριήρεις πληρώσαντες τὰ πλοῖα κατῆγον, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 87. The story respecting Demadês is told somewhat differently in Sextus Empiricus adv. Grammaticos, p. 281.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 849.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, ix. 4; Polybius, v. 10. Theopomp. Frag. 262. See the note of Wicher's ad Theopompi Fragmenta, p. 259.

<sup>5</sup> Justin, ix. 4. Deinarch. con. Demosth. s. 20, p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> Pausanias, iv. 27, 5; ix. 1, 3.

voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenês and his policy. New speakers,<sup>1</sup> who would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschinês, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself.<sup>2</sup> He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenokratês and Phokion.<sup>3</sup> Among them was Demadês also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demadês, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favourable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald, to the same effect, had been previously refused.<sup>4</sup> Æschinês (according to the assertion of Demosthenês) took part as a sympathising guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty.<sup>5</sup> At length Demadês with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

Conduct of  
Æschinês—  
Demadês is  
sent as  
envoy to  
Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 310. οὐ δι' ἐαυτῶν τό γε πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ δι' ὧν μάλισθ' ὑπελάμβανον ἀγνοήσεσθαι, &c.

So the enemies of Alkibiadês put up against him in the assembly speakers of affected candour and impartiality—ἄλλους ῥήτορας ἐνέεντες, &c. Thucyd. vi. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319, 320.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 319. δς εὐθέως μετὰ τὴν μάχην πρεσβευτὴς ἐπορεύετο πρὸς Φίλιππον, &c. Compare Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16. Diogen. Laert. iv. 5, in his life of

the philosopher Xenokratês.

<sup>4</sup> Demadês, Fragment. Orat. p. 179. χιλίων ταφῇ Ἀθηναίων μαρτυρεῖται, κηδευσθεῖσα ταῖς τῶν ἐναντίων χερσίν, ὥς ἀντὶ πολεμίων φιλίας ἐποίησα τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσιν. Ἐνταῦθα ἐπιστάς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἔγραψα τὴν εἰρήνην· ὁμολογῶ. Ἐγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς· οὐκ ἀρνοῦμαι· δισχιλίους γάρ αἰχμαλώτους ἄνευ λύτρων καὶ χίλια πολιτῶν σώματα χωρὶς κήρυκος, καὶ τὸν Ὀρωπὸν ἄνευ πρεσβείας λαβὼν ὑμῖν, ταῦτ' ἔγραψα. See also Suidas v. Δημάδης.

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. De Coronâ, p. 321.

Peace of  
Demadês,  
concluded  
between  
Philip and  
the Athe-  
nians. The  
Athenians  
are com-  
pelled to  
recognise  
him as chief  
of the  
Hellenic  
world.

Demadês proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army, was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the 2000 prisoners without ransom, was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively, but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a farther cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Periklês would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgement by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions to headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognise not Sparta or Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Pan-hellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers, who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organised the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians or impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenês and others. The peace of Demadês, recognising Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the acceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

Polybius praises the generosity of Philip in granting such favourable terms, and even affirms, not very accurately, that he secured thereby the steady gratitude and attachment of the Athenians.<sup>1</sup> But Philip would have gained nothing by killing his prisoners; not to mention that he would have provoked an implacable spirit of revenge among the Athenians. By selling his prisoners for slaves he would have gained something, but by the use actually made of them he gained more. The recognition of his Hellenic supremacy by Athens was the capital step for the prosecution of his objects. It insured him against dissentients among the remaining Grecian states, whose adhesion had not yet been made certain, and who might possibly have stood out against a proposition so novel and so anti-Hellenic, had Athens set them the example. Moreover, if Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens in this way, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Dekeleia—yet the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these circumstances, Athens and Peiræus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his farther progress. Thebes—an inland city, hated by the other Bœotian cities—was prostrated by the battle of Chæroneia, and left without any means of successful defence. But the same blow was not absolutely mortal to Athens, united in her population throughout all the area of Attica, and superior at sea. We may see therefore that—with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair—Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his headship. His political game was well played, now as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius, he has little claim.

Remarks of Polybius on the Demadean peace—means of resistance still possessed by Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius, v. 10; xvii. 14; Diodor. Fragm. lib. xxxii.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on the motion of Demadês, passed various honorary and complimentary votes in his favour; of what precise nature we do not know.<sup>1</sup> Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of 2000 captive citizens, were sufficient to render the peace popular at the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful kings, which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenês among his countrymen was noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season favourable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them proved successful. And when the time came for electing a public orator to deliver the funeral discourse at the obsequies celebrated for the slain at Chæroneia — he was invested with that solemn duty, not only in preference to Æschinês, who was put up in competition, but also to Demadês the recent mover of the peace.<sup>3</sup> He was farther honoured with strong marks of esteem and sympathy from the surviving relatives of these gallant citizens. Moreover it appears that Demosthenês was continued in an important financial post as one of the joint managers of the Theoric Fund, and as member of a Board for purchasing corn; he was also shortly afterwards appointed superintendent of the walls and defences of the city. The orator Hyperidês, the political coadjutor of Demosthenês, was impeached by Aristogeiton under the Graphê Paranomon. for his illegal and unconstitutional decree (proposed under the immediate terror of the defeat at Chæroneia), to grant manumission to the slaves, citizenship to metics, and resto-

<sup>1</sup> Demadês. Fragm. p. 179. ἔγραψα καὶ Φιλίππῳ τιμὰς, οὐκ ἀργοῦμαι, &c. Compare Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* i. 2, 3 — καὶ πλείονα ἔτι τῶν Φιλίππῳ δοθέντων Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς τιμὴν συγχωρῆσαι, &c., and Clemens Alex. *Admonit.*

ad Gent. p. 36 B. τὸν Μακεδόνα Φιλίππον ἐν Κυνοσάργει νομοθετοῦντες προσκυνεῖν, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, ix. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. *De Coronâ*, p. 310-320

ration of citizenship to those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. The occurrence of peace had removed all necessity for acting upon this decree; nevertheless an impeachment was entered and brought against its mover. Hyperidês, unable to deny its illegality, placed his defence on the true and obvious ground—"The Macedonian arms (he said) darkened my vision. It was not I who moved the decree; it was the battle of Chæroneia."<sup>1</sup> The substantive defence was admitted by the Dikastery; while the bold oratorical turn attracted notice from rhetorical critics.

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes—  
 having reconstituted the anti-Theban cities in Bœotia—having constrained Athens to submission and dependent alliance—and having established a garrison in Ambrakia, at the same time mastering Akarnania, and banishing the leading Akarnanians who were opposed to him—

B.C. 338-337.

Expedition of Philip into Peloponnesus. He invades Laconia.

Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in the territory of Sparta. The Corinthians, Argeians, Messenians, Eleians, and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit, nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the three sides; towards Argos, Messênê, and Megalopolis.<sup>2</sup> We have no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 849.

4. viii. 27, 8. From Diodorus xvii.

<sup>2</sup> Polybius, ix. 28, 33. xvii. 14; Tacitus, Annal. iv. 43; Strabo, viii. p. 361; Pausanias, ii. 20, 1. viii. 7,

3. we see how much this adhesion to Philip was obtained under the pressure of necessity.

**B. C. 337.** Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks, and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it at 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised.<sup>1</sup> The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made by Demadês. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens.<sup>2</sup> It appears that Samos was still recognised as belonging to them<sup>3</sup>—or at least such portion of the island as was occupied by the numerous Athenian kleruchs or outsettlers, first established in the island after the conquest by Timotheus in 365 B.C., and afterwards reinforced. For several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendancy henceforward disappears.

The Athenians, deeply mortified by such humiliation, were reminded by Phokion that it was a necessary result of the peace which they had accepted on the motion of Demadês, and that it was now too late to murmur.<sup>4</sup> We cannot wonder at

Mortification to Athenian feelings—degraded position of

<sup>1</sup> Justin, ix. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16; Pausanias, i. 25, 3. Τὸ γὰρ ἀτύχημα τὸ ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ ἄπασιν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἤρξε κακοῦ, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δούλους ἐποίησε τοὺς ὑπεριδόντας, καὶ ἔσσι μετὰ Μακεδόνων ἐτάχθησαν. Τὰς μὲν δὲ πολλὰς Φίλιππος τῶν πόλεων εἶλεν. Ἀθηναῖοις δὲ λόγῳ συνθέμενος,

ἔργῳ σφᾶς μάλιστα ἐκάκωσε, νήσους τε ἀφελόμενος καὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ναυτικά παύσας ἀρχῆς.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xviii. 56. Σάμον δὲ δίδομεν Ἀθηναίοις, ἐπειδὴ καὶ Φίλιππος ἔδωκεν ὁ πατήρ. Compare Plutarch, Alexand. c. 28.

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, c. 16.

their feelings. Together with the other free cities of Greece, they were enrolled as contributory appendages of the king of Macedon; a revolution, to them more galling than to the rest, since they passed at once, not merely from simple autonomy, but from a condition of superior dignity, into the common dependence. Athens had only to sanction the scheme dictated by Philip and to furnish her quota towards the execution. Moreover, this scheme—the invasion of Persia—had ceased to be an object of genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the peace of Antalkidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

Athens and of Greece. No genuine feeling in Greece now towards war against Persia.

It was in 337 B.C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip;<sup>1</sup> who was at the same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king Pleurias.<sup>2</sup> In the spring of 336 B.C., a portion of the Macedonian army under Parmenio and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself intending speedily to follow.<sup>3</sup>

B.C. 337.

Preparations of Philip for the invasion of Persia.

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was Kleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus.

Philip repudiates Olympias, and marries a new wife, Kleopatra—resentment of Olympias

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, vii. 9, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 93.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, ix. 5; Diodor. xvi. 91.

and Alexander—dissension at court.

It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her brother Alexander of Epirus.<sup>1</sup> This step provoked violent dissensions among the partisans of the two queens and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the marriage banquet Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Kleopatra to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in wrath—"Do you then proclaim *me* as a bastard?"—at the same time hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander; who retorted—"Here is a man preparing to cross from Europe into Asia—who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another."<sup>2</sup> After this violent quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon arose, because Alexander had opened negotiation for marriage with the daughter of the satrap of Karia. Rejecting such an alliance as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander;<sup>3</sup> while the friends of Attalus stood high in favour.

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A son had just been born to him from his new wife Kleopatra.<sup>4</sup> His ex-

<sup>1</sup> Athenæus, xiii. p. 557; Justin, ix. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 9; Justin, ix. 7; Diodor. xvi. 91-93.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 10; Arrian, iii. 6; 5.

<sup>4</sup> Pausanias (viii. 7, 5) mentions a son born to Philip by Kleopatra; Diodorus (xvii. 2) also notices a son. Justin in one place (ix. 7) mentions a daughter, and in another

place (xi. 2) a son named Caranus Satyrus (ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 55) states that a daughter named Eirôpê was born to him by Kleopatra.

It appears that the son was born only a short time before the late festival and the assassination of Philip. But I incline to think that the marriage with Kleopatra must well have taken place two years

pedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the preceding year, had been actually commenced; Parmenio and Attalus having been sent across to Asia with the first division, to be followed presently by himself with the remaining army. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating her brother Alexander king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing. Philip indeed held a Macedonian garrison in Ambrakia,<sup>1</sup> the chief Grecian city on the Epirotic border; and he had also contributed much to establish Alexander as prince. But he now deemed it essential to conciliate him still farther, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage Kleopatra, his daughter by Olympias.<sup>2</sup> For this marriage, celebrated at *Ægæ* in Macedonia in August 336 B.C., Philip provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendour, commemorating at the same time the recent birth of his son by Kleopatra.<sup>3</sup> Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic exhibitions,<sup>4</sup> among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in the tragedy of *Kinyras*, &c. with every species of attraction known to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed, were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.<sup>5</sup>

Great festival in Macedonia—celebrating the birth of a son to Philip by Kleopatra—and the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus.

or more before that event, and that there may have been a daughter born before the son. Certainly Justin distinguishes the two, stating that the daughter was killed by order of Olympias, and the son by that of Alexander (ix. 7; xi. 2).

Arrian (iii. 6, 5) seems to mean *Kleopatra* the wife of Philip—though he speaks of *Eurydikê*.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 3.

<sup>2</sup> This *Kleopatra*—daughter of Philip, sister of Alexander the

Great, and bearing the same name as Philip's last wife—was thus niece of the Epirotic Alexander, her husband. Alliances of that degree of kindred were then neither disreputable nor unfrequent.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Josephus, *Antiq.* xix. 1, 13; Suetonius, *Caligula*, c. 57. See Mr. Clinton's Appendix (4) on the Kings of Macedonia, *Fast. Hellen.* p. 230, note.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvi. 92.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry. There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous—Pausanias, one of the royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis in Upper Macedonia; who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself, nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed accurately make out amidst discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Kleopatra, who

Pausanias  
—outrage  
inflicted  
upon him—  
his resent-  
ment  
against  
Philip, en-  
couraged  
by the par-  
tisans of  
Olympias  
and Alex-  
ander.

had given the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be had in Macedonia against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one account Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly Pausanias determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself on Attalus—who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the Macedonian troops in Asia—his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom the demand for redress had been refused. It appears that this turn of sentiment, diverting the appetite for revenge away from the real criminal, was not wholly spontaneous on the part of Pausanias, but was artfully instigated by various party conspirators who wished to destroy Philip. The enemies of Attalus and queen Kleopatra (who herself is said to have treated Pausanias with insult<sup>2</sup>)—being of course also partisans of Olympias and Alexander—were well disposed to make use of the maddened Pausanias as an instrument, and to direct his exasperation against the king. He had poured forth his complaints both to Olympias and to Alexander; the former

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 10. Ἡ Φιλίππου (ἐπιθεσίς) ὑπὸ Πausανίου, διὰ τὸ εἶσαι ὑβρισθῆναι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀττάλου, &c. Justin, ix. 6. Diodor. xvi. 93.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

is said to have worked him up vehemently against her late husband—and even the latter repeated to him a verse out of Euripidês, wherein the fierce Medea, deserted by her husband Jason who had married the daughter of the Corinthian king Kreon, vows to include in her revenge the king himself, together with her husband and his new wife.<sup>1</sup> That the vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion; but that some among his partisans—men eager to consult his feelings and to ensure his succession—lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established. A Greek sophist named Hermokratês is also said to have contrived to the deed, though seemingly without intention, by his conversation; and the Persian king (an improbable report) by his gold.<sup>2</sup>

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre, already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting his escape—like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ<sup>3</sup> under circumstances very similar—had not his foot stumbled amidst some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralysed with astonishment and consternation. At length however some hastened to assist the dying king; while others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdikkas overtook him and slew him immediately.<sup>4</sup>

B.C. 336.

Assassination of Philip by Pausanias, who is slain by the guards.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 94; Justin, ix. 7;

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, Exp. Alex. ii. 14, 10.

Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 32.

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit and favour his chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are known to us by name—three brothers from the Lynkestian district of Upper Macedonia—Alexander, Heromenês, and Arrhibæus sons of Aëropus;<sup>1</sup> but it seems that there were other besides. The Lynkestian Alexander—whose father-in-law Antipater was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers in the service of Philip—belonged to a good family in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of Lynkestis.<sup>2</sup> It was he who, immediately after Pausanias had assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king, helped him to put on his armour, and marched as one of his guards to take possession of the regal palace.<sup>3</sup>

This “prima vox”<sup>4</sup> was not simply an omen or presage to Alexander of empire to come, but essentially serviceable to him as a real determining cause or condition. The succession to the Macedonian throne was often disturbed by feud and bloodshed among the members of the regal family; and under the latter circumstances of Philip’s reign, such disturbance was peculiarly probable. He had been on bad terms with Alexander, and on still worse terms with Olynthians. While banishing persons attached to Alexander, he had lent his ear to Attalus with the partisans of the new queen Kleopatra. Had these latter got the first start after the assassination, they would have organised an opposition

Alexander the Great is declared king—first notice given to him by the Lynkestian Alexander, one of the conspirators—Attalus and queen Kleopatra, with her infant son, are put to death.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* i. 25, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xii. 14; Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 5, with the note of Müttzell.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2. “Soli Alexandro Lyncistarum fratri pepercit, servans in eo auspiciū dignitatis suæ; nam regem eum primus salutaverat.”

<sup>4</sup> Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 80. “Dum queritur tempus locusque, quodque in

re tali difficillimum est, prima vox dum animo spes, timor, ratio, cæcæ observantur; egressum cubitum Vespasianum, pauci milites sol adstantes ordine, Imperator salutavero. Tum cæteri accurre Cæsarem, et Augustum, et omnes principatus vocabula cumulant. Mens a metu ad fortunam transierat.”

o Alexander in favour of the infant prince; which proposition might have had some chances of success, since they had been in favour with the deceased king, and were heretofore in possession of many important posts. But the speed of Pausanias took them unprepared, and for the moment paralysed them; while, before they could recover or take concert, one of the accomplices of the assassin ran to put Alexander in motion without delay. A decisive initiatory movement from him and his friends, at this critical juncture, determined waverers and forestalled opposition. We need not wonder therefore that Alexander, when king, testified extraordinary gratitude and esteem for his Lynkestian namesake; not simply exempting him from the punishment of death inflicted on the other accomplices, but also promoting him to great honours and important military commands. Neither Alexander and Olympias on the one side, nor Attalus and Kleopatra on the other, were personally safe, except by acquiring the accession. It was one of the earliest proceedings of Alexander to send over a special officer to Asia, for the purpose of bringing home Attalus prisoner, or of putting him to death; the last of which was done, seemingly through the cooperation of Parmenio (who was in joint command with Attalus) and his son Philôtas.<sup>1</sup> The unfortunate Kleopatra and her child were both put to death shortly afterwards.<sup>2</sup> Other persons also were slain, of whom I shall speak farther in describing the reign of Alexander.

We could have wished to learn from some person actually present, the immediate effect produced upon the great miscellaneous crowd in the theatre, when the sudden murder of Philip first became known. Among the Greeks present, there were doubtless many who welcomed it

Satisfaction manifested by Olympias at the death of Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Quintus Curtius, vii. 1, 3; Diodorus, xvii. 2, 5. Compare Justin, i. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Justin. ix. 7; xi. 2. Pausanias, iii. 7, 5; Plutarch, Alex. c. 10.

According to Pausanias, Olympias caused Kleopatra and her infant boy to perish by a horrible death; being roasted or baked on a brazen vessel surrounded by fire. According to Justin, Olympias first

slew the daughter of Kleopatra on her mother's bosom, and then caused Kleopatra herself to be hanged; while Alexander put to death Caranus, the infant son of Kleopatra. Plutarch says nothing about this; but states that the cruel treatment of Kleopatra was inflicted by order of Olympias during the absence of Alexander, and that he was much displeased

with silent satisfaction, as seeming to reopen for them the door of freedom. One person alone dared to manifest satisfaction; and that one was Olympias.<sup>1</sup>

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of twenty three years.<sup>2</sup> Our information about him is signally defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame, nor his interior government are known to us with exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighbouring sea-coast. At his death, Macedonian ascendancy was established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambrakian, Messenian, and Saronic Gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognised the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like the Ætolians and others, defended by a rugged home. Good fortune had waited on Philip's steps, with few rare interruptions;<sup>3</sup> but it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent, political and military. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage, of Philip were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That among the causes of Philip's conquests, one was corruption, employed abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbours and enemies—the other, with winning and agreeable manners, he combined recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even toward

at it. The main fact, that Kleopatra and her infant child were despatched by violence, seems not open to reasonable doubt; though we cannot verify the details.

<sup>1</sup> After the solemn funeral of Philip, Olympias took down and burned the body of Pausanias (which had been crucified), providing for him a sepulchral monument and an annual ceremony of

commemoration. Justin, ix. 7.

<sup>2</sup> Justin (ix. 3) calls Philip 46 years of age; Pausanias (viii. 7, 4) speaks of him as 46. See Mr. Clinton's Fast. Hellen. Appen. 4. p. 227.

<sup>3</sup> Theopompus, Fragm. 265. ap. Athenæ. iii. p. 77. καὶ εὐτυχῶς πάντα Φίλιππον. Compare Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 24.

allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose —this we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it.<sup>1</sup> Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organized, and usually commanded, by himself. Its organization adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphikratês.<sup>2</sup> Begun as well as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment and aggrandisement at the expense of all his neighbours —the less can we find room for that mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognised, we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek cities in Chalkidikê and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.

Besides his skill as a general and politician, Philip was no mean proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters. The testimony of Æschinês as to his effective powers of speaking, though requiring some allowance, is not to be rejected. Isokratês addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander, tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either with the crimes of ambition, or the licenses of inordinate appetite. The contemporary historian

<sup>1</sup> Theopomp. Fragm. 249; Theopompus ap. Polybium, viii. 11. ἀδικώτατον δὲ καὶ καχοπραγμονέστατον περὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων καὶ συμμάχων κατασκευάς, πλείστα δὲ πόλεις ἐξην-δραπόδισμένον καὶ πεπραξικοπηχότα μετὰ δόλου καὶ βίας, &c.

Justin, ix. 8. Pausanias, vii. 7, 3; vii. 10, 14; viii. 7, 4. Diodor. xvi. 54.

The language of Pausanias about Philip, after doing justice to his great conquests and exploits, is very strong—δ; γε καὶ ὕρκους θεῶν

καταπάτησεν δαί, καὶ σπονδὰς ἐπὶ πάντι ἐψεύσατο, πίστιν τε ἤτιμασε μάλιστα ἀνθρώπων, &c. By such conduct, according to Pausanias, Philip brought the divine wrath both upon himself and upon his race, which became extinct with the next generation.

<sup>2</sup> A striking passage occurs, too long to cite, in the third Philippic of Demosthenês (p. 123-124) attesting the marvellous stride made by Philip in the art and means of effective warfare.

Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip's genius, stigmatised not only the perfidy of his public dealings, but also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which he indulged—encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian and Grecian body-guard, 800 in number, was a troop in which no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless treachery sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only Centaurs and Læstrygons.<sup>1</sup> The number of Philip's mistresses and wives was almost on an Oriental scale; and the dissensions thus introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers, were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of Xenophon's *Hellenica*) when there was neither leading city prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphikratés. How different might have been his career, had Epaminondas

<sup>1</sup> Theopomp. Fragm. 249. 'Ἀπλῶς δ' εἰπεῖν . . . . ἡγοῦμαι τοιαῦτα θηρία γεγονέναι, καὶ τοιοῦτον τρόπον τοὺς φίλους καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους Φιλίππου προσαγορευθέντας, οἷους οὔτε τοὺς Κενταύρους τοὺς τὸ Πήλιον κατασχόντας, οὔτε τοὺς Λαιστρυγόνας τοὺς Λεοντίνον πεδίον οἰκίσαντας, οὔτ' ἄλλους οὐδ' ὅποιους.

Compare Athenæ. iv. p. 166, 167; vi. p. 260, 261. Demosthen. Olynth. ii. p. 23.

Polybius (viii. 11) censures Theopompus for self contradiction, in ascribing to Philip both unprincipled means and intemperate habits, and yet extolling his ability and energy as a king. But I see no contradiction between the two. The love of enjoyment was not

suffered to stand in the way of Philip's military and political schemes, either in himself or in his officers. The master-passion overpowered all appetites; but while that passion did not require effort, intemperance was the habitual relaxation. Polybius neither produces any sufficient facts, nor cites any contemporary authority, to refute Theopompus.

It is to be observed that the statements of Theopompus, respecting both the public and private conduct of Philip, are as disparaging as anything in Demosthenes.

<sup>2</sup> Satyrus ap. Athenæ. xiii. p. 56. 'Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος δαί κατά πόλεμιν ἐγέραι, &c.

survived the victory of Mantinea, gained only two years before Philip's accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenês sufficed for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæroneia—at Byzantium and at Thebes—did he signally frustrate Philip's combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that "public inefficiency," at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which even Æschinês complains;<sup>1</sup> and to this decay of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find, during the reign of his son Alexander, the like genius and vigour exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of a subject province.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês cont. Timarchum, p. 26. εἴτα τι θαυμάζομεν τὴν κοινὴν ἀπραξίαν, τοιούτων ῥητόρων ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ δήμου γνώμας ἐπιγραφόμενων;

Æschinês chooses to ascribe this public inefficiency—which many admitted and deplored, though few

except Demosthenês persevered in contending against it—to the fact that men of scandalous private lives (like Timarchus) were permitted, against the law, to move decrees in the public assembly. Compare Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 37.

## CHAPTER XCI.

## FIRST PERIOD OF THE REIGN OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT—SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF THEBES.

My last preceding chapter ended with the assassination of Philip of Macedon, and the accession of his son Alexander the Great, then twenty years of age.

It demonstrates the altered complexion of Grecian history, that we are now obliged to seek for marking events in the succession to the Macedonian crown, or in the ordinances of Macedonian kings. In fact, the Hellenic world has ceased to be autonomous. In Sicily, indeed, the free and constitutional march, revived by Timoleon, is still destined to continue for a few years longer; but all the Grecian cities south of Mount Olympus have descended into dependents of Macedonia. Such dependence, established as a fact by the battle of Chæroneia and by the subsequent victorious march of Philip over Peloponnesus, was acknowledged in form by the vote of the Grecian synod at Corinth. While even the Athenians had been compelled to concur in submission, Sparta alone, braving all consequences, continued inflexible in her refusal. The adherence of Thebes was not trusted to the word of the Thebans, but ensured by the Macedonian garrison established in her citadel, called the Kadmeia. Each Hellenic city, small and great—maritime, inland, and insular—(with the single exception of Sparta), was thus enrolled as a separate unit in the list of subject-allies attached to the imperial headship of Philip.

Under these circumstances, the history of conquered Greece loses its separate course, and becomes merged in that of conquering Macedonia. Nevertheless, there are particular reasons which constrain the historian of Greece to carry on the two together for a few years longer. First, conquered Greece exercised a powerful action on her conqueror—"Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit." The Macedonians, though speaking a language

State of  
Greece at  
Alexander's ac-  
cession—  
dependence  
on the  
Macedon-  
ian kings.

Unwilling  
subjection  
of the  
Greeks—  
influence  
of Grecian  
intelli-  
gence on  
Macedonia.

of their own, had neither language for communicating with others, nor literature, nor philosophy, except Grecian and derived from Greeks. Philip, while causing himself to be chosen chief of Hellas, was himself not only partially hellenised, but an eager candidate for Hellenic admiration. He demanded the headship under the declared pretence of satisfying the old antipathy against Persia. Next, the conquests of Alexander, though essentially Macedonian, operated indirectly as the initiatory step of a series of events, diffusing Hellenic language (with some tinge of Hellenic literature) over a large breadth of Asia—opening that territory to the better observation, in some degree even to the superintendence, of intelligent Greeks—and thus producing consequences important in many ways to the history of mankind. Lastly, the generation of free Greeks upon whom the battle of Chæroneia fell, were not disposed to lie quiet if any opportunity occurred for shaking off their Macedonian masters. In the succeeding chapters will be recorded the unavailing efforts made for this purpose, in which Demosthenês and most of the other leaders perished.

Alexander (born in July 356 B.C.), like his father Philip, was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with Grecian sentiment and intelligence. It is true that his ancestors, some centuries before, had been emigrants from Argos; but the kings of Macedonia had long lost all trace of any such peculiarity as might originally have distinguished them from their subjects. The basis of Philip's character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of a barbarian prince, not the *ingenium civile*, or sense of reciprocal obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.

A kinsman of Olympias, named Leonidas, and an Akarnanian named Lysimachus, are mentioned as the chief tutors to whom Alexander's childhood was entrusted.<sup>1</sup> Of course the Iliad of Homer was among the first things which he

Basis of Alexander's character—not Hellenic.

Boyhood and education of Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. c. 5, 6.

learnt as a boy. Throughout most of his life, he retained a strong interest in this poem, a copy of which, said to have been corrected by Aristotle, he carried with him in his military campaigns. We are not told, nor is it probable, that he felt any similar attachment for the less warlike *Odyssey*. Even as a child, he learnt to identify himself in sympathy with *Achillès*,—his ancestor by the mother's side, according to the *Æakid* pedigree. The tutor *Lysimachus* won his heart by calling himself *Phoenix*—*Alexander*, *Achillès*—and *Philip*, by the name of *Peleus*. Of *Alexander's* boyish poetical recitations, one anecdote remains, both curious and of unquestionable authenticity. He was ten years old when the Athenian legation, including both *Æschinès* and *Demosthenès*, came to *Pella* to treat about peace. While *Philip* entertained them at table, in his usual agreeable and convivial manner, the boy *Alexander* recited for their amusement certain passages of poetry which he had learnt; and delivered, in response with another boy, a dialogue out of one of the Grecian dramas.<sup>1</sup>

At the age of thirteen, *Alexander* was placed under the instruction of *Aristotle*, whom *Philip* expressly invited for the purpose, and whose father *Nikomachus* had been both friend and physician of *Philip's* father *Amyntas*. What course of study *Alexander* was made to go through, we unfortunately cannot state. He enjoyed the teaching of *Aristotle* for at least three years, and we are told that he devoted himself to it with ardour, contracting a strong attachment to his preceptor. His powers of addressing an audience, though not so well attested as those of his father, were always found sufficient for his purpose: moreover, he retained even in the midst of his fatiguing Asiatic campaigns, an interest in Greek literature and poetry.

At what precise moment, during the lifetime of his father, *Alexander* first took part in active service we do not know. It is said that once, when quite a youth, he received some Persian envoys during the absence of his father; and that he surprised them by the maturity of his demeanour, as well as by the political bearing and pertinence of his questions.<sup>2</sup> Though only sixteen years of age, in 340 B.C. he was left at home as regent while *Philip*

He receives instruction from Aristotle.

Early political action and maturity of Alexander—his quarrels with his father. Family discord.

<sup>1</sup> *Æschinès* cont. *Timarch.* p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> *Plutarch, Alex.* 5.

was engaged in the sieges of Byzantium and Perinthus. He put down a revolt of the neighbouring Thracian tribe called Mædi, took one of their towns, and founded it anew under the title of Alexandria; the earliest town which bore that name, afterwards applied to various other towns planted by him and by his successors. In the march of Philip into Greece (338 B.C.), Alexander took part, commanded one of the wings at the battle of Chæroneia, and is said to have first gained the advantage on his side over the Theban sacred band.<sup>1</sup>

Yet notwithstanding such marks of confidence and cooperation, other incidents occurred producing bitter animosity between the father and the son. By his wife Olympias, Philip had as offspring Alexander and Kleopatra: by a Thessalian mistress named Philinna, he had a son named Aridæus (afterwards called Philip Aridæus): he had also daughters named Kynna (or Kynanê) and Thessalonikê. Olympias, a woman of sanguinary and implacable disposition, had rendered herself so odious to him that he repudiated her, and married a new wife named Kleopatra. I have recounted in my ninetieth chapter the indignation felt by Alexander at this proceeding, and the violent altercation which occurred during the conviviality of the marriage banquet; where Philip actually snatched his sword, threatened his son's life, and was only prevented from executing the threat by falling down through intoxication. After this quarrel, Alexander retired from Macedonia, conducting his mother to her brother Alexander king of Epirus. A son was born to Philip by Kleopatra. Her brother or uncle Attalus acquired high favour. Her kinsmen and partisans generally were also promoted, while Ptolemy, Nearchus, and other persons attached to Alexander, were banished.<sup>2</sup>

The prospects of Alexander were thus full of uncertainty and peril, up to the very day of Philip's assassination. The succession to the Macedonian crown, though transmitted in the same family, was by no means assured as to individual members; moreover, in the regal house of Macedonia<sup>3</sup> (as among the kings called Diadochi, who acquired

Uncertainty of Alexander's position during the last year of Philip.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alex. 9. Justin says that Alexander was the companion of his father during part of the war in Thrace (ix. 1).

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alex. 10. Arrian, iii. 6, 8.

<sup>3</sup> See the third chapter of Plutarch's life of Demetrius Poliorkê-

dominion after the death of Alexander the Great), violent feuds and standing mistrust between father, sons, and brethren, were ordinary phænomena, to which the family of the Antigonids formed an honourable exception. Between Alexander and Olympias on the one side, and Kleopatra with her son and Attalus on the other, a murderous contest was sure to arise. Kleopatra was at this time in the ascendent; Olympias was violent and mischievous; and Philip was only forty-seven years of age. Hence the future threatened nothing but aggravated dissension and difficulties for Alexander. Moreover his strong will and imperious temper, eminently suitable for supreme command, disqualified him from playing a subordinate part even to his own father. The prudence of Philip, when about to depart on his Asiatic expedition, induced him to attempt to head these family dissensions by giving his daughter Kleopatra in marriage to her uncle Alexander of Epirus, brother of Olympias. It was during the splendid marriage festival, then celebrated at *Ægæ*, that he was assassinated—Olympias, Kleopatra, and Alexander, being all present, while Attalus was in Asia, commanding the Macedonian

tês; which presents a vivid description of the feelings prevalent between members of regal families in those ages. Demetrius, coming home from the chase with his hunting javelins in his hand, goes up to his father Antigonus, salutes him, and sits down by his side without disarming. This is extolled as an unparalleled proof of the confidence and affection subsisting between the father and the son. In the families of all the other Diadochi (says Plutarch) murders of sons, mothers, and wives, were frequent—murders of brothers were even common, assumed to be precautions necessary for security. Οὕτως ἄρα πάντα δυσκωνοίνητον ἢ ἀρχῇ καὶ μεστὸν ἀπιστίας καὶ δυσνοίας, ὥστε ἀγάλλεσθαι τὸν μέγιστον τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου διαδόχων καὶ προσβύτατον, ὅτι μὴ φοβέσθαι τὸν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ προσίσταται τὴν λόγγην ἔχοντα τοῦ σώματος πλησίον. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ

καὶ μόνος, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὁ οἶκος οὗτος ἐπὶ πλείστας διαδοχὰς τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν ἐκαθάρευσεν, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς μόνος τῶν ἀπ' Ἀντιγόνου Φίλιππος ἀνείλεν υἱόν. Αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἀπᾶσαι διαδοχαὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἔχουσι παίδων, πολλῶν δὲ μητέρων φόνους καὶ γυναικῶν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀδελφούς ἀναιρεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ γεωμέτραι τὰ αἰτήματα λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω συνεχωρεῖτο κοινόν τι νομιζόμενον αἵτημα καὶ βασιλικόν ὑπὲρ ἀσφαλείας.

Compare Tacitus, *Histor.* v. 8, about the family feuds of the kings of Judæa; and Xenoph. *Hieron.* iii. 8.

In noticing the Antigonid family as a favourable exception, we must confine our assertion to the first century of that family. The bloody tragedy of Perseus and Demetrius shortly preceded the ruin of the empire.

division sent forward in advance, jointly with Parmenio. Had Philip escaped this catastrophe, he would doubtless have carried on the war in Asia Minor with quite as much energy and skill as it was afterwards prosecuted by Alexander: though we may doubt whether the father would have stretched out to those ulterior undertakings which, gigantic and far-reaching as they were, fell short of the insatiable ambition of the son. But successful as Philip might have been in Asia, he would hardly have escaped gloomy family feuds; with Alexander as a mutinous son, under the instigations of Olympias,—and with Kleopatra on the other side, feeling that her own safety depended upon the removal of regal or quasi-regal competitors.

From such formidable perils, visible in the distance, if not immediately impending, the sword of Pausanias guaranteed both Alexander and the Macedonian kingdom. But at the moment when the blow was struck, and when the Lynkestian Alexander, one of those privy to it, ran to forestall resistance and place the crown on the head of Alexander the Great<sup>1</sup>—no one knew what to expect from the young prince thus suddenly exalted at the age of twenty years. The sudden death of Philip in the fulness of glory and ambitious hopes, must have produced the strongest impression, first upon the festive crowd assembled,—next throughout Macedonia,—lastly, upon the foreigners whom he had reduced to dependence, from the Danube to the borders of Pæonia. All these dependencies were held only by the fear of Macedonian force. It remained to be proved whether the youthful son of Philip was capable of putting down opposition and upholding the powerful organisation created by his father. Moreover Perdikkas, the elder brother and predecessor of Philip, had left a son named Amyntas, now at least twenty-four years of age, to whom many looked as the proper successor.<sup>2</sup>

Impression  
produced  
by the  
sudden  
death of  
Philip.

But Alexander, present and proclaimed at once by his friends, showed himself, both in word and deed, perfectly competent to the emergency. He mustered, caressed, and conciliated, the divisions of the Macedonian army and the chief officers. His addresses were judicious and

Accession  
of Alex-  
ander—  
his energy  
and judge-  
ment.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 25, 2; Justin, xi. 2.  
See preceding chapter, p. 322.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, *De Rebus post Alexandrum*, *Fragm. ap. Photium, cod.*

energetic, engaging that the dignity of the kingdom should be maintained unimpaired,<sup>1</sup> and that even the Asiatic projects already proclaimed should be prosecuted with as much vigour as if Philip still lived.

It was one of the first measures of Alexander to celebrate with magnificent solemnities the funeral of his deceased father. While the preparations for it were going on, he instituted researches to find out and punish the accomplices of Pausanias. Of these indeed, the most illustrious person mentioned to us—Olympias—was not only protected by her position from punishment, but retained great ascendancy over her son to the end of his life. Three other persons are mentioned by name as accomplices,—brothers and persons of good family from the district of Upper Macedonia called Lynkêstis—Alexander, Heromenês, and Arrhabæus, sons of Aëropus. The two latter were put to death, but the first of the three was spared, and even promoted to important charges as a reward for his useful forwardness in instantly saluting Alexander king.<sup>2</sup> Others also, we know not how many, were executed; and Alexander seems to have imagined that there still remained some undetected.<sup>3</sup> The Persian king boasted in public letters,<sup>4</sup> with how much truth we cannot say, that he too had been among the instigators of Pausanias.

Among the persons slain about this time by Alexander, we may number his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas—son of Perdikkas (the elder brother of the deceased Philip): Amyntas was a boy when his father Perdikkas died. Though having a preferable claim to the succession, according to usage, he had been put aside by his uncle Philip, on the ground of his age and of the strenuous efforts required on commencing a new reign. Philip had however given in marriage to this Amyntas

92. p. 220; Plutarch, *De Fortuna* Alex. Magn. p. 327. *πᾶσα δὲ ὅπουλος ἦν ἡ Μακεδονία* (after the death of Philip) *πρὸς Ἀμύνταν ἀποβλέπουσα καὶ τοὺς Ἀερόπου παῖδας.*

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xvii. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 25, 2; Curtius, vii. 1, 6. Alexander son of Aëropus was son-in-law of Antipater. The case

of this Alexander—and of Olympias—afforded a certain basis to those who said (Curtius, vi. 43) that Alexander had dealt favourably with the accomplices of Pausanias.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Alexand.* 10-27; Diodor. xvii. 51; Justin, xi. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

his daughter (by an Illyrian mother) Kynna. Nevertheless, Alexander now put him to death,<sup>1</sup> on accusation of conspiracy: under what precise circumstances does not appear—but probably Amyntas (who besides being the son of Philip's elder brother, was at least twenty-four years of age, while Alexander was only twenty) conceived himself as having a better right to the succession, and was so conceived by many others. The infant son of Kleopatra by Philip is said to have been killed by Alexander, as a rival in the succession; Kleopatra herself was afterwards put to death by Olympias during his absence, and to his regret. Attalus, also, uncle of Kleopatra and joint commander of the Macedonian army in Asia, was assassinated under the private orders of Alexander, by Hekataëus and Philotas.<sup>2</sup> Another Amyntas, son of Antiochus (there seem to have been several Macedonians named Amyntas), fled for safety into Asia:<sup>3</sup> probably others, who felt themselves to be objects of suspicion, did the like—since by the Macedonian custom, not merely a person convicted of high treason, but all his kindred along with him, were put to death.<sup>4</sup>

By unequivocal manifestations of energy and address, and by despatching rivals or dangerous malcontents, Alexander thus speedily fortified his position on the throne at home. But from the foreign dependents of Macedonia—Greeks,

Sentiment  
at Athens  
on the  
death of  
Philip—

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, vi. 9, 17. vi. 10, 24. Arrian mentioned this Amyntas son of Perdikkas (as well as the fact of his having been put to death by Alexander before the Asiatic expedition), in the lost work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον—see Photius, cod. 92. p. 220. But Arrian, in his account of Alexander's expedition, does not mention the fact; which shows that his silence is not to be assumed as a conclusive reason for discrediting allegations of others.

Compare Polyænus, viii. 60; and Plutarch, Fort. Alex. Magn. p. 327.

It was during his expedition into Thrace and Illyria, about eight months after his accession, that Alexander promised to give his

sister Kynna in marriage to Langarus prince of the Agrianes (Arrian, Exp. Al. M. i. 5, 7). Langarus died of sickness soon after; so that this marriage never took place. But when the promise was made, Kynna must have been a widow. Her husband Amyntas must therefore have been put to death during the first months of Alexander's reign.

<sup>2</sup> See Chap. XC.; Diod. xvii. 2; Curtius. vii. 1, 6; Justin, ix. 7. xi. 2. xii. 6; Plutarch, Alexand. 10; Pausanias, viii. 7, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 17, 10; Plutarch, Alex. 20; Curtius, iii. 28, 18.

<sup>4</sup> Curtius, vi. 42, 20. Compare with this custom, a passage in the Ajax of Sophoklès, v. 725.

language  
of Demo-  
sthenês—  
inclination  
to resist  
Macedonia,  
but no  
overt act.

Thracians, and Illyrians—the like acknowledgment was not so easily obtained. Most of them were disposed to throw off the yoke; yet none dared to take the initiative of moving, and the suddenness of Philip's death found them altogether unprepared for combination. By that event the Greeks were discharged from all engagement, since the vote of the confederacy had elected him personally as Imperator. They were now at liberty, in so far as there was any liberty at all in the proceeding, to elect any one else, or to abstain from re-electing at all, and even to let the confederacy expire. Now it was only under constraint and intimidation, as was well known both in Greece and in Macedonia, that they had conferred this dignity even on Philip, who had earned it by splendid exploits, and had proved himself the ablest captain and politician of the age. They were by no means inclined to transfer it to a youth like Alexander, until he had shown himself capable of bringing the like coercion to bear, and extorting the same submission. The wish to break loose from Macedonia, widely spread throughout the Grecian cities, found open expression from Demosthenês and others in the assembly at Athens. That orator (if we are to believe his rival Æschinês), having received private intelligence of the assassination of Philip, through certain spies of Charidemus, before it was publicly known to others, pretended to have had it revealed to him in a dream by the gods. Appearing in the assembly with his gayest attire, he congratulated his countrymen on the death of their greatest enemy, and pronounced high encomiums on the brave tyrannicide of Pausanias, which he would probably compare to that of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.<sup>1</sup> He depreciated the abilities of Alexander, calling him Margitês (the name of a silly character in one of the Homeric poems), and intimating that he would be too much distracted with embarrassments and ceremonial duties at home, to have leisure for a foreign march. Such, according to Æschinês, was the language of Demosthenês on the first news of Philip's death. We cannot doubt that the public of Athens, as well as Demosthenês

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiphont. c. 29.  
p. 469. c. 78. p. 603; Plutarch, De-  
mosth. 22.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 547.  
c. 50.

felt great joy at an event which seemed to open to them fresh chances of freedom, and that the motion for a sacrifice of thanksgiving,<sup>1</sup> in spite of Phokion's opposition, was readily adopted. But though the manifestation of sentiment at Athens was thus anti-Macedonian, exhibiting aversion to the renewal of that obedience which had been recently promised to Philip, Demosthenês did not go so far as to declare any positive hostility.<sup>2</sup> He tried to open communication with the Persians in Asia Minor, and also, if we may believe Diodorus, with the Macedonian commander in Asia Minor, Attalus. But neither of the two missions was successful. Attalus sent his letter to Alexander; while the Persian king,<sup>3</sup> probably relieved by the death of Philip from immediate fear of the Macedonian power, despatched a peremptory refusal to Athens, intimating that he would furnish no more money.<sup>4</sup>

Not merely in Athens, but in other Grecian states also, the death of Philip excited aspirations for freedom. The Lacedæmonians, who, though unsupported, had stood out inflexibly against any obedience to him, were now on the watch for new allies; while the Arcadians, Argeians, and Eleians, manifested sentiments adverse to Macedonia. The Ambrakiots expelled the garrison placed by Philip in their city; the Ætolians passed a vote to assist in restoring those Acarnanian exiles whom he had banished.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the Thessalians manifested unshaken adherence to Macedonia. But the Macedonian garrison at Thebes, and the macedonising Thebans who now governed that city,<sup>6</sup> were probably the main obstacles

B.C. 336.  
(Autumn).

Discontent  
in Greece—  
but no  
positive  
movement.

Plutarch, Phokion, 16.

We gather this from Æschinês v. Ktesiph. p. 551. c. 52.

Diodorus (xvii. 5) mentions this communication of Demosthenês to Attalus; which, however, I cannot think improbable. Probably Aridemos was the organ of the communications.

This letter from Darius is directly alluded to, and even a sentence cited from it, by Æschinês v. Ktesiph. p. 633, 634. c. 88. We know that Darius wrote in very different language not long after-

wards, near the time when Alexander crossed into Asia (Arrian, ii. 14, 11). The first letter must have been sent shortly after Philip's death, when Darius was publicly boasting of having procured the deed, and before he had yet learnt to fear Alexander. Compare Diodor. xvii. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvii. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Diodorus (xvii. 3) says that the Thebans passed a vote to expel the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. But I have little hesitation in rejecting this statement.

to any combined manifestation in favour of Hellenic autonomy.

Apprised of these impulses prevalent throughout the Grecian world, Alexander felt the necessity of checking them by a demonstration immediately as well as intimidating. His energy and rapidity of proceedings speedily overawed all those who had speculated on his youth, or had adopted the epithets applied to him by Demosthenes.

B.C. 336  
(October).  
March of Alexander into Greece, submission of Athens.

Having surmounted, in a shorter time than was supposed possible, the difficulties of his newly-acquired position at home, he marched into Greece at the head of a formidable army, seemingly about two months after the death of Philip. He was favourably received by the Thebans, who passed a vote constituting Alexander head of Greece in place of his father Philip; which vote was speedily confirmed by the Amphiktyonic assembly, convoked at Thermopylæ. Alexander next advanced to Thebes, and from thence over the isthmus of Corinth into Peloponnesus. The details of his march we do not know; but his great force, probably not inferior to that which had conquered at Chæroneia, spread terror everywhere, silencing all but his partisans. Nowhere was the alarm greater than at Athens. The Athenians, recollecting both the speech of their orators and the votes of their assembly,—offensive at least, if not hostile, to the Macedonians—trembled that the march of Alexander should be directed against the city, and accordingly made preparation for standing a siege. All citizens were enjoined to bring in their families and properties from the country, insomuch that the space within the walls was full both of fugitives and of cattle.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the assembly adopted, on the motion of Demades, a resolution of apology and full submission to Alexander: they not only recognized him as chief of Greece, but conferred upon him divine honours, in terms even more emphatic than those bestowed on Philip.<sup>2</sup> The motion, with other legates, carried the resolution to Alexander, whom they found at Thebes, and who accepted their

We may be sure that the presence of the Macedonian garrison was connected with the predominance in the city of a party favourable to Macedonia. In the ensuing year, when the resistance really occur-

red, this was done by the Macedonian party, who then came back from exile.

<sup>1</sup> Demadis Fragment. *ὅτι ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν ἐκέρχοντο*, p. 180.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian. i. 1, 4.

mission. A young speaker named Pytheas is said to have opposed the vote in the Athenian assembly.<sup>1</sup> Whether Demosthenês did the like—or whether, under the feeling of disappointed anticipations and overwhelming Macedonian force, he condemned himself to silence,—we cannot say. That he did not go with Demadês on the mission to Alexander, seems a matter of course, though he is said to have been appointed by public vote to do so, and to have declined the duty. He accompanied the legation as far as Mount Kithæron, on the frontier, and then returned to Athens.<sup>2</sup> We read with astonishment that Æschinês and his other enemies denounced this step as a cowardly desertion. No envoy could be so odious to Alexander, or so likely to provoke refusal for the proposition which he carried, as Demosthenês. To employ him in such a mission would have been absurd; except for the purpose probably intended by his enemies, that he might be either detained by the conqueror as an expiatory victim,<sup>3</sup> or sent back as a pardoned and humiliated prisoner.

After displaying his force in various portions of Peoponnesus, Alexander returned to Corinth, where he convened deputies from the Grecian cities generally. The list of those cities which obeyed the summons is not before us, but probably it included nearly all the cities of Central Greece. We know only that the Lacedæmonians continued to stand aloof, refusing all concurrence. Alexander asked from the assembled deputies the same appointment which the victorious Philip had required and obtained two years before—the hegemony or headship of the Greeks collectively for the purpose of prosecuting

B.C. 336  
(Autumn).

Alexander  
is chosen  
Imperator  
of the  
Greeks in  
the conven-  
tion at  
Corinth—  
continued  
refusal of  
concur-  
rence by  
Sparta.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. 804.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 564. 50; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. 57; Diodor. xvii. 4; Plutarch, Demosth. c. 23 (Plutarch confounds the proceedings of this year with those of the succeeding year). Demadês, in the fragment of his oration remaining to us, makes no allusion to this proceeding of Demosthenês.

This decree, naming Demosthenês among the envoys, is likely enough to have been passed chiefly by the votes of his enemies. It was always open to an Athenian citizen to accept or decline such an appointment.

<sup>3</sup> Several years afterwards, Demadês himself was put to death by Antipater, to whom he had been sent as envoy from Athens (Diodor. xviii. 48).

war against Persia.<sup>1</sup> To the request of a prince at the head of an irresistible army, one answer only was admissible. He was nominated Imperator with full powers, by land and sea. Overawed by the presence and sentiments of Macedonian force, all acquiesced in this vote except the Lacedæmonians.

The convention sanctioned by Alexander was probably the same as that settled by and with his father Philip. Its grand and significant feature was that it recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince as imperator, or executive head and arm. It crowned him with a legitimate sanction as keeper of the peace within Greece and conqueror abroad in the name of Greece. Of its other conditions, some are made known to us by subsequent complaints; such conditions as, being equitable and tutelary towards the members generally, the Macedonian chief found it inconvenient to observe, and speedily began to violate. Each Hellenic city was pronounced, by the first article of the convention, to be free and autonomous. In each, the existing political constitution was recognised as it stood; all other cities were forbidden to interfere with it, or second any attack by its hostile exiles.<sup>2</sup> No new despot was to be established; no dispossessed despot was to be restored.<sup>3</sup> Each city became bound to discourage in every other, as far as possible, all illegal violence—such as political executions, confiscation, spoliation, re-division of land, or abolition of debts, factious manumission of slaves, &c.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 1, 2. αἰτεῖν παρ' αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας στρατείας, ἥτινα Φιλίππῳ ἤδη ἔδωσαν καὶ αἰτήσαντα λαβεῖν παρὰ πάντων, πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, &c.

Arrian speaks as if this request had been addressed only to the Greeks within Peloponnesus; moreover he mentions no assembly at Corinth, which is noticed (though with some confusion) by Diodorus, Justin, and Plutarch. Cities out of Peloponnesus, as well as within it, must have been included; unless we suppose that the resolution of the Amphiktyonic assembly, which had been previously passed, was

held to comprehend all the exiles of Peloponnesian cities, which seems not probable.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès (or Pseudo-Demosthenès), Orat. xvii. De Fœd. Alexandrino, p. 213, 214. ἐπιτάγη συνθήκη εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ, ἐλευθερίαν εἶναι καὶ αὐτονόμους τοὺς Ἕλληνας. Ἔστι γὰρ γεγραμμένον, εἰάν τις πολιτείας τὰς παρ' ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τοὺς ὄρκους τοὺς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὤμνυσαν, καταλύσῃσι, πολεμῇ εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν . . .

<sup>3</sup> Demosthen. Orat. de Fœd. Alex. p. 213.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 215.

to each was guaranteed freedom of navigation; maritime capture was prohibited, on pain of enmity from all.<sup>1</sup> Each was forbidden to send armed vessels into the harbour of any other, or to build vessels or engage seamen there.<sup>2</sup> By each, an oath was taken to observe these conditions, to declare war against all who violated them, and to keep them inscribed on a commemorative column. Provision seems to have been made for admitting any additional city<sup>3</sup> in its subsequent application, though it might not have been a party to the original contract. Moreover, it appears that a standing military force, under Macedonian orders, was provided to enforce observance of the convention; and that the synod of deputies was contemplated as likely to meet periodically.<sup>4</sup>

Such was the convention, in so far as we know its terms, agreed to by the Grecian deputies at Corinth with Alexander; but with Alexander at the head of an irresistible army. He

B.C. 336

(Autumn).

Authority

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 217. ἐστὶ γὰρ που ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, τὴν θάλατταν πλεῖν τοὺς μετέχοντας τῆς εἰρήνης, καὶ μηδένα κωλύειν αὐτοὺς μηδὲ πτάγειν πλοῖον μηδενὸς τούτων· ἐάν τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιῇ, πολέμιον εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης μετέχουσιν. . . .

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 218, 219. Böckhe, in his instructive comments on this convention (Forschungen über dem Gebiete der Attischen Literatur, p. 623), has treated the prohibition here mentioned as if there were one specially binding the Macedonians not to sail with armed ships into the Peiræus. This undoubtedly is the particular case which the orator insists; but I receive it to have been only a particular case under a general prohibitory rule.

Arrian, ii. 1, 7; ii. 2, 4. Demosth. de Fœd. Alex. p. 213. Tenedos, Mitylênê, Antissa, and Eresus, hardly have been members of the convention when first sworn.

Demosth. Orat. de Fœd. Alex. p. 215. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις μελεῖσθαι τοὺς συνεδρεύοντας

καὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένους, ὅπως ἐν ταῖς κοινωνοῦσαις πόλεσι μὴ γίνωνται θάνατοι μηδὲ φυγαὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεσι νόμους. . . . Οἱ δὲ τοσοῦτον δέουσι τούτων τι κωλύειν, ὥστε καὶ συγκατασκευάζουσιν, &c. (p. 216).

The persons designated by οἱ δὲ, and denounced throughout this oration generally, are, Alexander or the Macedonian officers and soldiers.

A passage in Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14, leads to the supposition, that a standing Macedonian force was kept at Corinth, occupying the Isthmus. The Thebans declared against Macedonia (in August or September 335 B.C.), and proceeding to besiege the Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia, sent envoys to entreat aid from the Arcadians. "These envoys (says Deinarchus) got with difficulty by sea to the Arcadians"—οἱ κατὰ θάλασσαν μόλις ἀφίχοντο πρὸς ἑκείνους. Whence should this difficulty arise, except from a Macedonian occupation of Corinth?

claimed by Alexander under the convention—degradation of the leading Grecian states.

proclaimed it as the "public statute of the Greeks,"<sup>1</sup> constituting a paramount obligation, of which he was the enforcer, binding on all, and authorising him to treat all transgressors as rebels. It was set forth as counterpart of, and substituted for, the convention of Antalkidas, which we shall presently see the officers of Darius trying to revive against him—the headship of Persia against that of Macedonia. Such is the melancholy degradation of the Grecian world, that its cities have no alternative except to choose between these two foreign potentates—or to invite the help of Darius, the most distant and least dangerous, whose headship could hardly be more than nominal, against a neighbour sure to be domineering and compressive, and likely enough to be tyrannical. Of the once powerful Hellenic chiefs and competitors—Sparta, Athens, Thebes—under each of whom the Grecian world had been upheld as an independent and self-determining aggregate, admitting the free play of native sentiment and character under circumstances more or less advantageous—the two last are now confounded as common units (or even held under garrison) among the subject allies of Alexander; while Sparta preserves only the dignity of an isolated independence.

It appears that during the nine months which succeeded the swearing of the convention, Alexander and his officers (after his return to Macedonia) were active, both by armed force and by mission and envoys, in procuring new adhesions and in remodelling the governments of various cities suitably to their own views. Complaints of such aggressions were raised in the public assembly of Athens, the only place in Greece where a liberty of discussion still survived. An oration pronounced by Demosthenês, Hyperidês, or one of the contemporary anti-Macedonian politicians.

B.C. 336-335  
(Winter—  
spring).

Encroachments and tyranny of the Macedonian officers in Greece—complaints of the orators at Athens.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 10. παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν. After the death of Darius, Alexander pronounced that the Grecian mercenaries who had been serving with that prince, were highly criminal for having contravened the general vote of the Greeks (παρὰ τὰ δόγ-

ματα τὰ Ἕλληνων), except such as had taken service before that vote was passed, and except the Sicilians, whom Alexander considered as subjects of Persia and not partakers, τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἕλληνων (Arrian, iii. 23, 15; iii. 24, 8, 9).

(about the spring or early summer of 335 B.C.),<sup>1</sup> imparts to us some idea both of the Macedonian interventions steadily going on, and of the unavailing remonstrances raised against them by individual Athenian citizens. At the time of this oration, such remonstrances had already been often repeated. They were always met by the macedonizing Athenians with peremptory declarations that the convention must be observed. But in reply, the remonstrants urged, that it was unfair to call upon Athens for strict observance of the convention, while the Macedonians and their partisans in the various cities were perpetually violating it for their own profit. Alexander and his officers (affirms this orator) had never once laid down their arms since the convention was settled. They had been perpetually tampering with the governments of the various cities, to promote their own partisans to power.<sup>2</sup> In Messênê, Sikyon, and Pellênê, they had subverted the popular constitutions, banished many citizens, and established friends of their own as despots. The Macedonian force, destined as a public guarantee to enforce the observance of the convention, had been employed only to overrule its best conditions, and to arm the hands of factious partisans.<sup>3</sup> Thus Alexander, in his capacity of Emperor, disregarding all the restraints of the convention, acted as chief despot for the maintenance of subordinate despots in the separate cities.<sup>4</sup> Even at

<sup>1</sup> This is the oration *περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν* already more than once alluded to above. Though standing among the Demosthenic works, it is supposed by Libanius as well as by most modern critics not to be the production of Demosthenês—upon internal grounds of style, which are certainly forcible. Libanius says that it bears much resemblance to the style of Hypérides. At any rate, there seems no reason to doubt that it is a genuine oration of one of the contemporary orators. I agree with Böhnecke (*Forschungen*, p. 629) in thinking that it must have been delivered a few months after the convention with Alexander, before the taking of Thebes.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês (or Pseudo-De-

mosth.), *Orat. De Fœdere Alex.* p. 216. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ῥαδίως τὰ ὅπλα ἐπὴννεχε ὁ Μακεδών, ὥστε οὐδέ κατέθετο πώποτε, ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιέρχεται καθ' ὅσον δύναται, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. *ib.* p. 214, 215.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) *Orat. De Fœdere Alex.* p. 212, 214, 215, 220, where the orator speaks of Alexander as the τύραννος of Greece.

The orator argues (p. 213) that the Macedonians had recognised despotism as contrary to the convention, in so far as to expel the despots from the towns of Antissa and Eresus in Lesbos. But probably these despots were in correspondence with the Persians on the opposite mainland, or with Memnon.

Athens, this imperial authority had rescinded sentences of the *Dikastery*, and compelled the adoption of measures contrary to the laws and constitution<sup>1</sup>.

At sea, the wrongful aggressions of Alexander or his officers had been not less manifest than on land. The convention, guaranteeing to all cities the right of free navigation, distinctly forbade each to take or detain vessels belonging to any other. Nevertheless the Macedonians had seized, in the Hellespont, all the merchantmen coming out with cargoes from the Euxine, and carried them into Tenedos, where they were detained, under various fraudulent pretences, in spite of remonstrances from the proprietors and cities whose supply of corn was thus intercepted. Among these sufferers, Athens stood conspicuous; since consumers of imported corn, ship-owners, and merchants, were more numerous there than elsewhere. The Athenians, addressing complaints and remonstrances without effect, became at length so incensed, and perhaps uneasy about their provisions, that they passed a decree to equip and despatch 100 triremes, appointing Menestheus (son of Iphikratês) admiral. By this strenuous manifestation, the Macedonians were induced to release the detained vessels. Had the detention been prolonged, the Athenian fleet would have sailed to extort redress by force; so that, as Athens was more than a match for Macedon on sea, the maritime empire of the latter would have been overthrown, while even on land much encouragement would have been given to malcontents against it.<sup>2</sup> Another incident had

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 215. τοὺς δ' ἰδίους ὑμᾶς νόμους ἀναγκάζουσι λύειν, τοὺς μὲν κεκριμένους ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀφιέντες, ἕτερα δὲ παμπλήθη τοιαῦτα βιαζόμενοι παρανομεῖν . . .

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 217. εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπεροφίας ἤλθον, ὥστε εἰς Τένεδον ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοῖα κατήγαγον, καὶ σκευωρούμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ οὐ πρότερον ἀφείσαν, πρὶν ὑμεῖς ἐψηφίσασθε τριήρεις ἕκαστον πληροῦν καὶ καθέλκειν εὐθὺς τότε—ὃ παρ' ἐλάχιστον ἐποίησεν αὐτοὺς ἀφαιρεθῆναι δικαίως τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν ἡγεμονίαν

. . . . p. 218. Ἔως γὰρ ἂν ἐξῇ τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν καὶ μόνοις ἀναμφισβητήτως εἶναι κυρίους (the Athenians), τοῖς γε κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τῇ ὑπαρχούσῃ δυνάμει ἐστὶ προβολὰς ἐτέρας ἰσχυροτέρας εὐρέσθαι, &c.

We know that Alexander caused a squadron of ships to sail round to and up the Danube from Byzantium (Arrian, i. 3, 3), to meet him after his march by land from the southern coast of Thrace. It is not improbable that the Athenian vessels detained may have come loaded with a supply of corn, and that the detention of the corn-ships

occurred, less grave than this, yet still dwelt upon by the orator as an infringement of the convention, and as an insult to the Athenians. Though an express article of the convention prohibited armed ships of one city from entering the harbour of another, still a Macedonian trireme had been sent into Peiræus to ask permission that smaller vessels might be built there for Macedonian account. This was offensive to a large proportion of Athenians, not only as violating the convention, but as a manifest step towards employing the nautical equipments and seamen of Athens for the augmentation of the Macedonian navy.<sup>1</sup>

"Let those speakers who are perpetually admonishing us to observe the convention (the orator contends), prevail on the imperial chief to set the example of observing it on his part. I too impress upon you the like observance. To a democracy nothing is more essential than scrupulous regard to equity and justice.<sup>2</sup> But the convention itself enjoins all its members to make war against transgressors; and pursuant to this article, you ought to make war against Macedon.<sup>3</sup> Be assured that all Greeks will see that the war is neither directed against them nor brought on by your fault.<sup>4</sup> At this juncture, such a step for the maintenance of your own freedom as well as Hellenic freedom generally, will be not less opportune and advantageous than it is just.<sup>5</sup> The time is coming for shaking off your disgraceful submission to others, and your oblivion of our own past dignity.<sup>6</sup> If you encourage me, I am prepared to make a

Language of the complaining Athenians—they insist only on strict observance of the convention. Boldness of their language.

may have been intended to facilitate this operation.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.) Orat. De Fœdere Alex. p. 219.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 211. οἶμαι γὰρ οὐδέν οὕτω τοῖς δημοκρατουμένοις πρέπειν, ὥς περὶ τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον σπουδάζειν.

I give here the main sense, without binding myself to the exact phrases.

<sup>3</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 213. καὶ γὰρ ἔτι προσγέγραπται ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις, πολέμιον εἶναι, τὸν ἑκείνα ἄπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ποιοῦντα, ἀπᾶσι τοῖς τῆς εἰρήνης κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ,

καὶ στρατεύεσθαι ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἅπαντας. Compare p. 214. init.

<sup>4</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 217. οὐδεὶς ὑμῖν ἐγκαλέσει ποτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὥς ἄρα παρέβητέ τι τῶν κοινῇ ὁμολογηθέντων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χάριν ἔξουσιν ὅτι μόνοι ἐξηλέγετε τοὺς ταῦτα ποιοῦντας, &c.

<sup>5</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 214. νυνὶ δ', ὅτ' εἰς ταῦτ' οὐ δίκαιον ἄμα καὶ ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ σύμφερον συνδεδράμηκεν, ἄλλον ἄρα τινὰ χρόνον ἀναμενεῖτε τῆς ἰδίας ἐλευθερίας ἄμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀντιλαβέσθαι;

<sup>6</sup> Demosth. ib. p. 220. εἰ ἄρα ποτε δεῖ παύσασθαι αἰσχροῦς ἐτέροις ἀκολουθοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μὴδ' ἀναμνησθῆναι

formal motion—To declare war against the violators of the convention, as the convention itself directs.”<sup>1</sup>

A formal motion for declaring war would have brought upon the mover a prosecution under the *Graphê Paranómōn*. Accordingly, though intimating clearly that he thought the actual juncture (what it was we do not know) suitable, he declined to incur such responsibility without seeing beforehand a manifestation of public sentiment sufficient to give him hopes of a favourable verdict from the *Dikastery*. The motion was probably not made. But a speech so bold, even though not followed up by a motion, is in itself significant of the state of feeling in Greece, during the months immediately following the Alexandrine convention. This harangue is only one among many delivered in the Athenian assembly, complaining of Macedonian supremacy as exercised under the convention. It is plain that the acts of Macedonian officers were such as to furnish ample ground for complaint; and the detention of all the trading ships coming out of the Euxine, shows us that even the subsistence of Athens and the islands had become more or less endangered. Though the Athenians resorted to no armed interference, their assembly at least afforded a theatre where public protest could be raised and public sympathy manifested.

It is probable too that at this time Demosthenês and the other anti-Macedonian speakers were encouraged by assurances and subsidies from Persia. Though the death of Philip, and the accession of an untried youth of twenty, had led Darius to believe for the moment that all danger of Asiatic invasion was passed, yet his apprehensions were now revived by Alexander's manifested energy, and by the renewal of the Grecian league under his supremacy.<sup>2</sup> It was apparently during the spring of 335 B.C., that Darius sent money to sustain the anti-Macedonian party at Athens and elsewhere. *Æschinês* affirms, and *Deinarchus* afterwards repeats (both of them orators hostile to Demosthenês)—That about this time, Darius sent to Athens 300 talents which the Athenian people refused, but which Demosthenês took,

μηδεμιᾶς φιλοτιμίας τῶν ἐξ ἀρχαιοτάτου καὶ πλείστου καὶ μάλιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἡμῖν ὑπαρχουσῶν.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. (or Pseudo-Demosth.)

Orat. De Fœdere Alex. εἰάν οὖν κελεύητε, γράψω, καθάπερ αἱ συνήθειαι κελεύουσι, πολεμεῖν τοῖς ποραβετηκόσιν. <sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 7.

reserving however 70 talents out of the sum for his own private purse: That public inquiry was afterwards instituted on the subject. Yet nothing is alleged as having been made out;<sup>1</sup> at least Demosthenês was neither condemned, nor even brought (as far as appears) to any formal trial. Out of such data we can elicit no specific fact. But they warrant the general conclusion, that Darius, or the satraps in Asia Minor, sent money to Athens in the spring of 335 B.C., and letters or emissaries to excite hostilities against Alexander.

That Demosthenês, and probably other leading orators, received such remittances from Persia, is no evidence of that personal corruption which is imputed to them by their enemies. It is noway proved that Demosthenês applied the money to his own private purposes. To receive and expend it in trying to organize combinations for the enfranchisement of Greece, was a proceeding which he would avow as not only legitimate, but patriotic. It was aid obtained from one foreign prince to enable Hellas to throw off the worse dominion of another. At this moment, the political interest of Persia coincided with that of all Greeks who aspired to freedom. Darius had no chance of becoming master of Greece; but his own security prescribed to him to protect her from being made an appendage of the Macedonian kingdom, and his means of doing so were at this moment ample, had they been efficaciously put forth. Now the purpose of a Greek patriot would be to preserve the integrity and autonomy of the Hellenic world against all foreign interference. To invoke the aid of Persia against Hellenic enemies—as Sparta had done both in the Peloponnesian war and at the peace of Antalkidas, and as Thebes and Athens had followed her example in doing afterwards—was an unwarrantable proceeding: but to invoke the same aid against the dominion of another

Corre-  
spondence  
of Demo-  
sthenês  
with Persia  
—justi-  
fiable and  
politic.

<sup>1</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 634; Deinarchus adv. Demosth. s. 11-19. p. 9-14. It is Æschinês who states that the 300 talents were sent to the Athenian people, and refused by them.

Three years later, after the battle of Issus, Alexander in his letter to Darius accuses that prince of having sent both letters and money

into Greece, for the purpose of exciting war against him. Alexander states that the Lacedæmonians accepted the money, but that all the other Grecian cities refused it (Arrian, ii. 14, 9). There is no reason to doubt these facts; but I find nothing identifying the precise point of time to which Alexander alludes.

foreigner, at once nearer and more formidable, was open to no blame on the score either of patriotism or policy. Demosthenês had vainly urged his countrymen to act with energy against Philip, at a time when they might by their own efforts have upheld the existing autonomy both for Athens and for Greece generally. He now seconded or invited Darius, at a time when Greece single-handed had become incompetent to the struggle against Alexander, the common enemy both of Grecian liberty and of the Persian empire. Unfortunately for Athens as well as for himself, Darius, with full means of resistance in his hands, played his game against Alexander even with more stupidity and improvidence than Athens had played hers against Philip.

While such were the aggressions of Macedonian officers in the exercise of their new imperial authority, throughout Greece and the islands—and such the growing manifestations of repugnance to it at Athens—Alexander had returned home to push the preparations for his Persian campaign. He did not however think it prudent to transport his main force into Asia, until he had made his power and personal ascendancy felt by the Macedonian dependencies, westward, northward, and north-eastward of Pella—Ilyrians, Pæonians, and Thracians. Under these general names were comprised a number<sup>1</sup> of distinct tribes, or nations, warlike and for the most part predatory. Having remained unconquered until the victories of Philip, they were not kept in subjection even by him without difficulty: nor were they at all likely to obey his youthful successor, until they had seen some sensible evidence of his personal energy.

Accordingly, in the spring, Alexander put himself at the head of a large force, and marched in an easterly direction from Amphipolis, through the narrow Sapæan pass between Philippi and the sea.<sup>2</sup> In ten days' march he reached the difficult mountain path over which alone he

<sup>1</sup> Strabo speaks of the Thracian ἔθνη as twenty-two in number, capable of sending out 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse (Strabo, vii. Fragm. Vatic. 48).

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, vii. p. 331 (Fragm.);

Arrian, i. 1, 6; Appian, Bell. Civil. iv. 87, 105, 106. Appian gives (iv. 103) a good general description of the almost impassable and trackless country to the north and north-east of Philippi.

could cross Mount Hæmus (Balkan). Here he found a body of the free Thracians and of armed merchants of the country assembled to oppose his progress, posted on the high ground with waggons in their front, which it was their purpose to roll down the steep declivity against the advancing ranks of the Macedonians. Alexander eluded this danger by ordering his soldiers either to open their ranks, so as to let the waggons go through freely—or where there was no room for such loose array, to throw themselves on the ground with their shields closely packed together and slanting over their bodies; so that the waggons, dashing down the steep and coming against the shields, were carried off the ground, and made to bound over the bodies on the space below. All the waggons rolled down without killing a single man. The Thracians, badly armed, were then easily dispersed by the Macedonian attack, with the loss of 1500 men killed, and all their women and children made prisoners.<sup>1</sup> The captives and plunder were sent back under an escort to be sold at the seaports.

Having thus forced the mountain road, Alexander led his army over the chain of Mount Hæmus, and marched against the Triballi; a powerful Thracian tribe,—extending (as far as can be determined) from the plain of Kossovo in modern Servia northward towards the Danube,—whom Philip had conquered, yet not without considerable resistance and even occasional defeat. Their prince Syrmus had already retired with the women and children of the tribe into an island of the Danube called Peukê, where many other Thracians had also sought shelter. The main force of the Triballi took post in woody ground on the banks of the river Lyginus, about three days' march from the Danube. Being tempted, however, by an annoyance from the Macedonian light-armed, to emerge from their covered position into the open plain, they were here attacked by Alexander with his cavalry and infantry, in close combat, and completely defeated. Three thousand of them were

His victory  
over the  
Triballi.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 1, 12, 17. The precise locality of that steep road whereby Alexander crossed the Balkan, cannot be determined. Baron von Moltke, in his account of the Russian campaign in Bulgaria (1828-1829), gives an enumeration of four

roads, passable by an army, crossing this chain from north to south (see chap. i. of that work). But whether Alexander passed by any one of these four, or by some other road still more to the west, we cannot tell.

slain, but the rest mostly eluded pursuit by means of the wood, so that they lost few prisoners. The loss of the Macedonians was only eleven horsemen and forty foot slain, according to the statement of Ptolemy, son of Lagus, then one of Alexander's confidential officers, and afterwards founder of the dynasty of Greco-Egyptian kings.<sup>1</sup>

Three days' march, from the scene of action, brought Alexander to the Danube, where he found some armed ships which had been previously ordered to sail (probably with stores of provision) from Byzantium round by the Euxine and up the river. He first employed these ships in trying to land a body of troops on the island of Peukê; but his attempt was frustrated by the steep banks, the rapid stream, and the resolute front of the defenders on shore. To compensate for this disappointment, Alexander resolved to make a display of his strength by crossing the Danube and attacking the Getæ; tribes, chiefly horsemen armed with bows,<sup>2</sup> analogous to the Thracians in habits and language. They occupied the left bank of the river, from which their town was about four miles distant. The terror of the Macedonian successes had brought together a body of 4000 Getæ, visible from the opposite shore, to resist any crossing. Accordingly Alexander got together a quantity of the rude boats (hollowed out of a single trunk) employed for transport on the river, and caused the tent-skins of the army to be stuffed with hay in order to support rafts. He then put himself on shipboard during the night, and contrived to carry across the river a body of 4000 infantry, and 1500 cavalry, landing on a part of the bank where there was high standing wheat and no enemy's post. The Getæ, intimidated not less by this successful passage than by the excellent array of Alexander's army, hardly stayed to sustain a charge of cavalry, but hastened to abandon their poorly fortified town and retire farther away from the river. Entering the town without resistance, he destroyed it, carried away such moveables as he found, and then returned to the river without delay. Before he quitted the northern bank, he offered sacrifice to Zeus the Preserver—to Hêraklês—and to the God Ister (Danube) himself, whom he thanked for having shown himself not impassable.<sup>3</sup> On the very same day, he

He crosses  
the Danube,  
defeats the  
Getæ, and  
returns  
back.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo, vii. p. 303.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 4, 2-7.

recrossed the river to his camp; after an empty demonstration of force, intended to prove that he could do what neither his father nor any Grecian army had ever yet done, and what every one deemed impossible—crossing the greatest of all known rivers without a bridge and in the face of an enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Neither the point where Alexander crossed the Danube,—nor the situation of the island called Peukê,—nor the identity of the river Lyginus,—nor the part of Mount Hæmus which Alexander forced his way over—can be determined. The data given by Arrian are too brief and too meagre, to make out with assurance any part of his march after he crossed the Nestus. The facts reported by the historian represent only a small portion of what Alexander really did in the expedition.

It seems clear however that the main purpose of Alexander was to attack and humble the Triballi. Their locality is known generally as the region where the modern Servia joins Bulgaria. They reached eastward (in the times of Thucydides, ii. 96) as far as the river Oskius or Isker, which crosses the chain of Hæmus from south to north, passes by the modern city of Sophia, and falls into the Danube. Now Alexander, in order to conduct his army from the eastern bank of the river Nestus, near its mouth, to the country of the Triballi, would naturally pass through Philippopolis, which city appears to have been founded by his father Philip, and therefore probably had a regular road of communication to the maritime regions. (See Stephanus Byz. v. Φιλιππόπολις.) Alexander would cross Mount Hæmus, then, somewhere north-west of Philippopolis. We read in the year 376 B.C. (Diodor. xv. 36) of an invasion of Abdëra by the Triballi; which shows

that there was a road, not unfit for an army, from their territory to the eastern side of the mouth of the river Nestus, where Abdëra was situated. This was the road which Alexander is likely to have followed. But he must probably have made a considerable circuit to the eastward; for the route which Paul Lucas describes himself as having taken direct from Philippopolis to Drama, can hardly have been fit for an army.

The river Lyginus may perhaps be the modern Isker, but this is not certain. The island called Peukê is still more perplexing. Strabo speaks of it as if it were near the mouth of the Danube (vii. p. 301-305). But it seems impossible that either the range of the Triballi, or the march of Alexander, can have extended so far eastward. Since Strabo (as well as Arrian) copied Alexander's march from Ptolemy, whose authority is very good, we are compelled to suppose that there was a second island called Peukê higher up the river.

The geography of Thrace is so little known, that we cannot wonder at our inability to identify these places. We are acquainted, and that but imperfectly, with the two high roads, both starting from Byzantium or Constantinople. 1. The one (called the King's Road, from having been in part the march of Xerxes in his invasion of Greece, Livy, xxxix. 27; Herod. vii. 115) crossing the Hebrus and the Nestus, touching the northern coast of the Ægean Sea at Neapolis, a little

The terror spread by Alexander's military operations was so great, that not only the Triballi, but the other autonomous Thracians around, sent envoys tendering presents or tribute, and soliciting peace. Alexander granted their request. His mind being bent upon war with Asia, he was satisfied with having intimidated these tribes so as to deter them from rising during his absence. What conditions he imposed, we do not know, but he accepted the presents.<sup>1</sup>

While these applications from the Thracians were under debate, envoys arrived from a tribe of Gauls occupying a distant mountainous region westward towards the Ionic Gulf. Though strangers to Alexander, they had heard so much of the recent exploits, that they came with demands to be admitted to his friendship. They were distinguished both for tall stature and for boastful language. Alexander readily exchanged with them assurances of

Embassy  
of Gauls to  
Alexander.  
His self-  
conceit.

south of Philippi; then crossing the Strymon at Amphipolis, and stretching through Pella across Inner Macedonia and Illyria to Dyrrhachium (the Via Egnatia). 2. The other, taking a more northerly course, passing along the upper valley of the Hebrus from Adrianople to Philippopolis, then through Sardica (Sophia) and Naissus (Nisch), to the Danube, near Belgrade; being the high road now followed from Constantinople to Belgrade.

But apart from these two roads, scarcely anything whatever is known of the country. Especially the mountainous region of Rhodopé, bounded on the west by the Strymon, on the north and east by the Hebrus, and on the south by the Ægean, is a Terra Incognita, except the few Grecian colonies on the coast. Very few travellers have passed along or described the southern or King's Road, while the region in the interior, apart from the high road, was absolutely unexplored until the visit of M. Vi-

quesnel in 1847, under scientific mission from the French government. The brief, but interesting account, composed by M. Viquesnel of this rugged and impracticable district, is contained in the "*Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Littéraires*" for 1850, published at Paris. Unfortunately, the map intended to accompany that account has not yet been prepared; but the published data, as far as they go, have been employed by Kiepert in constructing his recent map of Turkey in Europe; the best map of these regions now existing, though still very imperfect. The illustrations (*Erläuterungen*) annexed by Kiepert to his map of Turkey, show the defective data on which the cartography of this country is founded. Until the survey of M. Viquesnel, the higher part of the course of the Strymon, and nearly all the course of the Nestus, may be said to have been wholly unknown.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 4, 5; Strabo, vii. p. 301.

alliance. Entertaining them at a feast, he asked, in the course of conversation, what it was that they were most afraid of, among human contingencies? They replied, that they feared no man, nor any danger, except only, lest the heaven should fall upon them. Their answer disappointed Alexander, who had expected that they would name him, as the person of whom they were most afraid; so prodigious was his conceit of his own exploits. He observed to his friends that these Gauls were swaggerers. Yet if we attend to the sentiment rather than the language, we shall see that such an epithet applies with equal or greater propriety to Alexander himself. The anecdote is chiefly interesting as it proves at how early an age the exorbitant self-esteem, which we shall hereafter find him manifesting, began. That after the battle of Issus he should fancy himself superhuman, we can hardly be astonished; but he was as yet only in the first year of his reign, and had accomplished nothing beyond his march into Thrace and his victory over the Triballi.

After arranging these matters, he marched in a south-westerly direction into the territory of the Agri-  
 anes and the other Pæonians, between the rivers  
 Strymon and Axios in the highest portion of  
 their course. Here he was met by a body of  
 Agrianes under their prince Langarus, who had  
 already contracted a personal friendship for him at Pella  
 before Philip's death. News came that the Illyrian Klei-  
 tus, son of Bardylis, who had been subdued by Philip,  
 had revolted at Pelion (a strong post south of lake Lychni-  
 lus, on the west side of the chain of Skardus and Pindus,  
 near the place where that chain is broken by the cleft  
 called the Klissura of Tzangon or Devol<sup>1</sup>) — and that the  
 western Illyrians, called Taulantii, under their prince  
 Glaukias, were on the march to assist him. Accordingly  
 Alexander proceeded thither forthwith, leaving Langarus  
 to deal with the Illyrian tribe Autariatæ, who had threatened  
 to oppose his progress. He marched along the bank and  
 up the course of the Erigon, from a point near where it  
 joins the Axios.<sup>2</sup> On approaching Pelion, he found the

Victories of  
 Alexander  
 over Klei-  
 tus and the  
 Illyrians.

<sup>1</sup> For the situation of Pelion, p. 310-324.

compare Livy, xxxi. 33, 34, and the <sup>2</sup> Assuming Alexander to have  
 remarks of Colonel Leake, Travels been in the territory of the Tri-  
 in Northern Greece, vol. iii. ch. 28, balli, the modern Servia, he would

Illyrians posted in front of the town and on the heights around, awaiting the arrival of Glaukias their promised ally. While Alexander was making his dispositions for attack, they offered their sacrifices to the gods; the victims being three boys, three girls, and three black rams. At first they stepped boldly forward to meet him, but before coming to close quarters, they turned and fled into the town with such haste that the slain victims were left lying on the spot.<sup>1</sup> Having thus driven in the defenders, Alexander was preparing to draw a wall of circumvallation round the Pelion, when he was interrupted by the arrival of Glaukias with so large a force as to compel him to abandon the project. A body of cavalry, sent out from the Macedonian camp under Philotas to forage, were in danger of being cut off by Glaukias, and were only rescued by the arrival of Alexander himself with a reinforcement. In the face of this superior force, it was necessary to bring off the Macedonian army, through a narrow line of road along the river Eordaikus, where in some places there was only room for four abreast, with hill or marsh everywhere around. By a series of bold and skilful manœuvres, and by effective employment of his battering-train or projectile machines to protect the rear-guard, Alexander completely baffled the enemy, and brought off his army without loss.<sup>2</sup> Moreover these Illyrians, who had not known how to make use of such advantages of position, abandoned themselves to disorder as soon as their enemy had retreated, neglecting all precautions for the safety of their camp. Apprised of this carelessness, Alexander made a force

in this march follow mainly the road which is now frequented between Belgrade and Bitolia; through the plain of Kossovo, Pristina, Katschanik (rounding on the north-eastern side the Ljubatrin, the north-eastern promontory terminating the chain of Skardus), Usch-kub, Kuprili, along the higher course of the Axios or Vardar until the point where the Erigon or Tscherna joins that river below Kuprili. Here he would be among the Pæonians and Agrianes, on the east—and the Dardani and Autariatæ, seemingly on the north and

west. If he then followed the course of the Erigon, he would pass through the portions of Macedonia then called Deuriopia and Pelagonia: he would go between the ridge of mountains, through which the Erigon breaks, called Nidje on the south, and Babuna on the north. He would pass afterwards to Florina, and not to Bitolia.

See Kiepert's map of these regions—a portion of his recent map of Turkey in Europe—and Griesbach's description of the general track.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 5, 12.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 6, 3-12.

night-march back, at the head of his Agrianian division and light troops supported by the remaining army. He surprised the Illyrians in their camp before daylight. The success of this attack against a sleeping and unguarded army was so complete, that the Illyrians fled at once without resistance. Many were slain or taken prisoners; the rest, throwing away their arms, hurried away homeward, pursued by Alexander for a considerable distance. The Illyrian prince Kleitus was forced to evacuate Pelion, which place he burned, and then retired into the territory of Glaukias.<sup>1</sup>

Just as Alexander had completed this victory over Kleitus and the Taulantian auxiliaries, and before he had returned home, news reached him of a menacing character. The Thebans had declared themselves independent of him, and were besieging his garrison in the Kadmeia.

B.C. 335  
(August).

Of this event, alike important and disastrous to those who stood forward, the immediate antecedents are very imperfectly known to us. It has already been remarked that the vote of submission on the part of the Greeks to Alexander as Emperor, during the preceding autumn, had been passed only under the intimidation of a present Macedonian force. Though the Spartans alone had courage to proclaim their dissent, the Athenians, Arcadians, Ætolians, and others, were well known, even to Alexander himself, as ready to do the like on any serious reverse to the Macedonian arms.<sup>2</sup> Moreover the energy and ability displayed by Alexander had taught the Persian king that all danger to himself was not removed by the death of Philip, and induced him either to send, or to promise, pecuniary aid to the anti-Macedonian Greeks. We have already noticed the manifestation of anti-Macedonian sentiment at Athens—proclaimed by several of the most eminent orators—Demosthenês, Lykurgus, Hyperidês, and others; as well as by active military men like Charidêmus and Ephialtês,<sup>3</sup> who probably spoke out more boldly when Alexander was absent on the Danube. In other cities, the same sentiment doubtless found advocates, though less distinguished; but at Thebes, where it could not be openly

The Thebans declare their independence against Macedonia.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 6. 19-22.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Ælian, V. H. xii. 57.

proclaimed, it prevailed with the greatest force.<sup>1</sup> The Thebans suffered an oppression from which most of the other cities were free—the presence of a Macedonian garrison in their citadel; just as they had endured, fifty years before, the curb of a Spartan garrison after the fraud of Phœbidas and Leontiadês. In this case, as in the former, the effect was to arm the macedonising leaders with absolute power over their fellow-citizens, and to inflict upon the latter not merely the public mischief of extinguishing all free speech, but also multiplied individual insults and injuries, prompted by the lust and rapacity of rulers, foreign as well as domestic.<sup>2</sup> A number of Theban citizens, among them the freest and boldest spirits, were in exile at Athens, receiving from the public indeed nothing beyond a safe home, but secretly encouraged to hope for better things by Demosthenês and the other anti-Macedonian leaders.<sup>3</sup> In like manner fifty years before, it was at Athens, and from private Athenian citizens, that the Thebans Pelopidas and Mellon had found that sympathy which enabled them to organise their daring conspiracy for rescuing Thebes from the Spartans. That enterprise, admired throughout Greece as alike adventurous, skilful, and heroic, was the model present to the imagination of the Theban exiles, to be copied if any tolerable opportunity occurred.

Such was the feeling in Greece, during the long absence of Alexander on his march into Thrace and Illyria; a period of four or five months, ending at August 335 B.C. Not only was Alexander thus long absent, but he sent home no reports of his proceedings. Couriers were

B.C. 335.

They are encouraged by Alexander's long ab-

<sup>1</sup> Demadês, ὑπὲρ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 14. Θηβαῖοι δὲ μέγιστον εἶχον δεσμὸν τὴν τῶν Μακεδόνων φρουρὰν, ὅφ' ἧς οὐ μόνον τὰς χεῖρας συνεδέθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν παρρησίαν ἀφῆρηντο....

<sup>2</sup> The Thebans, in setting forth their complaints to the Arcadians, stated—ὅτι οὐ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας φιλίαν Θηβαῖοι διαλύσαι βουλόμενοι, τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπανεστῆσαν, οὐδ' ἐναντίον τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐδὲν πράξοντες, ἀλλὰ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἐν τῇ πόλει γινόμενα φέρειν οὐκέτι δυνά-

μενοι, οὐδὲ τὴν δουλείαν ὑπομένειν, οὐδὲ τὰς ὕβρεις ὁρᾶν τὰς εἰς τὰ ἐλευθέρα σώματα γινόμενας.

See Demadês περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, s. 13, the speech of Cleadas, Justin, xi. 4; and (Deinarchus cont. Demosth. s. 20) compare Livy, xxxix. 27—about the working of the Macedonian garrison at Maroneia, in the time of Philip son of Demetrius.

<sup>3</sup> Demadês περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, Fragm. ad fin.

likely enough to be intercepted among the mountains and robbers of Thrace; and even if they reached Pella, their despatches were not publicly read, as such communications would have been read to the Athenian assembly. Accordingly we are not surprised to hear that rumours arose of his having been defeated and slain. Among these reports, both multiplied and confident, one was even certified by a liar who pretended to have just arrived from Thrace, to have been an eye-witness of the fact, and to have been himself wounded in the action against the Triballi, where Alexander had perished.<sup>1</sup> This welcome news, not fabricated, but too hastily credited, by Demosthenês and Lykurgus,<sup>2</sup> was announced to the Athenian assembly. In spite of doubts expressed by Demadês and Phokion, it was believed not only by the Athenians and the Theban exiles there present, but also by the Arcadians, Eleians, Ætolians and other Greeks. For a considerable time, through the absence of Alexander, it remained uncontradicted, which increased the confidence in its truth.

It was upon the full belief in this rumour, of Alexander's defeat and death, that the Grecian cities proceeded. The event severed by itself their connexion with Macedonia. There was neither son nor adult brother to succeed to the throne: so that not merely the foreign ascendancy, but even the intestine unity, of Macedonia, was likely to be

sence in  
Thrace,  
and by  
reports of  
his death.

The The-  
ban exiles  
from  
Athens get  
possession  
of Thebes.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 3. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ πολὺς ὁ λόγος (of the death of Alexander) καὶ παρὰ πολλῶν ἐφοίτα, ὅτι τε χρόνον ἄπῃν οὐκ ὀλίγον καὶ ὅτι οὐδεμία ἀγγελία παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀφίχτο, &c.

<sup>2</sup> Demadês περὶ τῆς δωδεκαετίας, ad fin. ἦν ἡ Δημοσθένους καὶ Λυκούργου τῷ μὲν λόγῳ παραταττόμενοι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐνίκων ἐν Τριβάλλοις, μόνον δ' οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος νεκρὸν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον προσέθηκαν. . . ἐμὲ δὲ στυγνὸν καὶ περιλυπὸν ἔφασκον εἶναι μὴ συνευδοκοῦντα, &c.

Justin, xi. 2. "Demosthenem oratorem, qui Macedonum deletas omnes cum rege copias à Triballis affirmaverit, producto in concionem auctore, qui in eo prælio, in quo

rex ceciderit, se quoque vulneratum diceret."

Compare Tacitus, Histor. i. 34. "Vix dum egresso Pisone, occisum in castris Othonem, vagus primum et incertus rumor, mox, ut in magnis mendaciis, interfuisse se quidam, et vidisse affirmabant, credulâ famâ inter gaudentes et in-curiosos . . . Obvius in palatio Julius Atticus, speculator, cruentum gladium ostentans, occisum à se Othonem exclamavit."

It is stated that Alexander was really wounded in the head by a stone, in the action with the Illyrians (Plutarch, Fortun. Alex. p. 327).

broken up. In regard to Athens, Arcadia, Elis, Ætolia, &c., the anti-Macedonian sentiment was doubtless vehemently manifested, but no special action was called for. It was otherwise in regard to Thebes. Phœnix, Prochy-tês, and other Theban exiles at Athens, immediately laid their plan for liberating their city and expelling the Macedonian garrison from the Kadmeia. Assisted with arms and money by Demosthenês and other Athenian citizens, and invited by their partisans at Thebes, they suddenly entered that city in arms. Though unable to carry the Kadmeia by surprise, they seized in the city, and put to death, Amyntas, a principal Macedonian officer, with Timolaus, one of the leading macedonizing Thebans.<sup>1</sup> They then immediately convoked a general assembly of the Thebans, to whom they earnestly appealed for a vigorous effort to expel the Macedonians, and reconquer the ancient freedom of the city. Expatiating upon the misdeeds of the garrison and upon the oppressions of those Thebans who governed by means of the garrison, they proclaimed that the happy moment of liberation had now arrived, through the recent death of Alexander. They doubtless recalled the memory of Pelopidas, and the glorious enterprise, cherished by all Theban patriots, whereby he had rescued the city from Spartan occupation, forty-six years before. To this appeal the Thebans cordially responded. The assembly passed a vote, declaring severance from Macedonia, and autonomy of Thebes—and naming as Bœotarchs some of the returned exiles, with others of the same party, for the purpose of energetic measures against the garrison in the Kadmeia.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately for Thebes, none of these new Bœotarchs were men of the stamp of Epaminondas, probably not even of Pelopidas. Yet their scheme, though from its melancholy result it is generally denounced as insane, really promised better at first than that of the anti-Spartan conspirators in 380 B.C. The Kadmeia was instantly summoned; hopes being perhaps indulged, that the Macedonian commander would surrender it with as little resistance as the Spartan harmost had done. But such hopes were not realized. Philip had probably caused the citadel to

They be-  
sieve the  
Macedo-  
nians in  
the Kad-  
meia—and  
entreat aid  
from other  
Greeks.  
Favourable  
sympathies  
shown to-  
wards  
them, but  
no positive  
aid.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 1; compare Deimachus cont. Demosthenês, s. 75.

p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 3-17.

be both strengthened and provisioned. The garrison defied the Theban leaders, who did not feel themselves strong enough to give orders for an assault, as Pelopidas in his time was prepared to do, if surrender had been denied.<sup>1</sup> They contented themselves with drawing and guarding a double line of circumvallation round the Kadmeia, so as to prevent both sallies from within and supplies from without.<sup>2</sup> They then sent envoys in the melancholy equipment of suppliants, to the Arcadians and others, representing that their recent movement was directed, not against Hellenic union, but against Macedonian oppression and outrage, which pressed upon them with intolerable bitterness. As Greeks and freemen they entreated aid to rescue them from such a calamity. They obtained much favourable sympathy, with some promise and even half-performance. Many of the leading orators at Athens—Demosthenês, Lykurgus, Hyperidês, and others—together with the military men Charidemus and Ephialtês—strongly urged their countrymen to declare in favour of Thebes and send aid against the Kadmeia. But the citizens generally, following Demadês and Phokion, waited to be better assured both of Alexander's death and of its consequences, before they would incur the hazard of open hostility against Macedonia, though they seem to have declared sympathy with the Theban revolution.<sup>3</sup> Demosthenês farther went as envoy into Peloponnesus, while the Macedonian Antipater also sent round urgent applications to the Peloponnesian cities, requiring their contingents, as members of the confederacy under Alexander, to act against Thebes. The eloquence of Demosthenês, backed by his money, or by Persian money administered through him, prevailed on the Peloponnesians to refuse compliance with Antipater, and to send no contingents against Thebes.<sup>4</sup> The Eleians and Ætolians held out general assurances favourable to the revolution at Thebes, while the Arcadians

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Hellen. v. 4, 11. See Ch. LXXVII. of this History.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 14.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 14. s. 19. καὶ Ἀρχάδων ἡκόντων εἰς Ἴσθμὸν, καὶ τὴν μὲν παρὰ Ἀντιπάτρου πρεσβείαν ἄπραχτον ἀποστείλάντων, &c.

In the vote passed by the people

of Athens some years afterwards, awarding a statue and other honours to Demosthenês, these proceedings in Peloponnesus are enumerated among his titles to public gratitude — καὶ ὡς ἐχώλυσε Πελοποννησίους ἐπὶ Θήβας Ἀλεξάνδρῳ βοηθῆσαι, χρήματα δοῦναι καὶ αὐτὸς πρεσβεύσας, &c. (Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 850.)

even went so far as to send out some troops to second it, though they did not advance beyond the isthmus.<sup>1</sup>

Here was a crisis in Grecian affairs, opening new possibilities for the recovery of freedom. Had the Arcadians and other Greeks lent decisive aid to Thebes—had Athens acted even with as much energy as she did twelve years afterwards during the Lamian war, occupying Thermopylæ with an army and a fleet—the gates of Greece might well have been barred against a new Macedonian force, even with Alexander alive and at its head. That the struggle of Thebes was not regarded at the time, even by macedonising Greeks, as hopeless, is shown by the subsequent observations both of Æschinês and Deinarchus at Athens. Æschinês (delivering five years afterwards his oration against Ktesiphon) accuses Demosthenês of having by his perverse backwardness brought about the ruin of Thebes. The foreign mercenaries forming part of the garrison of the Kadmeia were ready (Æschinês affirms) to deliver up that fortress, on receiving five talents: the Arcadian generals would have brought up their troops to the aid of Thebes, if nine or ten talents had been paid to them—having repudiated the solicitations of Antipater. Demosthenês (say these two orators) having in his possession 300 talents from the Persian king, to instigate anti-Macedonian movements in Greece, was supplicated by the Theban envoys to furnish money for these purposes, but refused the request, kept the money for himself, and thus prevented both the surrender of the Kadmeia and the onward march of the Arcadians.<sup>2</sup> The charge here advanced against Demosthenês appears utterly incredible. To suppose that anti-Macedonian movements counted for so little in his eyes, is an hypothesis belied by his whole history. But the fact that such allegations were made by Æschinês only five years afterwards, proves the reports and the feelings of the time—that the chances of successful resistance to Macedonia on the part of the Thebans were not deemed unfavourable. And when the Athenians, following the counsels of Demadês and Phokion, refused to aid Thebes or occupy Thermopylæ—they

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 10, 2; Æschinês adv. Deinarch. adv. Demosth. p. 15, 16. Ktesiphont. p. 634. s. 19-22.

<sup>2</sup> Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 634;

perhaps consulted the safety of Athens separately, but they receded from the generous and Pan-hellenic patriotism which had animated their ancestors against Xerxês and Mardonius.<sup>1</sup>

The Thebans, though left in this ungenerous isolation, pressed the blockade of the Kadmeia, and would presently have reduced the Macedonian garrison, had they not been surprised by the awestrking event of Alexander arriving in person at Onchêstus in Bœotia, at the head of his victorious army. The first news of his being alive was furnished by his arrival at Onchêstus. No one could at first believe the fact. The Theban leaders contended that it was another Alexander, the son of Aëropus, at the head of a Macedonian army of relief.<sup>2</sup>

In this incident we may note two features, which characterized Alexander to the end of his life; matchless celerity of movement, and no less remarkable favour of fortune. Had news of the Theban rising first reached him while on the Danube or among the distant Triballi,—or even embarrassed in the difficult region round Pelion,—he could hardly by any effort have arrived in time to save the Kadmeia. But he learnt it just when he had vanquished Kleitus and Glaukias, so that his hands were perfectly free—and also when he was in a position peculiarly near and convenient for a straight march into Greece without

Rapid march and unexpected arrival of Alexander with his army before Thebes. His good fortune as to the time of hearing the news.

<sup>1</sup> See Herod. viii. 143. Demosthenês in his orations frequently insists on the different rank and position of Athens, as compared with those of the smaller Grecian states—and on the higher and more arduous obligations consequent thereupon. This is one grand point of distinction between his policy and that of Phokion. See a striking passage in the speech *De Coronâ*, p. 245. s. 77; and *Orat. De Republ. Ordinand.* p. 167. s. 37.

Isokratês holds the same language touching the obligations of Sparta,—in the speech which he puts into the mouth of Archidamus. "No one will quarrel with Epidau-

rians and Phliasians, for looking only how they can get through and keep themselves in being. But for Lacedæmonians, it is impossible to aim simply at preservation and nothing beyond—by any means, whatever they may be. If we cannot preserve ourselves with honour, we ought to prefer a glorious death." (*Isokratês*, *Orat. vi.* *Archid.* s. 106.)

The backward and narrow policy, which Isokratês here proclaims as fit for Epidaurus and Phlius, but not for Sparta—is precisely what Phokion always recommended for Athens, even while Philip's power was yet nascent and unsettled.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 9.

going back to Pella. From the pass of Tschangon (or of the river Devol), near which Alexander's last victories were gained, his road lay southward, following downwards in part the higher course of the river Haliakmon, through Upper Macedonia or the regions called Eordæa and Elymeia which lay on his left, while the heights of Pindus and the upper course of the river Aous, occupied by the Epirots called Tymphæi and Parauæi, were on the right. On the seventh day of march, crossing the lower ridges of the Cambunian mountains (which separate Olympus from Pindus and Upper Macedonia from Thessaly), Alexander reached the Thessalian town of Pelinna. Six days more brought him to the Bœotian Onchêstus.<sup>1</sup> He was already within Thermopylæ, before any Greeks were aware that he was in march, or even that he was alive. The question about occupying Thermopylæ by a Grecian force was thus set aside. The difficulty of forcing that pass, and the necessity of forestalling Athens in it by stratagem or celerity, was present to the mind of Alexander, as it had been to that of Philip in his expedition of 346 B.C. against the Phokians.

His arrival, in itself a most formidable event, told with double force on the Greeks from its extreme suddenness. We can hardly doubt that both Athenians and Thebans had communications at Pella—that they looked upon any Macedonian invasion as likely to come from thence—and that they expected Alexander himself (assuming him to be still living, contrary to their belief back in his capital before he began any new enterprise Upon this hypothesis—in itself probable, and such as would have been realised if Alexander had not already advanced so far southward at the moment when he received the news<sup>2</sup>—they would at least have known beforehand of his approach, and would have had the option of a defensive combination open. As it happened, his unexpected appearance in the heart of Greece precluded all combinations, and checked all idea of resistance.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 6. See respecting this region, Colonel Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. vi. p. 300-304; ch. xxviii. p. 303-305. &c.; and for Alexander's line of march, the map at the end of the volume.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xvii. 9) incorrectly says that Alexander came back unexpectedly from *Thrace*. Had this been the fact, he would have come by Pella.

Two days after his arrival in Bœotia, he marched his army round Thebes, so as to encamp on the south side of the city; whereby he both intercepted the communication of the Thebans with Athens, and exhibited his force more visibly to the garrison in the Kadmeia. The Thebans, though alone and without hope of succour, maintained their courage unshaken. Alexander deferred the attack for a day or two, in hopes that they would submit; he wished to avoid an assault which might cost the lives of many of his soldiers, whom he required for his Asiatic schemes. He even made public proclamation,<sup>1</sup> demanding the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders Phoenix and Prochytês, but offering to any other Theban who chose to quit the city, permission to come and join him on the terms of the convention sworn in the preceding autumn. A general assembly being convened, the macedonising Thebans enforced the prudence of submission to an irresistible force. But the leaders recently returned from exile, who had headed the rising, warmly opposed this proposition, contending for resistance to the death. In them, such resolution may not be wonderful, since (as Arrian<sup>2</sup> remarks) they had gone too far to hope for lenity. As it appears however that the mass of citizens deliberately adopted the same resolution, in spite of strong persuasion to the contrary,<sup>3</sup> we see plainly that they had already felt the bitterness of Macedonian dominion, and that sooner than endure a renewal of it, sure to be yet worse, coupled with the dishonour of surrendering their leaders—they had made up their minds to perish with the freedom of their city. At a time when the sentiment of Hellas as an autonomous system was passing away, and when Grecian courage was degenerating into a mere instrument for the aggrandisement of Macedonian chiefs, these countrymen of Epaminondas and Pelopidas set an example of devoted self-sacrifice in the cause of Grecian liberty, not less honourable than that of Leonidas at Thermopylæ, and only less esteemed because it proved infructuous.

Siege of  
Thebes.  
Proclama-  
tion of  
Alexander.  
Determina-  
tion of the  
Thebans to  
resist.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 9; Plutarch, Alex-  
and. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 7, 16.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 9.

In reply to the proclamation of Alexander, the Thebans made from their walls a counter-proclamation, demanding the surrender of his officers Antipater and Philotas, and inviting every one to join them, who desired, in concert with the Persian king and the Thebans, to liberate the Greeks and put down the despot of Hellas.<sup>1</sup> Such a haughty defiance and retort incensed Alexander to the quick. He brought up his battering engines and prepared everything for storming the town. Of the murderous assault which followed, we find different accounts, not agreeing with each other, yet not wholly irreconcilable. It appears that the Thebans had erected, probably in connexion with their operations against the Kadmeia, an outwork defended by a double palisade. Their walls were guarded by the least effective soldiers, metics and liberated slaves; while their best troops were bold enough to go forth in front of the gates and give battle. Alexander divided his army into three divisions; one under Perdikkas and Amyntas, against the outwork—a second, destined to combat the Thebans who sallied out—and a third, held in reserve. Between the second of these three divisions, and the Thebans in front of the gates, the battle was so obstinately contested, that success at one time seemed doubtful, and Alexander was forced to order up his reserve. The first Macedonian success was gained by Perdikkas,<sup>2</sup> who, aided by the division of Amyn-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 9.

<sup>2</sup> The attack of Perdikkas was represented by Ptolemy, from whom Arrian copies (i. 8, 1), not only as being the first and only attack made by the Macedonian army on Thebes, but also as made by Perdikkas *without orders from Alexander*, who was forced to support it in order to preserve Perdikkas from being overwhelmed by the Thebans. According to Ptolemy and Arrian, therefore, the storming of Thebes took place both without the orders, and against the wishes, of Alexander; the capture moreover was effected rapidly with little trouble to the besieging army (ἡ ἀλωσις δὲ ὀλίγου τε καὶ οὐ ξύ-

πόνος τῶν ἐλόντων συνεγενήσατο, Arr. i. 9, 9): the bloodshed and pillage were committed by the vindictive sentiment of the Bœotian allies.

Diodorus had before him a very different account. He affirms that Alexander both combined and ordered the assault—that the Thebans behaved like bold and desperate men, resisting obstinately and for a long time—that the slaughter afterwards was committed by the general body of the assailants; the Bœotian allies being doubtless conspicuous among them. Diodorus gives this account at some length, and with his customary rhetorical amplifications

tas and also by the Agrianian regiment and the bowmen, carried the first of the two outworks, as well as a postern gate which had been left unguarded. His troops also stormed the second outwork, though he himself was severely wounded and borne away to the camp. Here the Theban defenders fled back into the city, along the hollow way which led to the temple of Heraklê, pursued by the light troops in advance of the rest. Upon these men, however, the Thebans presently turned, repelling them with the loss of Eurybotas

Plutarch and Justin are more brief; but coincide in the same general view, and not in that of Arrian. Polyænus again (iv. 3, 12) gives something different from all.

To me it appears that the narrative of Diodorus is (in its basis, and striking off rhetorical amplifications) more credible than that of Arrian. Admitting the attack made by Perdikkas, I conceive it to have been a portion of the general plan of Alexander. I cannot think it probable that Perdikkas attacked without orders, or that Thebes was captured with little resistance. It was captured by one assault (*Æschinês adv. Ktesiph. p. 524*), but by an assault well combined and stoutly contested—not by one begun without preparation or order, and successful after hardly any resistance. Alexander, after having offered what he thought liberal terms, was not the man to shrink from carrying his point by force; nor would the Thebans have refused those terms, unless their minds had been made up for strenuous and desperate defence, without hope of ultimate success.

What authority Diodorus followed, we do not know. He may have followed Kleitarchus, a contemporary and an *Æolian*, who must have had good means of information respecting such an event as the capture of Thebes (see Geier, *Alexandri M. Historiarum Scriptores etate suppare, Lips. 1844*,

p. 6-152; and Vossius, *De Historicis Græcis*, i. x. p. 90, ed. Westermann). I have due respect for the authority of Ptolemy, but I cannot go along with Geier and other critics who set aside all other witnesses, even contemporary, respecting Alexander, as worthy of little credit, unless where such witnesses are confirmed by Ptolemy or Aristobulus. We must remember that Ptolemy did not compose his book until after he became king of Egypt, in 306 B.C.; nor indeed until after the battle of Ipsus in 301, according to Geier (p. 1); at least twenty-nine years after the sack of Thebes. Moreover, Ptolemy was not ashamed of what Geier calls (p. 11) the "pious fraud" of announcing, that two speaking serpents conducted the army of Alexander to the holy precinct of Zeus Ammon (*Arrian, iii. 3*). Lastly, it will be seen that the depositions which are found in other historians, but not in Ptolemy and Aristobulus, relate principally to matters discreditable to Alexander. That Ptolemy and Aristobulus *forgot or omitted*, is in my judgement far more probable, than that other historians *invented*. Admiring biographers would easily excuse themselves for refusing to proclaim to the world such acts as the massacre of the Branchidæ, or the dragging of the wounded Batis at Gaza.

their commanding officer and seventy men slain. In pursuing these bowmen, the ranks of the Thebans became somewhat disordered, so that they were unable to resist the steady charge of the Macedonian guards and heavy infantry coming up in support. They were broken, and pushed back into the city; their rout being rendered still more complete by a sally of the Macedonian garrison out of the Kadmeia. The assailants being victorious on this side, the Thebans who were maintaining the combat without the gates were compelled to retreat, and the advancing Macedonians forced their way into the town along with them. Within the town, however, the fighting still continued; the Thebans resisting in organised bodies as long as they could; and when broken, still resisting even single-handed. None of the military population sued for mercy; most of them were slain in the streets; but a few cavalry and infantry cut their way out into the plain and escaped. The fight now degenerated into a carnage. The Macedonians with their Pæonian contingents were incensed with the obstinate resistance; while various Greeks serving as auxiliaries—Phokians, Orchomenians, Thespians, Platæans,—had to avenge ancient and grievous injuries endured from Thebes. Such furious feelings were satiated by an indiscriminate massacre of all who came in their way, without distinction of age or sex—old men, women, and children, in houses and even in temples. This wholesale slaughter was accompanied of course by all the plunder and manifold outrage with which victorious assailants usually reward themselves.<sup>1</sup>

More than five hundred Macedonians are asserted to have been slain, and six thousand Thebans. Thebes is razed; the Theban captives sold as slaves; the territory distributed among the neighbouring cities. Thirty thousand captives were collected.<sup>2</sup> The final destiny of these captives, and of Thebes itself, was submitted by Alexander to the Orchomenians, Platæans, Phokians, and other Grecian auxiliaries in the assault. He must have known well beforehand what the sentence of such judges would be. They pronounced, that the city of Thebes should be razed to the ground: that the Kadmeia alone should be maintained, as a military

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 8; Diodor. xvii. 12, 13. (Alexand. 11) agree in giving the

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus (xvii. 14) and Plutarch totals of 6000 and 30,000.

post with Macedonian garrison : that the Theban territory should be distributed among the allies themselves: that Orchomenus and Platæa should be rebuilt and fortified: that all the captive Thebans, men, women, and children, should be sold as slaves—excepting only priests and priestesses, and such as were connected by recognised ties of hospitality with Philip or Alexander, or such as had been *proxeni* of the Macedonians: that the Thebans who had escaped should be proclaimed outlaws, liable to arrest and death, wherever they were found; and that every Grecian city should be interdicted from harbouring them.<sup>1</sup>

This overwhelming sentence, in spite of an appeal for lenity by a Theban<sup>2</sup> named Kleadas, was passed by the Grecian auxiliaries of Alexander, and executed by Alexander himself, who made but one addition to the excepting clauses. He left the house of Pindar standing, and spared the descendants of the poet. With these reserves, Thebes was effaced from the earth. The Theban territory was partitioned among the reconstituted cities of Orchomenus and Platæa. Nothing, except the Macedonian military post

The Kadmeia is occupied as a Macedonian military post. Retribution upon the Thebans from Orchomenus and Platæa.

at the Kadmeia, remained to mark the place where the chief of the Bœotian confederacy had once stood. The captives were all sold, and are said to have yielded 440 talents; large prices being offered by bidders from feelings of hostility towards the city.<sup>3</sup> Diodorus tells us that this sentence was passed by the general synod of Greeks. But we are not called upon to believe that this synod, subservient though it was sure to be when called upon to deliberate under the armed force of Alexander, could be brought to sanction such a ruin upon one of the first and most ancient Hellenic cities. For we learn from Arrian that the question was discussed and settled only by the Grecian auxiliaries who had taken part with Alexander;<sup>4</sup> and that the sentence therefore represents the bitter antipathies of the Orchomenians, Platæans, &c. Without doubt, these cities had sustained harsh and cruel treatment

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 9; Diodor. xvii. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xi. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 14; Justin, xi. 4: "pretium non ex ementium commodo, sed ex inimicorum odio ex-

tenditur."

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, i. 9, 13. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου συμμάχοις, οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέτρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι, ἔδοξε, &c.

from Thebes. In so far as they were concerned, the retribution upon the Thebans was merited. Those persons, however, who (as Arrian tells us) pronounced the catastrophe to be a divine judgement upon Thebes for having joined Xerxês against Greece<sup>1</sup> a century and a half before—must have forgotten that not only the Orchomenians, but even Alexander of Macedon, the namesake and predecessor of the destroying conqueror, had served in the army of Xerxês along with the Thebans.

Arrian vainly endeavours to transfer from Alexander to the minor Bœotian towns the odium of this cruel destruction, unparalleled in Grecian history (as he himself says), when we look to the magnitude of the city; yet surpassed in the aggregate by the subversion under the arms of Philip, of no less than thirty-two free Chalkidic cities, thirteen years before. The known antipathy of these Bœotians was invoked by Alexander to colour an infliction which satisfied at once his sentiment, by destroying an enemy who defied him—and his policy, by serving as a terrific example to keep down other Greeks.<sup>2</sup> But though such were the views which governed him at the moment, he came afterwards to look back upon the proceeding with shame and sorrow. The shock to Hellenic feeling, when a city was subverted, arose not merely from the violent extinction of life, property, liberty, and social or political institutions—but also from the obliteration of legends and the suppression of religious observances, thus wronging and provoking the local Gods and heroes. We shall presently find Alexander himself sacrificing at Ilium,<sup>3</sup> in order to appease the wrath of

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 9, 10. He informs us (i. 9, 12) that there were many previous portents which foreshadowed this ruin: Diodorus (xvii. 10), on the contrary, enumerates many previous signs, all tending to encourage the Thebans.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alex. 11. ἡ μὲν πόλις ἦλθω καὶ διαρπασθεῖσα κατεσκάφη, τὸ μὲν ὅλον προσδοχέσαντος αὐτοῦ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάθει τηλικούτῳ ἐκπλαγέντας καὶ πτήξαντας ἀτρεμέσιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ καλλωπισαμένου χριζοσθαι

τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων ἐγγλήμασιν.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 11, 13. To illustrate farther the feeling of the Greeks, respecting the wrath of the Gods arising from the discontinuance of worship where it had been long continued—I transcribe a passage from Colonel Sleeman's work respecting the Hindoos, whose religious feelings are on so many points analogous to those of the Hellènes:—

\* "Human sacrifices were certainly

Priam, still subsisting and efficacious, against himself and his race, as being descended from Neoptolemus the slayer of Priam. By his harsh treatment of Thebes, he incurred the displeasure of Dionysus, the god of wine, said to have been born in that city, and one of the principal figures in Theban legend. It was to inspirations of the offended Dionysus that Alexander believed himself to owe that ungovernable drunken passion under which he afterwards killed Kleitus, as well as the refusal of his Macedonian soldiers to follow him farther into India.<sup>1</sup> If Alexander in after days thus repented of his own act, we may be sure that the like repugnance was felt still more strongly by others; and we can understand the sentiment under which, a few years after his decease, the Macedonian Kassander, son of Antipater, restored the destroyed city.

At the time, however, the effect produced by the destruction of Thebes was one of unmitigated terror throughout the Grecian cities. All of them sought to make their peace with the conqueror. The Arcadian contingent not only returned home from the Isthmus, but even condemned their leaders to death. The Eleians recalled their chief macedonising citizens out of exile into ascendancy at home. Each tribe of Ætolians sent envoys to Alexander, entreating for-

Extreme  
terror  
spread  
throughout  
Greece.  
Sympathy  
of the  
Athenians  
towards  
the Theban  
exiles.

offered in the city of Saugor during the whole Mahratta government, up to the year 1800—when they were put a stop to by the local governor, Assa Sahib, a very humane man. I once heard a learned Brahmin priest say, that he thought the decline of his (Assa Sahib's) family and government arose from this innovation. 'There is (said he) no sin in not offering human sacrifices to the Gods, where none have been offered; but where the Gods have been accustomed to them, they are very naturally annoyed when the rite is abolished, and visit the place and people with all kinds of calamity.' The priest did not seem to think that there was anything singular in this mode of reasoning: perhaps three Brahmin

priests out of four would have reasoned in the same manner." (Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, vol. i. ch. xv. p. 130.)

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Alex.* 13: compare Justin, xi. 4; and Isokratēs ad Philipp. (Or. v. s. 35), where he recommends Thebes to Philip on the ground of pre-eminent worship towards Heraklēs.

It deserves notice, that while Alexander himself repented of the destruction of Thebes, the macedonising orator at Athens describes it as a just, though deplorable penalty, brought by the Thebans upon themselves by reckless insanity of conduct (*Æschinēs adv. Ktesiph.* p. 524)

givenness for their manifestations against him. At Athens, we read with surprise, that on the very day when Thebes was assaulted and taken, the great festival of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, with its multitudinous procession of votaries from Athens to Eleusis, was actually taking place, at a distance of two days' march from the besieged city. Most Theban fugitives who contrived to escape, fled to Attica as the nearest place of refuge, communicating to the Athenians their own distress and terror. The festival was forthwith suspended. Every one hurried within the walls of Athens,<sup>1</sup> carrying with him his moveable property into a state of security. Under the general alarm prevalent that the conqueror would march directly into Attica, and under the hurry of preparation for defence, the persons both most alarmed and most in real danger were, of course Demosthenês, Lykurgus, Charidemus, and those others who had been loudest in speech against Macedonia, and had tried to prevail on the Athenians to espouse openly the cause of Thebes. Yet notwithstanding such terror of consequences to themselves, the Athenians afforded shelter and sympathy to the miserable Theban fugitives. They continued to do this even when they must have known that they were contravening the edict of proscription just sanctioned by Alexander.

Shortly afterwards, envoys arrived from that monarch with a menacing letter, formally demanding the surrender of eight or ten leading citizens of Athens—Demosthenês, Lykurgus, Hyperidês, Polyeuktus, Mœroklês, Diotimus,<sup>2</sup> Ephialtês, and Charidemus. Of these the first four were eminent orators, the last two military men; a strenuous advocates of an anti-Macedonia policy. Alexander in his letter denounced them as the causes of the battle of Chæroneia, and the offensive resolutions which had been adopted at Athens after the death of Philip, and even

Alexander demands the surrender of the chief anti-Macedonian leaders at Athens. Memorable debate at Athens. The demand refused.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 10, 4.

<sup>2</sup> The name of Diotimus is mentioned by Arrian (i. 10, 6), but not by Plutarch; who names Demon instead of him (Plutarch; Demosth. c. 23), and Kallisthenês instead of Hyperidês. We know nothing about

Diotimus, except that Demosthenês (De Coronâ, p. 264) alludes to him along with Charidemus, as having received an expression of gratitude from the people, in requital for present of shields which he had made. He is mentioned also, also

the recent hostile proceedings of the Thebans.<sup>1</sup> This momentous summons, involving the right of free speech and public debate at Athens, was submitted to the assembly. A similar demand had just been made upon the Thebans, and the consequences of refusal were to be read no less plainly in the destruction of their city than in the threats of the conqueror. That even under such trying circumstances, neither orators nor people failed in courage—we know as a general fact; though we have not the advantage (as Livy had in his time) of reading the speeches made in the debate.<sup>2</sup> Demosthenês, insisting that the fate of the citizens generally could not be severed from that of the specific victims, is said to have recounted in the course of his speech, the old fable—of the wolf requiring the sheep to make over to him their protecting dogs, as a condition of peace—and then devouring the unprotected sheep forthwith. He, and those demanded along with him, claimed the protection of the people, in whose cause alone they had incurred the wrath of the conqueror. Phokion on the other hand—silent at first, and rising only under constraint by special calls from the popular voice—contended that there was not force enough to resist Alexander, and that the persons in question must be given up. He even made appeal to themselves individually, reminding them of the self-devotion of the daughters of Erechtheus, memorable in Attic legend—and calling on them to surrender themselves voluntarily for the purpose of averting public calamity. He added, that he (Phokion) would rejoice to offer up either himself, or his best friend, if by such sacrifice he could save the city.<sup>3</sup> Lykurgus, one of the orators whose extradition was required, answered this speech of Phokion with vehemence and bitterness; and the public sentiment went along with him, indignantly repudiating Phokion's advice. By a resolute patriotism highly

with Charidêmus and others, in the third of the Demosthenic epistles, p. 1482.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 10, 6; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orat. p. 847. ἐξήτει αὐτὸν (Demosthenês) ἀπειλῶν εἰ μὴ δοίησαν. Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Demosth. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Livy, ix. 18. "(Alexander), ad-

versus quem Athenis, in civitate fractâ Macedonum armis, cernente tum maxime prope fumantes Thebarum ruinas, concionari libere ausi sint homines,—id quod ex monumentis orationum patet," &c.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, 9-17; Diodor. xvii. 15.

honourable at this trying juncture, it was decreed that the persons demanded should not be surrendered.<sup>1</sup>

On the motion of Demadês, an embassy was sent to Alexander, deprecating his wrath against the ten, and engaging to punish them by judicial sentence, if any crime could be proved against them. Demadês, who is said to have received from Demosthenês a bribe of five talents, undertook this mission. But Alexander was at first inexorable; refusing even to hear the envoys, and persisting in his requisition. It was only by the intervention of a second embassy, headed by Phokion, that a remission of terms was obtained. Alexander was persuaded to withdraw his requisition, and to be satisfied with the banishment of Charidemus and Ephialtês, the two anti-Macedonian military leaders. Both of them accordingly, and seemingly other Athenians with them, passed into Asia, where they took service under Darius.<sup>2</sup>

It was indeed no part of Alexander's plan to under-

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 15. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος τοῦτον μὲν (Phokion) τοῖς θορύβοις ἐξέβαλε, προσάντως ἀκούων τοὺς λόγους.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 10, 8; Diodor. xvii. 15; Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Justin, xi. 4; Deinarchus cont. Demosth. p. 26.

Arrian states that the visit of Demadês with nine other Athenian envoys to Alexander, occurred prior to the demand of Alexander for the extradition of the ten citizens. He (Arrian) affirms that immediately on hearing the capture of Thebes, the Athenians passed a vote, on the motion of Demadês, to send ten envoys, for the purpose of expressing satisfaction that Alexander had come safely from the Illyrians, and that he had punished the Thebans for their revolt. Alexander (according to Arrian) received this mission courteously, but replied by sending a letter to the Athenian people, in-

sisting on the surrender of the ten citizens.

Now both Diodorus and Plutarch represent the mission of Demadês as posterior to the demand made by Alexander for the ten citizens; and that it was intended to meet and deprecate that demand.

In my judgement, Arrian's tale is the less credible of the two. I think it highly improbable that the Athenians would by public vote express satisfaction that Alexander had punished the Thebans for their revolt. If the macedonising party at Athens was strong enough to carry so ignominious a vote, they would also have been strong enough to carry the subsequent proposition of Phokion—that the ten citizens demanded should be surrendered. The fact, that the Athenians afforded willing shelter to the Theban fugitives, is a farther reason for disbelieving this alleged vote.

take a siege of Athens, which might prove long and difficult, since the Athenians had a superior naval force, with the sea open to them, and the chance of effective support from Persia. When therefore he saw that his demand for the ten orators would be firmly resisted, considerations of policy gradually overcame his wrath, and induced him to relax.

Phokion returned to Athens as the bearer of Alexander's concessions, thus relieving the Athenians from extreme anxiety and peril. His influence—already great and of long standing, since for years past he had been perpetually re-elected general—became greater than ever, while that of Demosthenês and the other anti-Macedonian orators must have been lowered. It was no mean advantage to Alexander, victorious as he was, to secure the incorruptible Phokion as leader of the macedonising party at Athens. His projects against Persia were mainly exposed to failure from the possibility of opposition being raised against him in Greece by the agency of Persian money and ships. To keep Athens out of such combinations, he had to rely upon the personal influence and party of Phokion, whom he knew to have always dissuaded her from resistance to the ever-growing aggrandisement of his father Philip. In his conversation with Phokion on the intended Asiatic expedition, Alexander took some pains to flatter the pride of Athens by describing her as second only to himself, and as entitled to the headship of Greece, in case anything should happen to him.<sup>1</sup> Such compliments were suitable to be repeated in the Athenian assembly: indeed the Macedonian prince might naturally prefer the idea of Athenian headship to that of Spartan, seeing that Sparta stood aloof from him, an open recusant.

The animosity of Alexander being appeased, Athens resumed her position as a member of the confederacy under his imperial authority. Without visiting Attica, he now marched to the Isthmus of Corinth, where he probably received from various Grecian cities deputations deprecating his displeasure, and proclaiming their submission to his imperial authority. He also prob-

Influence  
of Phokion  
in obtain-  
ing these  
milder  
terms—his  
increased  
ascendency  
at Athens.

B.C. 335  
(Autumn).

Alexander  
at Corinth  
—obedience  
of the  
Grecian  
synod—  
interview

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Phokion, 17; Plutarch, Alexand. 13.

ably presided at a meeting of the Grecian synod, where he would dictate the contingents required for his intended Asiatic expedition in the ensuing spring. To the universal deference and submission which greeted him, one exception was found—the Cynic philosopher Diogenês, who resided at Corinth, satisfied with a tub for shelter, and with the coarsest and most self-denying existence. Alexander approached him with a numerous suite, and asked him if he wished for anything; upon which Diogenes is said to have replied,—“Nothing, except that you would stand a little out of my sunshine.” Both the philosopher and his reply provoked laughter from the bystanders, but Alexander himself was so impressed with the independent and self-sufficing character manifested, that he exclaimed,—“If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenês.”<sup>1</sup>

Having visited the oracle of Delphi, and received or extorted from the priestess<sup>2</sup> an answer bearing favourable promise for his Asiatic schemes, he returned to Macedonia before the winter. The most important permanent effect of his stay in Greece was the reconstitution of Bœotia; that is, the destruction of Thebes, and the reconstitution of Orchomenus, Thespiæ, and Plataea, dividing between them the Theban territory; all guarded and controlled by a Macedonian garrison in the Kadmeia. It would have been interesting to learn some details about this process of destruction and restitution of the Bœotian towns; a process not only calling forth strong manifestations of sentiment, but also involving important and difficult questions to settle. But unfortunately we are not permitted to know anything beyond the general fact.

Alexander left Greece for Pella in the autumn of 335 B.C., and never saw it again.

It appears, that during this summer, while he was occupied in his Illyrian and Theban operations, the Macedonian force under Parmenio in Asia had had to contend against a Persian army, of Greek mercenaries, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian. Parmenio, marching into Æolis, besieged and took Gryniûm; after which he attacked Pitanê, but was compelled by Memnon

B.C. 335.  
Military operations of Parmenio in Asia Minor against Memnon.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alex. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alex. 14.

to raise the siege. Memnon even gained a victory over the Macedonian force under Kallas in the Troad, compelling them to retire to Rhoeteum. But he failed in an attempt to surprise Kyzikus, and was obliged to content himself with plundering the adjoining territory.<sup>1</sup> It is affirmed that Darius was engaged this summer in making large preparations, naval as well as military, to resist the intended expedition of Alexander. Yet all that we hear of what was actually done implies nothing beyond a moderate force.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 7.

## CHAPTER XCII.

## ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER.

A YEAR and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north, of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B.C., his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life—from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April 334 B.C. to his death at Babylon in June 323 B.C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for farther aggrandisement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly-grown Oriental empire. During all these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers, and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all

To what extent the Asiatic projects of Alexander belonged to Grecian history.

the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief-secretary, Euménês of Kardia, was a Greek, and probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still more, by its connexion with previous projects, dreams, and legends long antecedent to the aggrandisement of Macedon—as well as by the character which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxês, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus, and of the Phœæan Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isokratês, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta—next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandisement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Pan-hellenic pretence of retaliation for the long-past insults of Xerxês. I call it a *pretence*, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served now two different purposes; first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalised as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult—

Pan-hellenic pretences set up by Alexander. The real feeling of the Greeks was adverse to his success.

next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favourable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the Emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared general and the Persian king a public enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 10; i. 29, 9, about the Grecian prisoners taken at the victory of the Granikus—ἔσους δὲ αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους ἔλαβε, τούτους δὲ δῆσας ἐν πέδαις, εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπέπεμψεν ἐργάζεσθαι, ὅτι παρὰ τὰ κοινῇ δοξάντα τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, Ἕλληνας ὄντες, ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὲρ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐμάχοντο. Also iii. 23, 15, about the Grecian soldiers serving with the Persians, and made prisoners in Hyrkania—'Αδίκειν γὰρ μέγала (said Alexander) τοὺς στρατευομένους ἐναντία τῇ Ἑλλάδι παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις παρὰ τὰ δόγματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

Toward the end of October 1812, near Moscow, General Winzin-

gerode, a German officer in the Russian service,—with his aide-de-camp a native Russian, Narishkin—became prisoner of the French. He was brought to Napoleon—"At the sight of that German general, all the secret resentments of Napoleon took fire. 'Who are you (he exclaimed)? a man without country! When I was at war with the Austrians, I found you in their ranks. Austria has become my ally, and you have entered into the Russian service. You have been one of the warmest instigators of the present war. Nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the Rhine: you

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexander's accession, Demosthenês, while instigating the Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them<sup>1</sup>—"The Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value; but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments." Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander's accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable prudence and vigour, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself, and withhold it from his enemy.

Greece an appendage, but a valuable appendage, to Macedonia.

Alexander's memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but of the general and the soldier. In this character his appearance forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldierlike qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery—in indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship and fatigue,—that he stands preeminent; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His

Extraordinary military endowments and capacity of Alexander.

are my subject. You are not an ordinary enemy: you are a rebel: I have a right to bring you to trial. *Sans d'armes*, seize this man! Then addressing the aide-de-camp of Winzingerode, Napoleon said, As for you, Count Narishkin, I have nothing to reproach you with: you are a Russian, you are doing your duty." (*Ségur's Account of the Campaign in Russia*, book ix. ch. vi. p. 132.)

These threats against Winzingerode were not realised, because

he was liberated by the Cossacks during his passage into France: but the language of Napoleon expresses just the same sentiment as that of Alexander towards the captive Greeks.

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Olynth. ii. p. 14. "Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν μὲν προσθήκης μέρει ἐστὶ τις οὐ σμικρά, οἷον ὑπῆρξε ποθ' ὁμῖν ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς Ὀλυνθίους . . . αὐτὴ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀσθενὴς καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἐστὶ μεσότης."

strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific warfare to a degree of efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep unimpaired.

We must recollect however that Alexander found the Macedonian military system built up by Philip and had only to apply and enlarge it. As transmitted to him, it embodied the accumulated result and matured fruit of a series of successive improvements, applied by Grecian tacticians to the primitive Hellenic arrangements. During the sixty years before the accession of Alexander, the art of war had been conspicuously progressive—to the sad detriment of Grecian political freedom. “Everything around us (says Demosthenês addressing the people of Athens in 342 B.C.) has been in advance for some years past—nothing is like what it was formerly—but nowhere is the alteration and enlargement more conspicuous than in the affairs of war. Formerly, the Lacedæmonians as well as other Greeks did nothing more than invade each other’s territory, during the four or five summer months with their native force of citizen hoplites: in winter they stayed at home. But now we see Philip in constant action winter as well as summer, attacking all around him, not merely with Macedonian hoplites, but with cavalry, light infantry, bowmen, foreigners of all descriptions, and siege batteries.”<sup>1</sup>

I have in several preceding chapters dwelt upon this progressive change in the character of Grecian soldiery. At Athens, and in most other parts of Greece, the burghers had become averse to hard and active military service. The use of arms had passed mainly to professional soldiers, who, without any feeling of citizenship, served wherever good pay was offered, and became immensely

<sup>1</sup> Demosth. Philipp. iii. p. 123, said by the orator, not strictly; compare Olynth. ii. p. 22. I adhere to his words. I give here the substance of what is

multiplied, to the detriment and danger of Grecian society.<sup>1</sup> Many of these mercenaries were lightly armed—peltasts served in combination with the hoplites.<sup>2</sup> Iphikratês greatly improved and partly re-armed the peltasts; whom he employed conjointly with hoplites so effectively as to astonish his contemporaries.<sup>3</sup> His innovation was farther developed by the great military genius of Epaminondas; who not only made infantry and cavalry, light-armed and heavy-armed, conspire to one scheme of operations, but also completely altered the received principles of battle-manceuvring, by concentrating an irresistible force of attack on one point of the enemy's line, and keeping the rest of his own line more on the defensive. Besides these important improvements, realised by generals in actual practice, intelligent officers like Xenophon embodied the results of their military experience in valuable published criticisms.<sup>4</sup> Such were the lessons which the Macedonian Philip learnt and applied to the enslavement of those Greeks, especially

<sup>1</sup> Isokratês, in several of his discourses, notes the gradual increase of these mercenaries—men without regular means of subsistence, or fixed residence, or civic obligations. Or. iv. (Panegyri.), s. 195; v. (Philippus), s. 112-142; Or. li. (De Pace), s. 31-56.

<sup>2</sup> Xenoph. Magist. Equit. ix. 4. ὅσα δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ πικρὸν ἀρξάμενον εὐδοχιμεῖν, ἐπεὶ τοὺς ἱππέας προσέλαβον· καὶ ἐν ταῖς λαῖς πόλεσι πανταχοῦ τὰ ξενικά μ' εὐδοχιμοῦντα.

Compare Demosth. Philippic. i. p. li. Xenoph. Hellenic. iv. 4, 14; Isokratês, Orat. vii. (Areopagit.), 33.

For an explanation of the improved arming of peltasts introduced by Iphikratês, see Chap. XV. of this History. Respect to these improvements, the statements both of Diodorus (xv. 44) and of Nepos are obscure. MM. Rüstow and Köchly (in their valuable work, Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens, Aarau, 1852, ii. p. 164) have interpreted the

statements in a sense to which I cannot subscribe. They think that Iphikratês altered not only the arming of peltasts, but also that of hoplites; a supposition, which I see nothing to justify.

<sup>4</sup> Besides the many scattered remarks in the Anabasis, the Cyropædia is full of discussion and criticism on military phenomena. It is remarkable to what an extent Xenophon had present to his mind all the exigences of war, and the different ways of meeting them. See as an example, Cyropæd. vi. 2; ii. 1.

The work on sieges, by Æneas (Poliorketika), is certainly anterior to the military improvements of Philip of Macedon; probably about the beginning of his reign. See the preface to it by Rüstow and Köchly, p. 8, in their edition of Die Griechischen Kriegsschriftsteller, Leipz. 1853. In this work, allusion is made to several others, now lost, by the same author—Παρασκευαστική βιβλος, Ποριστική βιβλος, Στρατοπεδευτική, &c.

of the Thebans, from whom they were derived. In his youth, as a hostage at Thebes, he had probably conversed with Epaminondas, and must certainly have become familiar with the Theban military arrangements. He had every motive, not merely from ambition of conquest, but even from the necessities of defence, to turn them to account and he brought to the task military genius and aptitude of the highest order. In arms, in evolutions, in engines, in regimenting, in war-office arrangements, he introduced important novelties; bequeathing to his successors the Macedonian military system, which, with improvements by his son, lasted until the conquest of the country by Rome near two centuries afterwards.

The military force of Macedonia, in the times anterior to Philip, appears to have consisted, like that of Thessaly, in a well-armed and well-mounted cavalry, formed from the substantial proprietors of the country—and in a numerous assemblage of peltasts or light infantry (somewhat analogous to the Thessalian Penestæ): these latter were the rural population, shepherds or cultivators, who tended sheep and cattle, or tilled the earth among the spacious mountains and valleys of Upper Macedonia. The Grecian towns near the coast, and the few Macedonian towns in the interior, had citizen-hoplites better armed; but foot service was not in honour among the natives, and the Macedonian infantry in their general character were hardly more than a rabble. At the period of Philip's accession, they were armed with nothing better than rusty swords and wicker shields, noway sufficient to make head against the inroads of their Thracian and Illyrian neighbours; before whom they were constantly compelled to flee for refuge up to the mountains.<sup>1</sup> Their condition was that of poor herdsmen, half-naked or covered

<sup>1</sup> See the striking speech addressed by Alexander to the discontented Macedonian soldiers, a few months before his death, at Opis or Susa (Arrian, vii. 9).

. . . . Φίλιππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὑμᾶς πλανήτας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διφθέραις τοὺς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνὰ τὰ ὄρη πρόβατα σατὰ ὀλίγα, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων κακῶς μαχομένους Ἴλλυριοῖς

τε καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροι Θραξί, χλαμύδας μὲν ὅμιν ἀντὶ τῷ διφθερῶν φορεῖν ἔδωκε, κατήγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὁρῶν ἐς τὰ πεδία, ἀξιομάχου καταστήσας τοῖς προσχώροις τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥς μὴ χωρίων ἔτι ὀχυρότητι πιστευόντας μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῇ σώζεσθαι . . . .

In the version of the same speech given by Curtius (x. 10, 23), w

only with hides, and eating from wooden platters; not much different from that of the population of Upper Macedonia three centuries before, when first visited by Perdikkas the ancestor of the Macedonian kings, and when the wife of the native prince baked bread with her own hands.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, though the Macedonian infantry was thus indifferent, the cavalry of the country was excellent, both in the Peloponnesian war, and in the war carried on by Sparta against Olynthus more than twenty years afterwards.<sup>2</sup> These horsemen, like the Thessalians, charged in compact order, carrying as their principal weapon of offence, not javelins to be hurled, but the short thrusting-pike for close combat.

Thus defective was the military organization which Philip found. Under his auspices it was cast altogether anew. The poor and hardy Landwehr of Macedonia, constantly on the defensive against predatory neighbours, formed an excellent material for soldiers, and proved not intractable to the innovations of a warlike prince. They were placed under constant training in the regular rank and file of heavy infantry: they were moreover brought to adopt a new description of arm, not only in itself very difficult to manage, but also comparatively useless to the soldier when fighting singlehanded, and only available by a body of men in close order, trained to move or stand together. The new weapon, of which we first hear the name in the army of Philip, was the sarissa—the Macedonian pike or lance. The sarissa was used both by the infantry of his phalanx, and by particular regiments of his cavalry; in both cases it was long, though that of the phalanx was much the longer of the two. The regiments of cavalry called Sarissophori or Lancers were a sort of light-horse, carrying a long lance, and distinguished from the heavier cavalry intended for the shock of hand combat, who carried the xyston or short pike. The sarissa of this

Philip re-arms and re-organises the infantry. Long Macedonian pike or sarissa.

find, "Modo sub Philippo seminu-dis, amicula ex purpurâ sordent, aurum et argentum oculi ferre non possunt: lignea enim vasa desiderant, et ex cratibus scuta rubiginemque gladiatorum," &c.

Compare the description given by Thucydides, iv. 124, of the

army of Brasidas and Perdikkas, where the Macedonian foot are described as ἄλλος ὁμιλος τῶν βαρβάρων πολὺς.

<sup>1</sup> Herodot. viii. 137.

<sup>2</sup> Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenoph. Helen. v. 2, 40-42.

cavalry may have been fourteen feet in length, as long as the Cossack pike now is; that of the infantry in phalanx was not less than twenty-one feet long. This dimension is so prodigious and so unwieldy, that we should hardly believe it, if it did not come attested by the distinct assertion of an historian like Polybius.

The extraordinary reach of the sarissa or pike constituted the prominent attribute and force of the Macedonian phalanx. The phalangites were drawn up in files generally of sixteen deep, each called a *Lochus*; with an interval of three feet between each two soldiers from front to rear. In front stood the *lochage*, a man of superior strength, and of tried military experience. The second and third men in the file, as well as the rearmost man who brought up the whole, were also picked soldiers, receiving larger pay than the rest. Now the sarissa, when in horizontal position, was held with both hands (distinguished in this respect from the pike of the Grecian hoplite, which occupied only one hand, the other being required for the shield), and so held that it projected fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman; while the hinder portion of six feet was so weighted as to make the pressure convenient in such division. Hence, the sarissa of the man standing second in the file, projected twelve feet beyond the front rank; that of the third man, nine feet; those of the fourth and fifth ranks respectively six feet and three feet. There was thus presented a quintuple series of pikes by each file to meet an advancing enemy. Of these five, the three first would be decidedly of greater projection, and even the fourth of not less projection, than the pikes of Grecian hoplites coming up as enemies to the charge. The ranks behind the fifth, while serving to sustain and press onward the front, did not carry the sarissa in a horizontal position, but slanted it over the shoulders of those before them, so as to break the force of any darts or arrows which might be shot over head from the rear ranks of the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

The phalangite (soldier of the phalanx) was farther provided with a short sword, a circular shield of rather more than two feet in diameter, a breast-piece, leggings, and a *kausia* or broad-

<sup>1</sup> Respecting the length of the pike of the Macedonian phalanx, see Appendix to this Chapter.

brimmed hat — the head-covering common in the Macedonian army. But the long pikes were in truth the main weapons of defence as well as of offence. They were destined to contend against the charge of Grecian hoplites with the one-handed pike and heavy shield; especially against the most formidable manifestation of that force, the deep Theban column organised by Epaminondas. This was what Philip had to deal with, at his accession, as the irresistible infantry of Greece, bearing down every thing before it by thrust of pike and propulsion of shield. He provided the means of vanquishing it, by training his poor Macedonian infantry to the systematic use of the long two-handed pike. The Theban column, charging a phalanx so armed, found themselves unable to break into the array of protended pikes, or to come to push of shield. We are told that at the battle of Chæroneia, the front rank Theban soldiers, the chosen men of the city, all perished on the ground; and this is not wonderful, when we conceive them as rushing, by their own courage as well as by the pressure upon them from behind, upon a wall of pikes double the length of their own. We must look at Philip's phalanx with reference to the enemies before him, not with reference to the later Roman organization, which Polybius brings into comparison. It answered perfectly the purposes of Philip, who wanted it mainly to stand the shock in front, thus overpowering Grecian hoplites in their own mode of attack. Now Polybius informs us, that the phalanx was never once beaten, in front and on ground suitable for it; and wherever the ground was fit for hoplites, it was also fit for the phalanx. The inconveniences of Philip's array, and of the long pikes, arose from the incapacity of the phalanx to change its front or keep its order on unequal ground; but such inconveniences were hardly less felt by Grecian hoplites.<sup>1</sup>

against the Grecian hoplites as organised by Epaminondas.

The Macedonian phalanx, denominated the *Pezetæri*<sup>2</sup> or Foot Companions of the King, comprised the general body of native infantry, as distinguished from special *corps d'armée*. The largest division

Regiments and divisions of

<sup>1</sup> The impression of admiration, and even terror, with which the Roman general Paulus Emilius was seized, on first seeing the Macedonian phalanx in battle array at Cynoskotta — has been recorded by Poly-

bios (Polybius, *Fragm.* xxix. 6, 11; Livy, xlv. 49).

<sup>2</sup> Harpokration and Photius, v. Πεζεταῖροι, Demost. Olynth. ii. p. 23; Arrian, iv. 23, 1. τῶν πεζεταίρων καλουμένων τὰς Τάξεις, and ii. 23, 2, &c.

the phalanx of it which we find mentioned under Alexander, —heavy- and which appears under the command of a armed general of division, is called a Taxis. How infantry. many of these Taxeis there were in all, we do not know; the original Asiatic army of Alexander (apart from what he left at home) included six of them, coinciding apparently with the provincial allotments of the country: Orestæ, Lynkestæ, Elimiotæ, Tymphæi, &c.<sup>1</sup> The writers on tactics give us a systematic scale of distribution (ascending from the lowest unit, the Lochus of sixteen men, by successive multiples of two, up to the quadruple phalanx of 16,384 men) as pervading the Macedonian army. Among these divisions, that which stands out as most fundamental and constant, is the Syntagma, which contained sixteen Lochi. Forming thus a square of sixteen men in front and depth, or 256 men, it was at the same time a distinct aggregate or permanent battalion, having attached to it four supernumeraries, an ensign, a rear-man, a herald, and an attendant or orderly.<sup>2</sup> Two of these Syntagmas composed a body of 512 men, called a Pentakosiarchy, which in Philip's time is said to have been the ordinary regiment, acting together under a separate command; but several of these were doubled by Alexander when he reorganized his army at Susa,<sup>3</sup> so as to form regiments of 1024 men, each under his Chiliarch, and each comprising four Syntagmas

Since we know from Demosthenês that the *pezetæri* date from the time of Philip, it is probable that the passage of Anaximenês (as cited by Harpokration and Photius) which refers them to Alexander, has ascribed to the son what really belongs to the father. The term *ἐταῖροι*, in reference to the kings of Macedonia, first appears in Plutarch, Pelopidas, 27, in reference to Ptolemy, before the time of Philip: see Otto Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philip*, p. 129 (the passage of Ælian referred to by him seems of little moment). The term *Companions* or *Comrades* had under Philip a meaning purely military, designating foreigners as well as Macedonians serving in his army: see Theopompus, Frag. 249. The term, originally applied only

to a select few, was by degree extended to the corps generally.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 14, 3; iii. 16, 19; Diodor. xvii. 67. Compare the note of Schmieder on the above passage of Arrian; also Droysen, *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*, p. 95, 96, and the elaborate note of Mützel on Curtius, v. 2, 3, p. 400.

The passage of Arrian (his description of Alexander's army arrayed at the Granikus) is confused and seems erroneous in some words of the text; yet it may be held to justify the supposition of six *taxeis* of *pezetæri* in Alexander's phalanx on that day. There seem also to be six *taxeis* at Arbêla (iii. 11, 16).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, *Tactic.* c. 10; Ælian *Tactic.* c. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, v. 2, 3.

All this systematic distribution of the Macedonian military force when at home, appears to have been arranged by the genius of Philip. On actual foreign service, no numerical precision could be observed; a regiment or a division could not always contain the same fixed number of men. But as to the array, a depth of sixteen, for the files of the phalangites, appears to have been regarded as important and characteristic,<sup>1</sup> perhaps essential to impart a feeling of confidence to the troops. It was a depth much greater than was common with Grecian hoplites, and never surpassed by any Greeks except the Thebans.

But the phalanx, though an essential item, was yet only one among many, in the varied military organization introduced by Philip. It was neither intended, nor fit, to act alone; being clumsy in changing front to protect itself either in flank or rear, and unable to adapt itself to uneven ground. There was another description of infantry organized by Philip called the Hypaspists—shield-bearers or Guards;<sup>2</sup> originally few in number, and employed for personal defence of the prince—but afterwards enlarged into several distinct *corps d'armée*. These Hypaspists or Guards were light infantry of the line;<sup>3</sup> they were hoplites, keeping regular array and intended for close combat, but more lightly armed, and more fit for diversities of circumstance and position than the phalanx. They seem to have fought with the one-handed pike and shield, like the Greeks; and not to have carried the two-handed phalangite pike or sarissa. They occupied a sort of intermediate place between the heavy infantry of the phalanx properly so called—and the peltasts and light troops generally. Alexander in his later campaigns had them distributed into Chiliarchies (how the distribution stood earlier, we have

Light infantry of the line—Hypaspistæ, or Guards.

<sup>1</sup> This is to be seen in the arrangements made by Alexander a short time before his death, when he incorporated Macedonian and Persian soldiers in the same lochus; the normal depth of sixteen was retained; all the front ranks or privileged men being Macedonians. The Macedonians were much hurt at seeing their native regimental array shared with Asiatics (Arrian,

vii. 11, 5. vii. 23, 4—8).

<sup>2</sup> The proper meaning of ὑπασπισταί, as guards or personal attendants on the prince, appears in Arrian, i. 5, 3; vii. 8, 6.

Neoptolemus, as ἀρχιυπασπιστής to Alexander, carried the shield and lance of the latter on formal occasions (Plutarch, Euménès, 1).

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 4, 3, 4; ii. 20, 5.

no distinct information), at least three in number, and probably more.<sup>1</sup> We find them employed by him in forward and aggressive movements; first his light troops and cavalry begin the attack; next the hypaspists come to follow it up; lastly, the phalanx is brought up to support them. The hypaspists are used also for assault of walled places, and for rapid night marches.<sup>2</sup> What was the total number of them we do not know.<sup>3</sup>

Besides the phalanx, and the hypaspists or Guards, the Macedonian army, as employed by Philip and Alexander, included a numerous assemblage of desultory or irregular troops, partly native Macedonians, partly foreigners, Thracians, Pæonians, &c. They were of different descriptions; peltasts, darters, and bowmen. The best of them appear to have been the Agriânes, a Pæonian tribe expert in the use of the javelin. All of them were kept in vigorous movement by Alexander, on the flanks and in front of his heavy infantry, or intermingled with his cavalry,—as well as for pursuit after the enemy was defeated.

Lastly, the cavalry in Alexander's army was also admirable—at least equal, and seemingly even superior in efficiency, to his best infantry.<sup>4</sup> I have already mentioned that cavalry was the choice native force of Macedonia, long before the reign of Philip; by whom it had been extended and improved.<sup>5</sup> The heavy cavalry, wholly or chiefly composed of native Macedonians, was known by the denomination of the Companions. There was besides a new and lighter variety of cavalry, apparently introduced

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iv. 30, 11; v. 23, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 20, 5; ii. 23, 6; iii. 18, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Droysen and Schmieder give the number of hypaspists in Alexander's army at Issus, as 6000. That this opinion rests on no sufficient evidence, has been shown by Mützell (ad Curtium, v. 2, 3. p. 399). But that the number of hypaspists left by Philip at his death was 6000 seems not improbable.

<sup>4</sup> See Arrian, v. 14, 1; v. 16, 4; Curtius, vi. 9, 22. "Equitatui, op-

timæ exercitûs parti," &c.

<sup>5</sup> We are told that Philip, after his expedition against the Scythians about three years before his death, exacted and sent into Macedonia 20,000 chosen mares, in order to improve the breed of Macedonian horses. The regal haras were in the neighbourhood of Pella (Justin, ix. 2; Strabo, xvi. p. 752, in which passage of Strabo, the details apply to the haras of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia, not to that of Philip at Pella).

by Philip, and called the Sarissophori, or Lancers, used like Cossacks for advanced posts or scouring the country. The sarissa which they carried was probably much shorter than that of the phalanx; but it was long, if compared with the xyston or thrusting-pike used by the heavy cavalry for the shock of close combat. Arrian, in describing the army of Alexander at Arbêla, enumerates eight distinct squadrons of this heavy cavalry—or cavalry of the Companions; but the total number included in the Macedonian army at Alexander's accession, is not known. Among the squadrons, several at least (if not all) were named after particular towns or districts of the country—Bottiaæ, Amphipolis, Apollonia, Anthemus, &c.;<sup>1</sup> there was one or more, distinguished as the Royal Squadron—the Agêma or leading body of cavalry—at the head of which Alexander generally charged, himself among the foremost of the actual combatants.<sup>2</sup>

The distribution of the cavalry into squadrons was that which Alexander found at his accession; but he altered it, when he remodelled the arrangements of his army (in 330 B.C.) at Susa, so as to subdivide the squadron into two Lochi, and to establish the Lochus for the elementary division of cavalry, as it had always been of infantry.<sup>3</sup> His reforms went thus to cut down the primary body of cavalry from the squadron to the half-squadron or Lochus, while they tended to bring the infantry together into larger bodies—from cohorts of 500 each to cohorts of 1000 men each.

Among the Hypaspists or Guards, also, we find an Agêma or chosen cohort which was called upon oftener than the rest to begin the fight. A still more select corps

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 2, 8, 9 (where we also find mentioned τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἁνωθεν Μακεδονίας ἰππέας); i. 12, 12; ii. 9, 6; iii. 11, 12.

About the ἱππεῖς σαρισσοφόροι, see i. 13, 1.

It is possible that there may have been sixteen squadrons of heavy cavalry, and eight squadrons of the Sarissophori,—each squadron from 180 to 250 men—as Rüstow and Köchly conceive (p. 243). But there is no sufficient evidence to prove

it; nor can I think it safe to assume, as they do, that Alexander carried over with him to Asia *just half* of the Macedonian entire force.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 11, 11; iii. 13, 1; iii. 18, 8. In the first of these passages, we have ἑλαί βασιλικαὶ in the plural (iii. 11, 12). It seems too that the different ἑλαὶ alternated with each other in the foremost position, or ἡγεμονία, for particular days (Arrian, i. 14, 9).

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 19.

were, the Body-Guards; a small company of tried and confidential men, individually known to Alexander, always attached to his person, and acting as adjutants or as commanders for special service. These Body-Guards appear to have been chosen from persons promoted out of the Royal Youths or Pages; an institution first established by Philip, and evincing the pains taken by him to bring the leading Macedonians into military organization as well as into dependence on his own person. The Royal Youths, sons of the chief persons throughout Macedonia, were taken by Philip into service, and kept in permanent residence around him for purposes of domestic attendance and companionship. They maintained perpetual guard of his palace, alternating among themselves the hours of daily and nightly watch: they received his horse from the grooms, assisted him to mount, and accompanied him if he went to the chase: they introduced persons who came to solicit interviews, and admitted his mistresses by night through a special door. They enjoyed the privilege of sitting down to dinner with him, as well as that of never being flogged except by his special order.<sup>1</sup> The precise number of the

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iv. 13, 1. Ἐκ Φιλίππου ἦν ἡδὴ καθεστῆχος, τῶν ἐν τέλει Μακεδόνων τοὺς παῖδας, ὅσοι ἐς ἡλικίαν ἐμειραχίσαντο, καταλέγεσθαι ἐς θεραπείαν τοῦ βασιλέως. Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν ἄλλην διαίταν τοῦ σώματος διακονεῖσθαι βασιλεῖ, καὶ κοιμώμενον φυλάσσειν, τοῦτοις ἐπετέτραπτο· καὶ ὁπότε ἐξελαύνοι βασιλεὺς, τοὺς ἵππους παρὰ τῶν ἱπποκόμων δεχόμενοι ἐκείνοι προσῆγον, καὶ ἀνέβαλον οὗτοι βασιλέα τὸν Περσικὸν τρόπον, καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ θήρᾳ φιλοτιμίας βασιλεῖ κοινωνοὶ ᾗσαν, &c.

Curtius, viii. 6, 1. "Mos erat principibus Macedonum adultos liberos regibus tradere, ad munia haud multum servilibus ministeriis abhorrentia. Excubabant servatis noctium vicibus proximi foribus ejus ædis, in quâ rex acquiescebat. Per hos pellices introducebantur, alio aditu quam quem armati obsidebant. Idem acceptos ab aga-

sonibus equos, quum rex ascensurus esset, admovebant; comitabanturque et venantem, et in præliis omnibus artibus studiorum liberalium exculiti. Præcipuus honor habebatur, quod licebat sedentibus vesci cum rege. Castigandi eo verberibus nullius potestas præter ipsum erat. Hæc cohors velut seminarium ducum præfectorumque apud Macedonas fuit: hinc habuerunt posteri reges, quorum stirpibus post multas ætates Romani opes ademerunt." Compare Curtius v. 6, 42 and Ælian, V. H. xiv. 49.

This information is interesting as an illustration of Macedonian manners and customs, which are very little known to us. In the last hours of the Macedonian monarchy, after the defeat at Pydna (168 B.C.), the *pueri regii* followed the defeated king Perseus to the sanctuary at Samothrace, and neve

company we do not know; but it must have been not small, since fifty of these youths were brought out from Macedonia at once by Amyntas to join Alexander, and to be added to the company at Babylon.<sup>1</sup> At the same time the mortality among them was probably considerable; since, in accompanying Alexander, they endured even more than the prodigious fatigues which he imposed upon himself.<sup>2</sup> The training in this corps was a preparation first for becoming Body-Guards of Alexander,—next, for appointment to the great and important military commands. Accordingly, it had been the first stage of advancement to most of the Diadochi, or great officers of Alexander, who after his death carved kingdoms for themselves out of his conquests.

It was thus that the native Macedonian force was enlarged and diversified by Philip, including at his death:—1. The phalanx, Foot-companions, or general mass of heavy infantry, drilled to the use of the long two-handed pike or sarissa—2. The Hypaspists, or lighter-armed corps of foot-guards—3. The companions, or heavy cavalry, the ancient indigenous force consisting of the more opulent or substantial Macedonians—4. The lighter cavalry, lancers, or Sarissophori. With these were joined foreign auxiliaries of great value. The Thessalians, whom Philip had partly subjugated and partly gained over, furnished him with a body of heavy cavalry not inferior to the native Macedonian. From various parts of Greece he derived hoplites, volunteers taken into his pay, armed with the full-sized shield and one-handed pike. From the warlike tribes of Thracians, Pæonians, Illyrians, &c., whom he had subdued around him, he levied contingents of light troops of various descriptions, peltasts, bowmen, darters, &c., all excellent in their way, and eminently serviceable to his combinations, in conjunction with the heavier masses. Lastly, Philip had completed his military arrangements by

Foreign  
auxiliaries  
—Grecian  
hoplites—  
Thessalian  
cavalry—  
Pæonians—  
Illyrians—  
Thracians,  
&c.

quitted him until the moment when he surrendered himself to the Romans (Livy, xlv. 5).

An illustration of the scourging, applied as a punishment to these young Macedonians of rank, see the case of Dekamnichus, handed over by king Archelaus to

Euripidès, to be flogged (Aristotle, Polit. v. 8, 13).

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, v. 6, 42; Diodor. xvii. 65.

<sup>2</sup> We read this about the youthful Philippos, brother of Lysimachus (Curtius, viii. 2, 36).

organising what may be called an effective siege-train for sieges as well as for battles; a stock of projectile and battering machines, superior to anything at that time extant. We find this artillery used by Alexander in the very first year of his reign, in his campaign against the Illyrians.<sup>1</sup> Even in his most distant Indian marches, he either carried it with him, or had the means of constructing new engines for the occasion. There was no part of his military equipment more essential to his conquests. The victorious sieges of Alexander are among his most memorable exploits.

To all this large, multifarious and systematised array of actual force, are to be added the civil establishments, the dépôts, magazines of arms, provision for remounts, drill officers and adjutants, &c., indispensable for maintaining it in constant training and efficiency. At the time of Philip's accession, Pella was an unimportant place;<sup>2</sup> at his death, it was not only strong as a fortification and place of deposit for regal treasure, but also the permanent centre, war-office, and training quarters, of the greatest military force then known. The military registers as well as the traditions of Macedonian discipline were preserved there until the fall of the monarchy.<sup>3</sup> Philip had employed his life in organising this powerful instrument of dominion. His revenues, large as they were, both from mines and from tributary conquests, had been exhausted in the work, so that he had left at his decease a debt of 500 talents. But his son Alexander found the instrument ready-made, with excellent officers, and trained veterans for the front ranks of his phalanx.<sup>4</sup>

This scientific organisation of military force, on a large scale and with all the varieties of arming and equipment made to cooperate for one end, is the great fact of Macedonian history. Nothing of the same kind and magnitude had ever before been seen. The Macedonians, like Epirots and Ætolians, had no other aptitude or marking quality except those of soldiership. Their rude and scattered tribes manifest no definite political

Magazines,  
war-office,  
and dépôt,  
at Pella.

Macedon-  
ian apti-  
tudes—  
purely  
military—  
military  
pride stood  
to them in  
lieu of  
national  
sentiment.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 6, 17.

<sup>2</sup> Demosthenès, *De Corona*, p. 247.

<sup>3</sup> Livy, xlii. 51; xliv. 46, also the comparison in Strabo, xvi. p. 752,

ments of Seleukus Nikator at Apameia in Syria, and those of Philip at Pella in Macedonia.

<sup>4</sup> Justin, xi. 6. About the debt of 500 talents left by Philip, see

institutions and little sentiment of national brotherhood; their union was mainly that of occasional fellowship in arms under the king as chief. Philip the son of Amyntas was the first to organise this military union into a system permanently and efficaciously operative, achieving by means of it conquests such as to create in the Macedonians a common pride of superiority in arms, which served as substitute for political institutions or nationality. Such pride was still farther exalted by the really superhuman career of Alexander. The Macedonian kingdom was nothing but a well-combined military machine, illustrating the irresistible superiority of the rudest men, trained in arms and conducted by an able general, not merely over undisciplined multitudes, but also over free, courageous, and disciplined citizenship, with highly gifted intelligence.

During the winter of 335-334 B.C., after the destruction of Thebes and the return of Alexander from Greece to Pella, his final preparations were made for the Asiatic expedition. The Macedonian army, with the auxiliary contingents destined for this enterprise, were brought together early in the spring. Antipater, one of the oldest and ablest officers of Philip, was appointed to act as viceroy of Macedonia during the king's absence. A military force, stated at 12,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry,<sup>1</sup> was left with him to keep down the cities of Greece, to resist aggressions from the Persian fleet, and to repress discontents at home. Such discontents were likely to be instigated by leading Macedonians or pretenders to the throne, especially as Alexander had no direct heir: and we are told that Antipater and Parmenio advised postponement of the expedition until the young king could leave behind him an heir of his own lineage.<sup>2</sup> Alexander overruled these representations, yet he did not disdain to lessen the perils at home by putting to death such men as he principally feared or mistrusted, especially the kinsmen of Philip's last wife Kleopatra.<sup>3</sup> Of the dependent tribes around, the most

B.C. 334.

Measures of Alexander previous to his departure for Asia. Antipater left as vice-roy at Pella.

the words of Alexander, Arrian, vii. 9, 10. Diodorus affirms (xvi. 8) that Philip's annual return from the gold mines was 1000 talents; a total not much to be trusted.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, xi. 5. "Proficiscens ad Persicum bellum omnes novercæ suæ cognatos, quos Philippus in

energetic chiefs accompanied his army into Asia, either by their own preference or at his requisition. After these precautions, the tranquillity of Macedonia was entrusted to the prudence and fidelity of Antipater, which were still farther ensured by the fact that three of his sons accompanied the king's army and person.<sup>1</sup> Though unpopular in his deportment,<sup>2</sup> Antipater discharged the duties of his very responsible position with zeal and ability; notwithstanding the dangerous enmity of Olympias, against whom he sent many complaints to Alexander when in Asia, while she on her side wrote frequent but unavailing letters with a view to ruin him in the esteem of her son. After a long period of unabated confidence, Alexander began during the last years of his life to dislike and mistrust Antipater. He always treated Olympias with the greatest respect; trying however to restrain her from meddling with political affairs, and complaining sometimes of her imperious exigences and violence.<sup>3</sup>

excelsiorem dignitatis locum provehens imperiis præfecerat, interfecit. Sed nec suis, qui apti regno videbantur, pepercit; ne qua materia seditionis procul se agente in Macedonia remaneret." Compare also xii. 6, where the Pausanias mentioned as having been put to death by Alexander is *not* the assassin of Philip. Pausanias was a common Macedonian name (see Diodor. xvi. 93).

I see no reason for distrusting the general fact here asserted by Justin. We know from Arrian (who mentioned the fact incidentally in his work τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον, though he says nothing about it in his account of the expedition of Alexander—see Photius, Cod. 92. p. 220) that Alexander put to death, in the early period of his reign, his first cousin and brother-in-law Amyntas. Much less would he scruple to kill the friends or relatives of Kleopatra. Neither Alexander nor Antipater would account such proceeding anything else than a reasonable measure of prudential

policy. By the Macedonian common law, when a man was found guilty of treason, all his relatives were condemned to die along with him (Curtius, vi. 11, 20).

Plutarch (De Fortuna Alex. Magn. p. 342) has a general allusion to these precautionary executions ordered by Alexander. Fortune (he says) imposed upon Alexander δεινὴν πρὸς ἄνδρας ὁμοφύλους καὶ συγγενεῖς διὰ φόβου καὶ σιδήρου καὶ πυρός ἀνάγκην ἀμύνης, ἀτερπέστατον τέλος ἔχουσαν.

<sup>1</sup> Kassander commanded a corps of Thracians and Pæonians: Iollas and Philippus were attached to the king's person (Arrian, vii. 27, 2; Justin, xii. 14; Diodor. xvii. 17).

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xvi. 1, 14. "Antipatrum — amariorem semper ministrum regni, quam ipsos reges, fuisse," &c.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. 25-39; Arrian, vii. 12, 12. He was wont to say, that his mother exacted from him a heavy house-rent for his domicile of ten months.

Kleopatra also (sister of Alexander and daughter of Olympias

The army intended for Asia, having been assembled at Pella, was conducted by Alexander himself first to Amphipolis, where it crossed the Strymon; next along the road near the coast to the river Nestus and to the towns of Abdêra and Maroneia; then through Thrace across the rivers Hebrus and Melas; lastly, through the Thracian Chersonese to Sestos. Here it was met by his fleet consisting of 160 triremes, with a number of trading vessels besides,<sup>1</sup> made up in large proportions from contingents furnished by Athens and Grecian cities.<sup>2</sup> The passage of the whole army—infantry, cavalry, and machines, on ships, across the strait from Sestos in Europe to Abydos in Asia—was superintended by Parmenio, and accomplished without either difficulty or resistance. But Alexander himself, separating from the army at Sestos, went down to Elæus at the southern extremity of the Chersonese. Here stood the chapel and sacred precinct of the hero Protesilaus, who was slain by Hektor; having been the first Greek (according to the legend of the Trojan war) who touched the shore of Troy. Alexander, whose imagination was then full of Homeric reminiscences, offered sacrifice to the hero, praying that his own disembarkation might terminate more auspiciously.

He then sailed across in the admiral's trireme, steering with his own hand, to the landing-place near Ilium called the Harbour of the Achæans. At mid-channel of the strait, he sacrificed a bull, with libations out of a golden goblet, to Poseidon and the Nereids. Himself too in full armour, he was the first (like Protesilaus) to tread the Asiatic shore; but he found no enemy like Hektor to meet him. From hence, mounting the hill on which Ilium was placed, he sacrificed to the patron-goddess Athênê; and deposited in her temple his own panoply, taking in exchange some of the arms said to have been worn by the heroes in the Trojan war, which he caused to be carried by guards along with him in his

B.C. 334  
(April).  
March of  
Alexander  
to the  
Helles-  
pont.  
Passage  
across to  
Asia.

Visit of  
Alexander  
to Ilium.

exercised considerable influence in the government. Dionysius, despot of the Pontic Herakleia, maintained himself against opposition in his government, during Alexander's life, mainly by paying assiduous

court to her (Memnon, Heracl. c. 4. ap. Photium, Cod. 224).

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 11, 9.

<sup>2</sup> The Athenians furnished twenty ships of war, Diodor. xvii. 22.

subsequent battles. Among other real or supposed monuments of this interesting legend, the Ilians showed to him the residence of Priam with its altar of Zeus Herkeios, where that unhappy old king was alleged to have been slain by Neoptolemus. Numbering Neoptolemus among his ancestors, Alexander felt himself to be the object of Priam's yet unappeased wrath; and accordingly offered sacrifice to him at the same altar, for the purpose of expiation and reconciliation. On the tomb and monumental column of Achilles, father of Neoptolemus, he not only placed a decorative garland, but also went through the customary ceremony of anointing himself with oil and running naked up to it: exclaiming how much he envied the lot of Achilles, who had been blest during life with a faithful friend, and after death with a great poet to celebrate his exploits. Lastly, to commemorate his crossing, Alexander erected permanent altars in honour of Zeus, Athênê, and Hêraklês; both on the point of Europe which his army had quitted, and on that of Asia where it had landed.<sup>1</sup>

The proceedings of Alexander, on the ever-memorable site of Ilium, are interesting as they reveal one side of his imposing character—the vein of legendary sympathy and religious sentiment wherein alone consisted his analogy with the

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 11; Plutarch Alexand. 15; Justin, xi. 5. The ceremony of running up to the column of Achilles still subsisted in the time of Plutarch — ἀλειψάμενος λίπα καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἐταίρων συναναδραμὼν γυμνός, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἔστιν, &c. The words here seem to imply that this monumental column was placed on an eminence, and that it was used as a goal for runners to *run up to* in matches at the festivals. Philostratus, five centuries after Alexander, conveys a vivid picture of the numerous legendary and religious associations connected with the plain of Troy and with the tomb of Protesilaus at Elæus, and of the many rites and ceremonies performed there even in his time (Philostrat. Heroica, xix. 14, 15.

p. 742, ed. Olearius — δρόμοις δ' ἐρρύθμισμένοις συνηλάαζον, ἀνακαλοῦντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα, &c., and the pages preceding and following).

Dikaearchus (Fragm. 19, ed. Didot, ap. Athenæum, xiii. p. 603) had treated in a special work about the sacrifices offered to Athênê at Ilium (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Ἰλίου θυσίας) by Alexander, and by many others before him; by Xerxês (Herodot. vii. 43), who offered up 1000 oxen — by Mindarus (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 4, &c.). In describing the proceedings of Alexander at Ilium, Dikaearchus appears to have dwelt much on the warm sympathy which that prince exhibited for the affection between Achilles and Patroklos: which sympathy Dikaearchus illustrated by characterising Alexander

Greeks. The young Macedonian prince had nothing of that sense of correlative right and obligation which characterised the free Greeks of the city community. But he was in many points a reproduction of the heroic Greeks,<sup>1</sup> his warlike ancestors in legend, Achilles and Neoptolemus, and others of that *Æakid* race, unparalleled in the attributes of force—a man of violent impulse in all directions, sometimes generous, often vindictive—ardent in his individual affections both of love and hatred, but devoured especially by an inextinguishable pugnacity, appetite for conquest, and thirst for establishing at all cost his superiority of force over others—“*Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis*”—taking pride, not simply in victorious generalship and direction of the arms of soldiers, but also in the personal forwardness of an Homeric chief, the foremost to encounter both danger and hardship. To dispositions resembling those of Achilles, Alexander indeed added one attribute of a far higher order. As a general, he surpassed his age in provident and even long-sighted combinations. With all his exuberant courage and sanguine temper, nothing was ever omitted in the way of systematic military precaution. Thus much he borrowed, though with many improvements of his own, from Grecian intelligence as applied to soldiership. But the character and dispositions, which he took with him to Asia, had the features, both striking and repulsive, of Achilles, rather than those of Agesilaus or Epaminondas.

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing, presented a total of 30,000 infantry, and 4500 cavalry, thus distributed:—

Review and total of the Macedonian army in Asia.

INFANTRY.	
Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists . . . . .	12,000
Allies . . . . .	7,000
Mercenaries . . . . .	5,000
Under the command of Parmenio . . . . .	24,000
Odryssians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians . . . . .	5,000
Agriænes and archers . . . . .	1,000
Total Infantry . . . . .	30,000

ασφιλόπαις ἐχμανῶς, and by recounting his public admiration for the eunuch Bagdās: compare Curtius, x. i. 25—about Bagdās.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, *Fort. Al. M.* ii. p. 334. Βριθὺς ὀπιτιοπάλας, δαίος ἀντιπάλοις —ταύτην ἔχων τέχνην προγονικὴν ἀπ' Αἰακιδῶν, &c.

Ἄλκην μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκεν Ὀλύμπιος Αἰακίδῃσι, Νούν δ' Ἀμυθαιονίδαις, πλοῦτον δ' ἔπορ' Ἀτρεΐδῃσιν.

(Hesiod. *Fragment.* 223, ed. Marktscheffel.)

Like Achilles, Alexander was dis-

## CAVALRY.

Macedonian heavy—under Philotas son of Parmenio . . .	1,500
Thessalian (also heavy)—under Kallas . . . . .	1,500
Miscellaneous Grecian—under Erigyius . . . . .	600
Thracian and Pæonian (light)—under Kassander . . . .	900
Total cavalry . . . . .	4,500

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander's first invading army. There were however other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as 43,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry.<sup>1</sup> Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers,<sup>2</sup> was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Buonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days. Nor had he even been able to bring together his auxiliaries, or complete the outfit of his army, without incurring a debt of 800 talents, in addition to that of 500 talents contracted by his father Philip.<sup>3</sup> Though Plutarch<sup>4</sup> wonders at the smallness of the force with which Alexander contemplated

tinguished for swiftness of foot (Plutarch, Fort. Al. M. i. p. 331).

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 17. Plutarch (Alexand. 15) says that the highest numbers which he had read of, were, — 43,000 infantry with 5000 cavalry: the lowest numbers, 30,000 infantry with 4000 cavalry (assuming the correction of Sintenis, τετρακισχιλίου in place of πεντακισχιλίου to be well founded, as it probably is—compare Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327).

According to Plutarch (Fort. Al. M. p. 327), both Ptolemy and Aristobulus stated the number of infantry to be 30,000; but Ptolemy gave the cavalry as 5000, Aristobulus, as only 4000. Nevertheless Arrian—who professes to follow mainly Ptolemy and Aristobulus whenever they agree—states the number of infantry as “not much more than 30,000; the cavalry as more than

5000” (Ex. Al. i. 11, 4). Anaximenes alleged 43,000 infantry, with 5500 cavalry. Kallisthenes (ap. Polybium, xii. 19) stated 40,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry. Justin (xi. 6) gives 32,000 infantry, with 4500 cavalry.

My statement in the text follows Diodorus, who stands distinguished, by recounting not merely the total, but the component items besides. In regard to the total of infantry, he agrees with Ptolemy and Aristobulus: as to cavalry, his statement is a mean between the two.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, vii. 9, 10—the speech which he puts in the mouth of Alexander himself—and Curtius, x. 2, 24.

Onesikritus stated that Alexander owed at this time a debt of 200 talents (Plutarch, Alex. 15).

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Fort. Alex. M. i. p. 327; Justin, xi. 6.

the execution of such great projects, yet the fact is, that in infantry he was far above any force which the Persians had to oppose him;<sup>1</sup> not to speak of comparative discipline and organisation, surpassing even that of the Grecian mercenaries, who formed the only good infantry in the Persian service; while his cavalry, though inferior as to number, was superior in quality and in the shock of close combat.

Most of the officers exercising important command in Alexander's army were native Macedonians. His intimate personal friend Hephæstion, as well as his body-guards Leonnatus and Lysimachus, were natives of Pella: Ptolemy the son of Lagus, and Pithon, were Eordians from Upper Macedonia; Kraterus and Perdikkas, from the district of Upper Macedonia called Orestis;<sup>2</sup> Antipater with his son Kassander, Kleitus son of Drôpidês, Parmenio with his two sons Philôtas and Nikanor, Seleukus, Kœnus, Amyntas, Philippus (these two last names were borne by more than one person), Antigonus, Neoptolemus,<sup>3</sup> Meleager, Peukestês, &c., all these seem to have been native Macedonians. All or most of them had been trained to war, under Philip, in whose service Parmenio and Antipater especially, had occupied a high rank.

Chief Macedonian officers.

Of the many Greeks in Alexander's service, we hear of few in important station. Medius, a Thessalian from Larissa, was among his familiar companions; but the ablest and most distinguished of all was Eumenês, a native of Kardia in the Thracian Chersonese. Eumenês, combining an excellent Grecian education with bodily activity and enterprise, had attracted when a young man the notice of Philip, and had been appointed as his secretary. After discharging these duties for seven years until the death of Philip, he was continued by Alexander in the post of chief secretary during the whole of that king's life.<sup>4</sup> He conducted most of Alexander's correspondence, and the daily record of his proceedings, which was kept under the name of the Royal Ephemerides.

Greeks in Alexander's service—Eumenês of Kardia.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 13, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, vi. 28, 6; Arrian, Indica, 18; Justin, xv. 3—4. Porphyry (Fragm. ap. Syncellum, Frag. Histor. Græc. vol. iii. p. 695—698) speaks of Lysimachus as a Thessalian from Kranon; but this must be a mistake:

compare Justin, xv. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Neoptolemus belonged, like Alexander himself, to the Æakid gens (Arrian, ii. 27, 9).

<sup>4</sup> Plutarch, Eumenês, c. 1; Cornelius Nepos, Eumen. c. 1.

But though his special duties were thus of a civil character, he was not less eminent as an officer in the field. Occasionally entrusted with high military command, he received from Alexander signal recompenses and tokens of esteem. In spite of these great qualities—or perhaps in consequence of them—he was the object of marked jealousy and dislike<sup>1</sup> on the part of the Macedonians, — from Hephæstion the friend, and Neoptolemus the chief armour-bearer, of Alexander, down to the principal soldiers of the phalanx. Neoptolemus despised Euménês as an unwarlike penman. The contemptuous pride with which Macedonians had now come to look down on Greeks, is a notable characteristic of the victorious army of Alexander, as well as a new feature in history; retorting the ancient Hellenic sentiment, in which Demosthenês, a few years before, had indulged towards the Macedonians.<sup>2</sup>

Though Alexander had been allowed to land in Asia unopposed, an army was already assembled under the Persian satraps within a few days' march of Abydos. Since the reconquest of Egypt and Phenicia, about eight or nine years before, by the Persian king Ochus, the power of that empire had been restored to a point equal to any anterior epoch since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece. The Persian successes in Egypt had been achieved mainly by the arms of Greek mercenaries, under the conduct and through the craft of the Rhodian general Mentor; who, being seconded by the preponderant influence of the eunuch Bagôas, confidential minister of Ochus, obtained not only ample presents, but also the appointment of military commander on the Hellespont and the Asiatic seaboard.<sup>3</sup> He procured the recall of his brother Memnon, who with his brother-in-law Artabazus had been obliged to leave Asia from unsuccessful revolt against the Persians, and had found shelter with

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, vii. 13, 1; Plutarch, Eum. 2, 3, 8, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Demosth. Philip. iii. p. 119, respecting Philip — οὐ μόνον οὐχ Ἕλληνας ὄντος, οὐδὲ προσήκοντος οὐδὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ βαρβάρου ἐντεῦθεν ἔθεν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ὀλέθρου Μακεδόνοιο, ἔθεν οὐδ' ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν

πρότερον πρῆσθαι.

Compare this with the exclamations of the Macedonian soldiers (called Argyraspides) against their distinguished chief Euménês, calling him *Χερόνησιτις ὀλεθρος* (Plutarch, Euménês, 18).

<sup>3</sup> See, in reference to these incidents, Chap. XC.

Philip.<sup>1</sup> He farther subdued, by force or by fraud, various Greek and Asiatic chieftains on the Asiatic coast; among them, the distinguished Hermeias, friend of Aristotle, and master of the strong post of Atarneus.<sup>2</sup> These successes of Mentor seem to have occurred about 343 B.C. He, and his brother Memnon after him, upheld vigorously the authority of the Persian king in the regions near the Hellespont. It was probably by them that troops were sent across the strait both to rescue the besieged town of Perinthus from Philip, and to act against that prince in other parts of Thrace;<sup>3</sup> that an Asiatic chief, who was intriguing to facilitate Philip's intended invasion of Asia, was seized and sent prisoner to the Persian court; and that envoys from Athens, soliciting aid against Philip, were forwarded to the same place.<sup>4</sup>

Ochus, though successful in regaining the full extent of Persian dominion, was a sanguinary tyrant, who shed by wholesale the blood of his family and courtiers. About the year 338 B.C., he died poisoned by the eunuch Bagôas, who placed upon the throne Arses, one of the king's sons, killing all the rest. After two years, however, Bagôas conceived mistrust of Arses, and put him to death also, together with all his children: thus leaving no direct descendant of the regal family alive. He then exalted to the throne one of his friends named Darius Codomannus (descended from one of the brothers of Artaxerxês Mnemon), who had acquired glory, in a recent war against the Kadusians, by killing in single combat a formidable champion of the enemy's army. Presently, however, Bagôas attempted to poison Darius also; but the latter, detecting the snare, forced him to drink the deadly draught himself.<sup>5</sup> In spite of such murders and

Succession  
of the Per-  
sian crown  
—Ochus—  
Darius Co-  
domannus.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52; Curtius, vi. 4, 25; vi. 5, 2. Curtius mentions also Manapis, another Persian exile, who had fled from Ochus to Philip.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 52. About the strength of the fortress of Atarneus, see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 11; Diodor. xiii. 65. It had been held in defiance of the Persians, even before the time of Hermeias — Compare also Isokratês, Or. iv. (Panegyry.) s. 167.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of Alexander, addressed to Darius after the battle of Issus apud Arrian. ii. 14, 7. Other troops sent by the Persians into Thrace (besides those despatched to the relief of Perinthus), are here alluded to.

<sup>4</sup> Demosthenês, Philippic. iv. p. 139, 140; Epistola Philippi apud Demosthen. p. 160.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvii. 5; Justin, x. 3; Curtius, x. 5, 22.

change in the line of succession, which Alexander afterwards reproached to Darius,<sup>1</sup> the authority of Darius seems to have been recognised, without any material opposition, throughout all the Persian empire.

Succeeding to the throne in the early part of B.C. 336 when Philip was organising the projected invasion of Persia, and when the first Macedonian division under Parmenio and Attalus was already making war in Asia—Darius prepared measures of defence at home, and tried to encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.<sup>2</sup> On the assassination of Philip by Pausanias, the Persian king publicly proclaimed himself (probably untruly) as having instigated the deed, and alluded in contemptuous terms to the youthful Alexander.<sup>3</sup> Conceiving the danger from Macedonia to be past, he imprudently slackened his efforts and withheld his supplies during the first months of Alexander's reign, when the latter might have been seriously embarrassed in Greece and in Europe by the effective employment of Persian ships and money. But the recent successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Bœotia, satisfied Darius that the danger was not past, so that he resumed his preparations for defence. The Phœnician fleet was ordered to be equipped; the satraps in Phrygia and Lydia got together a considerable force, consisting in part of Grecian mercenaries; while Memnon, on the sea-board, was furnished with the means of taking 5000 of these mercenaries under his separate command.<sup>4</sup>

We cannot trace with any exactness the course of these events during the nineteen months between Alexander's accession and his landing in Asia (August 336 B.C. to March or April 334 B.C.).

We learn generally that Memnon was active and even aggressive on the north-eastern coast of the Ægean. Marching northward from his own territory (the region of Assus or Atarneus skirting the Gulf of Adramyttium<sup>5</sup>) across the range of Mount Ida, he came suddenly upon the town of Kyzikus on the Propontis. He failed, however, though only by a little, in his attempt to surprise it,

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 14, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 7. <sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 14, 11.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvii. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Diodor. xvii. 7: compare Arrian,

i, 17, 9. ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν Μένονος ἔπεμψεν — which doubtless means this region, conquered by Mentor from Hermeias of Atarneus.

and was forced to content himself with a rich booty from the district around.<sup>1</sup> The Macedonian generals Parmenio and Kallas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenio, acting in Æolis, took Grynium, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitanê; while Kallas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteium.<sup>2</sup>

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region north-east of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B.C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phenician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

Superiority of the Persians at sea: their imprudence in letting Alexander cross the Hellespont unopposed.

At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zeleia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsitês the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians—Spithridatês (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnakês, Atizyês, Mithridatês, Rheomithrês, Niphatês, Petinês, &c. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valour. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Baktrians,

Persian force assembled in Phrygia, under Arsitês and others.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 7; Polyænus, v. 34, 5.

of military operations near Magnesia, between Parmenio and Memnon (Polyænus, v. 34, 4).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 7. We read also

Hyrkanians, Kappadokians, Paphlagonians, &c.<sup>1</sup> In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number,<sup>2</sup> composed however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as 20,000 cavalry, and nearly 20,000 mercenary foot; by Diodorus as 10,000 cavalry, and 100,000 infantry; by Justin even at 600,000. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth—that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander—he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, and if necessary, even towns themselves—in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbours.<sup>3</sup>

Had his plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 18, 19; Arrian, i. 12, 14; i. 16, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 12, 16; i. 13, 4.

<sup>3</sup> Compare the policy recommended by Memnon, as set forth in Arrian (i. 12, 16), and in Diodorus (xvii. 18). The superiority of Diodorus is here incontestable. He proclaims distinctly both the defensive and the offensive side of Memnon's policy; which, when taken together, form a scheme of operations no less effective than prudent. But Arrian omits all notice of the offensive policy, and mentions only the defensive—the

retreat and destruction of the country; which, if adopted alone, could hardly have been reckoned upon for success, in starving out Alexander, and might reasonably be called in question by the Persian generals. Moreover, we should form but a poor idea of Memnon's ability, if in this emergency he neglected to avail himself of the irresistible Persian fleet.

I notice the rather this point of superiority of Diodorus, because recent critics have manifested a tendency to place too exclusive a confidence in Arrian, and to dis-

Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonourable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was farther strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsitês, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burnt.<sup>1</sup> Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus— "of not being able to procure a dinner in his own country."<sup>2</sup> The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granikus.

Arsitês rejects Memnon's advice, and determines to fight.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the *Iliad*, and immortalised by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Skêpsis,<sup>3</sup> and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth: near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in

credit almost all allegations respecting Alexander except such as Arrian either certifies or countenances. Arrian is a very valuable historian; he has the merit of giving us plain narrative without rhetoric, which contrasts favourably both with Diodorus and with Curtius; but he must not be

set up as the only trustworthy witness.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 12, 18.

<sup>2</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenic*. iv. 1. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, xii. p. 602. The rivers Skamander, Æsepus, and Granikus, all rise from the same height, called Kotylus. This comes from Demetrius, a native of Skêpsis.

many places; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zeleia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granikus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrasteia, a Greek city, situated between Priapus and Parium.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbê (where he had reviewed his army)—on the first day to Perkôtê, on the second to the river Praktius, on the third to Hermôtus; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (Companion) cavalry.

From Hermôtus (the fourth day from Arisbê) he marched towards the Granikus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenio advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

In Alexander's array, the phalanx or heavy infantry formed the central body. The six Taxeis or divisions, of which it consisted, were commanded (reckoning from right to left) by Perdikkas, Kœnus, Amyntas son of Andromenês, Philippus, Meleager, and Kraterus.<sup>2</sup> Immediately on the right of the phalanx, were the hypaspistæ, or light infantry, under Nikanor son of Parmenio—then the light horse or lancers, the Pæonians,

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 18, 19. Οἱ βάρβαροι. τὴν ὑπώρειαν κατειλημμένοι, &c. "prima congressio in campis Adrastis fuit." Justin, xi. 6; compare Strabo, xiii. p. 587, 588.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 14, 3. The text of Arrian is not clear. The name of Kraterus occurs twice. Various explanations are proposed. The

words ἔστε ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον τῆς συμμάχου τάξεως seem to prove that there were three τάξεις of the phalanx (Kraterus, Meleager, and Philippus) included in the left half of the army—and three others (Perdikkas, Kœnus, and Amyntas) in the right half; while the words ἐπὶ δὲ, ἡ Κρατίου τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου appear

and the Apolloniate squadron of Companion-cavalry commanded by the Ilarch Sokratês, all under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus—lastly the full body of Companion-cavalry, the bowmen and the Agrianian darters, all under Philôtas (son of Parmenio), whose division formed the extreme right.<sup>1</sup> The left flank of the phalanx was in like manner protected by three distinct divisions of cavalry or lighter troops—first, by the Thracians, under Agathon—next, by the cavalry of the allies, under Philippus son of Menelaus—lastly, by the Thessalian cavalry, under Kallas, whose division formed the extreme left. Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenio; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank—for there was no recognized centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granikus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Baktrians were on their right, under Rheomithrês—the Paphlagonians and Hyrkanians in the centre, under Arsîtês and Spithridatês—on the left were Memnon and Arsamenês with their divisions.<sup>2</sup> The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence.<sup>3</sup> There being no firing or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other; so that the Persians easily recognized Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendour of his armour and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanour of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own

wrongly inserted. There is no good reason for admitting *two* distinguished officers, each named Kraterus. The name of Philippus and his τάξις is repeated twice; once in counting from the right of the τάξις, — once again in counting from the left.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch states that Alexander struck into the river with thirteen squadrons (ἵλαι) of cavalry. Whe-

ther this total includes all then present in the field, or only the Companion-cavalry — we cannot determine (Plutarch, Alex. 16).

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 14, 8. Χρόνον μὲν δὴ ἀμφοτέρω τὰ στρατεύματα, ἐπ' ἀκροῦ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐφυστῶτες, ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸ μέλλον δοκεῖν ἡτυχίαν ἔχον· καὶ σιγῇ ἦν πολλῇ ἐφ' ἑκατέρων.

left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of Companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead—(the squadrons of Apollonia, of which Sokratês was captain—commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippos) supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspistæ.<sup>1</sup> He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry.<sup>2</sup> Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenio, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins—others down at the water's edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 14, 9. τοὺς προδρόμους ἱππέας mean the same cavalry as those who are called (in i. 14, 2) σαρισσοφόρους ἱππέας, under Amyntas son of Arrhibæus.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 14, 10. Αὐτὸς δὲ (Alexander) ἄγων τὸ δέξιον χέρας . . . ἐμβαίνει ἐς τὸν πόρον, λοξὴν αἰὲ παρὰ τὴν τάξιν ἢ παρὰ τὸ ρεῦμα, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἐχθαίνοντι αὐτῷ οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ χέρας προσπίπτουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὡς ἀνυστόν, τῇ φάλαγγι προσμίσξῃ αὐτοῖς.

Apparently, this passage λοξὴν αἰὲ παρὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἢ παρὰ τὸ ρεῦμα is to be interpreted by the phrase which follows, describing the purpose to be accomplished.

I cannot think that the words imply a movement *en échelon*, as Rüstow and Köchly contend (*Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegswesens*, p. 271)—nor a crossing of the river *against* the stream, to break the force of the current, as is the opinion of others.

the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervour on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander, with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility.<sup>1</sup> Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him—Aretis, one of the horseguards who generally aided him in mounting his horse—and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the Companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse

Cavalry  
battle.  
Personal  
danger of  
Alexander.  
His life is  
saved by  
Kleitus.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 15, 5. Καὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (Alexander himself) ξυνειστῆκει μάχη καρτερὰ, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἄλλαι ἐπ' ἄλλαις τῶν τάξεων τοῖς Μακεδόσι διέβαινον οὐ χαλεπῶς ἥδη.

These words deserve attention, because they show how incomplete

Arrian's description of the battle had before been. Dwelling almost exclusively upon the personal presence and achievements of Alexander, he had said little even about the right half of the army and nothing at all about the left

forward against Mithridatês (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridatês, and laid him prostrate on the ground: he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhœsakês, who struck him a blow on the head with his scimitar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhœsakês through the body with his pike.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridatês, was actually close behind Alexander, with hand and scimitar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Kleitus son of Dropidês—one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service—struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridatês and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander's life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridatês, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armour, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigour and success;<sup>2</sup> and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander's cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardour of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention.<sup>3</sup> He brought up his phalanx and hypaspistæ to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected

half of it under Parmenio. We discover from these words that *all* the τάξεις of the phalanx (not only the three in Alexander's half, but also the three in Parmenio's half) passed the river nearly at the same time, and for the most part with little or no resistance.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 6—12; Diodor.

xvi. 20; Plutarch, Alex. 16. These authors differ in the details. I follow Arrian.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor xvii. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 1. Plutarch says that the infantry, on seeing the cavalry routed, demanded to capitulate on terms with Alexander; but this seems hardly probable.

flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except 2000 made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.<sup>1</sup>

Complete victory of Alexander, Destruction of the Grecian infantry on the side of the Persians.

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number—for only 1000 of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander, was terrible.

Loss of the Persians — numbers of their leading men slain.

There were slain not only Mithridatês, Rhœsakês, Spithridatês, whose names have been already mentioned,—but also Pharnakês, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanês satrap of Kappadokia, Atizyês, Niphatês, Petinês and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsitês, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon's advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation.<sup>2</sup> The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian's account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterwards re-assembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the Companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander.<sup>3</sup> It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265.<sup>4</sup> If this be correct, the

Small loss of the Macedonians.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 4; Diodor. xvii. 21. Diodorus says that on the part of the Persians more than 10,000 foot were killed, with 2000 cavalry;

and that more than 20,000 men were made prisoners.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 5, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 7, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, in describing another

resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly 20,000, most part of them Greek mercenaries. Of these only 2000 were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valour, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.<sup>1</sup>

After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five Companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Dium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honourably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athênê in the acropolis with this inscription—“Alex-

battle, considers that the proportion of twelve to one, between wounded and killed, is above what could have been expected (v. 24, 8). Rüstow and Köchly (p. 273) state that in modern battles, the ordinary proportion of wounded to killed is from 8: 1 to 10: 1.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 8; Plutarch, Alex-

and. 16. Aristobulus (apud Plutarch. l. c.) said that there were slain among the companions of Alexander (τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον) thirty-four persons, of whom nine were infantry. This coincides with Arrian's statement about the twenty-five companions of the cavalry, slain.

ander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedæmonians (*present these offerings*), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia."<sup>1</sup> Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandising impulse under the name of a supposed Panhellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the Oriental world. True Grecian interests lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander.

The battle of the Granikus, brought on by Arsitês and the other satraps contrary to the advice of Memnon, was moreover so unskilfully fought by them, that the gallantry of their infantry, the most formidable corps of Greeks that had ever been in the Persian service, was rendered of little use. The battle, properly speaking, was fought only by the Persian cavalry;<sup>2</sup> the infantry was left to be surrounded and destroyed afterwards.

Unskilfulness of the Persian leaders. Immense impression produced by Alexander's victory.

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances; first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realising almost the wailings of Atosa, Xerxês, and the Chorus, in the *Persæ* of Æschylus,<sup>3</sup> after the battle of Salamis—next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the *mêlée*, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of contemporaries.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 16, 10, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian usually calls the battle of the Granikus an *ἰππομαχία* (i. 17, 10, and elsewhere).

The battle was fought in the

Attic month Thargelion: probably the beginning of May (Plutarch, Camillus, 19).

<sup>3</sup> Æschylus, *Pers.* 950 *seqq*

Several of the neighbouring Mysian mountaineers, though mutinous subjects towards Persia, came down to make submission to him, and were permitted to occupy their lands under the same tribute as they had paid before. The inhabitants of the neighbouring Grecian city of Zeleia, whose troops had served with the Persians, surrendered and obtained their pardon; Alexander admitting the plea that they had served only under constraint. He then sent Parmenio to attack Daskylum, the stronghold and chief residence of the satrap of Phrygia. Even this place was evacuated by the garrison and surrendered, doubtless with a considerable treasure therein. The whole satrapy of Phrygia thus fell into Alexander's power and was appointed to be administered by Kallas for his behalf, levying the same amount of tribute as had been paid before.<sup>1</sup> He himself then marched, with his main force, in a southerly direction towards Sardis—the chief town of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel of Sardis—situated on a lofty and steep rock projecting from Mount Tmolus, fortified by a triple wall with an adequate garrison—was accounted impregnable, and at any rate could hardly have been taken by anything less than a long blockade,<sup>2</sup> which would have allowed time for the arrival of the fleet and the operations of Memnon. Yet such was the terror which now accompanied the Macedonian conqueror, that when he arrived within eight miles of Sardis, he met not only a deputation of the chief citizens, but also the Persian governor of the citadel, Mithrinês. The town, citadel, garrison, and treasure were delivered up to him without a blow. Fortunately for Alexander, there was not in Asia any Persian governor of courage and fidelity such as had been displayed by Maskamês and Bogês after the repulse of Xerxês from Greece.<sup>3</sup> Alexander treated Mithrinês with courtesy and honour, granted freedom to the Sardians and to the other Lydians generally, with the use of their own Lydian laws. The betrayal of Sardis by Mithrinês was a signal good fortune to Alexander. On going up

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 17, 1, 2.

<sup>2</sup> About the almost impregnable fortifications and position of Sardis, see Polybius, vii. 15–18; Herod. i. 84. It held out for nearly two years against Antiochus III. (A.C.

216), and was taken at last only by the extreme carelessness of the defenders; even then, the citadel was still held.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. vii. 106, 107.

to the citadel, he contemplated with astonishment its prodigious strength; congratulating himself on so easy an acquisition, and giving directions to build there a temple of Olympian Zeus, on the spot where the old palace of the kings of Lydia had been situated. He named Pausanias governor of the citadel, with a garrison of Peloponnesians from Argos; Asander, satrap of the country; and Nikas, collector of tribute.<sup>1</sup> The freedom granted to the Lydians, whatever it may have amounted to, did not exonerate them from paying the usual tribute.

From Sardis, he ordered Kallas, the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia—and Alexander son of Aëropus, who had been promoted in place of Kallas to the command of the Thessalian cavalry—to attack Atarneus and the district belonging to Memnon, on the Asiatic coast opposite Lesbos.

Hemarches  
from Sardis  
to the coast.  
Capture of  
Ephesus.

Meanwhile he himself directed his march to Ephesus, which he reached on the fourth day. Both at Ephesus and at Miletus—the two principal strongholds of the Persians on the coast, as Sardis was in the interior—the sudden catastrophe at the Granikus had struck unspeakable terror. Hegesistratus, governor of the Persian garrison (Greek mercenaries) at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander offering to surrender the town on his approach; while the garrison at Ephesus, with the Macedonian exile Amyntas, got on board two triremes in the harbour and fled. It appears that there had been recently a political revolution in the town, conducted by Syrphax and other leaders, who had established an oligarchical government. These men, banishing their political opponents, had committed depredations on the temple of Artemis, overthrown the statue of Philip of Macedon dedicated therein, and destroyed the sepulchre of Heropythus the liberator in the agora.<sup>2</sup> Some of the party, though abandoned by their garrison, were still trying to invoke aid from Memnon, who however was yet at a distance. Alexander entered the town without resistance, restored the exiles, established a democratical constitution,

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 17, 5—9; Diodor. xvii. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 17, 12. Respecting these commotions at Ephesus, which had preceded the expedition of Alexander, we have no information: nor are we told who

Heropythus was, or under what circumstances he had liberated Ephesus. It would have been interesting to know these facts, as illustrating the condition of the Asiatic Greeks previous to Alexander's invasion.

and directed that the tribute heretofore paid to the Persians should now be paid to the Ephesian Artemis. Syrophax and his family sought refuge in the temple, from whence they were dragged by the people and stoned to death. More of the same party would have been despatched, had not the popular vengeance been restrained by Alexander; who displayed an honourable and prudent moderation.<sup>1</sup>

Thus master of Ephesus, Alexander found himself in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nikanor; and received propositions of surrender from the two neighbouring inland cities, Magnesia and Tralleis. To occupy these cities, he despatched Parmenio with 5000 foot (half of them Macedonians) and 200 of the Companion-cavalry; while he at the same time sent Antimachus with an equal force in a northerly direction, to liberate the various cities of Æolic and Ionic Greeks. This officer was instructed to put down in each of them the ruling oligarchy, which acted with a mercenary garrison as an instrument of Persian Supremacy—to place the government in the hands of the citizens—and to abolish all payment of tribute. He himself—after taking part in a solemn festival and procession to the temple of Ephesian Artemis, with his whole army in battle-array—marched southward towards Miletus; his fleet under Nikanor proceeding thither by sea.<sup>2</sup> He expected probably to enter Miletus with as little resistance as Ephesus. But his hopes were disappointed: Hegesistratus, commander of the garrison in that town, though under the immediate terror of the defeat at the Granikus he had written to offer submission, had now altered his tone, and determined to hold out. The formidable Persian fleet,<sup>3</sup> four hundred sail of Phenician and Cyprian ships of war with well-trained seamen, was approaching.

This naval force, which a few weeks earlier would have prevented Alexander from crossing into Asia, now afforded the only hope of arresting the rapidity and ease of his conquests. What steps had been taken by the Persian officers since the defeat at the Granikus, we do not hear. Many of them had fled, along with Memnon, to

He finds  
the first re-  
sistance at  
Miletus.

Near ap-  
proach of  
the Persian  
fleet. Mem-  
non is made  
command-  
er-in-chief  
of the Per-  
sians.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 17, 10—13.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 18, 5, 6.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 19, 10—13.

Miletus;<sup>1</sup> and they were probably disposed, under the present desperate circumstances, to accept the command of Memnon as their only hope of safety, though they had despised his counsel on the day of the battle. Whether the towns in Memnon's principality of Atarneus had attempted any resistance against the Macedonians, we do not know. His interests however were so closely identified with those of Persia, that he had sent up his wife and children as hostages, to induce Darius to entrust him with the supreme conduct of the war. Orders to this effect were presently sent down by that prince;<sup>2</sup> but at the first arrival of the fleet, it seems not to have been under the command of Memnon, who was however probably on board.

It came too late to aid in the defence of Miletus. Three days before its arrival, Nikanor the Macedonian admiral, with his fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, had occupied the island of Ladê, which commanded the harbour of that city. Alexander found the outer portion of Miletus evacuated, and took it without resistance. He was making preparations to besiege the inner city, and had already transported 4000 troops across to the island of Ladê, when the powerful Persian fleet came in sight, but found itself excluded from Miletus, and obliged to take moorings under the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê. Unwilling to abandon without a battle the command of the sea, Parmenio advised Alexander to fight this fleet, offering himself to share the hazard aboard. But Alexander disapproved the proposition, affirming that his fleet was inferior not less in skill than in numbers; that the high training of the Macedonians would tell for nothing on shipboard; and that a naval defeat would be the signal for insurrection in Greece. Besides debating such prudential reasons, Alexander and Parmenio also differed about the religious promise of the case. On the sea-shore, near the stern of the Macedonian ships, Parmenio had seen an eagle, which filled him with confidence that the ships would prove victorious. But Alexander contended that this interpretation was incorrect. Though the eagle doubtless promised to him victory, yet it had been seen on land—and therefore his victories would be on land: hence the result signified was, that he would over-

The Macedonian fleet occupies the harbour of Miletus, and keeps out the Persians.

Alexander declines naval combat. His debate with Parmenio.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 22. <sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 23.

come the Persian fleet, by means of land operations.<sup>1</sup> This part of the debate, between two practical military men of ability, is not the least interesting of the whole; illustrating as it does, not only the religious susceptibilities of the age, but also the pliancy of the interpretative process, lending itself equally well to inferences totally opposite. The difference between a sagacious and a dullwitted prophet, accommodating ambiguous omens to useful or mischievous conclusions, was one of very material importance in the ancient world.

Alexander now prepared vigorously to assault Miletus. Alexander besieges Miletus. Capture of the city. letus, repudiating with disdain an offer brought to him by a Milesian citizen named Glaukippus —that the city should be neutral and open to him as well as to the Persians. His fleet under Nikanor occupied the harbour, blocked up its narrow mouth against the Persians, and made threatening demonstrations from the water's edge; while he himself brought up his battering-engines against the walls, shook or overthrew them in several places, and then stormed the city. The Milesians, with the Grecian mercenary garrison, made a brave defence, but were overpowered by the impetuosity of the assault. A large number of them were slain, and there was no way of escape except by jumping into little boats, or swimming off upon the hollow of the shield. Even of these fugitives, most part were killed by the seamen of the Macedonian triremes; but a division of 300 Grecian mercenaries got on to an isolated rock near the mouth of the harbour, and there prepared to sell their lives dearly. Alexander, as soon as his soldiers were thoroughly masters of the city, went himself on shipboard to attack the mercenaries on the rock, taking with him ladders in order to effect a landing upon it. But when he saw that they were resolved on a desperate defence, he preferred admitting them to terms of capitulation, and received them into his own service.<sup>2</sup> To the surviving Milesian citizens he granted the condition of a free city, while he caused all the remaining prisoners to be sold as slaves.

The powerful Persian fleet, from the neighbouring promontory of Mykalê, was compelled to witness, without being able to prevent, the capture of Miletus, and was presently withdrawn to Halikarnassus. At the same time Alexander came to the resolution of disbanding his own fleet; which, while costing more than he could then

The Persian fleet retires to Halikarnassus. Alexander disbands his own fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 18, 9—15; i. 20, 2.    <sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 19; Diodor. xvii. 22.

afford, was nevertheless unfit to cope with the enemy in open sea. He calculated that by concentrating all his efforts on land operations, especially against the cities on the coast, he should exclude the Persian fleet from all effective hold on Asia Minor, and ensure that country to himself. He therefore paid off all the ships, retaining only a moderate squadron for the purposes of transport.<sup>1</sup>

Before this time, probably, the whole Asiatic coast northward of Miletus—including the Ionic and *March of Alexander to Halikarnassus.* *Ada, queen of Karia, joins him.* *Æolic cities and the principality of Memnon—* had either accepted willingly the dominion of Alexander, or had been reduced by his detachments. Accordingly he now directed his march southward of Miletus, towards Karia, and especially towards Halikarnassus, the principal city of that territory. On entering Karia, he was met by Ada, a member of the Karian princely family, who tendered to him her town of Alinda and her other possessions, adopting him as her son, and entreating his protection. Not many years earlier, under Mausôlus and Artemisia, the powerful princes of this family had been formidable to all the Grecian islands. It was the custom of Karia that brothers and sisters of the reigning family intermarried with each other: Mausôlus and his wife Artemisia were succeeded by Idrieus and his wife Ada, all four being brothers and sisters, sons and daughters of Hekatomnus. On the death of Idrieus, his widow Ada was expelled from Halikarnassus and other parts of Karia by her surviving brother Pixodarus; though she still retained some strong towns, which proved a welcome addition to the conquests of Alexander. Pixodarus, on the contrary, who had given his daughter in marriage to a leading Persian named Orontobatês, warmly espoused the Persian cause, and made Halikarnassus a capital point of resistance against the invader.<sup>2</sup>

But it was not by him alone that this city was defended. The Persian fleet had repaired thither from Miletus; Memnon, now invested by Darius with supreme command on the Asiatic coast and the *Strong garrison, and good defensive*

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 20, 1—4; Diodor. xvii. 22. At the same time, the statement of Diodorus can hardly be correct (xvii. 24), that Alexander sent his battering engines from Miletus to Halikarnassus by sea. This would

only have exposed them to be captured by the Persian fleet.

We shall see that Alexander reorganised his entire fleet during the ensuing year.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 23, 11, 12; Diodor. xvii. 24; Strabo xiv. p. 657.

preparation, at Halikarnassus. *Ægean*, was there in person. There was not only Orontobatês with many other Asiatics, but also a large garrison of mercenary Greeks, commanded by Ephialtês, a brave Athenian exile. The city, strong both by nature and by art, with a surrounding ditch forty-five feet broad and twenty-two feet deep,<sup>1</sup> had been still farther strengthened under the prolonged superintendence of Memnon;<sup>2</sup> lastly, there were two citadels, a fortified harbour with its entrance fronting the south, abundant magazines of arms, and good provision of defensive engines. The siege of Halikarnassus was the most arduous enterprise which Alexander had yet undertaken. Instead of attacking it by land and sea at once, as at Miletus, he could make his approaches only from the land, while the defenders were powerfully aided from seaward by the Persian ships with their numerous crews.

His first efforts, directed against the gate on the north or northeast of the city, which led towards Mylasa, were interrupted by frequent sallies and discharges from the engines on the walls. After a few days thus spent without much avail, he passed with a large section of his army to the western side of the town, towards the outlying portion of the projecting tongue of land, on which Halikarnassus and Myndus (the latter farther westward) were situated. While making demonstrations on this side of Halikarnassus, he at the same time attempted a night attack on Myndus, but was obliged to retire after some hours of fruitless effort. He then confined himself to the siege of Halikarnassus. His soldiers, protected from missiles by moveable penthouses (called Tortoises), gradually filled up the wide and deep ditch round the town, so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls. The engines being brought up close, the work of demolition was successfully prosecuted; notwithstanding vigorous sallies from the garrison, repulsed, though not without loss and difficulty, by the Macedonians. Presently the shock of the battering-engines had overthrown two towers of the city-wall, together with two intermediate breadths of wall; and a third tower was beginning

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, 1. 20, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, 1. 20, 5. ἑξόπαντα ταῦτα

Μέμνων τε αὐτὸς παρὼν ἐκ πολλοῦ παρεσκευάχει, &c.

to totter. The besieged were employed in erecting an inner wall of brick to cover the open space, and a wooden tower of the great height of 150 feet for the purpose of casting projectiles.<sup>1</sup> It appears that Alexander waited for the full demolition of the third tower, before he thought the breach wide enough to be stormed; but an assault was prematurely brought on by two adventurous soldiers from the division of Perdikkas.<sup>2</sup> These men, elate with wine, rushed up singlehanded to attack the Mylasean gate, and slew the foremost of the defenders who came out to oppose them, until at length, reinforcements arriving successively on both sides, a general combat took place at a short distance from the wall. In the end, the Macedonians were victorious, and drove the besieged back into the city. Such was the confusion, that the city might then have been assaulted and taken, had measures been prepared for it beforehand. The third tower was speedily overthrown; nevertheless, before this could be accomplished, the besieged had already completed their half-moon within, against which accordingly, on the next day, Alexander pushed forward his engines. In this advanced position, however, being as it were within the circle of the city-wall, the Macedonians were exposed to discharges not only from engines in their front, but also from the towers yet standing on each side of them. Moreover, at night, a fresh sally was made with so much impetuosity, that some of the covering wicker-work of the engines, and even the main woodwork of one of them, was burnt. It was not without difficulty that Philôtas and Hellanikus, the officers on guard, preserved the remainder; nor were the besieged finally driven in, until Alexander himself appeared with reinforcements.<sup>3</sup> Though his troops had been victors in these successive combats, yet he could not carry off his dead, who lay close to the walls, without soliciting a truce for burial. Such request usually counted as a confession of defeat: nevertheless Alexander solicited the truce, which was granted by Memnon, in spite of the contrary opinion of Ephialtês.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare Arrian, i. 21, 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 25, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Both Arrian (i. 21, 5) and Diodorus (xvii. 25) mention this proceeding of the two soldiers of

Perdikkas, though Diodorus says that it occurred at night, which cannot well be true.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 21, 7—12.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvii. 25.

After a few days of interval, for burying his dead and repairing the engines, Alexander recommenced attack upon the half-moon, under his own personal superintendence. Among the leaders within, a conviction gained ground that the place could not long hold out. Ephialtês especially, resolved not to survive the capture, and seeing that the only chance of preservation consisted in destroying the besieging engines, obtained permission from Memnon to put himself at the head of a last desperate sally.<sup>1</sup> He took immediately near him 2000 chosen troops, half to encounter the enemy, half with torches to burn the engines. At daybreak, all the gates being suddenly and simultaneously thrown open, sallying parties rushed out from each against the besiegers; the engines from within supporting them by multiplied discharges of missiles. Ephialtês with his division, marching straight against the Macedonians on guard at the main point of attack, assailed them impetuously, while his torch-bearers tried to set the engines on fire. Himself distinguished no less for personal strength than for valour, he occupied the front rank, and was so well seconded by the courage and good array of his soldiers charging in deep column, that for a time he gained advantage. Some of the engines were successfully fired, and the advanced guard of the Macedonian troops, consisting of young troops, gave way and fled. They were rallied partly by the efforts of Alexander, but

<sup>1</sup> The last desperate struggle of the besieged, is, what stands described in i, 23 of Arrian, and in xvii. 26, 27 of Diodorus; though the two descriptions are very different. Arrian does not name Ephialtês at Halikarnassus. He follows the Macedonian authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus; who probably dwelt only on Memnon and the Persians as their real enemies, treating the Greeks in general as a portion of the hostile force. On the other hand, Diodorus and Curtius appear to have followed, in great part, Grecian authors; in whose view, eminent Athenian exiles, like Ephialtês and Charidemus, counted for much more.

The fact here mentioned by Diodorus, that Ephialtês drove back the young Macedonian guard, and that the battle was restored only by the extraordinary efforts of the old guard—is one of much interest which I see no reason for mistrusting, though Arrian says nothing about it. Curtius (v. 2; viii. 1) makes allusion to it on a subsequent occasion, naming Atharrias: the part of his work in which it ought to have been narrated is lost. On this, as on other occasions, Arrian slurs over the partial reverse, obstructions, and losses, of Alexander's career. His authorities probably did so before him.

still more by the older Macedonian soldiers, companions in all Philip's campaigns; who, standing exempt from night-watches, were encamped more in the rear. These veterans, among whom one Atharrias was the most conspicuous, upbraiding the cowardice of their comrades,<sup>1</sup> cast themselves into their accustomed phalanx-array, and thus both withstood and repulsed the charge of the victorious enemy. Ephialtês, foremost among the combatants, was slain, the rest were driven back to the city, and the burning engines were saved with some damage. During this same time, an obstinate conflict had also taken place at the gate called Tripylon, where the besieged had made another sally, over a narrow bridge thrown across the ditch. Here the Macedonians were under the command of Ptolemy (not the son of Lagus), one of the king's body-guards. He, with two or three other conspicuous officers, perished in the severe struggle which ensued, but the sallying party were at length repulsed and driven into the city.<sup>2</sup> The loss of the besieged was severe, in trying to get again within the walls, under vigorous pursuit from the Macedonians.

By this last unsuccessful effort, the defensive force of Halikarnassus was broken. Memnon and Orontobatês, satisfied that no longer defence of the town was practicable, took advantage of the night to set fire to their wooden projectile engines and towers, as well as to their magazines of arms, with the houses near the exterior wall, while they carried away the troops, stores, and inhabitants, partly to the citadel called Salmakis—partly to the neighbouring islet called Arkonnesus—partly to the island of Kos.<sup>3</sup> Though thus evacuating the town, however, they still kept good garrisons well provisioned in the two citadels belonging to it. The conflagration, stimulated by a strong wind, spread widely. It was only extinguished by the orders of Alexander, when he entered the town, and put to death all those whom he found with firebrands. He directed that the Halikarnassians

Memnon is forced to abandon Halikarnassus, and withdraw the garrison by sea, retaining only the citadel. Alexander enters Halikarnassus.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvi. 27; Curtius, v. 1; viii. 2. . . . οἱ γὰρ πρεσβύτατοι τῶν Μακεδόνων, διὰ μὲν τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀπολελυμένοι τῶν κινδύνων, συνεστρατευμένοι δὲ Φιλίππῳ . . . τοῖς μὲν πυγμαχοῦσι νεωτέροις πικρῶς ὠνειδίσαν τὴν ἀνανδρίαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ

συναθροισθέντες καὶ συναρπίζαντες, ὑπέστησαν τοὺς δοκῶντας ἤδη νενικηχέναι . . .

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 22, 5.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, i. 23, 3, 4; Diodor. xvii. 27.

found in the houses should be spared, but that the city itself should be demolished. He assigned the whole of Karia to Ada, as a principality, doubtless under condition of tribute. As the citadels still occupied by the enemy were strong enough to require a long siege, he did not think it necessary to remain in person for the purpose of reducing them; but surrounding them with a wall of blockade, he left Ptolemy and 3000 men to guard it.<sup>1</sup>

Having concluded the siege of Halikarnassus, Alexander sent back his artillery to Tralles, ordering (Winter). Parmenio, with a large portion of the cavalry, the allied infantry, and the baggage waggons, to Sardis.

The ensuing winter months he employed in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia. All this southern coast of Asia Minor is mountainous; the range of Mount Taurus descending nearly to the sea so as to leave little or no intervening breadth of plain. In spite of great strength of situation, such was the terror of Alexander's arms, that all the Lykian towns—Hyparna, Telmissus, Pinara, Xanthus, Patara, and thirty others—submitted to him without a blow.<sup>2</sup> One alone among them, called Marmareis, resisted to desperation.<sup>3</sup> On reaching the territory called Milyas, the Phrygian frontier of Lykia, Alexander received the surrender of the Greek maritime city, Phasêlis. He assisted the Phaselites in destroying a mountain fort erected and garrisoned against them by the neighbouring Pisidian mountaineers and paid a public compliment to the sepulchre of their deceased townsman, the rhetorician Theodektês.<sup>4</sup>

After this brief halt at Phasêlis Alexander directed his course to Pergê in Pamphylia. The ordinary mountain road, by which he sent most of his army, was so difficult as to require some leveling by Thracian light troops sent in advance for the purpose. But the king himself, with a select detachment, took a road more difficult still, called Klimax, under the mountains by the brink of the sea. When the wind blew from the south, this road was covered by such a depth of water as to be impracticable; for some time before he reached the spot, the wind had blown strong

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 23, 11; Diodor. xvii.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 28.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, xiv. p. 657.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, i. 24, 11; Plutarch, Alex-

<sup>5</sup> Arrian, i. 24, 6—9.

and. 17.

from the south—but as he came near, the special providence of the Gods (so he and his friends conceived it) brought on a change to the north, so that the sea receded and left an available passage, though his soldiers had the water up to their waists.<sup>1</sup> From Pergê he marched on to Sidê, receiving on his way envoys from Aspendus, who offered to surrender their city, but deprecated the entrance of a garrison; which they were allowed to buy off by promising fifty talents in money, together with the horses which they were bringing up as tribute for the Persian king. Having left a garrison at Sidê, he advanced onward to a strong place called Syllium, defended by brave natives with a body of mercenaries to aid them. These men held out, and even repulsed a first assault; which Alexander could not stay to repeat, being apprised that the Aspendians had refused to execute the conditions imposed, and had put their city in a state of defence. Returning rapidly, he constrained them to submission, and then marched back to Pergê; from whence he directed his course towards the greater Phrygia,<sup>2</sup> through the difficult mountains, and almost indomitable population, of Pisidia.

After remaining in the Pisidian mountains long enough to reduce several towns or strong posts, Alexander proceeded northward into Phrygia, passing by the salt lake called Askanius to the steep and impregnable fortress of Kelænæ, garrisoned by 1000 Karians, and 100 mercenary Greeks. These men, having no hope of relief from the Persians, offered to deliver up the fortress, unless such relief should arrive before the sixtieth day.<sup>3</sup> Alexander accepted the propositions, remained ten days at Kelænæ, and left there Antigonos (afterwards the most powerful among his successors) as satrap of Phrygia, with 1500 men. He then marched northward to Gordium on the river Sangarius, where Parmenio was directed to meet him, and where his winter-campaign was concluded.<sup>4</sup>

Alexander concludes his winter campaign at Gordium. Capture of Kelænæ.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 26, 4. οὐκ ἔνευ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡς αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄμφ' αὐτὸν ἐξηγοῦντο, &c. Strabo, xiv. p. 666; Curtius, v. 3, 22.

Plutarch's words (Alexand. 17) must be taken to mean that Alexander did not boast so much of

this special favour from the Gods as some of his panegyrists boasted for him.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 27, 1—3.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, iii. 1, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, i. 29, 1—5.

## APPENDIX.

ON THE LENGTH OF THE MACEDONIAN  
SARISSA OR PIKE.

THE statements here given about the length of the sarissa carried by the phalangite, are taken from Polybius, whose description is on all points both clear and consistent with itself. "The sarissa (he says) is sixteen cubits long, according to the original theory; and fourteen cubits, as adapted to actual practice" — τὸ δὲ τῶν σαρισσῶν μέγεθος ἐστὶ, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν, ἑκκαίδεκα πηχῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀρμογὴν τὴν πρὸς τὴν ἀλγέθειαν, δεκατεσσάρων. Τούτων δὲ τοὺς τέσσαρας ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ μεταξὺ ταῖν χερσῶν διάστημα, καὶ τὸ κατόπιν σῆκωμα τῆς προβολῆς (xviii. 12).

The difference here indicated by Polybius between the length in theory, and that in practice, may probably be understood to mean, that the phalangites, when in exercise, used pikes of the greater length; when on service, of the smaller: just as the Roman soldiers were trained in their exercises to use arms heavier than they employed against an enemy.

Of the later Tactic writers, Leo (Tact. vi. 39) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus, repeat the double measurement of the sarissa as given by Polybius. Arrian (Tact. c. 12) and Polyænus (ii. 29, 2) state its length at sixteen cubits—Ælian (Tact. c. 14) gives fourteen cubits. All these authors follow either Polybius, or some other authority concurrent with him. None of them contradict him, though none state the case so clearly as he does.

Messrs. Rüstow and Köchly (Gesch. des Griech. Kriegswesens, p. 238), authors of the best work that I know respecting ancient military matters, reject the authority of Polybius as it here stands. They maintain that the passage must be corrupt, and that Polybius must have meant to say that the sarissa was sixteen *feet* in length—not sixteen *cubits*. I cannot subscribe to their opinion, nor do I think that their criticism on Polybius is a just one.

First they reason as if Polybius had said that the sarissa of actual service was *sixteen* cubits long. Computing the weight of such a weapon from the thickness required in the shaft, they pronounce that it would be unmanageable. But Polybius gives the actual length as only *fourteen* cubits: a very material difference. If we accept the hypothesis of these authors—that corruption of the text has made us read *cubits* where we ought to have read *feet*,—it will follow that the length of the sarissa, as given by Polybius, would be *fourteen feet*, not *sixteen feet*. Now this length is not sufficient to justify various passages in which its prodigious length is set forth.

Next, they impute to Polybius a contradiction in saying that the Roman soldier occupied a space of three feet, equal to that occupied by a Macedonian soldier—and yet that in the fight, he had two Macedonian soldiers and ten pikes, opposed to him (xviii. 13). But there is here no contradiction at all: for Polybius expressly says that the Roman, though occupying three feet when the legion was drawn up

in order, required, when fighting, an expansion of the ranks and an increased interval to the extent of three feet behind him and on each side of him (χάλασμα καὶ διάστασις ἀλλήλων ἔχειν δεήσει τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐλάχιστον τρεῖς πόδας κατ' ἐπιστάτην καὶ παραστάτην) in order to allow full play for his sword and shield. It is therefore perfectly true that each Roman soldier, when actually marching up to attack the phalanx occupied as much ground as two phalangites, and had ten pikes to deal with.

Farther, it is impossible to suppose that Polybius, in speaking of *cubits*, really meant *feet*: because (cap. 12) he speaks of *three feet* as the interval *between each* rank in the file, and these *three feet* are clearly made equal to *two cubits*. His computation will not come right, if in place of *cubits* you substitute *feet*.

We must therefore take the assertion of Polybius as we find it; that the pike of the phalangite was fourteen cubits or twenty-one feet in length. Now Polybius had every means of being well informed on such a point. He was above thirty years of age at the time of the last war of the Romans against the Macedonian king Perseus, in which war he himself served. He was intimately acquainted with Scipio, the son of Paulus Emilius, who gained the battle of Pydna. Lastly, he had paid great attention to tactics, and had even written an express work on the subject.

It might indeed be imagined, that the statement of Polybius, though true as to his own time, was not true as to the time of Philip and Alexander. But there is nothing to countenance such a suspicion—which moreover is expressly disclaimed by Rüstow and Köchly.

Doubtless twenty-one feet is a prodigious length, unmanageable except by men properly trained, and inconvenient for all evolutions. But these are just the terms under which the pike of the phalangite is always spoken of. So Livy, xxxi. 39, "Erant pleraque silvestria circa, incommoda phalangi maximè Macedonum; quæ, nisi ubi *prælongis hastis* velut vallum ante clypeos objecit (quod ut fiat, libero campo opus est) nullius admodum usus est." Compare also Livy, xlv. 40, 41, where, among other intimations of the immense length of the pike, we find, "Si carptim aggrediendo, circumagere *immobilem longitudine et gravitate hastam* cogas, confusâ strue implicatur;" also xxxiii. 8, 9.

Xenophon tells us that the Ten Thousand Greeks in their retreat had to fight their way across the territory of the Chalybes, who carried a pike *fifteen cubits* long, together with a short sword: he does not mention a shield, but they wore greaves and helmets (Anab. iv. 7, 15). This is a length greater than what Polybius ascribes to the pike of the Macedonian phalangite. The Mosynœki defended their citadel "with pikes so long and thick that a man could hardly carry them" (Anabas. v. 4, 25). In the Iliad, when the Trojans are pressing hard upon the Greek ships, and seeking to set them on fire, Ajax is described as planting himself upon the poop, and keeping off the assailants with a thrusting-pike of twenty-two cubits or thirty-three feet in length (ἑυστὸν ναῦμαχον ἐν παλάμῃσιν—δυσωχαιεικοσίπηχυ, Iliad, xv. 678). The spear of Hektor is ten cubits, or eleven cubits, in length—intended to be hurled (Iliad, vi. 319; viii. 494)—the reading is not settled, whether ἔγχος ἔχ' ἑνδεκάπηχυ, or ἔγχος ἔχεν δεκάπηχυ.

The Swiss infantry, and the German Landsknechte, in the sixteenth century, were in many respects a reproduction of the Macedonian phalanx: close ranks, deep files, long pikes, and the three or four first ranks composed of the strongest and bravest men in the regiment—either officers, or picked soldiers receiving double pay. The length and impenetrable array of their pikes enabled them to resist the charge of the heavy cavalry or men at arms: they were irresistible in front, unless an enemy could find means to break in among the pikes, which was sometimes, though rarely, done. Their great confidence was in the length of the pike—Macchiavelli says of them (*Ritratti dell' Alemagna*, Opere, t. iv. p. 159; and *Dell' Arte della Guerra*, p. 232—236), “Dicono tenere tale ordine, che non è possibile entrare tra loro, nè accostarseli, quanto è la picca lunga. Sono ottime genti in campagna, a far giornata: ma per espugnare terre non vagliono, e poco nel difenderlo: ed universalmente, dove non possano tenere l'ordine loro della milizia non vagliano.”

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## CHAPTER XCIII.

## SECOND AND THIRD ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF ALEXANDER—BATTLE OF ISSUS—SIEGE OF TYRE.

IT was about February or March 333 B.C., when Alexander reached Gordium; where he appears to have halted for some time, giving to the troops who had been with him in Pisidia a repose doubtless needful. While at Gordium, he performed the memorable exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot. There was preserved in the citadel an ancient waggon of rude structure, said by the legend to have once belonged to the peasant Gordius and his son Midas—the primitive rustic kings of Phrygia, designated as such by the Gods, and chosen by the people. The cord (composed of fibres from the bark of the cornel tree), attaching the yoke of this waggon to the pole, was so twisted and entangled as to form a knot of singular complexity, which no one had ever been able to untie. An oracle had pronounced, that to the person who should untie it the empire of Asia was destined. When Alexander went up to see this ancient relic, the surrounding multitude, Phrygian as well as Macedonian, were full of expectation that the conqueror of the Granikus and of Halikarnassus would overcome the difficulties of the knot and acquire the promised empire. But Alexander, on inspecting the knot, was as much perplexed as others had been before him, until at length, in a fit of impatience, he drew his sword and severed the cord in two. By every one this was accepted as a solution of the problem, thus making good his title to the empire of Asia; a belief which the Gods ratified by a storm of thunder and lightning during the ensuing night.<sup>1</sup>

B.C. 333.

Alexander  
cuts the  
Gordian  
knot.<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 3; Curtius, iii. 2, 17; Plutarch, Alex. 18; Justin. xi. 7.

At Gordium, Alexander was visited by envoys from Athens, entreating the liberation of the Athenian prisoners taken at the Granikus, who were now at work chained in the Macedonian mines. But he refused this prayer until a more convenient season. Aware that the Greeks were held attached to him only by their fears, and that, if opportunity occurred, a large fraction of them would take part with the Persians, he did not think it prudent to relax his hold upon their conduct.<sup>1</sup>

Such opportunity seemed now not unlikely to occur. Memnon, excluded from efficacious action on the continent since the loss of Halikarnassus, was employed among the islands of the Ægean (during the first half of 333 B.C.), with the purpose of carrying war into Greece and Macedonia. Invested with the most ample command, he had a large Phenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, together with his nephew Pharnabazus and the Persian Autophradatês. Having acquired the important island of Chios, through the cooperation of a part of its inhabitants, he next landed on Lesbos, where four out of the five cities, either from fear or preference, declared in his favour; while Mitylênê, the greatest of the five, already occupied by a Macedonian garrison, stood out against him. Memnon accordingly disembarked his troops and commenced the blockade of the city both by sea and land, surrounding it with a double palisade wall from sea to sea. In the midst of this operation he died of sickness; but his nephew Pharnabazus, to whom he had consigned the command provisionally, until the pleasure of Darius could be known, prosecuted his measures vigorously, and brought the city to a capitulation. It was stipulated that the garrison introduced by Alexander should be dismissed; that the column, recording alliance with him, should be demolished; that the Mityleneans should become allies of Darius, upon the terms of the old convention called by the name of Antalkidas; and that the citizens in banishment should be recalled, with restitution of half their property. But Pharnabazus, as soon as admitted, violated the capitulation at once. He not only extorted contributions, but introduced

B.C. 333.

Progress of Memnon and the Persian fleet—they acquire Chios and a large part of Lesbos—they besiege Mitylênê. Death of Memnon. Capture of Mitylênê.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, i. 29, 8.

a garrison under Lykomêdês, and established a returned exile named Diogenês as despot.<sup>1</sup> Such breach of faith was ill-calculated to assist the farther extension of Persian influence in Greece.

Had the Persian fleet been equally active a year earlier, Alexander's army could never have landed in Asia. Nevertheless, the acquisitions of Chios and Lesbos, late as they were in coming, were highly important as promising future progress. Several of the Cyclades islands sent to tender their adhesion to the Persian cause; the fleet was expected in Eubœa, and the Spartans began to count upon aid for an anti-Macedonian movement.<sup>2</sup> But all these hopes were destroyed by the unexpected decease of Memnon.

Hopes excited in Greece by the Persian fleet, but ruined by the death of Memnon.

It was not merely the superior ability of Memnon, but also his established reputation both with Greeks and Persians, which rendered his death a fatal blow to the interests of Darius. The Persians had with them other Greek officers—brave and able—probably some not unfit to execute the full Memnonian schemes. But none of them had gone through the same experience in the art of exercising command among Orientals—none of them had acquired the confidence of Darius to the same extent, so as to be invested with the real guidance of operations, and upheld against court-calumnies. Though Alexander had now become master of Asia Minor, yet the Persians had ample means, if effectively used, of defending all that yet remained, and even of seriously disturbing him at home. But with Memnon vanished the last chance of employing these means with wisdom or energy. The full value of his loss was better appreciated by the intelligent enemy whom he opposed, than by the feeble master whom he served. The death of Memnon, lessening the efficiency of the Persians at sea, allowed full leisure to re-organize the Macedonian fleet,<sup>3</sup> and to employ the undivided land-force for farther inland conquest.<sup>4</sup>

Memnon's death an irreparable mischief to Darius.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 1, 4—9.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 2, 6; Curtius, iii. 3, 19; iii. 4, 8. "Nondum enim Memnonem vitâ excessisse cognoverat

(Alexander)—satis gnarus, cuncta in expedito fore, si nihil ab eo moveretur."

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvi. 31.

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of this eminent Rhodian, he was yet more a gainer by the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of Memnon, and to take the offensive against the Macedonians on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived, and were still coming in.<sup>1</sup> Their numbers became greater and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which is given by some as 600,000 men—by others as 400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry. The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language, filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were among them between 20,000 and 30,000 Grecian mercenaries. The Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him. From Sogdiana, Baktria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive; but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian sea had come in—Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbikes, Barkanians, Hyrkanians, Kardakes, &c.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxês in the plain of Doriskus, by piling off a space capable of containing exactly 10,000 men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession.<sup>2</sup> Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an Oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance,—accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength,—the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a God on earth, certain to trample down all before—just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxês,<sup>3</sup> and by stronger reason

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 30, 31. Diodorus represents the Persian king as having begun to issue letters of convocation for the troops, after he heard the death of Memnon; which cannot be true. The letters

must have been sent out before.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iii. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Herodot. vii. 56—and the colloquy between Xerxês and Demaratus vii. 103, 104—where the language put by Herodotus into the mouth

Xerxês respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake, the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgement.

But though such was the persuasion of Orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidêmus; who having incurred the implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together with Ephialtês to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidêmus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidêmus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxês), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidizing an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerable wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle of their immense muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidêmus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius, himself stung with the reply, and still farther

Free speech and sound judgement of Charidêmus. He is put to death by Darius.

f Xerxês is natural and instructive. On the other hand, the superior penetration of Cyrus the younger expresses supreme contempt for the military inefficiency of an

Asiatic multitude — Xenophon, *Anabas.* i. 7, 4. Compare the blunt language of the Arcadian Antiochus—*Xen. Hellen.* vii. 1, 38; and *Cyropæd.* viii. 8, 20.

exasperated by the clamours of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidæmus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late (exclaimed the Athenian) the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you."<sup>1</sup>

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the plans of Memnon—the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the precise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. For at the time of the battle of the Granikus, when Memnon's counsel was originally given, the defensive part of it was not easy to act upon; since the Persians had no very strong or commanding position. But now, in the spring of 333 B.C., they had a line of defence as good as they could possibly desire; advantages, indeed, scarcely to be paralleled elsewhere. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Kilikia; a line of defence (as will presently appear) nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Kilikia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Kilikia and Assyria—and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme could not present itself and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time

Darius abandoned Memnon's plans, just at the time when he had the best defensive positions for executing them with effect.

Darius recalls the Grecian mercenaries from the fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iii. 2, 10-20; Diodor. xvii. 30.

despatched Thymôdes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army.<sup>1</sup> Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favour of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader. If Darius erred, it was not so much in relinquishing the open plain of Sochi, as in originally preferring that plain with a pitched battle, to the strong lines of defence offered by Taurus and Amanus.

Criticism of  
Arrian on  
Darius's  
plan.

The narrative of Arrian, exact perhaps in what it affirms, is not only brief and incomplete, but even omits on various occasions to put in relief the really important and determining points.

While halting at Gordium, Alexander was joined by those newly-married Macedonians whom he had sent home to winter, and who now came back with reinforcements to the number of 3000 infantry and 300 cavalry, together with 200 Thesalian cavalry, and 150 Eleians.<sup>2</sup> As soon as his troops had been sufficiently rested, he marched (probably about the latter half of May) towards Paphlagonia and Kappadokia. At Ankyra he was met by a deputation from the Paphlagonians, who

B.C. 333.  
(Summer).

March of  
Alexander  
from  
Gordium  
through  
Paphla-  
gonia and  
Kappa-  
dokia.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 2, 1; ii. 13, 3. Curtius, iii. 3, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, i. 29, 6.

submitted themselves to his discretion, only entreating that he would not conduct his army into their country. Accepting these terms, he placed them under the government of Kallas, his satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Advancing farther, he subdued the whole of Kappadokia, even to a considerable extent beyond the Halys, leaving therein Sabiktas as satrap.<sup>1</sup>

Having established security in his rear, Alexander marched southward towards Mount Taurus. He reached a post called the Camp of Cyrus, at the northern foot of that mountain, near the pass Tauri-pylæ, or Kilikian Gates, which forms the regular communication between Kappadokia on the north side, and Kilikia on the south, of this great chain. The long road ascending and descending was generally narrow, winding, and rugged, sometimes between two steep and high banks; and it included, near its southern termination, one spot particularly obstructed and difficult. From ancient times, down to the present, the main road from Asia Minor into Kilikia and Syria has run through this pass. During the Roman empire, it must doubtless have received many improvements, so as to render the traffic comparatively easier. Yet the description given of it by modern travellers represents it to be as difficult as any road ever traversed by an army.<sup>2</sup> Seventy years before Alexander, it had been traversed by the younger Cyrus with the 10,000 Greeks, in his march up to attack his brother Artaxerxes; and Xenophon,<sup>3</sup> who then went through it, pronounces it absolutely impracticable for an army, if opposed by any occupying force. So thoroughly persuaded was Cyrus himself of this fact, that he had prepared a fleet,

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 4, 2; Curtius, iii. 1, 22; Plutarch, Alex. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Respecting this pass, see Chap. LXIX. of the present History. There are now two passes over Taurus, from Erekli on the north side of the mountain—one the easternmost, descending upon Adana in Kilikia—the other, the westernmost, upon Tarsus. In the war (1832) between the Turks and Ibrahim Pacha, the Turkish commander left the westernmost pass

undefended, so that Ibrahim Pacha passed from Tarsus along it without opposition. The Turkish troops occupied the easternmost pass, but defended themselves badly, so that the passage was forced by the Egyptians (*Histoire de la Guerre de Mehemed Ali, par Cadavène et Barrault, p. 243*).

Alexander crossed Taurus by the easternmost of the two passes.

<sup>3</sup> Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 20.

in case he found the pass occupied, to land troops by sea in Kilikia in the rear of the defenders; and great indeed was his astonishment to discover that the habitual recklessness of Persian management had left the defile unguarded. The narrowest part, while hardly sufficient to contain four armed men abreast, was shut in by precipitous rocks on each side.<sup>1</sup> Here, if anywhere, was the spot in which the defensive policy of Memnon might have been made sure. To Alexander, inferior as he was by sea, the resource employed by the younger Cyrus was not open.

Yet Arsamês, the Persian satrap commanding at Tarsus in Kilikia, having received seemingly from his master no instructions, or worse than none, acted as if ignorant of the existence of his enterprising enemy north of Mount Taurus. On the first approach of Alexander, the few Persian soldiers occupying the pass fled without striking a blow, being seemingly unprepared for any enemy more formidable than mountain-robbers. Alexander thus became master of this almost insuperable barrier without the loss of a man.<sup>2</sup> On the ensuing day he marched his whole army over it into Kilikia, and arriving in a few hours at Tarsus, found the town already evacuated by Arsamês.<sup>3</sup>

At Tarsus Alexander made a long halt; much longer than he intended. Either from excessive fatigue, or from bathing while hot in the chilly water of the river Kydnus, he was seized with a violent fever, which presently increased to so dangerous a pitch that his life was despaired of. Amidst the grief and alarm with which this misfortune filled the army, none of the physicians would venture to administer remedies, from fear of being held responsible for what threatened to be

B.C. 333.

Conduct of Arsamês, the Persian satrap. Alexander passes Mount Taurus without the least resistance. He enters Tarsus.

B.C. 333.

(Summer).

Dangerous illness of Alexander. His confidence in the physician Philippus, who cures him.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iii. 4, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iii. 4, 11. "Contemplatus locorum situm (Alexander), non alias dicitur magis admiratus esse felicitatem suam," &c.

See Plutarch, Demetrius, 47, where Agathoklês (son of Lysimachus) holds the line of Taurus against Demetrius Poliorkêtês.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 4, 3-8; Curtius, iii.

4. Curtius ascribes to Arsamês the intention of executing what had been recommended by Memnon before the battle of the Granikus — to desolate the country in order to check Alexander's advance. But th's can hardly be the right interpretation of the proceeding. Arrian's account seems more reasonable.

a fatal result.<sup>1</sup> One alone among them, an Akarnanian named Philippus, long known and trusted by Alexander, engaged to cure him by a violent purgative draught. Alexander directed him to prepare it; but before the time for taking it arrived, he received a confidential letter from Parmenio, entreating him to beware of Philippus, who had been bribed by Darius to poison him. After reading the letter, he put it under his pillow. Presently came Philippus with the medicine, which Alexander accepted and swallowed without remark, at the same time giving Philippus the letter to read, and watching the expression of his countenance. The look, words, and gestures of the physician were such as completely to reassure him. Philippus, indignantly repudiating the calumny, repeated his full confidence in the medicine, and pledged himself to abide the result. At first it operated so violently as to make Alexander seemingly worse, and even to bring him to death's door; but after a certain interval, its healing effects became manifest. The fever was subdued, and Alexander was pronounced out of danger, to the delight of the whole army.<sup>2</sup> A reasonable time sufficed to restore him to his former health and vigour.

It was his first operation, after recovery, to send forward Parmenio, at the head of the Greeks, Thessalians, and Thracians, in his army, for the purpose of clearing the forward route and of securing the pass called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria.<sup>3</sup> This narrow road, bounded by the range of Mount Amanus on the east and by the sea on the west, had been once barred by a double cross-wall with gates for passage, marking the original boundaries of Kilikia and Syria. The Gates, about six days' march beyond Tarsus,<sup>4</sup> were found guarded, but

<sup>1</sup> When Hephæstion died of fever at Ekbatana, nine years afterwards, Alexander caused the physician who had attended him to be crucified (Plutarch, *Alexand.* 72; Arrian, vii. 14).

<sup>2</sup> This interesting anecdote is recounted, with more or less of rhetoric and amplification, in all the historians—Arrian, ii. 4; Diodor. xvii. 31; Plutarch, *Alexand.* 19; Curtius, iii. 5; Justin, xi. 8.

It is one mark of the difference produced in the character of Alexander, by superhuman successes

continued for four years—to contrast the generous confidence which he here displayed towards Philippus, with his cruel prejudgement and torture of Philôtas four years afterwards.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 5, 1; Diodor. xvii. 32; Curtius, iii. 7, 6.

<sup>4</sup> Cyrus the younger was five days in marching from Tarsus to Issus, and one day more from Issus to the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, —Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 4, 1; Chap. LXIX of this History.

the guard fled with little resistance. At the same time, Alexander himself, conducting the Macedonian troops in a south-westerly direction from Tarsus, employed some time in mastering and regulating the towns of Anchialus and Soli, as well as the Kilikian mountaineers. Then, returning to Tarsus, and recommencing his forward march, he advanced with the infantry and with his chosen squadron of cavalry, first to Magarsus near the mouth of the river Pyramus, next to Mallus; the general body of cavalry, under Philôtas, being sent by a more direct route across the Alëian plain. Mallus, sacred to the prophet Amphiloehus as patron-hero, was said to be a colony from Argos; on both these grounds Alexander was disposed to treat it with peculiar respect. He offered solemn sacrifice to Amphiloehus, exempted Mallus from tribute, and appeased some troublesome discord among the citizens.<sup>1</sup>

It was at Mallus that he received his first distinct communication respecting Darius and the main Persian army; which was said to be encamped at Sochi in Syria, on the eastern side of Mount Amanus about two days' march from the mountain pass now called Beylan. That pass, traversing the Amanian range, forms the continuance of the main road from Asia Minor into Syria, after having passed first over Taurus, and next through the difficult point of ground above specified (called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria), between Mount Amanus and the sea. Assembling his principal officers, Alexander communicated to them the position of Darius, now encamped in a spacious plain with prodigious superiority of numbers, especially of cavalry. Though the locality was thus rather favourable to the enemy, yet the Macedonians, full of hopes and courage, called upon Alexander to lead them forthwith against him. Accordingly Alexander, well pleased with their alacrity, began his forward march on the following morning. He passed through Issus, where he left some sick and wounded under a moderate guard—then through the Gates of Kilikia and Syria. At the second day's march from those Gates, he reached the seaport Myriandrus, the first town of Syria or Phenicia.<sup>2</sup>

B.C. 333.

March of Alexander out of Kilikia, through Issus, to Myriandrus.

Here, having been detained in his camp one day by a dreadful storm, he received intelligence which altogether

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 5, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 6.

changed his plans. The Persian army had been marched away from Sochi, and was now in Kilikia, following in his rear. It had already got possession of Issus.

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous host, stated at 600,000 men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of gold and silver alone, we are told that there was enough to furnish load for 600 mules and 300 camels.<sup>1</sup> A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross.<sup>2</sup> Much of the treasure and baggage, however, was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

March of Darius from the interior to the eastern side of Mount Amanus. Immense numbers of his army: great wealth and ostentation in it; the treasure and baggage is sent to Damascus.

B.C. 333.

Position of Darius on the plain eastward of Mount Amanus. He throws open the mountain passes, to let Alexander come through, and fight a pitched battle.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Kilikia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes—first, the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea—next, the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realized. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All

Impatience of Darius at the delay of Alexander in Kilikia. He crosses Mount

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iii. 3, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iii. 7, 1.

was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations; and when Alexander, immediately after recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Kilikia, this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenio wished to await the attack of the Persians in Kilikia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so.<sup>1</sup> At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an advance into Kilikia with all his army. Thymôdês indeed, and other intelligent Grecian advisers—together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas—deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that too, speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Kilikia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous.<sup>2</sup> Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Kilikia.<sup>3</sup> To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iii. 7, 8.

<sup>2</sup> From Æschinês (cont. Ktesiphont. p. 552) it seems that Demosthenês, and the anti-Macedonian statesmen at Athens, received letters at this moment written in high spirits, intimating that Alexander was "caught and pinned up" in Kilikia. Demosthenês (if we may believe Æschinês) went about

showing these letters, and boasting of the good news which was at hand. Josephus (Ant. Jud. xi. 8, 3) also reports the confident anticipations of Persian success, entertained by Samballat at Samaria, as well as by all the Asiatics around.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 6; Curtius, iii. 8, 2; Diodor. xvii. 32.

only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible.<sup>1</sup> Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of the enemy.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in the plain—Darius was coming over into Kilikia by the northern pass to drive them before him back into Macedonia.<sup>2</sup> Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms.<sup>3</sup> He then marched forward—along the same road by the shore of the Gulf which had already been followed by Alexander—and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he that he refused to believe the news until it had been confirmed by some officers whom he sent northward along the coast of the Gulf in a small galley, and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favourable auspices under which a battle would now take place.<sup>4</sup> His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be led against the enemy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cicero, *Epist. ad Famil.* xv. 4. See the instructive commentary of Müttzell ad Curtium, iii. 8. p. 103, 104. I have given, in an Appendix to this Volume a Plan of the ground near Issus, together with some explanatory comments.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch (*Alexand.* 20) states this general fact correctly; but he is mistaken in saying that the two armies missed one another in the night, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 7, 2; Curtius, iii. 8, 14. I have mentioned, a few pages back, that about a fortnight before Alexander had sent Parmenio forward from Tarsus to secure the

Gates of Kilikia and Syria, while he himself marched backward to Soli and Anchialus. He and Parmenio must have been separated at this time by a distance not less than eight days of ordinary march. If, during this interval, Darius had arrived at Issus, he would have been just between them, and would have cut them off one from the other. It was Alexander's good luck that so grave an embarrassment did not occur.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, ii. 7. 8.

<sup>5</sup> Arrian, ii. 7; Curtius, iii. 10; Diodor, xvii. 33.

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles.<sup>1</sup> By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Kilikia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward towards Darius. At first the breadth of practicable road was so confined as to admit only a narrow column of march, with the cavalry following the infantry; presently it widened, enabling Alexander to enlarge his front by bringing up successively the divisions of the phalanx. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. On the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five Taxeis or divisions of the phalanx, under Kœnus, Pœdikkas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. Of these three last or left divisions, Kraterus had the general command; himself subject to the orders of Parmenio, who commanded the entire left half of the army. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more than fourteen stadia, or somewhat more than one English mile and a half.<sup>2</sup> From fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenio to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the Companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianes, and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Kretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenio.<sup>3</sup>

Position of the Macedonian army south of the river Pinarus.

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching,

<sup>1</sup> Kallisthenês called the distance 100 stadia (ap. Polyb. xii. 19). This seems likely to be under the truth.

Polybius criticises severely the description given by Kallisthenês of the march of Alexander. Not having before us the words of Kallisthenês himself, we are hard-

ly in a condition to appreciate the goodness of the criticism; which in some points is certainly overstrained.

<sup>2</sup> Kallisthenês ap. Polybius, xii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 8, 4—13.

Position of the Persian army north of the Pinarus. resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw across the river a force of 30,000 cavalry, and 20,000 infantry, to ensure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the river.<sup>1</sup> He composed his phalanx, or main line of battle, of 90,000 hoplites; 30,000 Greek hoplites in the centre, and 30,000 Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Kardakes), on each side of these Greeks. These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude<sup>2</sup>—filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of 20,000 men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites; yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the right bank of the Pinarus the 30,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry

<sup>1</sup> Compare Kallisthenês ap. Polyb. xii. 17; and Arrian, ii. 8, 8. Considering how narrow the space was, such numerous bodies as these 30,000 horse and 20,000 foot must have found little facility in moving. Kallisthenês did not notice them, as far as we can collect from Polybius.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 8, 9. Τοσοῦτους γὰρ ἐπὶ φάλαγγος ἀπλῆς ἐδέχαστο τό χωρίον, ἵνα ἐτάσσοντο.

The depth of this single phalanx is not given, nor do we know the exact width of the ground which it occupied. Assuming a depth of sixteen, and one pace in breadth to each soldier, 4000 men would stand in the breadth of a stadium of 250 paces; and therefore 80,000 men in a breadth of twenty stadia (see the calculation of Rüstow and Köchly (p. 280) about the Macedonian line). Assuming a depth of twenty-six, 6500 men would stand in the breadth of the stadium, and

therefore 90,000 in a total breadth of 14 stadia which is that given by Kallisthenês. But there must have been intervals left, greater or less, we know not how many; the covering detachments, which had been thrown out before the river Pinarus, must have found some means of passing through to the rear, when recalled.

Mr. Kinneir states that the breadth between Mount Amanus and the sea varies between one mile and a half (English) and three miles. The fourteen stadia of Kallisthenês are equivalent to nearly one English mile and three-quarters.

Neither in ancient nor in modern times have Oriental armies ever been trained, by native officers, to regularity of march or array—see Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 498; Volney, Travels in Egypt and Syria, vol. i. p. 124.

were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for them to act, so that they were forced to cross to the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.<sup>1</sup>

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarrissophori, as well as the light infantry, Pæonians and archers, to the front of his right. The Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the 20,000 Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these 20,000 men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills. They manifested so little firmness, and gave way so easily, that he felt no dread of any serious aggressive movement from them. He therefore contented himself with holding back in reserve against them a body of 300 heavy cavalry; while he placed the Agrianians and the rest on the right of his main line, in order to make his front equal to that of his enemies.<sup>2</sup>

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 10, 2. Kallisthenês appears to have reckoned the mercenaries composing the Persian phalanx at 30,000—and the cavalry at 30,000. He does not seem to have taken account of the Kardakes. Yet Polybius in his criticism tries to make out that there was not room for an array of even 60,000; while Arrian enumerates

90,000 hoplites, not including cavalry (Polyb. xii. 18).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 9; Kallisthenês ap. Polyb. xii. 17. The slackness of this Persian corps on the flank, and the ease with which Alexander drove them back—a material point in reference to the battle—are noticed also by Curtius, iii. 9, 11.

the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the Kardakes or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Kardakes scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives.<sup>1</sup> He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 11, 6. εὐθὺς, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄρματος, σὺν τοῖς πρώτοις ἔφευγε, &c.

This simple statement of Arrian is far more credible than the highly wrought details given by Diodorus (xvii. 34) and Curtius (iii. 11, 9) about a direct charge of Alexander upon the chariot of Darius and a murderous combat immediately round that chariot, in which the horses became wounded and unmanageable, so as to be on the point of overturning it. Charès even went so far as to affirm that Alexander had come into personal conflict with Darius, from whom he had received his wound in the thigh (Plutarch, *Alex.* 20). Plutarch had seen the letter addressed by Alexander to Antipater, simply intimating that he had received a slight wound in the thigh.

In respect to this point, as to so many others, Diodorus and Curtius have copied the same authority.

Kallisthenès (ap. Polyb. xii. 22) stated that Alexander had laid his

plan of attack with a view to bear upon the person of Darius, which is not improbable (compare Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 8, 22), and was in fact realized, since the first successful charge of the Macedonians came so near to Darius, as to alarm him for the safety of his own person. To the question put by Polybius—How did Alexander know in what part of the army Darius was?—we may reply, that the chariot and person of Darius would doubtless be conspicuous: moreover, the Persian kings were habitually in the centre—and Cyrus the younger, at the battle of Kunaxa, directed the attack to be made exactly against the person of his brother Artaxerxès.

After the battle of Kunaxa, Artaxerxès assumed to himself the honour of having slain Cyrus with his own hand, and put to death those who had really done the deed because they boasted of it (Plutarch, *Artax.* 16).

to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

This great battle—we might rather say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost,—through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Darius,—within a few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under Kraterus and Parmenio) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy son of Seleukus, with 120 of the front-rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemies' left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.<sup>1</sup>

Alarm and immediate flight of Darius—defeat of the Persians.

<sup>1</sup> This is the supposition of Mr. Williams, and it appears to me probable, though Mr. Ainsworth calls it in question, in consequence of the difficulties of the ground southward of Myriandrus towards the sea. [See Mr. Ainsworth's Essay

on the Cilician and Syrian Gates, *Journal of the Geograph. Society*, 1838, p. 194.] These Greeks, being merely fugitives with arms in their hands—with neither cavalry nor baggage—could make their way over very difficult ground.

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus<sup>1</sup> and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat. Of the Kardakes on the *right* flank of the Grecian hoplites in the Persian line, we hear nothing, nor of the Macedonian infantry opposed to them. Perhaps these Kardakes came little into action, since the cavalry on their part of the field were so severely engaged. At any rate they took part in the general flight of the Persians, as soon as Darius was known to have left the field.<sup>2</sup>

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives were prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; insomuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it.<sup>3</sup> The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken, together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of 3000 talents in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the

Vigorous  
and de-  
structive  
pursuit by  
Alex-  
ander—  
capture of  
the mother  
and wife of  
Darius.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 11, 3; Curtius, iii. 11, 13. Kallisthenès stated the same thing as Arrian—that this Persian cavalry had crossed the Pinarus, and charged the Thessalians with bravery. Polybius censures him for it, as if he had affirmed something false and absurd (xii. 18). This shows that the criti-

cisms of Polybius are not to be accepted without reserve. He reasons as if the Macedonian phalanx *could* not cross the Pinarus—converting a difficulty into an impossibility (xii. 22).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 11; Curtius, iii. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 11, 11; Kallisthenès ap. Polyb. xii. 20.

Persians is said to have amounted to 10,000 horse and 100,000 foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees—Arsamês, Rheomithrês, and Atizyês, who had commanded at the Granikus—Sabakês, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.<sup>1</sup>

The mother, wife, and family of Darius, who became captives, were treated by Alexander's order with the utmost consideration and respect. When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found the Persian regal tent reserved and prepared for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He

Courteous  
treatment  
of the regal  
female  
prisoners  
by Alex-  
ander.

was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learnt that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonnatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a fair contest for the empire of Asia.<sup>2</sup> Besides this anecdote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behaviour to these princesses; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought it necessary to contradict in a letter. It is certain (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.<sup>3</sup>

How this vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 36. Curtius (iii. 11, 27) says that the Macedonians lost thirty-two foot and one hundred and fifty horse, killed; with 504 men wounded;—Justin states, 130 foot, and 150 horse (xi, 9).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 12, 8—from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Compare Diodor.

xvii. 36; Curtius, iii. 11, 24; iii. 12, 17.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alex. 22. ἐγὼ γὰρ (Alexander) οὐχ ὅτι ἐωρακώς ἂν εὗρεθῆιν τὴν Δαρσίου γυναῖκα ἢ βεβουλευμένος ἰδεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν λεγόντων περὶ τῆς εὐμορφίας αὐτῆς προσδεγμένος τὸν λόγον.

Complete dispersion of the Persian army—Darius recrosses the Euphrates—escape of some Perso-Grecian mercenaries.

limits of Kilikia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it—we cannot make out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number, made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads and by-paths; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage, would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies.

Darius managed to get together 4000 of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsakus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of 8000 of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymôdês. These men, fighting their way out of Kilikia (seemingly towards the south, by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phenicia, where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.<sup>1</sup> With this single exception, the enormous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or re-form, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice or thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.<sup>2</sup>

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralysed by

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 13, 2, 3; Diodor. xvii. 48. Curtius says that these Greeks got away by by-paths across the mountains (Amanus)—which may be true (Curtius, iii. 11, 19).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 12, 1; Curtius, iii. 12,

27; Diodor. xvii. 40. The "Are Alexandri, in radicibus Amani," are mentioned by Cicero (ad Famil. xv, 4). When commanding in Kilikia, he encamped there with his army four days.

the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, re-appearing in different places for operations of detail, but we shall find no farther resistance to Alexander, during almost two years, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called—together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show; a contempt not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe. Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter, upon which most remark is usually made, was, that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as I have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any ground, unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish;<sup>1</sup> nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly—as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him.<sup>2</sup> But it was not merely as a general, that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice, in quitting the field

<sup>1</sup> See this faith put forward in the speech of Xerxēs—Herodot. vii. 48: compare the speech of Achæmenēs, vii. 236.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 10, 2. καὶ ταύτη ὡς

δῆλος ἐγένετο (Darius) τοῖς ἀμφ' Ἀλέξανδρον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος (a remarkable expression borrowed from Thucydides, iv. 34). Compare

Arrian, ii. 6, 7.

and thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their effect.<sup>1</sup> Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

Happy was it for Memnon that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it! The fleet in the *Ægean*, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobatês had received from the Macedonians in Karia,<sup>2</sup> was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organize an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his 100 triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios, as the result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of tentriremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Krete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradatês to Halikarnassus.<sup>3</sup> It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Krete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Kretan towns to join the Persians.<sup>4</sup> On the whole,

<sup>1</sup> Immediately before the battle of Kunaxa, Cyrus the younger was asked by some of the Grecian officers, whether he thought that his brother Artaxerxês (who had as yet made no resistance) would fight—"To be sure he will (was

the reply); if he is the son of Darius and Parysatis, and my brother, I shall not obtain the crown without fighting!" Personal cowardice, in a king of Persia at the head of his army, seemed inconceivable (Xenoph. Anab. i. 7, 9).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 5, 8.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian ii. 13, 4-8.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvii. 48.

however, the victory of Issus overawed all free spirit throughout Greece, and formed a guarantee to Alexander for at least a temporary quiescence. The philo-Macedonian synod, assembled at Corinth during the period of the Isthmian festival, manifested their joy by sending to him an embassy of congratulation and a wreath of gold.<sup>1</sup>

With little delay after his victory, Alexander marched through Kœle-Syria to the Phenician coast, detaching Parmenio in his way to attack Damascus, whither Darius, before the battle, had sent most part of his treasure with many confidential officers, Persian women of rank, and envoys. Though the place might have held out a considerable siege, it was surrendered without resistance by the treason or cowardice of the governor; who made a feint of trying to convey away the treasure, but took care that it should fall into the hands of the enemy.<sup>2</sup> There was captured a large treasure—with a prodigious number and variety of attendants and ministers of luxury, belonging to the court and the grandees.<sup>3</sup> Moreover the prisoners made were so numerous, that most of the great Persian families had to deplore the loss of some relative, male or female. There were among them the widow and daughters of king Ochus, the predecessor of Darius—the daughter of Darius's brother Oxathrês—the wives of Artabazus, and of Pharnabazus—the three daughters of Mentor, and Barsinê, widow of the deceased Memnon with her child, sent up by Memnon to serve as an hostage for his fidelity. There were also several eminent Grecian exiles, Theban, Lacedæmonian and Athenian, who had fled to Darius, and whom he had thought fit to send to Damascus, instead of allowing them to use their pikes with the army at Issus. The Theban and Athenian exiles were at once released by Alexander; the Lacedæmonians were for the time put under

B.C. 333.  
(Winter).

Capture of  
Damascus  
by the Ma-  
cedonians,  
with Per-  
sian  
treasure  
and prison-  
ers.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 48; Curtius, iv. 5, 11. Curtius seems to mention this vote later, but it must evidently have been passed at the first Isthmian festival after the battle of Issus.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 11, 13; Curtius, iii. 13. The words of Arrian (ii. 15, 1) — ὁπίσω κομίσαντα ἐς Δαμασκὸν —

confirm the statement of Curtius, that this treasure was captured by Parmenio, not in the town, but in the hands of fugitives who were conveying it away from the town.

<sup>3</sup> A fragment of the letter from Parmenio to Alexander is preserved, giving a detailed list of the articles of booty (Athenæus xiii. p. 607).

arrest, but not detained long. Among the Athenian exiles was a person of noble name and parentage—Iphikratês, son of the great Athenian officer of that name.<sup>1</sup> The captive Iphikratês, not only received his liberty, but was induced by courteous and honourable treatment to remain with Alexander. He died however shortly afterwards from sickness, and his ashes were then collected, by order of Alexander, to be sent to his family at Athens.

I have already stated in a former chapter<sup>2</sup> that the elder Iphikratês had been adopted by Alexander's grandfather into the regal family of Macedonia, as the saviour of their throne. Probably this was the circumstance which determined the superior favour shown to the son, rather than any sentiment either towards Athens or towards the military genius of the father. The difference of position, between Iphikratês the father and Iphikratês the son, is one among the painful evidences of the downward march of Hellenism. The father, a distinguished officer moving amidst a circle of freemen, sustaining by arms the security and dignity of his own fellow-citizens, and even interfering for the rescue of the Macedonian regal family; the son, condemned to witness the degradation of his native city by Macedonian arms, and deprived of all other means of reviving or rescuing her, except such as could be found in the service of an Oriental prince, whose stupidity and cowardice threw away at once his own security and the freedom of Greece.

Master of Damascus and of Kœle-Syria, Alexander advanced onward to Phenicia. The first Phenician town which he approached was Marathus, on the mainland opposite the islet of Aradus, forming, along with that islet and some other neighbouring towns, the domain of the Aradian prince Gerostratus. That prince was himself now serving with his naval contingent among the Persian fleet in the Ægean; but his son Strato, acting as viceroy at

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 15, 5; Curtius, iii. 13, 13—16. There is some discrepancy between the two (compare Arrian, iii. 24, 7) as to the names of the Lacedæmonian envoys.

<sup>2</sup> See above, in this History,

Chaps. LXXVII., LXXIX.; and Æschinês, Fals. Leg. p. 263. c. 13.

Alexander himself had consented to be adopted by Ada princess of Karia as her son (Arrian, i. 23, 12).

home, despatched to Alexander his homage with a golden wreath, and made over to him at once Aradus with the neighbouring towns included in its domain. The example of Strato was followed, first by the inhabitants of Byblus, the next Phenician city in a southerly direction; next, by the great city of Sidon, the queen and parent of all Phenician prosperity. The Sidonians even sent envoys to meet him and invite his approach.<sup>1</sup> Their sentiments were unfavourable to the Persians, from remembrance of the bloody and perfidious proceeding which (about eighteen years before) had marked the recapture of their city by the armies of Ochus.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, the naval contingents both of Byblus and of Sidon (as well as that of Aradus), were at this moment sailing in the Ægean with the Persian admiral Autophradatês, and formed a large proportion of his entire fleet.<sup>3</sup>

While Alexander was still at Marathus, however, previous to his onward march, he received both envoys and a letter from Darius, asking for the restitution of his mother, wife, and children—and tendering friendship and alliance, as from one king to another. Darius farther attempted to show, that the Macedonian Philip had begun the wrong against Persia—that Alexander had continued it—and that he himself (Darius) had acted merely in self-defence. In reply, Alexander wrote a letter, wherein he set forth his own case against Darius, proclaiming himself the appointed leader of the Greeks, to avenge the ancient invasion of Greece by Xerxês. He then alleged various complaints against Darius, whom he accused of having instigated the assassination of Philip as well as the hostilities of the anti-Macedonian cities in Greece. "Now (continued he), by the grace of the Gods, I have been victorious, first over your satraps, next over yourself. I have taken care of all who submit to me, and made them satisfied with their lot. Come yourself to me also, as to the master of all Asia. Come without fear of suffering harm; ask me, and you shall receive back your mother and wife, and anything else which you please. When next you write to me, however, address me not as an equal, but as lord of Asia and of all that belongs to you; otherwise I shall deal

Letter of  
Darius  
soliciting  
peace and  
the restitu-  
tion of the  
regal cap-  
tives.  
Haughty  
reply of  
Alexander.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 14, 11; ii. 15, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvi. 45.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 15, 8; ii. 20, 1. Curtius, iv. 1, 6-16.

with you as a wrong-doer. If you intend to contest the kingdom with me, stand and fight for it, and do not run away. I shall march forward against you, wherever you may be."<sup>1</sup>

This memorable correspondence, which led to no result, is of importance only as it marks the character of Alexander, with whom fighting and conquering were both the business and the luxury of life, and to whom all assumption of equality and independence with himself, even on the part of other kings—every thing short of submission and obedience—appeared in the light of wrong and insult to be avenged. The recital of comparative injuries, on each side, was mere unmeaning pretence. The real and only question was (as Alexander himself had put it in his message to the captive Sisygambis<sup>2</sup>) which of the two should be master of Asia.

The decision of this question, already sufficiently advanced on the morrow after the battle of Issus, was placed almost beyond doubt by the rapid and unopposed successes of Alexander among most of the Phenician cities. The last hopes of Persia now turned chiefly upon the sentiments of these Phenicians. The greater part of the Persian fleet in the Ægean was composed of Phenician triremes, partly from the coast of Syria, partly from the island of Cyprus. If the Phenician towns made submission to Alexander, it was certain that their ships and seamen would either return home spontaneously or be recalled; thus depriving the Persian quiver of its best remaining arrow. But if the Phenician towns held out resolutely against him, one and all, so as to put him under the necessity of besieging them in succession—each lending aid to the rest by sea, with superiority of naval force, and more than one of them being situated upon islets—the obstacles to be overcome would have been so multiplied, that even Alexander's energy and ability might hardly have proved sufficient for them: at any rate, he would have had hard work before him for perhaps two years, opening the door to many new

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii, 14; Curtius, iv. 1, 10; Diodor. xvii. 39. I give the substance of this correspondence from Arrian. Both Curtius and Diodorus represent Darius as offer-

ing great sums of money and large cessions of territory, in exchange for the restitution of the captives. Arrian says nothing of the kind.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 12, 9.

accidents and efforts. It was therefore a signal good fortune to Alexander when the prince of the islet of Aradus spontaneously surrendered to him that difficult city, and when the example was followed by the still greater city of Sidon. The Phenicians, taking them generally, had no positive tie to the Persians; neither had they much confederate attachment one towards the other, although as separate communities they were brave and enterprising. Among the Sidonians, there was even a prevalent feeling of aversion to the Persians, from the cause above mentioned. Hence the prince of Aradus, upon whom Alexander's march first came, had little certainty of aid from his neighbours, if he resolved to hold out; and still less disposition to hold out single-handed, after the battle of Issus had proclaimed the irresistible force of Alexander not less than the impotence of Persia. One after another, all these important Phenician seaports, except Tyre, fell into the hands of Alexander without striking a blow. At Sidon, the reigning prince Strato, reputed as philo-Persian, was deposed, and a person named Abdalonymus—of the reigning family, yet poor in circumstances—was appointed in his room.<sup>1</sup>

With his usual rapidity, Alexander marched onward towards Tyre; the most powerful among the Phenician cities, though apparently less ancient than Sidon. Even on the march, he was met by a deputation from Tyre, composed of the most eminent men in the city, and headed by the son of the Tyrian prince Azemilchus, who was himself absent commanding the Tyrian contingent in the Persian fleet. These men brought large presents and supplies for the Macedonian army, together with a golden wreath of honour; announcing formally that the Tyrians were prepared to do whatever Alexander commanded.<sup>2</sup> In reply, he commended the dispositions of the city, accepted the presents, and desired the deputation to communicate at home, that he wished to enter Tyre and offer sacrifice to Hêraklê. The Phenician God Melkart was supposed identical with the Grecian Hêraklê,

Alexander appears before Tyre—readiness of the Tyrians to surrender, yet not without a point reserved—he determines to besiege the city.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 1, 20-25; Justin, xi. 10. Diodorus (xvii. 47) tells the story as if it had occurred at Tyre, and not at Sidon; which is highly improbable.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 15, 9. ὡς ἐγνωχότων Τυρίων πράσσειν, ὅτι ἂν ἐπαγγέλη Ἀλέξανδρος. Compare Curtius, iv. 2, 3.

and was thus ancestor of the Macedonian kings. His temple at Tyre was of the most venerable antiquity; moreover the injunction, to sacrifice there, is said to have been conveyed to Alexander in an oracle.<sup>1</sup> The Tyrians at home, after deliberating on this message, sent out an answer declining to comply, and intimating that they would not admit within their walls either Macedonians or Persians; but that as to all other points, they would obey Alexander's orders.<sup>2</sup> They added that his wish to sacrifice to Hêraklês might be accomplished without entering their city, since there was in Palætyrus (on the mainland over against the islet of Tyre, separated from it only by the narrow strait) a temple of that God yet more ancient and venerable than their own.<sup>3</sup> Incensed at this qualified adhesion, in which he took note only of the point refused,—Alexander dismissed the envoys with angry menaces, and immediately resolved on taking Tyre by force.<sup>4</sup>

Those who (like Diodorus) treat such refusal on the part of the Tyrians as foolish wilfulness,<sup>5</sup> have not fully considered how much the demand included. When Alexander made a solemn sacrifice to Artemis at Ephesus, he marched to her temple with his whole force armed and in battle array.<sup>6</sup> We cannot doubt that his sacrifice at Tyre to Hêraklês—his ancestral Hero, whose especial attribute was force—would have been celebrated with an array equally formidable, as in fact it was, after the town had been taken.<sup>7</sup> The Tyrians were thus required to admit within their walls an irresistible military force; which might indeed be withdrawn after the sacrifice was completed, but which might also remain, either

<sup>1</sup> Curtius (*ut suprâ*) adds these motives: Arrian inserts nothing beyond the simple request. The statement of Curtius represents what is likely to have been the real fact and the real feeling of Alexander.

It is certainly true that Curtius overloads his narrative with rhetorical and dramatic amplification; but it is not less true that Arrian falls into the opposite extreme—squeezing out his narrative until little is left beyond the dry skeleton.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 16, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, iv. 2, 4; Justin, xi. 10. This item, both prudent and probable, in the reply of the Tyrians is not noticed by Arrian.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian. ii. 16, 11. τοὺς μὲν πρέσβεις πρὸς ὀργὴν ὀπίσω ἀπέπεμψεν &c. Curtius, iv. 2, 5. "Non tenuit iram, cujus alioqui potens non erat," &c.

<sup>5</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 40. Οἱ δὲ Τύριοι βουλομένου τοῦ βασιλέως τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ τῷ Τυρίῳ θύσαι, προπαιτέστερον διεκώλυσαν αὐτὸν τῆς εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσόδου.

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, i. 18, 4.

<sup>7</sup> Arrian ii. 24, 10.

wholly or in part, as permanent garrison of an almost impregnable position. They had not endured such treatment from Persia, nor were they disposed to endure it from a new master. It was in fact, hazarding their all; submitting at once to a fate which might be as bad as could befall them after a successful siege. On the other hand, when we reflect that the Tyrians promised every thing short of submission to military occupation, we see that Alexander, had he been so inclined, could have obtained from them all that was really essential to his purpose, without necessity of besieging the town. The great value of the Phenician cities consisted in their fleet, which now acted with the Persians, and gave to them the command of the sea.<sup>1</sup> Had Alexander required that this fleet should be withdrawn from the Persians and placed in his service, there can be no doubt that he would have obtained it readily. The Tyrians had no motive to devote themselves for Persia, nor did they probably (as Arrian supposes) attempt to trim between the two belligerents, as if the contest was still undecided.<sup>2</sup> Yet rather than hand over their city to the chances of a Macedonian soldiery, they resolved to brave the hazards of a siege. The pride of Alexander, impatient of opposition even to his most extreme demands, prompted him to take a step politically unprofitable, in order to make display of his power, by degrading and crushing, with or without a siege, one of the most ancient, spirited, wealthy, and intelligent communities of the ancient world.

Tyre was situated on an islet nearly half a mile from the mainland;<sup>3</sup> the channel between the two being shallow towards the land, but reaching a depth of eighteen feet in the part adjoining the city. The islet was completely surrounded by prodigious walls, the loftiest portion of which, on

He prepares to besiege Tyre—  
situation of the place.

<sup>1</sup> This is the view expressed by Alexander himself, in his addresses to the army, inviting them to undertake the siege of Tyre (Arrian, ii. 17, 3-8).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 16, 12. Curtius says (iv. 2, 2), "*Tyros facilius societatem Alexandri acceptura videbatur, quam imperium.*" This is representing the pretensions of the Tyrians as greater than the fact

warrants. They did not refuse the *imperium* of Alexander, though they declined compliance with one extreme demand.

Ptolemy I. (son of Lagus) afterwards made himself master of Jerusalem, by entering the town on the Sabbath, under pretence of offering sacrifice (Josephus, Antiq. Jud. xii. 1).

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, iv. 2, 7, 8. The site of

the side fronting the mainland, reached a height of not less than 150 feet, with corresponding solidity and base.<sup>1</sup> Besides these external fortifications, there was a brave and numerous population within, aided by a good stock of arms, machines, ships, provisions, and other things essential to defence.

It was not without reason, therefore, that the Tyrians, when driven to their last resource, entertained hopes of holding out even against the formidable arm of Alexander as he then stood; they might have held out successfully, for he had as yet no fleet, and they could defy any attack made simply from land. The question turned upon the Phœnician and Cyprian ships, which were for the most part (the Tyrian among them) in the *Ægean* under the Persian admiral. Alexander—master as he was of Aradus, Byblus, Sidon, and all the Phœnician cities except Tyre—calculated that the seamen belonging to these cities would follow their countrymen at home and bring away their ships to join him. He hoped also, as the victorious potentate, to draw to himself the willing adhesion of the Cyprian cities. This could hardly have failed to happen, if he had treated the Tyrians with decent consideration; but it was no longer certain, now that he had made them his enemies.

What passed among the Persian fleet under Autophradâtês in the *Ægean*, when they were informed, first that Alexander was master of the other Phœnician cities—next, that he was commencing the siege of Tyre—we know very imperfectly. The Tyrian prince Azemilchus brought home his ships for the defence of his own city;<sup>2</sup> the Sidonian and Aradian ships also went home, no longer serving against a power to whom their own cities had submitted; but the Cyprians hesitated longer before they declared themselves. If Darius, or even Autophradâtês without Darius, instead of abandoning Tyre altogether (as they actually did) had energetically aided the resistance which it offered to Alexander, as the interests of Persia dictated—the Cypriot ships might not improbably have been re-

Tyre at the present day presents nothing in the least conformable to the description of Alexander's time.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 18, 3; ii. 21, 4; ii. 22, 8.

<sup>2</sup> Azemilchus was with Autophradâtês when Alexander declared hostility against Tyre (Arrian, ii. 15, 10); he was in Tyre when it was captured (Arrian, ii. 24, 8).

tained on that side in the struggle. Lastly, the Tyrians might indulge a hope, that their Phenician brethren, if ready to serve Alexander against Persia, would be nowise hearty as his instruments for crushing a kindred city. These contingences, though ultimately they all turned out in favour of Alexander, were in the beginning sufficiently promising to justify the intrepid resolution of the Tyrians; who were farther encouraged by promises of aid from the powerful fleets of their colony Carthage. To that city, whose deputies were then within their walls for some religious solemnities, they sent many of their wives and children.<sup>1</sup>

Alexander began the siege of Tyre without any fleet; the Sidonian and Aradian ships not having yet come. It was his first task to construct a solid mole two hundred feet broad, reaching across the half mile of channel between the mainland and the islet. He pressed into his service labouring hands by thousands from the neighbourhood; he had stones in abundance from Palætyrus, and wood from the forests in Lebanon. But the work, though prosecuted with ardour and perseverance, under pressing instigations from Alexander, was tedious and toilsome, even near the mainland, where the Tyrians could do little to impede it; and became far more tedious as it advanced into the sea, so as to be exposed to their obstruction, as well as to damage from winds and waves. The Tyrian triremes and small boats perpetually annoyed the workmen, and destroyed parts of the work, in spite of all the protection devised by the Macedonians, who planted two towers in front of their advancing mole, and discharged projectiles from engines provided for the purpose. At length, by unremitting efforts the mole was pushed forward until it came nearly across the channel to the city-wall; when suddenly, on a day of strong wind, the Tyrians sent forth a fireship loaded with combustibles, which they drove against the

Alexander constructs a mole across the strait between Tyre and the mainland. The project is defeated.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 2, 10; Arrian, ii. 24, 8; Diodor. xvii. 40, 41. Curtius (iv. 2, 15) says that Alexander sent envoys to the Tyrians to invite them to peace; that the Tyrians not only refused the propositions, but put the deputies to death, contrary to the law of nations. Arrian mentions nothing about this send-

ing of deputies, which he would hardly have omitted to do had he found it stated in his authorities, since it tends to justify the proceedings of Alexander. Moreover it is not conformable to Alexander's temperament, after what had passed between him and the Tyrians.

front of the mole and set fire to the two towers. At the same time, the full naval force of the city, ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt,—the outer woodwork which kept the mole together was torn up in many places,—and a large part of the structure came to pieces.<sup>1</sup>

Alexander had thus not only to construct fresh engines, but also to begin the mole nearly anew. He resolved to give it greater breadth and strength, for the purpose of carrying more towers abreast in front, and for better defence against lateral attacks. But it had now become plain to him, that while the Tyrians were masters of the sea, no efforts by land alone would enable him to take the town. Leaving Perdikkas and Kraterus therefore to reconstruct the mole and build new engines, he himself repaired to Sidon, for the purpose of assembling as large a fleet as he could. He got together triremes from various quarters—two from Rhodes, ten from the seaports in Lykia, three from Soli and Mallus. But his principal force was obtained by putting in requisition the ships of the Phenician towns, Sidon, Byblus, and Aradus, now subject to him. These ships, eighty in number, had left the Persian admiral and come to Sidon, there awaiting his orders; while not long afterwards, the princes of Cyprus came thither also, tendering to him their powerful fleet of 120 ships of war.<sup>2</sup> He was now master of a fleet of 200 sail, comprising the most part, and the best part, of the Persian navy. This was the consummation of Macedonian triumph—the last real and effective weapon wrested from the grasp of Persia. The prognostic afforded by the eagle near the ships at Miletus, as interpreted by Alexander, had now been fulfilled; since by successful operations on land, he had conquered and brought into his power a superior fleet.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 18, 19; Diodor. xvii. 22; Curtius, iv. 3, 6, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 20, 1–4; Curtius, iv. 2, 14. It evinces how strongly Arrian looks at everything from Alexander's point of view, when we find him telling us, that the monarch *forgave* the Phenicians

and Cyprians for their adherence and past service in the Persian fleet, considering that they had acted under compulsion.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian i. 18, 15. In the siege of Tyre (four centuries earlier) by the Assyrian monarch Salmaneser, Sidon and other Phenician towns

Having directed these ships to complete their equipments and training, with Macedonians as soldiers on board, Alexander put himself at the head of some light troops for an expedition of eleven days against the Arabian mountaineers on Libanus, whom he dispersed or put down, though not without some personal exposure and hazard.<sup>1</sup> On returning to Sidon, he found Kleander arrived with a reinforcement of 4000 Grecian hoplites, welcome auxiliaries for prosecuting the siege. Then, going aboard his fleet in the harbour of Sidon, he sailed with it in good battle order to Tyre, hoping that the Tyrians would come out and fight. But they kept within, struck with surprise and consternation; having not before known that their fellow-Phenicians were now among the besiegers. Alexander, having ascertained that the Tyrians would not accept a sea-fight, immediately caused their two harbours to be blocked up and watched; that on the north, towards Sidon, by the Cyprians—that on the south, towards Egypt, by the Phenicians.<sup>2</sup>

He appears before Tyre with a numerous fleet, and blocks up the place by sea.

From this time forward the doom of Tyre was certain. The Tyrians could no longer offer obstruction to the mole, which was completed across the channel and brought up to the town. Engines were planted upon it to batter the walls; moveable towers were rolled up to take them by assault; attack was also made from seaward. Yet though reduced altogether to the defensive, the Tyrians still displayed obstinate bravery, and exhausted all the resources of ingenuity in repelling the besiegers. So gigantic was the strength of the wall fronting the mole, and even that of the northern side fronting Sidon, that none of Alexander's engines could make any breach in it; but on the south side towards Egypt he was more successful. A large breach having been made in this south wall, he assaulted it with two ships manned by the hypaspists and the soldiers of his phalanx: he himself commanded in one and Admêtus in the other. At the same time he caused the town to be menaced all round, at every approachable point, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the defenders. Himself and his

Capture of Tyre by storm—desperate resistance of the citizens.

had lent their ships to the besieger (Menander apud Joseph. Antiq. Jud. ix. 14, 2).

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 20, 5; Plutarch, Alexander, 24.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 20, 9—16.

two ships having been rowed close up to the breach in the south wall, boarding bridges were thrown out from each deck, upon which he and Admêtus rushed forward with their respective storming parties. Admêtus got upon the wall, but was there slain; Alexander also was among the first to mount, and the two parties got such a footing on the wall as to overpower all resistance. At the same time his ships also forced their way into the two harbours, so that Tyre came on all sides into his power.<sup>1</sup>

Though the walls were now lost, and resistance had become desperate, the gallant defenders did not lose their courage. They barricaded the streets, and concentrated their strength especially at a defensible post called the Agenorion, or chapel of Agenor. Here the battle again raged furiously until they were overpowered by the Macedonians, incensed with the long toils of the previous siege, as well as by the slaughter of some of their prisoners, whom the Tyrians had killed publicly on the battlements. All who took shelter in the temple of Hêraklês were spared by Alexander, from respect to the sanctuary: among the number were the prince Azemilchus, a few leading Tyrians, the Carthaginian envoys, and some children of both sexes. The Sidonians also, displaying a tardy sentiment of kindred, and making partial amends for the share which they had taken in the capture, preserved some lives from the sword of the conqueror.<sup>2</sup> But the greater number of the adult

Surviving  
males, 2000  
in number,  
hanged by  
order of  
Alexander.  
The re-  
maining  
captives  
sold.

freemen perished with arms in their hands; while 2000 of them who survived either from disabling wounds, or from the fatigue of the slaughterers, were hanged on the sea-shore by order of Alexander.<sup>3</sup> The females, the children, and the slaves, were sold to the slave-merchant. The number sold is said to have been about 30,000: a total rather small, as we must assume slaves to be included; but we are told that many had been previously sent away to Carthage.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 23, 24; Curtius, iv. 4, 11; Diodor. xvii. 46.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 4, 15.

<sup>3</sup> This is mentioned both by Curtius (iv. 4, 17) and by Diodorus

(xv. 46). It is not mentioned by Arrian, and perhaps may not have found a place in Ptolemy or Aristobulus; but I see no ground for disbelieving it.

Thus master of Tyre, Alexander marched into the city and consummated his much-desired sacrifice to Hêraklês. His whole force, land and naval, fully armed and arrayed, took part in the procession. A more costly hecatomb had never been offered to that God, when we consider that it had been purchased by all the toils of an unnecessary siege, and by the extirpation of these free and high-spirited citizens, his former worshippers.

B.C. 332.

July-Aug.

Duration of the siege for seven months.

Sacrifice of Alexander to Hêraklês.

What the loss of the Macedonians had been, we cannot say. The number of their slain is stated by Arrian at 400,<sup>1</sup> which must be greatly beneath the truth; for the courage and skill of the besieged had prolonged the siege to the prodigious period of seven months, though Alexander had left no means untried to accomplish it sooner.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the close of the siege of Tyre, Alexander received and rejected a second proposition from Darius, offering 10,000 talents, with the cession of all the territory westward of the Euphrates, as ransom for his mother and wife, and proposing that Alexander should become his son-in-law as well as his ally. "If I were Alexander (said Parmenio) I should accept such terms, instead of plunging into farther peril." — "So would I (replied Alexander) if I were Parmenio; but since I am Alexander, I must return a different answer." His answer to Darius was to this effect: — "I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are already mine, and you are tendering to me a part in place of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter, I *shall* marry her — whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish to obtain from me any act of friendship."<sup>3</sup> Alexander might spare the submissive and the prostrate; but he could not brook an equal or a competitor, and his

Second letter from Darius to Alexander, who requires unconditional submission.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iv. 24, 9; Diodorus, xvii. 46.

<sup>2</sup> The resuscitating force of commercial industry is seen by the fact that in spite of this total destruction, Tyre again rose to be a wealthy and flourishing city (Strabo, xvi. p. 757).

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, ii. 25, 5; Curtius, iv. 5. The answer is more insolent in

the naked simplicity of Arrian, than in the pomp of Curtius. Plutarch (Alexand. 29) both abridges and softens it. Diodorus also gives the answer differently (xvii. 54) — and represents the embassy as coming somewhat later in time, after Alexander's return from Egypt.

language towards them was that of brutal insolence. Of course this was the last message sent by Darius, who now saw, if he had not before seen, that he had no chance open except by the renewal of war.

Being thus entire master of Syria, Phenicia, and Palestine, and having accepted the voluntary submission of the Jews, Alexander marched forward to conquer Egypt. He had determined, before he undertook any farther expedition into the interior of the Persian empire, to make himself master of all the coast-lands which kept open the communications of the Persians with Greece, so as to secure his rear against any serious hostility. His great fear was, of Grecian soldiers or cities raised against him by Persian gold;<sup>1</sup> and Egypt was the last remaining possession of the Persians, which gave them the means of acting upon Greece. Those means were indeed now prodigiously curtailed by the feeble condition of the Persian fleet in the *Ægean*, unable to contend with the increasing fleet of the Macedonian admirals Hegelochus and Amphoterus, now numbering 160 sail.<sup>2</sup> During the summer of 332 B.C., while Alexander was prosecuting the siege of Tyre, these admirals recovered all the important acquisitions—Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—which had been made by Memnon for the Persian interests. The inhabitants of Tenedos invited them and ensured their success; those of Chios attempted to do the same, but were coerced by Pharnabazus, who retained the city by means of his insular partisans, Apollonidês and others, with a military force. The Macedonian admirals laid siege to the town, and were presently enabled to carry it by their friends within. Pharnabazus was here captured with his entire force; twelve triremes thoroughly armed and manned, thirty store-ships, several privateers, and 3000 Grecian mercenaries. Aristonikus, philo-Persian despot of Methymna—arriving at Chios shortly afterwards, but ignorant of the capture—was entrapped into the harbour and made prisoner. There remained only Mitylênê, which was held for the Persians by the Athenian Charês, with a garrison of 2000 men: who however, seeing no hope of holding out against the Macedonians, consented to evacuate the city on condition of a free departure. The Persians were thus ex-

The Macedonian fleet overpowers the Persian, and becomes master of the *Ægean* with the islands.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 17, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 5, 14.

pelled from the sea, from all footing among the Grecian islands, and from the vicinity of Greece and Macedonia.<sup>1</sup>

These successes were in full progress, when Alexander himself directed his march from Tyre to Egypt, stopping in his way to besiege Gaza. This considerable town, the last before entering on the desert track between Syria and Egypt, was situated between one and two miles from the sea.

March of  
Alexander  
towards  
Egypt—  
siege of  
Gaza.

It was built upon a lofty artificial mound, and encircled with a high wall; but its main defence was derived from the deep sand immediately around it, as well as from the mud and quicksand on its coast. It was defended by a brave man, the eunuch Batis, with a strong garrison of Arabs, and abundant provision of every kind. Confiding in the strength of the place, Batis refused to admit Alexander. Moreover his judgement was confirmed by the Macedonian engineers themselves, who, when Alexander first surveyed the walls, pronounced it to be impregnable, chiefly from the height of its supporting mound. But Alexander could not endure the thought of tacitly confessing his inability to take Gaza. The more difficult the enterprise, the greater was the charm for him, and the greater would be the astonishment produced all around when he should be seen to have triumphed.<sup>2</sup>

He began by erecting a mound south of the city, close by the wall for the purpose of bringing up his battering engines. This external mound was completed, and the engines had begun to batter the wall, when a well-planned sally by the garrison overthrew the assailants and destroyed the engines. The timely aid of Alexander himself with his hypaspists, protected their retreat; but he himself, after escaping a snare from a pretended Arabian deserter, received a severe wound through the shield and the breastplate into the shoulder, by a dart discharged from a catapult; as the prophet Aristander

His first  
assaults  
fail—he is  
wounded—  
he erects  
an immense  
mound  
round the  
town.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 5, 14—22; Arrian, iii. 2, 4—8.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 26, 5. Οἱ δὲ μηχανοποιοὶ γνώμην ἀπεδείκνυντο, ἀπορον εἶναι βίᾳ ἐλεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, διὰ ὕψος τοῦ χώματος· ἀλλ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐδόκει αἰρετέον εἶναι, ὅσῳ ἀπορώτερον ἐκπλήξειν γάρ τοὺς πολεμίους τὸ ἔργον

τῷ παραλόγῳ ἐπὶ μάχῃ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐλεῖν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι αὐτοῖς, λεγόμενον ἔς τε τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ Δαρσίον.

About the fidelity and obstinate defensive courage, shown more than once by the inhabitants of Gaza—see Polybius, xvi. 40.

had predicted — giving assurance at the same time, that Gaza would fall into his hands.<sup>1</sup> During the treatment of his wound, he ordered the engines employed at Tyre to be brought up by sea; and caused his mound to be carried around the whole circumference of the town, so as to render it approachable from every point. This Herculean work, the description of which we read with astonishment, was 250 feet high all round, and two stadia (1240 feet) broad;<sup>2</sup> the loose sand around could hardly have been suitable, so that materials must have been brought up from a distance. The undertaking was at length completed; in what length of time we do not know, but it must have been considerable—though doubtless thousands of labourers would be pressed in from the circumjacent country.<sup>3</sup>

Gaza is taken by storm, after a siege of two months. Gaza was now attacked at all points by battering-rams, by mines, and by projectile engines with various missiles. Presently the walls were breached in several places, though the defenders were unremitting in their efforts to repair the damaged parts. Alexander attempted three distinct general assaults; but in all three he was repulsed by the bravery of the Gazæans. At length, after still farther breaching of the wall, he renewed for the fourth time his attempt to storm. The entire Macedonian phalanx being brought up to attack at different points, the greatest emulation reigned among the officers. The Æakid Neoptolemus was first to mount the wall; but the other divisions manifested hardly less ardour, and the town was at length taken. Its gallant defenders resisted with unabated spirit to the last; and all fell in their posts, the incensed soldiery being no way disposed to give quarter.

One prisoner alone was reserved for special treatment — the prince or governor himself, the eunuch Batis; who, having manifested the greatest energy and valour, was taken severely wounded, yet

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 26, 27; Curtius, iv. 6, 12—18; Plutarch, Alexand. 25.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 27, 5. *χωμα χωννύσαι ἐν κύκλῳ παντόθεν τῆς πόλεως*. It is certainly possible, as Droysen remarks (*Gesch. Alex. des Grossen* p. 199), that *παντόθεν* is not to be interpreted with literal strictness, but only as meaning in *many*

*different portions* of the walled circuit. Yet if this had been intended, Arrian would surely have said *χωμαζα* in the plural, not *χωμα*.

<sup>3</sup> Diodorus (xvii. 48) states the whole duration of the siege as two months. This seems rather under than over the probable truth.

still alive. In this condition he was brought by Leonnatus and Philôtas into the presence of Alexander, who cast upon him looks of vengeance and fury. The Macedonian prince had undertaken the siege mainly in order to prove to the world that he could overcome difficulties insuperable to others. But he had incurred so much loss, spent so much time and labour, and undergone so many repulses before he succeeded, that the palm of honour belonged rather to the minority vanquished than to the multitude of victors. To such disappointment, which would sting Alexander in the tenderest point, is to be added the fact, that he had himself incurred great personal risk, received a severe wound, besides his narrow escape from the dagger of the pretended Arabian deserter. Here was ample ground for violent anger; which was moreover still farther exasperated by the appearance of Batis—an eunuch—a black man—tall and robust, but at the same time fat and lumpish—and doubtless at the moment covered with blood and dirt. Such visible circumstances, repulsive to eyes familiar with Grecian gymnastics, contributed to kindle the wrath of Alexander to its highest pitch. After the siege of Tyre, his indignation had been satiated by the hanging of the 2000 surviving combatants; here, to discharge the pressure of a still stronger feeling, there remained only the single captive, upon whom therefore he resolved to inflict a punishment as novel as it was cruel. He directed the feet of Batis to be bored, and brazen rings to be passed through them; after which the naked body of this brave man, yet surviving, was tied with cords to the tail of a chariot driven by Alexander himself, and dragged at full speed amidst the triumphant jeers and shouts of the army.<sup>1</sup> Herein Alexander, emulous even from childhood of the exploits of his legendary ancestor Achilles,

governor  
Batis, who  
becomes  
prisoner,  
severely  
wounded.

Wrath of  
Alexander  
against  
Batis,  
whom he  
causes to  
be tied to a  
chariot,  
and drag-  
ged round  
the town.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 6, 25—30; Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verbor. p. 123—125—with the citation there given from Hegesias of Magnesia. Diodorus (xvii. 48, 49) simply mentions Gaza in two sentences, but gives no details of any kind.

Arrian says nothing about the treatment of Batis, nor did he

probably find anything about it in Ptolemy or Aristobulus. There are assignable reasons why they should pass it over in silence, as disgraceful to Alexander. But Arrian, at the same time, says nothing inconsistent with or contradicting the statement of Curtius while he himself recognizes how

copied the ignominious treatment described in the *Iliad* as inflicted on the dead body of Hektor.<sup>1</sup>

This proceeding of Alexander, the product of Homeric reminiscences operating upon an infuriated and vindictive temperament, stands out in respect of barbarity from all that we read respecting the treatment of conquered towns in antiquity. His remaining measures were conformable to received usage. The wives and children of the Gazæans were sold into slavery. New inhabitants were admitted from the neighbourhood, and a garrison was placed there to hold the town for the Macedonians.<sup>2</sup>

The two sieges of Tyre and Gaza, which occupied both together nine months,<sup>3</sup> were the hardest fighting that Alexander had ever encountered, or in fact ever did encounter throughout his life. After such toils, the march to Egypt, which he now commenced (October 332 B.C.), was an affair of holiday and triumph. Mazakês, the satrap of Egypt, having few Persian troops and a disaffected native population, was noway disposed to resist the approaching conqueror. Seven days' march brought Alexander and his army from Gaza to Pelusium, the frontier fortress of Egypt, commanding the eastern branch of the Nile, whither his fleet, under the command of Hephæstion, had come also. Here he found not only open gates and a submissive governor, but also crowds of Egyptians assembled to welcome him.<sup>4</sup> He placed a garrison in Pelusium, sent his fleet up the river to Memphis, and marched himself to the same place by land. The satrap Mazakês surrendered himself, with all the treasure in the city, 800 talents in amount, and much precious furniture. Here Alexander reposed some time, offerings splendid

emulous Alexander was of the proceedings of Achilles (vii. 14, 7).

The passage describing this scene, cited from the lost author Hegesias by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, as an example of bad rhythm and taste, has the merit of bringing out the details respecting the person of Batis, which were well calculated to disgust and aggravate the wrath of Alexander. The bad taste of Hegesias as a writer does

not diminish his credibility as a witness.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, vii. 14, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, ii. 27, 11. About the circumstances and siege of Gaza, see the work of Stark, *Gaza und die Philistäische Küste*, p. 242. Leip. 1852.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 48; Josephus, Antiq. xi. 4.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, iii. 1, 3; Curtius, iv. 7, 1, 2; Diodor. xvii. 49.

sacrifices to the Gods generally, and especially to the Egyptian God Apis; to which he added gymnastic and musical matches, sending to Greece for the most distinguished artists.

From Memphis, he descended the westernmost branch of the Nile to Kanôpus at its mouth, from whence he sailed westerly along the shore to look at the island of Pharos, celebrated in Homer, and the lake Mareôtis. Reckoning Egypt now as a portion of his empire, and considering that the business of keeping down an unquiet population, as well as of collecting a large revenue, would have to be performed by his extraneous land and sea force, he saw the necessity of withdrawing the seat of government from Memphis, where both the Persians and the natives had maintained it, and of founding a new city of his own on the seaboard, convenient for communication with Greece and Macedonia. His imagination, susceptible to all Homeric impressions and influenced by a dream, first fixed upon the isle of Pharos as a suitable place for his intended city.<sup>1</sup> Perceiving soon, however, that this little isle was inadequate by itself, he included it as part of a larger city to be founded on the adjacent mainland. The Gods were consulted, and encouraging responses were obtained; upon which Alexander himself marked out the circuit of the walls, the direction of the principal streets, and the sites of numerous temples to Grecian Gods as well as Egyptian.<sup>2</sup> It was thus that the first stone was laid of the mighty, populous, and busy Alexandria; which however the founder himself never lived to see, and wherein he was only destined to repose as a corpse. The site of the place between the sea and the Lake Mareôtis, was found airy and healthy, as well as convenient for shipping and commerce. The protecting island of Pharos gave the means of forming two good harbours for ships coming by sea, on a coast harbourless elsewhere; while the Lake Mareôtis, communicating by various canals with the river Nile, received with facility the exportable produce from the interior.<sup>3</sup> As soon as houses were ready,

He determines on founding Alexandria.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 8, 1-4; Plutarch, Alexand. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 1, 8; Curtius, iv. 8, 2-6; Diodor. xvii. 52.

<sup>3</sup> Strabo, xvii. p. 793. Other au-

thors however speak of the salubrity of Alexandria less favourably than Strabo: see St. Croix, Examen des Hist. d'Alexandre, p. 287.

commencement was made by the intendant Kleomenês, transporting to them in mass the population of the neighbouring town of Kanôpus, and probably of other towns besides.<sup>1</sup>

Alexandria became afterwards the capital of the Ptolemaic princes. It acquired immense grandeur and population during their rule of two centuries and a half, when their enormous revenues were spent greatly in its improvement and decoration. But we cannot reasonably ascribe to Alexander himself any prescience of such an imposing future. He intended it as a place from which he could conveniently rule Egypt, considered as a portion of his extensive empire all round the Ægean; and had Egypt remained thus a fraction, instead of becoming a substantive imperial whole, Alexandria would probably not have risen beyond mediocrity.<sup>2</sup>

The other most notable incident, which distinguished the four or five months' stay of Alexander in Egypt, was his march through the sandy desert to the temple of Zeus Ammon. This is chiefly memorable as it marks his increasing self-adoration and inflation above the limits of humanity. His achievements during the last three years had so transcended the expectations of every one, himself included—the Gods had given to him such incessant good fortune, and so paralysed or put down his enemies—that the hypothesis of a superhuman personality seemed the natural explanation of such a superhuman career.<sup>3</sup> He had to look back to the heroic legends, and to his ancestors Perseus and Hêraklês, to find a worthy prototype.<sup>4</sup> Conceiving himself to be (like them) the son of Zeus, with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon. His march of several days, through a sandy desert—always fatiguing, sometimes perilous,—was distinguished by manifest evidences of the favour of

<sup>1</sup> Pseudo - Aristotle *Œconomic*. ii. 32.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian iii. 5, 4-9. Tacitus (*Annal.* i. 11) says about Egypt under the Romans—"provinciam aditu difficilem, annonæ fecundam, superstitione et lasciviâ discordem et mobilem, insciam legum, ignaram

magistratum," &c. Compare Polybius ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 797.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 51. τεκμήρια δ' ἔσθαι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσεως τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι κατορθωμάτων (answer of the priest of Ammon to Alexander).

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, iii. 3, 2.

the Gods. Unexpected rain fell just when the thirsty soldiers required water. When the guides lost their track, from shifting of the sand, on a sudden two speaking serpents, or two ravens, appeared preceding the march and indicating the right direction. Such were the statements made by Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and Kallisthenês, companions and contemporaries; while Arrian, four centuries afterwards, announces his positive conviction that there was a divine intervention on behalf of Alexander, though he cannot satisfy himself about the details.<sup>1</sup> The priest of Zeus Ammon addressed Alexander, as being the son of the God, and farther assured him that his career would be one of uninterrupted victory, until he was taken away to the Gods; while his friends also, who consulted the oracle for their own satisfaction, received for answer that the rendering of divine honours to him would be acceptable to Zeus. After profuse sacrifices and presents, Alexander quitted the oracle, with a full and sincere faith that he really was the son of Zeus Ammon; which faith was farther confirmed by declarations transmitted to him from other oracles—that of Erythræ in Ionia, and of Branchidæ near Miletus.<sup>2</sup> Though he did not directly order himself to be addressed as the son of Zeus, he was pleased with those who volunteered such a recognition, and angry with sceptics or scoffers, who disbelieved the oracle of Ammon. Plutarch thinks that this was a mere political manœuvre of Alexander, for the purpose of overawing the non-Hellenic population over whom he was enlarging his empire.<sup>3</sup> But it seems rather to have been a genuine faith,—a simple exaggeration of that exorbitant vanity which from the beginning reigned so largely in his bosom. He was indeed aware that it was repugnant to the leading Macedonians in many ways, but especially as a deliberate insult to the memory of Philip. This is the theme always touched upon in moments of dissatisfaction. To Parmenio, to Philôtas,

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 3, 12. Καὶ ὅτι μὲν θεῶν τι ξυνέπελαβεν αὐτῷ, ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶδος ταύτῃ ἔχει τὸ δ' ἀτρεχὲς τοῦ λόγου ἀφείλοντο οἱ ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἐξηγησάμενοι.

Compare Curtius, iv. 7, 12—15; Diodor. xvii. 49—51; Plutarch. Alex.

27; Kallisthenês ap. Strabon. xvii. p. 814.

<sup>2</sup> Kallisthenês, Fragm. xvi. ap. Alex. Magn. Histor. Scriptor. ed. Geier. p. 257; Strabo, xvii. p. 814.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. 28. Arrian hints at the same explanation (vii. 29, 6).

to Kleitus, and other principal officers, the insolence of the king, in disclaiming Philip and putting himself above the level of humanity, appeared highly offensive. Discontents on this subject among the Macedonian officers, though condemned to silence by fear and admiration of Alexander, became serious, and will be found reappearing hereafter.<sup>1</sup>

The last month of Alexander's stay in Egypt was passed at Memphis. While nominating various officers for the permanent administration of the country, he also received a visit of Hegelochus his admiral, who brought as prisoners Aristonikis of Methymna, and other despots of the various Grecian cities. Alexander ordered them to be handed over to their respective cities, to be dealt with as the citizens pleased; all except the Chian Apollonidês, who was sent to Elephantinê in the south of Egypt for detention. In most of the cities, the despots had incurred such violent hatred, that when delivered up, they were tortured and put to death.<sup>2</sup> Pharnabazus also had been among the prisoners, but had found means to escape from his guards when the fleet touched at Kos.<sup>3</sup>

In the early spring, after receiving reinforcements of Greeks and Thracians, Alexander marched into Phenicia. It was there that he regulated the affairs of Phenicia, Syria, and Greece, prior to his intended expedition into the interior against Darius. He punished the inhabitants of Samaria, who had revolted and burnt alive the Macedonian prefect Andromachus.<sup>4</sup> In addition to all the business transacted, Alexander made costly presents to the Tyrian Hêraklês, and offered splendid sacrifices to other Gods. Choice festivals with tragedy were also celebrated, analogous to the Dionysia at Athens, with the best actors and chorists contending for the prize. The princes of Cyprus vied with each other in doing honour to the son of Zeus Ammon; each undertaking the duty of chorêgus, getting up at his own cost a drama with distinguished chorus and actors, and striving to obtain the prize from

B.C. 331.  
(January).  
Arrangements made by Alexander at Memphis—Grecian prisoners brought from the Ægean.

B.C. 331.  
(February—March).  
He proceeds to Phenicia—message from Athens. Splendid festivals. Reinforcements sent to Antipater.

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 10, 3—"fastidio esse patriam, abdicari Philippum patrem, cœlum vanis cogitationibus petere." Arrian, iii. 26, 1; Curtius,

vi. 9, 18; vi. 11, 23.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 8, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 2, 8, 9.

<sup>4</sup> Curtius, iv. 8, 10.

pre-appointed judges—as was practised among the ten tribes at Athens.<sup>1</sup>

In the midst of these religious and festive exhibitions, Alexander was collecting magazines for his march into the interior.<sup>2</sup> He had already sent forward a detachment to Thapsakus, the usual ford of the Euphrates, to throw bridges over the river. The Persian Mazæus was on guard on the other side, with a small force of 3000 men, 2000 of them Greeks; not sufficient to hinder the bridges from being built, but only to hinder them from being carried completely over to the left bank. After eleven days of march from Phenicia, Alexander and his whole army reached Thapsakus. Mazæus, on the other side, as soon as he saw the main army arrive, withdrew his small force without delay, and retreated to the Tigris; so that the two bridges were completed, and Alexander crossed forthwith.<sup>3</sup>

Once over the Euphrates, Alexander had the option of marching down the left bank of that river to Babylon, the chief city of the Persian empire, and the natural place to find Darius.<sup>4</sup> But this march (as we know from Xenophon, who made it with the Ten Thousand Greeks) would be one of extreme suffering and through a desert country where no provisions were to be got. Moreover, Mazæus in retreating had taken a northeasterly direction towards the upper part of the Tigris; and some prisoners reported that Darius with his main army was behind the Tigris, intending to defend the passage of that river against Alexander. The Tigris appears not to be fordable below Nineveh (Mosul). Accordingly he directed his march, first nearly northward, having

B.C. 331.  
(June-  
July).

He marches  
to the  
Euphrates  
—crosses it  
without  
opposition  
at Thap-  
sakus.

March  
across from  
the Euph-  
rates to  
the Tigris.  
Alexander  
fords the  
Tigris  
above  
Nineveh,  
without  
resistance.

<sup>1</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. 29; Arrian, l. c.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian iii. 6, 12.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian iii. 7, 1—6; Curtius, iv. 9, 12 — “undecimis castris pervenit ad Euphraten.”

<sup>4</sup> So Alexander considers Babylon (Arrian, iii. 17, 3-10)—προχωρησάντων ἔξιν τῇ δυνάμει ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνά τε καὶ Δαρείον . . . . τὸν τε ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος στόλον ποιησόμεθα, &c.

This is the explanation of Arrian's remark, iii. 7, 6—where he assigns the reason why Alexander, after passing the Euphrates at Thapsakus, did not take the straight road towards Babylon. Cyrus the younger marched directly to Babylon to attack Artaxerxēs. Susa, Ekbatana, and Persepolis were more distant, and less exposed to an enemy from the west.

the Euphrates on his left hand; next eastward across Northern Mesopotamia, having the Armenian mountains on his left hand. On reaching the ford of the Tigris, he found it absolutely undefended. Not a single enemy being in sight, he forded the river as soon as possible, with all his infantry, cavalry, and baggage. The difficulties and perils of crossing were extreme, from the depth of the water, above their breasts, the rapidity of the current, and the slippery footing.<sup>1</sup> A resolute and vigilant enemy might have rendered the passage almost impossible. But the good fortune of Alexander was not less conspicuous in what his enemies left undone, than in what they actually did.<sup>2</sup>

After this fatiguing passage, Alexander rested for two days. During the night an eclipse of the moon occurred, nearly total; which spread consternation among the army, combined with complaints against his overweening insolence, and mistrust as to the unknown regions on which they were entering. Alexander, while offering solemn sacrifices to Sun, Moon, and Earth, combated the prevailing depression by declarations from his own prophet Aristander and from Egyptian astrologers, who proclaimed that Helios favoured the Greeks, and Selênê the Persians; hence the eclipse of the moon portended victory to the Macedonians — and victory too (so Aristander promised), before the next new moon. Having thus reassured the soldiers, Alexander marched for four days in a south-easterly direction through the territory called Aturia, with the Tigris on his right hand, and the Gordyene or Kurd mountains on his left. Encountering a small advanced guard of the Persians, he here learnt from prisoners that Darius with his main host was not far off.<sup>3</sup>

Nearly two years had elapsed since the ruinous defeat of Issus. What Darius had been doing during this long interval, and especially during the first half of it, we are unable to say. We hear only of one proceeding on his part—his missions, twice repeated, to Alexander, tendering or entreating peace, with

B.C. 331.  
(Sept. 20).  
Eclipse of  
the moon.  
Alexander  
approaches  
near to the  
army of  
Darius in  
position.

B.C. 331.  
(September).

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 7, 8; Diodor. xvii. 55; Curtius, iv. 9, 17–24. “Magna munimenta regni Tigris atque Euphrates erant,” is a part of the speech put into the mouth of Darius before the battle of Arbêla,

by Curtius (iv. 14, 10). Both these great defences were abandoned.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 9, 23; Plutarch, Alexand. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 7, 12; iii. 8, 3. Curtius, iv. 10, 11–18.

the especial view of recovering his captive family. Nothing else does he appear to have done, either to retrieve the losses of the past, or to avert the perils of the future; nothing, to save his fleet from passing into the hands of the conqueror; nothing, to relieve either Tyre or Gaza, the sieges of which collectively occupied Alexander for near ten months. The disgraceful flight of Darius at Issus had already lost him the confidence of several of his most valuable servants. The Macedonian exile Amyntas, a brave and energetic man, with the best of the Grecian mercenaries, gave up the Persian cause as lost,<sup>1</sup> and tried to set up for himself, in which attempt he failed and perished in Egypt. The satrap of Egypt, penetrated with contempt for the timidity of his master, was induced, by that reason as well as by others, to throw open the country to Alexander.<sup>2</sup> Having incurred so deplorable a loss, as well in reputation as in territory, Darius had the strongest motives to redeem it by augmented vigour.

Inaction of Darius since the defeat at Issus.

But he was paralysed by the fact, that his mother, his wife, and several of his children, had fallen into the hands of the conqueror. Among the countless advantages growing out of the victory of Issus, this acquisition was not the least. It placed Darius in the condition of one who had given hostages for good behaviour to his enemy. The Persian kings were often in the habit of exacting from satraps or generals the deposit of their wives and families, as a pledge for fidelity; and Darius himself had received this guarantee from Memnon, as a condition of entrusting him with the Persian fleet.<sup>3</sup> Bound by the like chains himself, towards one who had now become his superior, Darius was afraid to act with energy, lest success should bring down evil upon his captive family. By allowing Alexander to subdue unopposed all the territory west of the Euphrates, he hoped to be allowed to retain his empire eastward, and to ransom back his family at an enormous

Paralysing effect upon him produced by the captivity of his mother and wife.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, ii. 13; Curtius, iv. 1, 27—30 — "cum in illo statu rerum id quemque, quod occupasset, habiturum arbitraretur" (Amyntas).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 1, 3. τήν τε ἐν Ἰσση μάχην ὅπως συνέβη πεπυσμένος (the

satrap of Egypt) καὶ Δαρσίον ὅτι αἰσχροῦ φυγῇ ἔφυγε, &c.

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 23. Compare Xenophon, Anabasis, i. 4, 9; Herodot. vii. 10.

price. Such propositions did satisfy Parmenio, and would probably have satisfied even Philip, had Philip been the victor. The insatiate nature of Alexander had not yet been fully proved. It was only when the latter contemptuously rejected everything short of surrender at discretion, that Darius began to take measures east of the Euphrates for defending what yet remained.

The conduct of Alexander towards the regal hostages honourable as it was to his sentiment, evinced at the same time that he knew their value as a subject of political negotiation.<sup>1</sup> It was essential that he should treat them with the full deference due to their rank, if he desired to keep up their price as hostages in the eyes of Darius as well as of his own army. He carried them along with his army, from the coast of Syria, over the bridge of the Euphrates, and even through the waters of the Tigris. To them, this must have proved a severe toil; and in fact, the queen Statira became so worn out that she died shortly after crossing the Tigris;<sup>2</sup> to him also, it must have been

Good treatment of the captive females by Alexander — necessary to keep up their value as hostages.

<sup>1</sup> The praise bestowed upon the continence of Alexander, for refusing to visit Statira the wife of Darius, is exaggerated even to absurdity.

In regard to women, Alexander was by temperament cold, the opposite of his father Philip. During his youth, his development was so tardy, that there was even a surmise of some physical disability (Hieronymus ap. Athenæ. x. p. 435). As to the most beautiful persons, of both sexes, he had only to refuse the numerous tenders made to him by those who sought to gain his favour (Plutarch, Alex. 22). Moreover, after the capture of Damascus, he did select for himself, from among the female captives, Barsinè, the widow of his illustrious rival Memnon; daughter of Artabazus, a beautiful woman of engaging manners, and above all, distinguished, by having received Hellenic education, from the simply Oriental harem of Darius

(Plutarch, Alex. 21). In adopting the widow of Memnon as his mistress, Alexander may probably have had present to his imagination the example of his legendary ancestor Neoptolemus, whose tender relations with Andromachè, widow of his enemy Hektor, would not be forgotten by any reader of Euripidès. Alexander had by Barsinè a son called Hèraklès.

Lastly, Alexander was so absorbed by ambition, — so overcharged with the duties and difficulties of command, which he always performed himself, — and so continually engaged in fatiguing bodily effort, — that he had little leisure left for indulgence; such leisure as he had, he preferred devoting to wineparties with the society and conversation of his officers.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 10, 19. "Itineris continui labore animique ægritudine fatigata," &c.

Curtius and Justin mention a third embassy sent by Darius (im-

an onerous obligation, since he not only sought to ensure to them all their accustomed pomp, but must have assigned a considerable guard to watch them, at a moment when he was marching into an unknown country, and required all his military resources to be disposable. Simply for safe detention, the hostages would have been better guarded and might have been treated with still greater ceremony, in a city or a fortress. But Alexander probably wished to have them near him, in case of the possible contingency of serious reverses to his army on the eastern side of the Tigris. Assuming such a misfortune to happen, the surrender of them might ensure a safe retreat under circumstances otherwise fatal to its accomplishment.

Being at length convinced that Alexander would not be satisfied with any prize short of the entire Persian empire, Darius summoned all his forces to defend what he still retained. He brought together a host said to be superior in number to that which had been defeated at Issus.<sup>1</sup> Contingents arrived from the farthest extremities of the vast Persian territory—from the Caspian sea, the rivers Oxus and Indus, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea. The plains eastward of the Tigris, about the latitude of the modern town of Mosul, between that river and the Gordyene mountains (Zagros), were fixed upon for the muster of this prodigious multitude; partly conducted by Darius himself from Babylon, partly arriving there by different routes from the north, east, and south. Arbêla—a considerable town about twenty miles east of the Great Zab river, still known under the name of Erbil, as a caravan station on the ordinary road between Erzeroum and Bagdad—was fixed on as the muster-place or head-quarters, where the chief magazines were collected and the heavy baggage lodged, and near which the troops were first assembled and exercised.<sup>2</sup>

Immense  
army col-  
lected by  
Darius, in  
the plains  
eastward of  
the Tigris  
—near  
Arbêla.

But the spot predetermined for a pitched battle was, the neighbourhood of Gaugamela near the river Bumôdus,

mediately after having heard of the death and honourable obsequies of Statira) to Alexander, asking for peace. The other authors allude only to two tentatives of

this kind; and the third seems by no means probable.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 7, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Diodorus, xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 9, 9.

He fixes the spot for encamping and awaiting the attack of Alexander—in a level plain near Gaugamela. about thirty miles west of Arbêla, towards the Tigris, and about as much south-east of Mosul—a spacious and level plain, with nothing more than a few undulating slopes, and without any trees. It was by nature well adapted for drawing up a numerous army, especially for the free manœuvres of cavalry, and the rush of scythed chariots; moreover, the Persian officers had been careful beforehand to level artificially such of the slopes as they thought inconvenient.<sup>1</sup> There seemed every thing in the ground to favour the operation both of the vast total, and the special forces, of Darius; who fancied that his defeat at Issus had been occasioned altogether by his having ventured himself in the narrow defiles of Kilikia—and that on open and level ground his superior numbers must be triumphant. He was even anxious that Alexander should come and attack him on the plain. Hence the undefended passage of the Tigris.

For those who looked only to numbers, the host assembled at Arbêla might well inspire confidence; for it is said to have consisted of 1,000,000 of infantry<sup>2</sup>—40,000 cavalry—200 scythed chariots—and fifteen elephants; of which animals we now read for the first time in a field of battle. But besides the numbers, Darius had provided for his troops more effective arms; instead of mere javelins, strong swords and short thrusting pikes, such as the Macedonian cavalry wielded so admirably in close combat—together with shields for the infantry and breastplates for the horsemen.<sup>3</sup> He counted much also on the terrific charge of the chariots, each of which had a pole projecting before the horses and terminating in a sharp

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 9, 12. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσα ἀνὼματα αὐτοῦ ἐς ἱππασίαν, ταῦτά τε ἐκ πολλοῦ οἱ Πέρσαι τοῖς τε ἄρμασιν ἐπελαύνειν εὐπεστὴ πεποιήκεσαν καὶ τῇ ἱππῳ ἱππασίμα.

<sup>2</sup> This is the total given by Arrian as what he found set forth (ἐλέγχο), probably the best information which Ptolemy and Aristobulus could procure (Arrian, iii. 8, 8).

Diodorus (xvii. 53) says 800,000

foot, 200,000 horse, and 200 scythed chariots. Justin (xi. 12) gives 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse. Plutarch (Alex. 31) talks generally of a million of men. Curtius states the army to have been almost twice as large as that which had fought in Kilikia (iv. 9, 3); he gives the total as 200,000 foot, and 45,000 horse (iv. 12, 13).

<sup>3</sup> Diodor. xvii. 53; Curtius, iv. 92.

point, together with three sword-blades stretching from the yoke on each side, and scythes also laterally from the naves of the wheels.<sup>1</sup>

Informed of the approach of Alexander, about the time when the Macedonian army first reached the Tigris, Darius moved from Arbêla, where his baggage and treasure were left—crossed by bridges the river Lykus or Great Zab, an operation which occupied five days—and marched to take post on the prepared ground near Gaugamela. His battle array was formed—of the Baktrians on the extreme left, under command of Bessus the satrap of Bactria; next, the Dahæ and Arachôti, under command of Barsaentes, satrap of Arachosia; then the native Persians, horse and foot alternating,—the Susians, under Oxathrês,—and the Kadusians. On the extreme right were the contingents of Syria both east and west of the Euphrates, under Mazæus; then the Medes, under Atropatês; next, the Parthians, Sakæ, Tapyrians, and Hyrkanians, all cavalry, under Phrataphernês; then the Albanians and the Sakesinæ. Darius himself was in the centre, with the choice troops of the army near and around him—the Persian select Horse-guards, called the king's kinsmen—the Persian foot-guards, carrying pikes with a golden apple at the butt-end—a regiment of Karians, or descendants of Karians, who had been abstracted from their homes and planted as colonists in the interior of the empire—the contingent of Mardi, good archers—and lastly, the mercenary Greeks, of number unknown, in whom Darius placed his greatest confidence.

B.C. 331.  
(September).

Position  
and battle  
array of  
Darius.

Such was the first or main line of the Persians. In the rear of it stood deep masses of Babylonians—inhabitants of Sittakê down to the Persian Gulf—Uxians, from the territory adjoining Susiana to the east—and others in unknown multitude. In front of it were posted the scythed chariots, with small advanced bodies of cavalry—Scythians and Baktrians on the left, with one hundred chariots—Armenians and Kappadokians on the right, with fifty more—and the remaining fifty chariots in front of the centre.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Curtius, iv. 9, 3; Diodor. xvii. 53. Notwithstanding the instructive note of Müttzell upon this passage of Curtius, the mode in

which these chariots were armed is not clear on all points.

<sup>2</sup> The Persian battle order here given by Arrian (iii. 11), is taken

**Alexander** had advanced within about seven miles of the Persian army, and four days' march since his crossing the Tigris—when he first learnt from Persian prisoners how near his enemies were. He at once halted, established on the spot a camp with ditch and stockade, and remained there for four days, in order that the soldiers might repose. On the night of the fourth day, he moved forward, yet leaving under guard in the camp the baggage, the prisoners, and the ineffectives. He began his march, over a range of low elevations which divided him from the enemy, hoping to approach and attack them at daybreak. But his progress was so retarded, that day broke, and the two armies first came in sight, when he was still on the descending slope of the ground, more than three miles distant. On seeing the enemy, he halted, and called together his principal officers, to consult whether he should not prosecute his march and commence the attack forthwith.<sup>1</sup> Though most of them pronounced for the affirmative, yet Parmenio contended that this course would be rash; that the ground before them, with all its difficulties, natural or artificial, was unknown, and that the enemy's position, which they now saw for the first time, ought to be carefully reconnoitred. Adopting this latter view, Alexander halted for the day; yet still retaining his battle order, and forming a new entrenched camp, to which the baggage and the prisoners were now brought forward from the preceding day's encampment.<sup>2</sup> He himself spent the

from Aristobulus, who affirmed that it was so set down in the official scheme of the battle, drawn up by the Persian officers, and afterwards captured with the baggage of Darius. Though thus authentic as far as it goes, it is not complete, even as to names—while it says nothing about numbers or depth or extent of front. Several names, of various contingents stated to have been present in the field, are not placed in the official return—thus the Sogdiani, the Arians, and the Indian mountaineers are mentioned by Arrian as

having joined Darius (iii. 8); the Kossæans, by Diodorus (xvii. 59); the Sogdiani, Massagetæ, Belitæ, Kossæans, Gortyæ, Phrygians, and Kataonians, by Curtius (iv. 12).

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 9, 5—7.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 9, 2—8. It is not expressly mentioned by Arrian that the baggage, &c., was brought forward from the first camp to the second. But we see that such must have been the fact, from what happened during the battle. Alexander's baggage, which was plundered by a body of Persian cavalry, cannot have been so far in

day, with an escort of cavalry and light troops, in reconnoitring both the intermediate ground and the enemy, who did not interrupt him, in spite of their immense superiority in cavalry. Parmenio, with Polysperchon and others, advised him to attack the enemy in the night; which promised some advantages, since Persian armies were notoriously unmanageable by night,<sup>1</sup> and since their camp had no defence. But on the other hand, the plan involved so many disadvantages and perils, that Alexander rejected it; declaring—with an emphasis intentionally enhanced, since he spoke in the hearing of many others—that he disdained the meanness of stealing a victory; that he both would conquer, and could, Darius fairly and in open daylight.<sup>2</sup> Having then addressed to his officers a few brief encouragements, which met with enthusiastic response, he dismissed them to their evening meal and repose.

On the next morning, he marshalled his army, consisting of 40,000 foot, and 7000 horse, in two lines.<sup>3</sup> The first or main line was composed, on the right, of the eight squadrons of Companion-cavalry, each with its separate captain, but all under the command of Philôtas son of Parmenio. Next (proceeding from right to left) came the Agêma or chosen band of the Hypaspistæ—then the remaining Hypaspistæ, under Nikanor—then the phalanx properly so called, distributed into six divisions, under the command of Kœnus, Perdikkas, Meleager, Polysperchon, Simmias, and Kraterus, respectively.<sup>4</sup> Next on the left of the phalanx, were arranged the allied Grecian cavalry, Lokrian and Phokian, Phthiot, Malians, and Peloponnesians; after whom, at the extreme left, came the Thessalians under Philippos—among the best cavalry in the army, hardly

Dispositions of Alexander for the attack—array of the troops.

the rear of the army as the distance of the first camp would require. This coincides also with Curtius, iv. 13, 35. The words ἐγὼ ἀπολείπειν (Arr. iii. 9, 2), indicate the contemplation of a purpose which was not accomplished—ὥς ἂμ' ἡμέρᾳ προσμῖξαι τοῖς πολεμίοις (iii. 9, 3). Instead of "coming into conflict" with the enemy at break of day—Alexander only arrived within sight of them at

break of day; he then halted the whole day and night within sight of their position; and naturally brought up his baggage, having no motive to leave it so far in the rear.

<sup>1</sup> Xenoph. Anab. iii. 4, 35.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 10, 3; Curtius, iv. 13, 4–10.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 12, 1–9.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, iii. 11; Diodor. xvii. 57; Curtius, iv. 13, 26–30.

inferior to the Macedonian Companions. As in the two former battles, Alexander himself took the command of the right half of the army, confiding the left to Parmenio.

Behind this main line, was placed a second or body of reserve, intended to guard against attacks in the flanks and rear, which the superior numbers of the Persians rendered probable. For this purpose, Alexander reserved,—on the right, the light cavalry or Lancers—the Pæonians, under Aretês and Aristo—half the Agrianes, under Attalus—the Macedonian archers, under Brison—and the mercenaries of old service, under Kleander; on the left, various bodies of Thracian and allied cavalry, under their separate officers. All these different regiments were held ready to repel attack either in flank or rear. In front of the main line were some advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops—Grecian cavalry, under Menidas on the right, and under Andromachus on the left—a brigade of darters under Balakrus, together with Agrianian darters, and some bowmen. Lastly, the Thracian infantry were left to guard the camp and the baggage.<sup>1</sup>

Forewarned by a deserter, Alexander avoided the places where iron spikes had been planted to damage the Macedonian cavalry.<sup>2</sup> He himself, at the head of the Royal Squadron, on the extreme right, led the march obliquely in that direction, keeping his right somewhat in advance. As he neared the enemy, he saw Darius himself with the Persian left centre immediately opposed to him—Persian guards, Indians, Albanians, and Karians. Alexander went on inclining to the right, and Darius stretching his front towards the left to counteract this movement, but still greatly outflanking the Macedonians to the left. Alexander had now got so far to his right, that he was almost beyond the ground levelled by Darius for the operations of his chariots in front. To check any farther movement in this direction, the Bactrian 1000 horse and the Scythians in front of the Persian left, were ordered to make a circuit and attack the Macedonian right flank. Alexander detached against them his regiment of cavalry under Menidas, and the action thus began.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 12, 2–6; Curtius, iv. 13, 30–32; Diodor. xvii. 57.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 13, 86; Polyænus, iv. 8, 17.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 13, 1–5.

The Baktrian horse, perceiving the advance of Menidas, turned from their circuitous movement to attack him, and at first drove him back until he was supported by the other advanced detachments—Pæonians and Grecian cavalry. The Baktrians, defeated in their turn, were supported by the satrap Bessus with the main body of Baktrians and Scythians in the left portion of Darius's line. The action was here for some time warmly contested, with some loss to the Greeks; who at length however, by a more compact order against enemies whose fighting was broken and desultory, succeeded in pushing them out of their place in the line, and thus making a partial opening in it.<sup>1</sup>

While this conflict was still going on, Darius had ordered his scythed chariots to charge, and his main line to follow them, calculating on the disorder which he expected that they would occasion. But the chariots were found of little service. The horses were terrified, checked, or wounded, by the Macedonian archers and darters in front; who even found means to seize the reins, pull down the drivers, and kill the horses. Of the hundred chariots in Darius's front, intended to bear down the Macedonian ranks by simultaneous pressure along their whole line, many were altogether stopped or disabled; some turned right round, the horses refusing to face the protended pikes, or being scared with the noise of pike and shield struck together; some which reached the Macedonian line, were let through without mischief by the soldiers opening their ranks; a few only inflicted wounds or damage.<sup>2</sup>

As soon as the chariots were thus disposed of, and the Persian main force laid open as advancing behind them, Alexander gave orders to the troops of his main line, who had hitherto been perfectly

Cowardice of Darius—he sets the example of

<sup>1</sup> Arrian iii. 13, 9.

<sup>2</sup> About the chariots, Arrian, iii. 13, 11; Curtius, iv. 15, 14; Diodor. xvii. 57, 58.

Arrian mentions distinctly only those chariots which were launched on Darius's left immediately opposite to Alexander. But it is plain that the chariots along the whole line must have been let off at one and the same signal—which we may understand as implied in the words of Curtius—"Ipse (Da-

rius) ante se falcatos currus habebat, quos signo dato universos in hostem effudit" (iv. 14, 3).

The scythed chariots of Artaxerxès, at the battle of Kunaxa, did no mischief (Xenoph. Anab. i. 8, 10—20). At the battle of Magnesia, gained by the Romans (B.C. 190) over the Syrian king Antiochus, his chariots were not only driven back, but spread disorder among his own troops (Appian. Reb. Syriac. 33).

flight—de-  
feat of the  
Persians.' silent,<sup>1</sup> to raise the war-shout and charge at a quick pace; at the same time directing Aretês with the Pæonians to repel the assailants on his right flank. He himself, discontinuing his slanting movement to the right, turned towards the Persian line, and dashed, at the head of all the Companion-cavalry, into that partial opening in it, which had been made by the flank movement of the Baktrians. Having by this opening got partly within the line, he pushed straight towards the person of Darius; his cavalry engaging in the closest hand-combat, and thrusting with their short pikes at the faces of the Persians. Here, as at the Granikus, the latter were discomposed by this mode of fighting—accustomed as they were to rely on the use of missiles, with rapid wheeling of the horse for renewed attack.<sup>2</sup> They were unable to prevent Alexander and his cavalry from gaining ground and approaching nearer to Darius; while at the same time, the Macedonian phalanx in front, with its compact order and long protended pikes, pressed upon the Persian line opposed to it. For a short interval, the combat here was close and obstinate; and it might have been much prolonged—since the best troops of Darius's army—Greeks, Karians, Persian guards, regal kinsmen, &c., were here posted,—had the king's courage been equal to that of his soldiers. But here, even worse than at Issus, the flight of the army began with Darius himself. It had been the recommendation of Cyrus the younger, in attacking the army of his brother Artaxerxês at Kunaxa, to aim the main blow at the spot where his brother was in person—since he well knew that victory there was victory everywhere. Having already once followed this scheme successfully at Issus, Alexander repeated it with still more signal success at Arbêla. Darius, who had been long in fear, from the time when he first beheld his formidable enemy on the neighbouring hills, became still more alarmed when he saw the scythed chariots prove a failure, and when the Mace-

<sup>1</sup> See the remarkable passage in the address of Alexander to his soldiers, previous to the battle, about the necessity of absolute silence until the moment came for the terrific war-shout (Arrian, iii. 9, 14): compare Thucyd. ii. 89—a

similar direction from Phormio to the Athenians.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 15, 4. οὕτως ἀκοντισμῶ ἔτι, οὕτως ἐξαλιγμοῖς τῶν ἵππων, ἥπερ ἱππομαχίας δίκη, ἐχρῶντο—about the Persian cavalry when driven to despair.

donians, suddenly breaking out from absolute silence into an universal war-cry, came to close quarters with his troops, pressing towards and menacing the conspicuous chariot on which he stood.<sup>1</sup> The sight and hearing of this terrific *mêlée*, combined with the prestige already attaching to Alexander's name, completely overthrew the courage and self-possession of Darius. He caused his chariot to be turned round, and himself set the example of flight.<sup>2</sup>

From this moment, the battle, though it had lasted so short a time, was irreparably lost. The king's flight, followed of course immediately by that of the numerous attendants around him, spread dismay among all his troops, leaving them neither centre of command, nor chief to fight for. The best soldiers in his army, being those immediately around him, were under these circumstances the first to give way. The fierce onset of Alexander with the Companion-cavalry, and the unremitting pressure of the phalanx in front, were obstructed by little else than a mass of disordered fugitives. During the same time, Aretês with

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 14, 2. ἦγε δρόμῳ τε καὶ ἀλαλαγμῷ ὡς ἐπὶ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον —Diodor. xvii. 60. Alexander μετὰ τῆς βασιλικῆς ἕλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἱππέων ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἤλαυσε τὸν Δαρεῖον.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 14, 3. Καὶ χρόνον μὲν τινα ὀλίγον ἐν χερσὶν ἡ μάχη ἐγένετο. "Ὡς δὲ οἱ τε ἱππεῖς οἱ ἅμω" Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀλέξανδρος εὐρώστωες ἐνέκειντο, ὥθισμοῖς τε χρώμενοι, καὶ τοῖς ξυστοῖς τὰ πρόσωπα τῶν Περσῶν κόπτοντες, ἡ τε φάλαγξ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ, πυκνὴ καὶ ταῖς σαρίσσαις πεφρικυῖα, ἐμβέβληκεν ἤδη αὐτοῖς, καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὰ θεῖνά καὶ πάλαι ἤδη φοβερῶ ὄντι Δαρεῖω ἐφαίνετο, πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἐπιστρέψας ἔφευγεν. At Issus, Arrian states that "Darius fled along with the first" (ii. 11, 6); at Arbêla here, he states that "Darius was the first to turn and flee;" an expression yet stronger and more distinct. Curtius and Diodorus, who seem here as elsewhere to follow generally the same authorities, give details, respecting

the conduct of Darius, which are not to be reconciled with Arrian, and which are decidedly less credible than Arrian's narrative. The fact that the two kings were here (at as Issus) near, and probably visible, to each other, has served as a basis for much embroidery. The statement that Darius, standing on his chariot, hurled his spear against the advancing Macedonians—and that Alexander also hurled his spear at Darius, but missing him, killed the charioteer—is picturesque and Homeric, but has no air of reality. Curtius and Diodorus tell us that this fall of the charioteer was mistaken for the fall of the king, and struck the Persian army with consternation, causing them forthwith to take flight, and thus ultimately forcing Darius to flee also (Diodor. xvii. 60; Curt. iv. 15, 26—32). But this is noway probable; since the real fight then going on was close, and with hand-weapons.

his Pæonians had defeated the Baktrians on the right flank,<sup>1</sup> so that Alexander was free to pursue the routed main body,—which he did most energetically. The cloud of dust raised by the dense multitude is said to have been so thick, that nothing could be clearly seen, nor could the pursuers distinguish the track taken by Darius himself. Amidst this darkness, the cries and noises from all sides were only the more impressive; especially the sound from the whips of the charioteers, pushing their horses to full speed.<sup>2</sup> It was the dust alone which saved Darius himself from being overtaken by the pursuing cavalry.

While Alexander was thus fully successful on his right and centre, the scene on his left under Parmenio was different. Mazæus, who commanded the Persian right, after launching his scythed chariots (which may possibly have done more damage than those launched on the Persian left, though we have no direct information about them), followed it up by vigorously charging the Grecian and Thessalian horse in his front, and also by sending round a detachment of cavalry to attack them on their left flank.<sup>3</sup> Here the battle was obstinately contested, and success for some time doubtful. Even after the flight of Darius, Parmenio found himself so much pressed, that he sent a message to Alexander. Alexander, though full of mortification at relinquishing the pursuit, checked his troops, and brought them back to the assistance of his left, by the shortest course across the field of battle. The two left divisions of the phalanx, under Simmias and Kraterus, had already stopped short in the pursuit, on receiving the like message from Parmenio; leaving the other four divisions to follow the advanced movement of Alexander.<sup>4</sup> Hence there arose a

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 14, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 60; Curtius, iv. 15, 32, 33. The cloud of dust, and the noise of the whips, are specified both by Diodorus and Curtius.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, iv. 16, 1; Diodorus, xvii. 59, 60; Arrian, iii. 14, 11. The two first authors are here superior to Arrian, who scarcely mentions at all this vigorous charge of Mazæus though he alludes to the effects produced by it.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, iii. 14, 6. He speaks directly here only of the τάξεις under the command of Simmias; but it is plain that what he says must be understood of the τάξεις commanded by Kraterus also. Of the six τάξεις or divisions of the phalanx, that of Kraterus stood at the extreme left—that of Simmias (who commanded on this day the τάξις of Amyntas son of Andromenēs) next to it (iii. 11, 16). If

gap in the midst of the phalanx, between the four right divisions, and the two left; into which gap a brigade of Indian and Persian cavalry darted, galloping through the midst of the Macedonian line to get into the rear and attack the baggage.<sup>1</sup> At first this movement was successful, the guard was found unprepared, and the Persian prisoners rose at once to set themselves free; though Sisygambis, whom these prisoners were above measure anxious to liberate, refused to accept their aid, either from mistrust of their force, or gratitude for the good treatment received from Alexander.<sup>2</sup> But while these assailants were engaged in plundering the baggage, they were attacked in the rear by the troops forming the second Macedonian line, who though at first taken by surprise, had now had time to face about and reach the camp. Many of the Persian brigade were thus slain, the rest got off as they could.<sup>3</sup>

Mazæus maintained for a certain time fair equality, on his own side of the battle, even after the flight of Darius. But when, to the paralysing effect of that fact in itself, there was added the spectacle of its disastrous effects on the left half of the Persian army, neither he nor his soldiers could persevere with unabated vigour in a useless combat. The Thessalian and Grecian horse, on the other hand, animated by the turn of fortune in their favour, pressed their enemies with redoubled energy, and at length drove them to flight; so that Parmenio was victor, on his own side and with his own forces, before the succours from Alexander reached him.<sup>4</sup>

therefore the τάξις of Simmias was kept back from pursuit, on account of the pressure upon the general Macedonian left (iii. 14, 6) — *à fortiori*, the τάξις of Kraterus must have been kept back in like manner.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 14, 7.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, iv. 15, 9—11; Diodor. xvii. 59. Curtius and Diodorus represent the brigade of cavalry, who plundered the camp and rescued the prisoners, to have been sent round by Mazæus from the Persian right; while Arrian states, more probably, that they got through the break accidentally left

in the phalanx, and traversed the Macedonian lines.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 14, 10. Curtius represents this brigade as having been driven off by Aretês and a detachment sent expressly by Alexander himself. Diodorus describes it as if it had not been defeated at all, but had ridden back to Mazæus after plundering the baggage. Neither of these accounts is so probable as that of Arrian.

<sup>4</sup> Diodor. xvii. 60. 'Ο Παρμενίων . . . . μόλις ἐπρέψατο τοὺς βαρβάρους, μάλιστα καταπλεγέντας τῇ κατὰ τὸν Δαρσείον φυγῇ. Curtius, iv. 16, 4—7. "Interim ad Mazæum fama

In conducting those succours, on his way back from the pursuit, Alexander traversed the whole field of battle, and thus met face to face some of the best Persian and Parthian cavalry, who were among the last to retire. The battle was already lost, and they were seeking only to escape. As they could not turn back, and had no chance for their lives except by forcing their way through his Companion-cavalry, the combat here was desperate and murderous; all at close quarters, cut and thrust with hand weapons on both sides, contrary to the Persian custom. Sixty of the Macedonian cavalry were slain; and a still greater number, including Hephæstion, Kœnus, and Menidas, were wounded, and Alexander himself encountered great personal danger. He is said to have been victorious; yet probably most of these brave men forced their way through and escaped, though leaving many of their number on the field.<sup>1</sup>

Having rejoined his left, and ascertained that it was not only out of danger, but victorious, Alexander resumed his pursuit of the flying Persians, in which Parmenio now took part.<sup>2</sup> The host of Darius was only a multitude of disorderly fugitives, horse and foot mingled together. The greater part of them had taken no share in the battle. Here, as at Issus, they remained crowded in stationary and unprofitable masses, ready to catch the contagion of terror and to swell the number of runaways, so soon as the comparatively small proportion of real combatants in the front had been beaten. On recommencing the pursuit, Alexander pushed forward with such celerity, that numbers of the fugitives were slain or taken, especially at the passage of the river Lykus;<sup>3</sup> where he was obliged to halt for a while, since his men as well as their horses were exhausted. At midnight, he again pushed forward, with such cavalry as

*superati regis pervenerat. Itaque quanquam validior erat, tamen fortunâ partium territus, percussis languidius instabat.*" Arrian, iv. 14, 11; iv. 15, 8.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 15, 6. Curtius also alludes to this combat; but with many particulars very different from Arrian (iv. 16, 19–25).

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 15, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 15, 10. Curtius (iv. 16, 12–18) gives aggravated details about the sufferings of the fugitives in passing the river Lykus—which are probably founded on fact. But he makes the mistake of supposing that Alexander had got as far as this river in his first pursuit, from which he was called back to assist Parmenio.

could follow him, to Arbêla, in hopes of capturing the person of Darius. In this he was disappointed, though he reached Arbêla the next day. Darius had merely passed through it, leaving an undefended town, with his bow, shield, chariot, a large treasure, and rich equipage, as prey to the victor. Parmenio had also occupied without resistance the Persian camp near the field of battle, capturing the baggage, the camels, and the elephants.<sup>1</sup>

Escape of  
Darius in  
person.  
Capture of  
the Persian  
camp, and  
of Arbêla.

To state any thing like positive numbers of slain or prisoners, is impossible. According to Arrian, 300,000 Persians were slain, and many more taken prisoners. Diodorus puts the slain at 90,000, Curtius at 40,000. The Macedonian killed were, according to Arrian, not more than 100—according to Curtius, 300: Diodorus states the slain at 500, besides a great number of wounded.<sup>2</sup> The estimate of Arrian is obviously

Loss in the  
battle.  
Completeness of the  
victory.  
Entire and  
irreparable  
dispersion  
of the Persian  
army.

too great on one side, and too small on the other; but whatever may be the numerical truth, it is certain that the prodigious army of Darius was all either killed, taken, or dispersed at the battle of Arbêla. No attempt to form a subsequent army ever succeeded; we read of nothing stronger than divisions or detachments. The miscellaneous contingents of this once mighty empire, such at least among them as survived, dispersed to their respective homes and could never be again mustered in mass.

The defeat of Arbêla was in fact the death-blow of the Persian empire. It converted Alexander into the Great King, and Darius into nothing better than a fugitive pretender. Among all the causes of the defeat—here as at Issus—the most prominent and indisputable was the cowardice of Darius himself. Under a king deficient not merely in the virtues of a general, but even in those of a private soldier, and who nevertheless insisted on commanding in person—nothing short of ruin could ensue. To those brave Persians whom he dragged into ruin along with him and who knew the real facts, he must have appeared as the betrayer of the empire. We

Causes of  
the defeat  
—cowardice of  
Darius.  
Uselessness of his  
immense  
numbers.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 15, 14; Curtius, v. 1, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 15, 16; Curtius, iv. 16, 27; Diodor. xvii. 61.

shall have to recall this state of sentiment, when we describe hereafter the conspiracy formed by the Baktrian satrap Bessus. Nevertheless, even if Darius had behaved with unimpeachable courage, there is little reason to believe, that the defeat of Arbêla, much less that of Issus, could have been converted into a victory. Mere immensity of number, even with immensity of space, was of no efficacy without skill as well as bravery in the commander. Three-fourths of the Persian army were mere spectators who did nothing, and produced absolutely no effect. The flank movement against Alexander's right, instead of being made by some unemployed division, was so carried into effect, as to distract the Baktrian troops from their place in the front line, and thus to create a fatal break, of which Alexander availed himself for his own formidable charge in front. In spite of amplitude of space—the condition wanting at Issus,—the attacks of the Persians on Alexander's flanks and rear were feeble and inefficient. After all, Darius relied mainly upon his front line of battle, strengthened by the scythe chariots; these latter being found unprofitable, there remained only the direct conflict, wherein the strong point of the Macedonians resided.

On the other hand, in so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander, they appear the most signal example recorded in antiquity, of military genius and sagacious combination. He had really as great an available force as his enemies, because every company in his army was turned to account, either in actual combat, or in reserve against definite and reasonable contingences. All his successes, and this most of all, were fairly earned by his own genius and indefatigable effort, combined with the admirable organization of his army. But his good fortune was no less conspicuous in the unceasing faults committed by his enemies. Except during the short period of Memnon's command, the Persian king exhibited nothing but ignorant rashness alternating with disgraceful apathy; turning to no account his vast real power of resistance in detail—keeping back his treasures to become the booty of the victor—suffering the cities which stoutly held out to perish unassisted—and committing the whole fate of the empire, on two successive occasions, to that very hazard which Alexander most desired.

General-  
ship of  
Alexander.

The decisive character of the victory was manifested at once by the surrender of the two great capitals of the Persian empire—Babylon and Susa. To Babylon, Alexander marched in person; to Susa, he sent Philoxenus. As he approached Babylon, the satrap Mazæus met him with the keys of the city; Bagophanês, collector of the revenue, decorated the road of march with altars, sacrifices, and scattered flowers; while the general Babylonian population and their Chaldæan priests poured forth in crowds with acclamations and presents. Susa was yielded to Philoxenus with the same readiness, as Babylon to Alexander.<sup>1</sup> The sum of treasure acquired at Babylon was great; sufficient to furnish a large donative to the troops—600 drachms per man to the Macedonian cavalry, 500 to the foreign cavalry, 200 to the Macedonian infantry, and something less to the foreign infantry.<sup>2</sup> But the treasure found and appropriated at Susa was yet greater. It is stated at 50,000 talents<sup>3</sup> (=about 11,500,000*l.* sterling), a sum which we might have deemed incredible, if we did not find it greatly exceeded by what is subsequently reported about the treasures in Persepolis. Of this Susian treasure four-fifths are said to have been in uncoined gold and silver, the remainder in golden Darics;<sup>4</sup> the untouched accumulations of several preceding kings, who had husbanded them against a season of unforeseen urgency. A moderate portion of this immense wealth, employed by Darius three years earlier to push the operations of his fleet, subsidize able Grecian officers, and organize anti-Macedonian resistance—would have preserved both his life and his crown.

B.C. 331.  
(Oct.-Nov.)  
Surrender  
of Babylon  
and Susa,  
the two  
great  
capitals of  
Persia.  
Alexander  
enters  
Babylon.  
Immense  
treasures  
acquired in  
both places.

Alexander rested his troops for more than thirty days amidst the luxurious indulgences of Babylon. He gratified the feelings of the population and the Chaldæan priests by solemn sacrifices to

B.C. 331.  
(Novem-  
ber, De-  
cember).

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 5—11; Diodor. xvii. 64; Curtius, v. 1, 17—20.

<sup>2</sup> Curtius, v. 1, 45; Diodor. xvii. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian states this total of 50,000 talents (iii. 16, 12).

I have taken them as Attic talents; if they were Æginæan talents, the value of them would be greater in the proportion of five to three.

<sup>4</sup> Curtius, v. 2, 11; Diodor. xvii. 66.

Alexander acts as king of Persia, and nominates satraps. He marches to Susa. He remodels the divisions of his army.

Belus, as well as by directing that the temple of that God, and the other temples destroyed in the preceding century by Xerxês, should be rebuilt.<sup>1</sup> Treating the Persian empire now as an established conquest, he nominated the various satraps. He confirmed the Persian Mazæus in the satrapy of Babylon, but put along with him two Greeks as assistants and guarantees—Apollodorus of Amphipolis, as commander of the military force—Asklepiodorus as collector of the revenue. He rewarded the Persian traitor Mithrinês, who had surrendered at his approach the strong citadel of Sardis, with the satrapy of Armenia. To that of Syria and Phenicia, he appointed Menês, who took with him 3000 talents, to be remitted to Antipater for levying new troops against the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus.<sup>2</sup> The march of Alexander from Babylon to Susa occupied twenty days; an easy route through a country abundantly supplied. At Susa he was joined by Amyntas son of Andromenês, with a large reinforcement of about 15,000 men—Macedonians, Greeks, and Thracians. There were both cavalry and infantry—and what is not the least remarkable, fifty Macedonian youths of noble family, soliciting admission into Alexander's corps of pages.<sup>3</sup> The incorporation of these new-comers into the army afforded him the opportunity for remodelling on several points the organization of his different divisions, the smaller as well as the larger.<sup>4</sup>

After some delay at Susa—and after confirming the Persian Abulitês, who had surrendered the city, in his satrapy, yet not without two Grecian officers as guarantees, one commanding the military force, the other governor of the citadel—Alex-

B.C. 331-330.  
(Winter.)

Alexander  
marches

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 6-9: compare Strabo, xvi. p. 738.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 16; Curtius, v. 1, 44; Diodor. xvii. 64. Curtius and Diodorus do not exactly coincide with Arrian; but the discrepancy here is not very important.

<sup>3</sup> Curtius, v. 1, 42: compare Diodor. xvii. 65; Arrian, iii. 16, 18.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 20; Curtius, v. 2, 6; Diodor. xvii. 65. Respecting this reorganization, begun now at

Susa and carried farther during the next year at Ekbatana, see Rüstow and Köchly, Griechisches Kriegswesen, p. 252 seq.

One among the changes now made was, that the divisions of cavalry—which, having hitherto coincided with various local districts or towns in Macedonia, had been officered accordingly—were redistributed and mingled together (Curtius, v. 2, 6).

ander crossed the river Eulæus or Pasitigris, and directed his march to the south-east towards Persis proper, the ancient heart or primitive seat from whence the original Persian conquerors had issued.<sup>1</sup> Between Susa and Persis lay a mountainous region occupied by the Uxii—rude but warlike shepherds, to whom the Great King himself had always been obliged to pay a tribute whenever he went from Susa to Persepolis, being unable with his inefficient military organization to overcome the difficulties of such a pass held by an enemy. The Uxii now demanded the like tribute from Alexander, who replied by inviting them to meet him at their pass and receive it. Meanwhile a new and little frequented mountain track had been made known to him, over which he conducted in person a detachment of troops so rapidly and secretly as to surprise the mountaineers in their own villages. He thus not only opened the usual mountain pass for the transit of his main army, but so cut to pieces and humiliated the Uxii, that they were forced to sue for pardon. Alexander was at first disposed to extirpate or expel them; but at length, at the request of the captive Sisygambis, permitted them to remain as subjects of the satrap of Susa, imposing a tribute of sheep, horses, and cattle, the only payment which their poverty allowed.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 17, 1. Ἄρας δὲ ἐκ Σούσων, καὶ διαβάς τὸν Πασιτιγρην ποταμὸν, ἐμβάλλει εἰς τὴν Οὐξίων γῆν.

The Persian Susa was situated between two rivers; the Choaspes (now Kherkha) on the west; the Eulæus or Pasitigris, now Karun, on the east; both rivers distinguished for excellent water. The Eulæus appears to have been called Pasitigris in the lower part of its course—Pliny, H. N. xxxi. 21. "Parthorum reges ex Choaspe et Eulæo tantum bibunt."

Ritter has given an elaborate exposition respecting these two rivers and the site of the Persian

Susa (Erdkunde, part ix. book iii. West-Asien, p. 291—320.)

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 17; Curtius, v. 3, 5—12; Diodor. xvii. 67; Strabo, xv. p. 729. It would seem that the road taken by Alexander in this march, was that described by Kinn-eir, through Bebahan and Kala-Sefid to Schiraz (Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire, p. 72). Nothing can exceed the difficulties of the territory for military operation.

No certainty is attainable, however, respecting the ancient geography of these regions. Mr. Long's Map of Ancient Persia shows how little can be made out.

into Persis proper—he conquers the refractory Uxii, in the intermediate mountains.

But bad as the Uxian pass had been, there remained another still worse—called the Susian or Persian gates,<sup>1</sup> in the mountains which surrounded the plain of Persepolis, the centre of Persis proper. Ariobarzanês, satrap of the province, held this pass; a narrow defile walled across, with mountain positions on both sides, from whence the defenders, while out of reach themselves, could shower down missiles upon an approaching enemy. After four days of march, Alexander reached on the fifth day the Susian Gates; which, inexpugnable as they seemed, he attacked on the ensuing morning. In spite of all the courage of his soldiers, however, he sustained loss without damaging his enemy, and was obliged to return to his camp. He was informed that there was no other track by which this difficult pass could be turned; but there was a long circuitous march of many days whereby it might be evaded, and another entrance found into the plain of Persepolis. To recede from any enterprise as impracticable, was a humiliation which Alexander had never yet endured. On farther inquiry, a Lykian captive, who had been for many years tending sheep as a slave on the mountains, acquainted him with the existence of a track known only to himself, whereby he might come on the flank of Ariobarzanês. Leaving Kraterus in command of the camp, with orders to attack the pass in front, when he should hear the trumpet give signal—Alexander marched forth at night at the head of a light detachment, under the guidance of the Lykian. He had to surmount incredible hardship and difficulty—the more so as it was mid-winter, and the mountain was covered with snow; yet such were the efforts of his soldiers and the rapidity of his movements, that he surprised all the Persian outposts, and came upon Ariobarzanês altogether unprepared. Attacked as they were at the same time by Kraterus also, the troops of the satrap were forced to abandon the Gates, and were for the most part cut to

<sup>1</sup> See the instructive notes of Mützell—on Quintus Curtius, v. 10, 3; and v. 12, 17, discussing the topography of this region, in so far as it is known from modern travellers. He supposes the Su-

sian Gates to have been near Kala-Sefid, west of the plain of Merdasht or Persepolis. Herein he dissents from Ritter, apparently on good grounds, as far as an opinion can be formed.

pieces. Many perished in their flight among the rocks and precipices; the satrap himself being one of a few that escaped.<sup>1</sup>

Though the citadel of Persepolis is described as one of the strongest of fortresses,<sup>2</sup> yet after this unexpected conquest of a pass hitherto deemed Alexander enters Persepolis. inexpugnable, few had courage to think of holding it against Alexander. Nevertheless Ariobarzanês, hastening thither from the conquered pass, still strove to organise a defence, and at least to carry off the regal treasure, which some in the town were already preparing to pillage. But Tiri-datês, commander of the garrison, fearing the wrath of the conqueror, resisted this, and despatched a message entreating Alexander to hasten his march. Accordingly Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, set forth with the utmost speed, and arrived in time to detain and appropriate the whole. Ariobarzanês, in a vain attempt to resist, was slain with all his companions. Persepolis and Pasargadæ—the two peculiar capitals of the Persian race, the latter memorable as containing the sepulchre of Cyrus the Great—both fell into the hands of the conqueror.<sup>3</sup>

On approaching Persepolis, the compassion of the army was powerfully moved by the sight of about 800 Grecian captives, all of them mutilated in some frightful and distressing way, by loss of legs, arms, eyes, ears, or some other bodily members. Mutilation was a punishment commonly inflicted in that age by Oriental governors even by such as were not accounted cruel. Thus Xenophon, in eulogizing the rigid justice of Cyrus the younger, remarks that in the public roads of his satrapy, men were often seen who had been deprived of their arms or legs, or otherwise mutilated, by penal authority.<sup>4</sup> Many of these maimed captives

B.C. 330.  
(January).

Mutilated  
Grecian  
captives.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 8, 1–14; Curtius, v. 4, 10–20; Diodor. xvii. 68.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 71.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 18, 16; Curtius, v. 4, 5; Diodor. xvii. 69.

<sup>4</sup> Xenoph. Anab. i. 9, 13. Similar habits have always prevailed among Orientals. "The most atrocious part of the Mahomedan system of punishment is that which regards theft and robbery. Mutilation, by cutting off the hand or

the foot, is the prescribed remedy for all higher degrees of the offence" (Mill, History of British India, book iii. ch. 5. p. 447).

"Tippoo Saib used to cut off the right hands and noses of the British camp-followers that fell into his hands" (Elphinstone, Hist. of India, vol. i. p. 380. ch. xi).

A recent traveller notices the

at Persepolis were old, and had lived for years in their unfortunate condition. They had been brought up from various Greek cities by order of some of the preceding Persian kings; but on what pretences they had been thus cruelly dealt with we are not informed. Alexander, moved to tears at such a spectacle, offered to restore them to their respective homes, with a comfortable provision for the future. But most of them felt so ashamed of returning to their homes, that they entreated to be allowed to remain all together in Persis, with lands assigned to them, and with dependent cultivators to raise produce for them. Alexander granted their request in the fullest measure, conferring besides upon each an ample donation of money, clothing and cattle.<sup>1</sup>

The sight of these mutilated Greeks was well calculated to excite not merely sympathy for them, but rage against the Persians, in the bosoms of all spectators. Alexander seized this opportunity, as well for satiating the anger and cupidity of his soldiers, as for manifesting himself in his self-assumed character of avenger of Greece against the Persians, to punish the wrongs done by Xerxès a century and a half before. He was now amidst the native tribes and seats of the Persians, the descendants of those rude warriors who, under the first Cyrus, had over-

many mutilated persons, female as well as male, who are to be seen in the northern part of Scinde (Burton, *Scenes in Scinde*, vol. ii. p. 281).

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 69; Curtius, v. 5; Justin, xi. 14. Arrian does not mention these mutilated captives; but I see no reason to mistrust the deposition of the three authors by whom it is certified. Curtius talks of 4000 captives; the other two mention 800. Diodorus calls them—*Ἕλληνες ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον βασιλέων ἀνάστατοι γεγονότες, ὀκταχόσιοι μὲν σχεδὸν τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντες, ταῖς δ' ἡλικίαις οἱ πλεῖστοι μὲν γεγηραχότες, ἡκρωτηριασμένοι δὲ πάντες, &c.* Some ἀνάρπαστοι πρὸς βασιλέα διὰ σοφίαν are noticed in Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 33: compare Herodot. iii. 93; iv. 204. I have al-

ready mentioned the mutilation of the Macedonian invalids, taken at Issus by Darius.

Probably these Greek captives were mingled with a number of other captives, Asiatics and others, who had been treated in the same manner. None but the Greek captives would be likely to show themselves to Alexander and his army, because none but they would calculate on obtaining sympathy from an army of Macedonians and Greeks. It would have been interesting to know who these captives were, or how they came to be thus cruelly used. The two persons among them, named by Curtius as spokesmen in the interview with Alexander, are—Euktemon, a Kymæan—and Theætétus, an Athenian.

spread Western Asia from the Indus to the *Ægean*. In this their home the Persian kings had accumulated their national edifices, their regal sepulchres, the inscriptions commemorative of their religious or legendary sentiment, with many trophies and acquisitions arising out of their conquests. For the purposes of the Great King's empire, Babylon, or Susa, or Ekbatana, were more central and convenient residences; but Persepolis was still regarded as the heart of Persian nationality. It was the chief magazine, though not the only one, of those annual accumulations from the imperial revenue, which each king successively increased, and which none seems to have ever diminished. Moreover, the Persian grandees and officers, who held the lucrative satrapies and posts of the empire, were continually sending wealth home to Persis, for themselves or their relatives. We may therefore reasonably believe what we find asserted, that Persepolis possessed at this time more wealth, public and private, than any place within the range of Grecian or Macedonian knowledge.<sup>1</sup>

Convening his principal officers, Alexander denounced Persepolis as the most hostile of all Asiatic cities,—the home of those impious invaders of Greece, whom he had come to attack. He proclaimed his intention of abandoning it to be plundered, as well as of burning the citadel. In this resolution he persisted, notwithstanding the remonstrance of Parmenio, who reminded him that the act would be a mere injury to himself by ruining his own property, and that the Asiatics would construe it as evidence of an intention to retire speedily, without founding any permanent dominion in the country.<sup>2</sup> After appropriating the regal treasure—to the alleged amount of 120,000 talents in gold and silver (=27,600,000*l.* sterling)<sup>3</sup>—Alexander set fire to the citadel. A host of mules, with 5000 camels, were sent for from Mesopotamia

Alexander carries away the regal treasures and then gives up Persepolis to be plundered and burnt by the soldiers.

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 70. πλουσιωτάτης οὔσης τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον, &c. Curtius, v. 6, 2, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, iii. 18, 18; Diodor. xvii. 70; Curtius, v. 6, 1; Strabo, xv. p. 731.

<sup>3</sup> This amount is given both by Diodorus (xvii. 71) and by Curtius (v. 6, 9). We see however from

Strabo that there were different statements as to the amount. Such overwhelming figures deserve no confidence upon any evidence short of an official return. At the same time, we ought to expect a very great sum, considering the long series of years that had been spent in amassing it. Alexander's own letters

and elsewhere, to carry off this prodigious treasure; the whole of which was conveyed out of Persis proper, partly to be taken along with Alexander himself in his ulterior marches, partly to be lodged in Susa and Ekbatana. Six thousand talents more, found in Pasargadæ, were added to the spoil.<sup>1</sup>

(Plutarch, Alex. 37) stated that enough was carried away to load 10,000 mule carts and 5000 camels.

To explain the fact of a large accumulated treasure in the Persian capitals, it must be remarked that what we are accustomed to consider as expenses of government, were not defrayed out of the regal treasure. The military force, speaking generally, was not paid by the Great King, but summoned by requisition from the provinces, upon which the cost of maintaining the soldiers fell, over and above the ordinary tribute. The king's numerous servants and attendants received no pay in money, but in kind; provisions for maintaining the court with its retinue were furnished by the provinces, over and above the tribute. See Herodot. i. 192; and iii. 91—and a good passage of Heeren, setting forth the small public disbursements out of the regal treasure, in his account of the internal constitution of the ancient Persian Empire (*Ideen über die Politik und den Verkehr der Völker der alten Welt*, part i. Abth. 1. p. 511—519).

Respecting modern Persia, Jaubert remarks (*Voyage en Arménie et en Perse*, Paris, 1821, p. 272. ch. 30)—“Si les sommes que l'on verse dans le trésor du Shah ne sont pas exorbitantes, comparativement à l'étendue et à la population de la Perse, elles n'en sortent pas non plus que pour des dépenses indispensables qui n'en absorbent pas la moitié. Le reste est converti en lingots, en pierres, et en divers objets d'une grande valeur et d'un transport

facile en cas d'événement: ce qui doit suffire pour empêcher qu'on ne trouve exagérés les rapports que tous les voyageurs ont faits de la magnificence de la cour de Perse. Les Perses sont assez clairvoyans pour pénétrer les motifs réels qui portent Futtéh Ali Shah à thésauriser.”

When Nadir-Shah conquered the Mogul Emperor Mahomed, and entered Delhi in 1739,—the imperial treasure and effects which fell into his hands is said to have amounted to 32,000,000*l.* sterling, besides heavy contributions levied on the inhabitants (Mill, *History of British India*, vol. ii. B. iii. ch. 4, p. 403). — Runjeet Sing left at his death (1839) a treasure of 8,000,000*l.* sterling; with jewels and other effects to several millions more [*The Punjab*, by Col. Steinbach, p. 16. London, 1845.]

Mr. Mill remarks, in another place that “in Hindostan, gold, silver, and gems are most commonly hoarded, and not devoted to production” (vol. i. p. 254. B. ii. ch. 5).

Herodotus (iii. 96) tells us that the gold and silver brought to the Persian regal treasure was poured in a melted state into earthen vessels; when it cooled, the earthen vessel was withdrawn, and the solid metallic mass left standing; a portion of it was cut off when occasion required for disbursements. This practice warrants the supposition that a large portion of it was habitually accumulated, and not expended.

<sup>1</sup> Arrian, iii. 18, 17. He does not give the amount, which I transcribe from Curtius, v. 6, 10.

The persons and property of the inhabitants were abandoned to the licence of the soldiers, who obtained an immense booty, not merely in gold and silver, but also in rich clothing, furniture, and ostentatious ornaments of every kind. The male inhabitants were slain,<sup>1</sup> the females dragged into servitude; except such as obtained safety by flight, or burned themselves with their property in their own houses. Among the soldiers themselves, much angry scrambling took place for the possession of precious articles, not without occasional bloodshed.<sup>2</sup> As soon as their ferocity and cupidity had been satiated, Alexander arrested the massacre. His encouragement and sanction of it was not a burst of transient fury, provoked by unexpected length of resistance, such as the hanging of the 2000 Tyrians and the dragging of Batis at Gaza—but a deliberate proceeding, intended partly as a recompense and gratification to the soldiery, but still more as an imposing manifestation of retributive vengeance against the descendants of the ancient Persian invaders. In his own letters seen by Plutarch, Alexander described the massacre of the native Persians as having been ordered by him on grounds of state policy.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Diodor. xvii. 70. Οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐπῆσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας πάντας φονεύοντες, τὰς δὲ κῆσας διαρπάζοντες, &c. Curtius, v. 6, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Diodor. xvii. 70, 71; Curtius v. 6, 3—7. These two authors concur in the main features of the massacre and plunder in Persepolis permitted to the soldiers by Alexander. Arrian does not mention it: he mentions only the deliberate resolution of Alexander to burn the palace or citadel, out of revenge on the Persian name. And such feeling, assuming it to exist, would also naturally dictate the general licence to plunder and massacre. Himself entertaining such vindictive feeling, and regarding it as legitimate, Alexander would either presume it to exist, or love to kindle it, in his soldiers; by whom indeed the licence to plunder would be sufficiently welcomed, with or without any

antecedent sentiment of vengeance.

The story (told by Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch, Alex. 38) that Alexander, in the drunkenness of a banquet, was first instigated by the courtesan Thais to set fire to the palace of Persepolis, and accompanied her to begin the conflagration with his own hand—may perhaps be so far true, that he really showed himself in the scene and helped in the burning. But that his resolution to burn was deliberately taken, and even maintained against the opposition of esteemed officers, is established on the authority of Arrian.

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, Alexand. 37. Φόρον μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα πολὺν τῶν ἀλισκομένων γενέσθαι συνέπεσε· γράφει γὰρ αὐτός, ὡς νομίζων αὐτῷ τοῦτο λυσιτελεῖν ἐκέλευεν ἀποσφάττεσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· νομίματος δὲ εὐρεῖν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐν Σούσοις, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην κατα-

As it was now winter or very early spring, he suffered his main army to enjoy a month or more of repose at or near Persepolis. But he himself, at the head of a rapidly moving division traversed the interior of Persis proper; conquering or receiving into submission the various towns and villages.<sup>1</sup> The greatest resistance which he experienced was offered by the rude and warlike tribe called the Mardi; but worse than any enemy was the severity of the season and the rugged destitution of a frozen country. Neither physical difficulties, however, nor human enemies, could arrest the march of Alexander. He returned from his expedition, complete master of Persis; and in the spring, quitted that province with his whole army, to follow Darius into Media. He left only a garrison of 3000 Macedonians at Persepolis, preserving to Tiridatês, who had surrendered to him the place, the title of satrap.<sup>2</sup>

Darius was now a fugitive, with the mere title of king, and with a simple body-guard rather than an army. On leaving Arbêla after the defeat, he had struck in an easterly direction across the mountains into Media; having only a few attendants round him, and thinking himself too happy to preserve his own life from an indefatigable pursuer.<sup>3</sup> He calculated that once across these mountains, Alexander would leave him for a time unmolested, in haste to march southward for the purpose of appropriating the great and real prizes of the campaign—Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. The last struggles of this ill-starred prince will be recounted in another chapter.

αευήναι τὸν πλοῦτον ἐκχομισθῆναι  
φησι μυρίοις ὀρικοῖς ζεύγεσι, καὶ  
πενταχισχιλίας καμήλοισι. That ἐν-  
ταῦθα means Persepolis, is shown  
by the immediately following com-  
parison with the treasure found at  
Susa.

<sup>1</sup> Diod. xvii. 73; Curtius, v. 6, 12–20.


<sup>2</sup> Curtius, v. 6, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 1–4.










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